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Abstract
Within a highway transportation network, the social welfare implications of two
different groups of agents setting tolls in competition for revenues are studied. The
first group comprises private sector toll road operators aiming to maximise revenues.
The second group comprises local governments or jurisdictions who may engage in
tax exporting. Extending insights from the public economics literature, jurisdictions
tax export because when setting tolls to maximise welfare for their electorate, they
simultaneously benefit from revenues from extra-jurisdictional users. Hence the
tolls levied by both groups will be higher than those intended solely to internalise
congestion, which then results in welfare losses. Therefore the overarching question
investigated is the extent of welfare losses stemming from such competition for toll
revenues.
While these groups of agents are separately studied, the interactions between agents
in each group in competition can be modelled within the common framework of
Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints. Several solution algorithms,
adapting methodologies from microeconomics as well as evolutionary computation,
are proposed to identify Nash Equilibrium toll levels. These are demonstrated on
realistic transportation networks. As an alternative paradigm to competition, the
possibilities for co-operation between agents in each group are also explored.
In the case of toll road operators, the welfare consequences of competition could
be positive or adverse depending on the interrelationships between the toll roads in
competition. The results therefore generalise those previously obtained to a more
realistic setting investigated here.
In the case of competition between jurisdictions, it is shown that the fiscal exter-
nality of tax exporting resulting from their toll setting decisions can substantially
reduce the welfare gains from internalising congestion. The ability of regulation,
co-operation and bilateral bargaining to reduce the welfare losses are assessed. The
research thus contributes to informing debates regarding the appropriate level of
institutional governance for toll pricing policies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
For nearly a century, economists in the tradition of Pigou (1920) have advocated
the use of tolls as a means of addressing inefficiencies associated with the use of
congested roads. The implementation of tolls also potentially generates a large
amount of revenue which could be used to compensate users inconvenienced by the
implementation of a pricing scheme (Hau, 2005). Here, the government is treated
as “a black box, through which revenue flows in and out, without diversion or
impediment” (Manville and King, 2013, p. 230).
In reality, public economics literature posits, and numerous examples attest to the
fact that governments compete for a variety of target objectives such as the op-
portunity to host hall mark events (Westerbeek et al., 2002), to attract investment
capital (Douglass, 2002; Parkinson et al., 2004), for grants from higher level govern-
ment (Lever, 1999), tourism (Hong, 2008) as well as crucially, for funds (Ferreira
et al., 2005).
The politically motivated desire to maximise social well-being of their electorate on
the one hand, while utilising toll revenues to reduce local taxation and finance public
goods desired by their residents on the other, point to the possibility of strategic
jurisdictional competition for toll revenues. Levinson (2001) provides econometric
evidence substantiating the use of tolls precisely as such a strategic instrument,
mirroring that of excise tax competition discussed in mainstream public economics
literature (e.g. Jacobs et al., 2010). Again applying econometric techniques, Rork
reached these same conclusions and notes that “toll increases in other states will be
met by increases in the home state”(Rork, 2009, p. 137). The literature has thus
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Figure 1.1: Left: Horizontal Tax Competition. Right: Vertical Tax Competition
recognised the potential for such policy interactions in the context of transportation
networks controlled by different jurisdictions (De Borger and Proost, 2012).
When jurisdictions engage in competition for toll revenues in the setting of a multi-
level governance structures, they also generate distortions into the economy as a re-
sult of their tax and expenditure policies i.e. fiscal decisions (Kenyon, 1997; Boadway
et al., 1998; Devereux et al., 2007). The relevance of such fiscal induced distortions,
also known as fiscal externalities, has gained increasing attention in the transporta-
tion systems management literature in recent years (De Borger et al., 2005, 2007;
Zhang et al., 2011).
Drawing directly from distinctions made in the public economics literature (Ferreira
et al., 2005; Devereux et al., 2007; Jacobs et al., 2010), two governmental organi-
sational structures and the competition that arises in each instance are illustrated
in Fig. 1.1. The left panel of this figure illustrates horizontal or inter-jurisdictional
competition, i.e. competition between governments at the same level or with similar
responsibilities (e.g. between two states in the US or two local authorities in the UK
(Kenyon, 1997; Boadway et al., 1998; Shah, 2001; Devereux et al., 2007) or between
different countries that constitute the EU (De Borger and Proost, 2012)).
On the other hand, the right panel illustrates vertical or inter-governmental compe-
tition (Kotsogiannis, 2010) which refers to competition between different levels and
types of responsibilities (e.g. between federal and state governments in the context
of federalist nations like the US, or central versus local governments in the context
of the unitary nations like the UK (De Borger and Proost, 2012)).
As in all other sectors of the economy, the state of institutional governance of trans-
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port matters because it is critical to the successful delivery of policy (Pemberton,
2000; van Zuylen and Taale, 2004; Taylor and Schweitzer, 2005; Marsden and May,
2006). Pemberton (2000) illustrates the interaction of decision makers in local gov-
ernment and points out that when developing integrated transport strategies in
Tyne and Wear (North East England), officials in other cities comprising the region
such as Sunderland, North Tyneside, South Tyneside and Gateshead perceived an
“over dominance in terms of policy determination by Newcastle City Council” (Pem-
berton, 2000, p. 300). Marsden and May (2006) recognise that the effectiveness of
integrated transportation strategies are diluted when there are splits in institutional
responsibilities. They noted that multiple tiers of government “appears to create
extra transactional barriers and impedes the implementation of the most effective
measures for cutting congestion” (Marsden and May, 2006). Studying the interac-
tions between a municipal road authority and a motorway authority, van Zuylen
and Taale (2004) demonstrated that independent decision making could result in
sub-optimal outcomes if each authority acted independently.
Thus one of the key issues examined in this thesis is therefore whether the corrective
effect on efficiency (intended with the use of tolls) is dwarfed by the distortions in-
duced through inter-jurisdictional competition. In particular, it examines the ques-
tion of what the appropriate level of governance of toll pricing should be. Following
Banzhaf and Chupp (2012), the key consideration could be presented as follows.
While local jurisdictions are more likely to pay attention to unique local conditions,
they will also ignore inter-jurisdictional spillovers. In transportation networks, the
main spillover is congestion since “congestion in metropolitan areas often crosses
local government and even state lines” (TRB, 1994, p. 58). On the other hand, a
higher echelon of government (e.g. central or federal level) may take into account
such spillovers but are also likely to impose uniform standards and policies which
may not cater well to local needs and circumstances without significant adaptation
or deviation.
Two particularly distinct approaches have been advocated and these have, in fact,
been adopted. In the UK, particularly to encourage local authorities to investigate
toll pricing, provisions in the Transport Act 2000 allow for revenues from toll pricing
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schemes to be specifically hypothecated (or earmarked) for funding local schemes.
On the other hand, in Sweden, while a government at the local level initially in-
troduced a toll pricing scheme, responsibility for managing the scheme presently
rests with an agency instituted at the national level (National Transport Agency
Transportstyrelsen) (Bo¨rjesson et al., 2012).
The policy relevance of this research goes beyond national governments. In par-
ticular, it also applies to increasingly important supranational bodies such as the
European Union (EU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). For example, the
EU has adopted a commitment to the principle of subsidiarity which states that
“that if reasonably possible, goods and services should be provided by the level
of government that is closest to the people” (Voorhees, 2005, p. 94). In prac-
tice, subsidiarity means that the implementation of policies, such as toll pricing,
should be decentralised to the member states. However, it has been shown that
allowing individual member states themselves to decide toll charges on portions of
the TransEuropean Network (TEN-T) corridors that inevitably pass through their
jurisdiction could, in fact, reduce welfare versus a cooperative federally led policy
(De Borger et al., 2007).
Regarding the competition for funds that motivates inter-jurisdictional competition,
it was noted that these funds could be used to finance infrastructure provision. This
is because in most countries, the highway infrastructure of roads have traditionally
been provided by governments (Zhang, 2005). However, several commentators (e.g.
Mills, 1995; Nijkamp and Rienstra, 1995; Walker and Smith, 1995; Dunn, 1999;
de Rus and Romero, 2004) have highlighted the trend towards a renaissance of pri-
vate sector involvement in the provision of roads through a Public Private Partner-
ship (PPP). A PPP can be regarded as “a contractual agreement between a public
agency (federal, state or local) and a private sector entity” (Gordon et al., 2013, p.
73). In this thesis, the private sector is assumed to be synonymous with profit driven
enterprises. It should be mentioned that PPPs are not unique to transportation and
have been used as a financing mechanism in other sectors of the economy as such as
education (Ball et al., 2003) and healthcare (McKee et al., 2006). In the UK, PPPs
are often referred to as Public Finance Initiatives (PFI) (Allen, 2003).
4
Privately operated roads are not entirely novel ideas (Viton, 1995; Bain, 2009a).
Bain (2009a) reports that in the UK, from the mid-1600s to 1878 when they were
abolished, roads were largely constructed and maintained by private companies
(known as “turnpike trusts”) through the private financing mechanism of “turn-
pike bonds”. Parallel historical developments are also found across the Atlantic in
the US as documented in Viton (1995).
In modern times, there are two ways through which private sector participants are
financially compensated for funding the construction and maintenance of highway
facilities in a PPP (Lockwood et al., 2000; Debande, 2002; Lockwood, 2007; Hensher
and Chung, 2011). The first is through the mechanism of “shadow tolls” where
the government pays a private sector financing consortium based on some agreed
measure in relation to the volume of traffic using the road (Grimsey and Lewis,
2004). The second is through tolls levied on the users of facilities. In this case, tolls
are paid by the road users themselves who use the facility. It is assumed throughout
this thesis, that when “tolls” are referred to, it implies that the users themselves
pay for the use of the road.
Examples of such private toll road projects include the Guangzhou-Shenzhen su-
perhighway in China, SR91 in California, USA and the Birmingham North Relief
Road (M6 Toll) in the UK (Fishbein and Babbar, 1996; Dunn, 1999; Engel et al.,
2002; Pugh and Fairburn, 2008). In Europe, about a third of the motorways are
privately owned (Verhoef, 2007) and private roads in the USA and other countries
are becoming more common (Winston and Yan, 2011; van den Berg and Verhoef,
2012). When private operators are engaged in toll road construction, it is usually
the case that the government awards a private sector participant, selected through
competitive tenders, a concession to construct and maintain a road for a period of
time.
It is in the public interest to ensure that concession rights awarded to private op-
erators, which could be in place for a lengthy period, are not abused. The private
sector demands high returns for taking on the risks associated with PPPs (Beesley
and Hensher, 1989; Nijkamp and Rienstra, 1995). These risks stem primarily from
both the demand uncertainty (Nagae and Akamatsu, 2006; Chen and Subprasom,
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2007) associated with the lengthy period before the original investment is recovered
and empirical evidence suggesting that traffic forecasts tend to overestimate traffic
levels and consequently, the revenue potential of toll roads, resulting in “optimism
bias” (Bain, 2009b). At the same time, the construction of a profitable road does
not necessarily translate into an increase in social surplus and could result in “cherry
picking” of projects (Yang and Meng, 2000; Ortiz et al., 2008). Similarly, a road
that enhances social welfare may not be provided by the private sector because it is
not profitable. This reflects the divergence between welfare and revenue objectives
(Mills, 1995; Ortiz et al., 2008).
In the absence of non-compete clauses in concession agreements, an operator with a
concession could potentially face competition with other operators doing the same
on other roads in the transportation network. This is not an altogether unrealistic
prospect. In fact, private operators compete with one another, as well as with
existing alternative toll free roads for patronage and toll revenues, on road networks
in the Republic of Ireland (Roughan & O’Donovan et al., 2011) and Sydney (Li
and Hensher, 2010). Such practical examples motivate the specific focus of this
thesis, which is not on the much broader subject of PPP where extensive literature
already exists (Go´mez-Iba´n˜ez and Meyer, 1993; Walker and Smith, 1995; Grimsey
and Lewis, 2004) but instead on the consequences on social welfare as a result of
competition between these private sector toll road operators in realistic networks.
In setting a toll that maximises revenue, the literature (e.g. Edelson, 1971; Verhoef
et al., 1996) has highlighted that the operator would be incentivised to take into
account congestion of the road under his control. In this way, the toll should induce
a more efficient usage of the road, an observation entirely in accordance with the
Pigouvian ideal of improving efficiency. However, as noted above, because the pri-
vate sector levies tolls so as to maximise revenue (rather than social welfare), the
operation of the private toll road will inevitably result in another distortion. Thus
in the face of competition between road operators, the issue investigated is whether
the efficiency improvements achieved with the use of tolls is offset by the distortion
due to the commercial (revenue maximising) interests of the private operators.
As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, there is extensive literature on compe-
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tition between private operators. However, the insights have been predominantly
obtained using traffic networks that abstract significantly from reality. This thesis
contributes by investigating the transferability of the insights to a more complex
network featuring multiple Origin Destination (OD) pairs. In addition, an implicit
assumption of this literature is that the toll road operators do not engage in anti-
competitive practices when they are faced with competition. As the number of such
private toll road operators in a network is likely to be small, this assumption is
unrealistic as they will recognise their interdependencies with rivals. In this case, it
would be of interest to regulators to understand the existence (and policy implica-
tions) of incentives for toll road operators to engage in unfair trade practices such
as collusion in toll setting.
When studying the effects of toll road operator and inter-jurisdictional competition
in highway transportation networks, it should be emphasised that the objectives of
the various agents are interrelated through an implicit relationship characterising
the equilibrium route choices of the users. This implicit relationship arises because
tolls influence the generalised travel costs incurred by users which then has a bearing
on their choice of routes through the network in turn affecting the objectives of these
agents.
In studies that have investigated competition in simple networks with a single OD
pair, so long as restrictive assumptions are imposed, these toll levels could be ana-
lytically determined. In the more realistic setting with multiple links and multiple
OD pairs such as those investigated in this thesis, the analytical approach would
then no longer be practical. In such a setting, determination of these toll levels
would require the application of solution algorithms.
1.2 Objectives and Scope
From the above discussion, two distinct groups able to utilise tolls to compete for toll
revenues from highway users were identified. The first group are toll road operators
that compete for toll revenues to maximise revenues. The second group comprises
jurisdictions that compete for toll revenues in order to finance public goods desired
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by their residents while looking after the welfare of their residents.
On the one hand, toll pricing has been proposed to address inefficiency in the high-
way transportation system. On the other hand, efficiency losses result from the toll
setting decisions made by each of these groups. Thus the aim of this thesis is to
investigate the extent of welfare losses stemming from competition for toll revenues
a) amongst toll road concessionaires, and separately, b) amongst jurisdictions. In or-
der to answer this question, this thesis applies transportation network analysis tools
within a modelling framework underpinned by principles of industrial organisation
and public sector economics with a view to:
1. assess the transferability of findings regarding private sector toll road compe-
tition from simple network models to a more realistic network setting;
2. investigate the incentives for, and consequences on social welfare of, collusion
between toll road operators;
3. study the welfare impacts of inter-jurisdictional competition for toll revenues;
4. assess the welfare implications when jurisdictions share toll pricing revenues
while setting tolls non-cooperatively;
5. develop solution algorithms taking into account route choices of the users in
support of the above;
6. test the algorithms developed with realistic networks and demonstrate the
applicability of the methods to realistic problems; and
7. draw policy conclusions and develop policy recommendations informed by the
modelling results.
The model developed will assume a single user class, a single time period and will
focus exclusively on highway transportation.
While toll pricing in traffic networks is recognised as a powerful transportation
demand management measure as it encourages travellers to adjust all aspects of their
travel behaviour (de Palma and Lindsey, 2011), this thesis will restrict attention to
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the impacts of toll pricing on the route choice (and demand) impacts. In this case,
all other responses to changes in the generalised cost of trips as a result of tolls and
congestion is modelled by means of an elastic demand function which captures trip
suppression.
In this regard, the traffic model used is based on equilibrium assignment where two
different route choice principles are separately considered. The first is based on
Wardrop’s user equilibrium principle (Wardrop, 1952) which leads to the Determin-
istic User Equilibrium (DUE) model. The second is the more general Stochastic
User Equilibrium (SUE) model (Daganzo and Sheffi, 1977; Sheffi, 1985). As will
be demonstrated through this thesis, the applicability of the solution algorithms
developed will depend on the routing paradigm assumed.
Technology of toll pricing and the costs of toll collection are not considered. As
noted in de Palma and Lindsey (2011), exploitation of innovations in electronic toll
collection have resulted in substantial reductions in the cost of toll collection which
can be done without impeding traffic flow.
As this thesis will be concerned with measuring welfare effects of different toll pricing
strategies, welfare changes are reported relative to that obtained in the no toll base
equilibrium.
A word on the mathematical notation used is in order. This thesis adopts the
convention that, unless otherwise stated, all vectors, distinguished by bold font,
are column vectors. In this connection, the superscript ⊺ is used to indicates the
transpose of a matrix. Notation and abbreviations are defined when introduced. A
full set of the abbreviations used is provided in Appendix F.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
The thesis is structured following the outline in Fig. 1.2.
Chapters 2 to 5 develop the theoretical background. Following a literature review,
it will be highlighted in Chapter 2 that the common underlying theme in a large
9
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Figure 1.2: Outline of the Thesis
portion of the existing literature on toll pricing has implicitly assumed that toll
pricing decisions are made by a single regulator. However, in order to study the
social welfare consequences of toll revenue competition (whether by private sector
toll road operators or by jurisdictions), this thesis argues that this basic paradigm
must be augmented by a framework capable of capturing the interactions of multiple
agents, each implementing toll pricing in pursuit of some individual objective. These
interactions can be analysed by drawing on principles from game theory which is
the subject of Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 subsequently integrates the game theoretic model describing interactions
between the agents responsible for toll setting with the underlying route choice
model. Here, drawing on analogy with economic theory of the Stackelberg model,
it will be emphasised that these agents can be modelled as “leaders” who set tolls
anticipating the responses of users to the toll pricing implementations, in pursuit
of their objectives. Thus, this integrated model fits within the framework of a
class of mathematical problems known as Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium
Constraints (EPECs). The notion of the equilibrium constraint emphasises that
the objectives of leaders are implicitly interrelated through, and constrained, by an
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underlying route choice model specifying the equilibrium route choice (and demand)
condition in a highway transportation network.
The purpose of the EPEC framework is two fold. Firstly, it allows for two alter-
nate suppositions as to how these leaders would behave depending on whether they
were assumed to either a) compete amongst themselves, resulting in a Non-Cooper-
ative EPEC (NCEPEC) or, b) cooperate, resulting in a Multiobjective Optimisation
Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (MOPEC). As the objectives of these lead-
ers could be improved if there was a possibility that they could act cooperatively
rather than competitively, both assumptions of the EPEC framework are relevant
for this study. Secondly, the EPEC framework allows for the development of al-
gorithmic approaches to determine the toll levels, predicated on the assumption
of the leaders’ behaviour. In this regard, it should be emphasised that research
into solution methods for EPECs has only begun recently and continues to be a
daunting research challenge. Assuming that these leaders were to compete amongst
themselves, Chapter 4 outlines two solution algorithms that can be used to solve
the NCEPEC.
As a result of the intrinsic nonsmooth nature of the EPEC formulation, Chapter
5 exploits recent developments in the field of evolutionary computation to develop
two further solution algorithms that capture both of the aforementioned behavioural
assumptions of the leaders. The crucial difference between the approaches developed
here and those in Chapter 4 is that the approaches here are not predicated on
the intrinsic assumption that the equilibrium link flows and demands obtained as
solutions of the underlying traffic models are differentiable. In addition, Chapter 5
exploits the concept of bilateral bargaining from Axiomatic Bargaining Theory to
bridge the gap between the two extreme assumptions of non-cooperative behaviour
and full cooperation amongst the leaders.
Chapters 6 to 9 focus on applications of the theoretical and algorithmic principles
discussed in the theoretical background to the two topics of competition for toll
revenues amongst revenue maximising toll road operators (Chapters 6 and 7) and
inter-jurisdictional toll revenue competition (Chapters 8 and 9). Each topic studied
is divided into two chapters each, distinguishing in this way between the underlying
11
route choice model assumed i.e. DUE and SUE. This distinction is introduced with
the intent of highlighting that the applicable solution algorithm, developed in the
earlier chapters, is dependent on the underlying route choice model adopted.
Chapter 10 is the concluding chapter of the thesis, in which the work through the
thesis is summarised, and the main conclusions are drawn. Possible avenues for
future research are discussed.
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Chapter 2
Toll Pricing In the Wider
Transport Policy Context
2.1 Introduction
As summarised in Chapter 1, this thesis focuses on assessing the welfare implications
induced by toll pricing policies initiated by various agents seeking to influence the
travel behaviour of road users in order to achieve some goals. This chapter has two
aims. Firstly, it sets the context of this research by both outlining the theoretical
justification for toll pricing and by means of an overview of relevant research in this
area. Secondly, this chapter identifies literature on the twin topics of private sector
involvement in highway transportation networks and competition between (govern-
mental) jurisdictions for toll revenues. In doing so, research gaps are identified with
a view to consolidating the direction of research undertaken in this work.
To economists, the costs a road user takes into account, when deciding to use an
already crowded road, excludes the costs his presence imposes on others. Similarly,
the use of vehicles produces a variety of emissions that contribute to smog, global
warming and acid rain (Joireman et al., 2004). In both these aforementioned in-
stances, the additional costs (congestion delays in the former, environmental impacts
in the latter) are not taken into account by the user, resulting in a market failure,
which economists argue, could be rectified through the imposition of a marginal cost
toll.
This marginal cost pricing principle can be straightforwardly generalised from the
often used pedagogical single road link case to network of roads where in the latter
case, a toll should be levied for the use of each and every congested road in the
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network. While the pursuit of this principle serves to maximise social welfare, it
also dictates that all congested roads in the network are subjected to tolls. This
requirement is particularly onerous being both impractical and costly (Verhoef et al.,
1996). Thus an extensive literature has developed, focusing on practical toll pricing
implementations, relaxing the stringent requirement that all road links in a network
are designated as tollable (i.e. available for toll pricing). Nevertheless, as will
be stressed in this chapter, whilst providing many useful insights, the underlying
premise of this literature is still restrictive in so far as it implicitly presumes that
toll pricing strategies are implemented by a single benevolent regulator seeking to
maximise social welfare for all road users.
Against this backdrop, it is recognised that the growth in demand for highway ca-
pacity has begun to outstrip the funds available to satisfy the growing need for
continued expansion and maintenance of the highway transportation system (e.g.
Forkenbrock, 2005; Zhang et al., 2009). As a result, there has been a global trend
towards supplanting the available resources by involving private sector participants
in the development of toll roads. In return for financing the construction of addi-
tional highway capacity, these private sector entities levy a toll charge on users who
utilise the facility when the toll road is open to traffic. However, the tolls introduced
by these private sector participants are intended to maximise revenue in order for
the original investment to be recouped and to obtain a return on their investments.
Thus the toll introduced with this objective in mind will inevitably differ from one
introduced for the purpose of maximising social welfare. Furthermore, with increas-
ing private sector participation, a toll road operator exercising control over the toll
on a particular road could face competition from others doing likewise elsewhere on
the network. This is not an altogether unrealistic possibility since such competition
is an existing occurrence on Sydney’s orbital motorway network (Li and Hensher,
2010). Thus with toll road competition, multiple agents are able to simultaneously
exercise control over toll levels that influence the route choice of users.
Furthermore, arising naturally as a consequence of transportation networks tran-
scending multiple jurisdictions, the introduction of a toll pricing policy in one juris-
diction has an impact on the welfare of another. As will be reviewed in this chapter,
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an emerging literature suggests that when implementing a toll pricing policy, a ju-
risdiction is politically motivated to view users from outside its jurisdiction, as a
source of congestion impeding local residents and as a source of toll revenue, whilst
paying less heed to their welfare.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Following this introduction,
the traditional justification for toll pricing, based on the argument that highway
traffic imposes costs on society beyond that borne by users themselves, is outlined
in the next section. As noted above, reasons of practicality constrain the regulatory
authority’s ability to impose tolls on all congested roads in the network. Hence,
several practical toll pricing designs have been suggested and these are briefly dis-
cussed herein. Subsequently, Section 2.3 challenges the usual implicit premise that
toll pricing policies are implemented by a single and benevolent regulator. Instead,
in order to evaluate the wider welfare implications, the need for a framework that is
able to fully take into account the actions of multiple interacting agents, each exer-
cising control over a subset of all toll pricing variables, is emphasised. Two specific
instances of multiple agent involvement in toll setting decisions lie at the heart of
this thesis. The first discussed in Section 2.4 is toll (revenue) competition amongst
independent revenue maximising private sector toll road operators. The second, the
focus of Section 2.5, is toll (revenue) competition amongst different jurisdictions.
Section 2.4 starts of with the necessary background on private sector involvement in
highway transportation systems before focusing on the specific issue of competition
between private toll road operators. The literature review presented in this sec-
tion shows that the welfare implications of allowing competition between toll road
operators pivots on the intrinsic interrelationships between the toll roads in com-
petition. The assumption of benevolence of governments implementing toll pricing
strategies is questioned in Section 2.5 where it is argued, extending insights from
the public economics literature, that governments generate various externalities in
pursuit of their fiscal policies. One of these externalities, relevant to a discussion on
the governance of transportation networks, is tax exporting, based on the argument
that while jurisdictions are concerned with the welfare of their own residents, they
treat users from outside their jurisdictions traversing the transportation networks
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within their jurisdiction as a source of revenue and as a source of congestion im-
peding local residents. The literature review presented in this section suggests that
when jurisdictions engage in tax exporting, the toll pricing policies introduced by
welfare maximising jurisdictions, in fact, become indistinguishable from that of rev-
enue maximising private toll road operators. The possibility of tax exporting further
raises the policy relevant question of whether toll pricing should be viewed primar-
ily as a local traffic management issue devolved to local governments or whether it
should be instituted within a national framework managed by a higher level (e.g.
central) government. Section 2.6 summarises the key issues discussed in this chapter,
focusing on the research gaps addressed in this thesis.
2.2 The Classical Justification for Toll Pricing
2.2.1 Congestion Externality on a Single Link
Congestion is a “condition that affects transportation networks when the demand
for a facility temporarily exceeds capacity” (Iacono and Levinson, 2011, p. 69).
In practice, this phenomenon manifests itself in the familiar “stop-start” condi-
tions experienced by many drivers during the morning and evening rush hours
in many cities around the world “when vehicles interact to impede each others’
progress”(DfT, 2013a). Ignoring tailbacks and queues resulting from accidents and
roadworks, economists, in the tradition of Pigou (1920), have long contended that
congestion arises because the costs that a road user takes into account when making
his decision to use the road excludes the costs his presence in the traffic stream
imposes on others. Thus “[d]riving on a congested road leads to a relatively long
travel time for the driver involved, but also increases the travel times for all other
drivers on the same road” (Emmerink et al., 1995, p. 582). In the parlance of
economists, the increase in travel time experienced by others due to the road user’s
action is termed a “(negative) externality” (Knight, 1924; Walters, 1961; Button,
1993; Small and Verhoef, 2007; Parry et al., 2007). The presence of negative ex-
ternalities in the highway transportation market is symptomatic of an underlying
market failure (MasCollel et al., 1995; Lipsey and Chrystal, 1999) which can be
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remedied by an imposition of a toll.
Although the term “externality” is widely used in economics, there is, in fact, “no
consensus on its exact definition and interpretation” (Verhoef, 1994, p. 273). How-
ever, a convenient working definition relevant for the ensuing discussion is that an
externality is the “indirect effect of a consumption activity or a production activity
on the consumption set of a consumer, the utility function of a consumer, or the
production function of a producer” (Laffont, 2008, p. 192). The word “indirect”
emphasises that “the effect concerns an agent other than the one exerting this eco-
nomic activity and that this effect does not work through the price system” (Laffont,
2008, p. 192, italics added). Echoing this, Mishan (1971) stresses that the essential
feature of an externality is that the “effect produced is not a deliberate creation but
an unintended or incidental by-product of some otherwise legitimate activity” (Mis-
han, 1971, p. 2, italics as per original). Thus applied in the highway transportation
context, the act (of using the congested road) has the unintended consequence of
increased costs being imposed (on other road users).
Congestion is unfortunately not the only negative externality associated with the use
of roads. Other externalities, such as noise annoyance, visual intrusion, pollution,
and accidents have been noted (Santos et al., 2010). However, studies estimating
the external costs of transport have shown that congestion costs are one of the
most significant component of externalities in the UK (Sansom et al., 2001), Europe
(Friedrich and Quinet, 2011) and the US (Delucchi and McCubbin, 2011). For this
reason, and because the congestion externality is the most tangible one since “a large
share of the population faces congestion on a daily basis” (Emmerink et al., 1995,
p. 582), the exposition here will develop the traditional justification for toll pricing
advanced by economists, assuming that congestion is the only relevant externality
distorting the market.
Consider uninterrupted traffic flow on a single road of a given distance on portions
of road away from conflicts such as on or off-ramps and friction from pedestrians and
intersections (Morrison, 1986). The traffic flow on the road is described by an engi-
neering speed-flow curve (Haight, 1963; Gerlough and Huber, 1975; Li, 2008) which
can be converted with the known distance to produce a travel time-flow relationship.
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Figure 2.1: Depicting the Economist’s Argument for Toll Pricing
Traffic flow is measured in passenger car equivalent units (pcus) per hour (TRB,
2010), a unit designed to capture the impacts of different vehicle compositions on
capacity by translating them into an equivalent stream of passenger cars.
Adopting a partial equilibrium approach, the economic rationale for toll pricing can
be illustrated with reference to Fig. 2.1. Assuming homogeneous users, the travel
time-flow relationship can be multiplied by a common value of time (Abrantes and
Wardman, 2011) and when other elements of costs independent of traffic flow (Hau,
2005) are added to it, the Average Social Cost curve is obtained. This is the curve
labelled on Fig. 2.1 as ASC which is equal to the Marginal Private Cost (MPC) curve
since it reflects the costs each user individually or “privately” incurs in deciding to
undertake the trip (Hau, 2005; Steinmetz, 2011). However, each user also generates
additional costs, such as congestion delay to other users by his presence, that he
ignores when making the decision to use the road. Both the private costs and
these additional costs are reflected in the MSC (Marginal Social Cost) curve which
explains why the MSC curve lies above the ASC for each unit of traffic flow and
rises much faster than the latter.
On the demand side, the inverse demand curve for trips, labelled on Fig. 2.1 as D, is
assumed to fully reflect Marginal Private Benefits (MPB) which is in turn equivalent
to Marginal Social Benefits (MSB) when there are no positive externalities of road
use (Small and Verhoef, 2007). The equilibrium in the highway market thus occurs
at the intersection of D and ASC at point b with traffic flow of v0 pcus/hr.
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However, economists view this free-market equilibrium as inefficient. This is because
for all drivers between v* and v0, the Marginal Social Costs exceeds the Marginal
Social Benefits. This results in a welfare loss given by the shaded area abc. The
socially optimal traffic flow should, instead, be given by the intersection of D and
MSC at point c of v* pcus/hr. However, in the absence of any incentive to do so,
this optimum would not be realised, and there is a discrepancy between the costs
users privately incur (ASC) and costs borne by society (MSC), resulting in a market
failure as the guiding first best dictum that prices should reflect marginal costs is
violated (Lipsey and Chrystal, 1999).
To correct the market failure, a charge, referred to synonymously as the “marginal
cost toll” or “Pigouvian toll” should be levied on each road user to rectify the
discrepancy (Button, 1993; Emmerink et al., 1995; Small and Verhoef, 2007). On
Fig. 2.1, this toll is given by the line segment marked cd, corresponding to a toll of
x*. It can be seen that this toll is equal to the difference between MSC and ASC
at the optimal traffic flow v* pcus/hr. This difference between MSC and ASC is
also known as the “marginal external congestion costs” (Small and Verhoef, 2007).
Charging every user of the congested link a toll equivalent to the marginal external
congestion cost is then said to internalise the externality so that road users would
be incentivised to take into account the congestion costs imposed on others when
making their decisions to use the road (Emmerink et al., 1995; Hau, 2005).
The internalisation of the congestion externality, through the imposition of the
Pigouvian marginal cost toll, thus corrects the market failure and in doing so,
maximises social welfare. With the first best toll, the welfare loss (area abc) is
eliminated. In the absence of any other distortions in the economy (Button, 1993;
Small and Verhoef, 2007), the removal of this welfare loss results in a (Pareto) effi-
cient allocation of resources (MasCollel et al., 1995; Lipsey and Chrystal, 1999). It
is thus the pursuit of the efficiency objective in transportation systems management
that advocates the use of tolls to correct the market failure (Rouwendal and Verhoef,
2006).
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2.2.2 Congestion Externalities on a Network
The model presented so far has outlined the rationale for toll pricing on a single road.
Nevertheless, the marginal cost pricing principle can, and has been, generalised to a
network of roads (Beckmann et al., 1956; Yang and Huang, 1998, inter alia). In the
literature (e.g Yang and Huang, 1998, 2005), this policy is referred to as either “first
best” or “system optimal” pricing and the resulting tolls, equal to the marginal
external congestion costs on each and every congested link, termed the first best or
system optimal toll vector (Verhoef, 2002a).
Though this thesis is only concerned with the route choice and demand impacts
of a toll pricing policy, it should be emphasised that in the wider transport policy
context, toll pricing is viewed as a powerful transportation demand management
measure stimulating users to adjust all aspects of their behaviour (de Palma and
Lindsey, 2011).
2.2.3 Practical Toll Pricing Schemes
While first best pricing maximises efficiency, it also imposes the unrealistic require-
ment that all congested links are designated as tollable. There are several reasons
why this cannot be achieved in practice. Firstly, despite technological innovations
(see e.g. de Palma and Lindsey, 2011, for a recent review), the costs associated
with collecting tolls on every congested road link in a highway network would still
be potentially prohibitive. Secondly, the public support for tolls is very low (May,
1986; Jones and Hervik, 1992; Small, 1992; Emmerink et al., 1995) and a toll free
route is usually provided, to enhance acceptability of any implementation. Further-
more, legislation in some countries, such as France, specifically require that toll free
alternatives are provided (Raux et al., 2007).
Second Best Toll Pricing
Abstracting from the theoretical first best model enunciated above, the practical
constraints to implementing first best pricing in the real (or “second best”) world,
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immediately implies that for maximum social welfare, the tolls, levied on road users
on the available subset of road links designated tollable, should then no longer be
set equal to the marginal external congestion costs. Following Lipsey and Lancaster
(1956), this is simply an application of the more general theory of the second best.
The main repercussion of this theorem on transportation research has been to en-
gender a stream of research on “second best toll pricing” (SBTP) problems (e.g.
Marchand, 1968; Le´vy-Lambert, 1968; Verhoef et al., 1996; Liu and McDonald,
1998, 1999). In these references, the situation considered has been that of a tolled
road alongside an untolled road in a two link highway network connecting a sin-
gle origin destination (OD) pair. As second best problems are “more difficult to
solve than first best problems” (Rouwendal and Verhoef, 2006, p. 109), research
on SBTP has, in tandem, been extended from the two link, single OD pair case
to general networks (i.e. with an arbitrary number of links and with multiple OD
pairs) where only a subset of the links were tollable (e.g. Yang and Lam, 1996; Ver-
hoef, 2002a,b) or where the tollable links were constrained to form a closed cordon
around a congested city centre (e.g. Sumalee, 2004a) and, relaxing the assumption of
user homogeneity, to take into account users distinguished by socio-economic status
through differences in their perceptions in the value of time (e.g. Yang and Zhang,
2002). Optimal tolls in the presence of other distortions in the economy, such as
those arising due to labour taxes, have also been considered (e.g Parry and Bento,
2001). Nevertheless, the common implicit underlying assumption in this literature
is that the entire network is managed by a single welfare maximising regulator.
The literature has been further expanded in several directions. Two directions are
closely related to the issues investigated in this thesis. Firstly, as will be discussed
in Section 2.4.2, the literature has further investigated private toll road operator(s)
playing a role in setting toll(s). Secondly, in the light of recent literature discussed
in Section 2.5 below, a second best situation also arises naturally because local
jurisdictions implementing toll pricing would usually only be limited to doing so
within its spatial boundaries.
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First Best Pricing as a Benchmark
Though first best pricing cannot be practically implemented, it nonetheless repre-
sents a theoretical benchmark as it gives the upper bound of social welfare gains
achievable with marginal cost pricing, against which practical toll pricing schemes
can be assessed. Faced with constraints which prevent absolute adherence to the
marginal cost pricing principle, the literature on toll pricing has thus centred on
attempts to maximise such a metric.
Types of Toll Pricing Schemes
Given the difficulties associated with the implementation of first best pricing, prac-
tical methods for toll pricing are second best schemes that adopt a combination of
one of the following five forms and where the level of charge could possibly vary by
time of day (TRB, 1994; Hau, 2006; de Palma and Lindsey, 2011):
• Facility-based schemes or point tolls: where a highway user is charged a fee
for using the road. Examples are tolls on bridges and tunnels in Hong Kong
(Loo, 2003) as well as the Birmingham North Relief Road (M6 Toll) in the
UK (Pugh and Fairburn, 2008). Facility-based schemes dominate in North
America (de Palma and Lindsey, 2011). A variant of the facility-based toll
pricing scheme, known as the High Occupancy/Toll (HOT) lanes, is particu-
larly prevalent in the US. Examples include the SR-91 in California (Sullivan,
2006) or the I-394 in Minnesota (Buckeye and Munich, 2004). On an other-
wise untolled road, HOT lanes (one or more lanes of a multi-lane highway)
give drivers the option of either paying a toll for its use (with the toll waived
if the vehicle is carrying a stipulated minimum number of passengers, usually
4) or travelling in the other lanes without the need to pay a toll.
• Cordons: a pricing scheme whereby vehicles intending to enter a particular
area (e.g. the city centre) “pay a toll to cross a cordon in the inbound direction,
in the outbound direction, or possibly in both directions” (de Palma and
Lindsey, 2011, p. 1381). Furthermore, a scheme may have single or multiple
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cordons. The Stockholm congestion charging scheme (Bo¨rjesson et al., 2012)
is an example of a cordon scheme.
• Zonal Schemes: where a fee has to be paid to enter or exit, or to travel within a
predefined area. An example of this is London’s Congestion Charging Scheme
(Leape, 2006; Santos and Fraser, 2006; Givoni, 2012). This is sometimes known
as an “Area License Scheme”.
• Distance Based Schemes: where the charges vary with the distance travelled
(Forkenbrock, 2005). A national distance-based heavy goods vehicle charge
is applicable in Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Slovakia and Switzerland
(Suter and Walter, 2001; Borgnolo et al., 2005; Broaddus and Gertz, 2008;
Poliak, 2009). In recent years, national distance based charging schemes have
been proposed in both the UK and the Netherlands but plans have been put
on hold due to a lack of political support (de Palma and Lindsey, 2011).
• Hybrid schemes: a combination of one or more of the aforementioned meth-
ods. For example, the toll pricing scheme currently in operation in Singapore
comprises both facility based schemes with tolls on several arterials as well as
cordon toll pricing within the Central Business District (CBD) (Menon, 2006).
2.2.4 Comparison of Alternative Toll Pricing Schemes
Several commentators have reported, using model based studies, that distance based
charging is an effective instrument for reducing congestion and meeting the efficiency
objective (e.g. May and Milne, 2000; Verhoef and Rouwendal, 2004; Mitchell et al.,
2005; Balwani and Singh, 2009). Verhoef and Rouwendal (2004) showed that in
some cases, a flat distance charge could result in first best efficiency gains. On the
other hand, May and Milne (2000) found that for the cordon scheme they tested
with a highway assignment model, though the most operationally feasible, was not
as effective in efficiency terms, as other pricing schemes tested when assessed across
a number of metrics. This finding was contradicted by both Mun et al. (2003)
and Santos (2004). Mun et al. (2003) showed that the cordon scheme they tested,
based on Japanese data, attained an economic welfare level very close to the system
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optimum levels. Santos (2004) simulated cordon pricing implementations for eight
English towns and noted that while the distributional impacts varied (Santos and
Rojey, 2004), the cordons were effective in the meeting the twin objectives of increas-
ing social welfare and reducing environmental impacts of traffic. This inconsistency
can be reconciled as May and Milne recognised that alternative cordon designs could
have been more effective as they only tested one specific scheme design.
Subsequent research has demonstrated that the extent of attainable efficiency gains
with cordon pricing is highly sensitive to the design of the toll pricing scheme itself,
specifically the location of toll points (May et al., 2002; Sumalee et al., 2005). In view
of this, Sumalee (2004a,b, 2008) and Zhang and Yang (2004) developed heuristics,
based on graph theory, to design toll pricing cordons that sought to maximise social
welfare but at the expense of heavy computational burden. Shepherd et al. (2008)
subsequently developed a faster, albeit heuristic, approach to accelerate the cordon
scheme design process. Much less knowledge has been acquired about the design
of zonal schemes though it is of practical relevance (e.g. in London’s Congestion
Charging Scheme). Nevertheless, there has been some research innovations in this
direction (e.g. Maruyama and Sumalee, 2007).
2.2.5 Environmental Externalities
As noted above, congestion is not the only externality in highway transportation.
Another externality, which has received increasing attention in recent years, is the
unintended negative consequences of road traffic on the environment. Johansson-
Stenman (2006) has shown that tolls should internalise both congestion and environ-
mental externalities while Yin and Lawphongpanich (2006) investigate modifications
to the first best pricing rule to highlight the trade-off encountered in attempting to
internalise both congestion and environmental externalities.
In an era when environmental concerns have been raised over ozone layer depletion,
green house gas production and global warming (ECMT, 1998; Joireman et al.,
2004), some toll pricing schemes have been implemented specifically with the aim of
internalising environmental externalities. Both Suter and Walter (2001) and Broad-
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dus and Gertz (2008) point out that the objective of heavy vehicle toll pricing in
Switzerland and Germany respectively was the internalisation of the environmen-
tal impacts of heavy goods vehicles. Similarly, the objective of Milan’s ECOPASS
scheme (also known as “Area C” (Percoco, 2014)), implemented in January 2008,
was introduced primarily for the purpose of improving the air quality in Milan
through traffic restraint (Rotaris et al., 2010). While the analysis in Invernizzi et al.
(2011) has attributed the observed reduction in carcinogenic Particulate Matter to
the implementation of the scheme, Percoco (2014) applied econometric techniques to
show that the environmental benefits of the scheme may have been offset as a result
of significant modal switch to powered two-wheelers (i.e. motorbikes and scooters).
2.3 Multiple Agents in the Governance of Toll Pricing
Policy
Thus far, consistent with large portions of the literature on toll pricing (e.g. Yang
and Lam, 1996; Yin, 2000; Zhang and Yang, 2004), the discussion has implicitly
assumed that a single regulator exercises control over all aspects of toll pricing
policy variables (e.g. the location of toll points and the toll levels) with the aim
of maximising a measure of social welfare for all travellers regardless of origin or
destination over the entire network. Such a governance structure can be termed
a “centric pricing scheme” (Zhang et al., 2011, p. 298). This assumption points
toward “an implicitly benevolent vision of government” (Manville and King, 2013,
p. 230). However, the adequacy of the conventional assumption of decision making
by a sole regulatory agency in transportation networks is questionable since, in
reality, “the situation where one single government controls an isolated network is
probably the exception rather than the rule” (Verhoef, 2008, p. 362).
The primary reason for motivating a multiple agent framework in the governance of
toll pricing is intimately related to the fact that transportation networks, generally
spanning multiple jurisdictions, are usually managed by different governments (Tay-
lor and Schweitzer, 2005; Rodrigue et al., 2013) where a jurisdiction is “the road
authority responsible for maintaining the road” (Levinson, 2000, p. 72). Within a
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nation, the (spatial and statutory) boundaries of a jurisdiction (e.g. local govern-
ment) are usually defined by the national government, possibly enshrined in legis-
lation, mainly for the purposes of clarifying public service responsibilities and for
administrative reasons. For example, as stipulated in the provisions of the Greater
London Authority Act of 1999, Transport for London (TfL) exercises jurisdiction
over many strategic roads within Greater London. Likewise, the Highways Agency
(HA) in England is tasked with operating, maintaining and improving England’s
Strategic Road Network, and thus exercises jurisdiction over motorways and trunk
roads (HA, 2014). As transportation networks are meant to connect users between
disparate geographical locations, it is inevitable that the routes users take to reach
their destinations would involve travel over networks that are controlled/regulated
by a jurisdiction different from where they commenced their trip.
When introducing a toll pricing scheme, a jurisdiction will usually be limited to
introducing toll points on roads within its jurisdictional boundaries. Furthermore,
a local regulatory authority would be primarily concerned with traffic conditions
in its own jurisdiction and would, arguably, place less weight on conditions outside
its sub-network. Taken together, this results in the so-called “distributed conges-
tion pricing scheme” (Zhang et al., 2011, p. 300). Since transportation networks
transcend artificial jurisdictional boundaries, the introduction of toll pricing (or the
application of any transport policy instrument, for that matter) in one jurisdiction
would inevitably have impacts on another (van Zuylen and Taale, 2004). The out-
come in transportation networks is thus “affected by the policy decision of several
governments, and the implications of these policies strongly interact” (De Borger
and Proost, 2012, p. 35). In such instances, robust assessments of the overall welfare
implications of implementing toll pricing policies can only be conducted by consid-
ering the outcomes on multiple jurisdictions simultaneously. Thus, while serving as
a useful benchmark, the paradigm of a single regulator is insufficient in evaluating
policy outcomes when different agents interact, by each introducing a toll pricing
policy, to maximise an individual local welfare measure. Furthermore, as will be
discussed in Section 2.5, jurisdictions cannot be presumed to act benevolently to-
wards all users when doing so which has significant implications for overall societal
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welfare.
A second motivation for a multiple agent framework relates to the observed global
trend towards deregulation which has taken place in many, including transportation,
industries over the last three to four decades. Within transportation, this has seen
an increased number of private sector profit maximising entities participating in the
provision of transportation services. For example, in the public transport industry in
the UK and elsewhere (de Rus, 2006; Johnson and Nash, 2012), it is evident that, in
an era of deregulation and privatisation, different agents, either acting individually
or as a group, could exercise leverage over key public transport policy instruments
such as fares and service frequencies (e.g Harker, 1988; Williams and Abdulaal,
1993; Zubeita, 1998; Li et al., 2012).
Alongside the observed trend towards deregulation, there has been increased inter-
ests shown by governments around the world in engaging private sector operators to
build and manage portions of the highway network (Roth, 1996; Yang and Huang,
2005). While deregulation and private sector engagement has led to broader par-
ticipation into the management of highway transportation systems, broader partic-
ipation has engendered more conflict in the decision-making process (Stough and
Rietveld, 1997; Dunn and Sussman, 2011). The conflicts arise partly because the
objectives of the private sector entities (profit or revenue maximisation) naturally
differ from those of the public sector (welfare maximisation) (Mills, 1995; Gordon
et al., 2013). Thus a multiple agent framework is necessary in order to fully take
into account the consequences of tolls, introduced by multiple revenue maximising
private operators, on social welfare.
2.4 Private Sector Involvement in Infrastructure Pro-
vision
The internalisation of traffic externalities, discussed in Section 2.2 above, has been
a key motivation leading to the introduction of the few toll pricing schemes cur-
rently in operation across the globe. However, as a result of both historical and
political reasons, Larsen (1995) points out that the objective for introducing urban
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toll cordons in Norway was “purely financial” (Larsen, 1995, p. 188) with road tolls
constituting 25% of road construction funding in Norway (Brathen and Odeck, 2009,
p. 377). Besides toll roads, cordons or “toll rings” have been implemented in several
Norwegian cities such as Bergen, Stavanger and Oslo. Though recent literature (e.g.
Ieromonachou et al., 2006) indicates that these schemes have begun to turn their
focus towards the internalisation of the congestion externalities of traffic, these toll
facilities were originally intended to raise revenues to fund highway infrastructure
investments.
Nevertheless, the Norwegian example still remains an exception to the norm. In
the majority of other countries around the world, tax revenues (usually receipts
from fuel taxes) are used by governments to fund construction and maintenance of
road networks such as the Interstate Highway System in the US (Winston, 2010;
Geddes, 2011) or the network in the UK (Mackie and Smith, 2005). At the same
time, with the declining purchasing power of fuel tax revenues due to inflation
(Parry et al., 2007), improved fuel efficiency of new vehicles (US-CBO, 2011) and the
diversion of fuel tax revenues to fund general non-transportation related budgetary
commitments (Goel and Nelson, 2003), it has been recognised, in the literature
examining the finances of the US Highway Trust Fund, that the future stream of
such revenues could be insufficient to satisfy the growing demand for increased
highway capacity and its continued maintenance (Forkenbrock, 2005; Zhang et al.,
2009; Geddes, 2011; Robitaille et al., 2011; Schank and Rudnick-Thorpe, 2011).
These reasons have played a pivotal role in the observed global trend in leveraging
private sector resources, through the use of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs),
to augment highway transportation infrastructure provision (Go´mez-Iba´n˜ez et al.,
1991; Fishbein and Babbar, 1996; Poole, 1998; Ortiz et al., 2008).
2.4.1 Private Toll Roads
Private sector participation in toll road construction is neither new nor theoretical
but is accelerating in pace across the globe (Fishbein and Babbar, 1996; Yang and
Huang, 2005). The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) concession model (see e.g. Yang
and Meng, 2000; Tsai and Chu, 2003) is an example of a PPP in highway trans-
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portation where the government awards a private sector participant (known as the
“concessionaire”), selected through a competitive tendering process, with conces-
sions to collect tolls from users of these roads (Engel et al., 2002) for a pre-specified
duration (“concession period”) when the road is opened to traffic. In return, the
concessionaire secures private capital to fund both the construction of the new road
and its continued maintenance over the life of the concession. After the conces-
sion expires, the road is then transferred back to the government (and tolls may be
abolished). Thus such roads are referred to as “private toll roads”.
Advocates of a market based approach to infrastructure provision (e.g. Geltner and
Moavenzadeh, 1987; Nijkamp and Rienstra, 1995; Roth, 1996; Engel et al., 2002)
point to four main reasons in support of private sector participation in the provision
of highway infrastructure. Firstly, by drawing on private sector resources such as
pension funds (Della Croce, 2012; Armistead, 2013), the total budget available to
meet infrastructure requirements increases. Secondly, they argue that the private
sector would be at least as efficient as a government run entity. While there is
evidence suggesting that “PPPs demonstrate clearly superior cost efficiency over
traditional procurement” (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, 2007, p. 1), others
highlight that the argument of increased cost efficiency of the private vis-a´-vis the
public sector is “more sociological or cultural than economic” (Geltner and Moaven-
zadeh, 1987, p. 15). Thirdly, it is highlighted that tolls are a more equitable means
of financing road provision (Gittings, 1987; US-CBO, 2011) as they will only be paid
by those who directly derive a benefit from using the facility whereas traditional fi-
nancing sources are derived from fuel taxes which are paid by all motorists including
those who may not use the facility. Fourthly, it has been noted that economic effi-
ciency of highway usage could be improved. The argument advanced in support of
this last point is that as fuel taxes are levied across all motorists who purchase fuel,
irrespective of their individual contribution to congestion, they are unable to directly
target the congestion externality (Parry and Small, 2005). Echoing this view, a re-
port by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has recognised that “fuel taxes
cannot provide a strong incentive for people to avoid overusing highways-that is, to
forgo trips for which the costs to themselves and others exceed the benefits.”(US-
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CBO, 2011, p. vi). On the other hand, revenue maximising concessionaires, as will
be discussed below, are motivated to take the congestion externality into account in
setting the toll(s).
As a road uniquely occupies space (Zhang and Levinson, 2005), the award of a
toll road concession inevitably confers a degree of monopoly power to the conces-
sionaire. One way to counter this monopoly power is to introduce competition.
Beyond competitive auctions between bidders for the award of the concession itself
(Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008a) (resulting in so-called “competition for the market”
(Etro, 2007)), there could also be direct competition between toll road concession-
aires (also termed “competition in the market” (Etro, 2007)). Thus in the absence
of non-compete clauses in the concession agreement, a concessionaire could poten-
tially face direct competition, for toll revenues, from toll roads controlled by other
consortia. Such competition can be observed, for example, between concessionaires
exercising control over tolls on the different segments constituting Sydney’s urban
orbital motorway network (Li and Hensher, 2010; Roads and Maritime Services,
2013) as well as between several PPP financed toll roads around Dublin, Republic
of Ireland (Roughan & O’Donovan et al., 2011). Thus an understanding of the wel-
fare implications of the latter case of toll road competition in the market is crucial
to inform future regulatory policy.
2.4.2 Competition between Private Toll Roads
The SBTP problem was previously introduced in Section 2.2.3 (see p. 20) in re-
lation to the practical difficulties associated with implementing Pigouvian welfare
maximising first best tolls. This section discusses the insights from another class of
SBTP problems that naturally arise in connection with private toll roads since each
concessionaire would be limited to deciding the toll level(s) only on the road(s) that
they have been awarded concessions for.
Table 2.1 lists a selection of the extensive literature contributing insights relevant
to understanding toll competition amongst toll road providers utilising networks
connecting a single OD pair. These works are differentiated by the network
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structure considered (i.e. either parallel or serial links) and whether link capacity
was endogenously determined. Alongside the first best pricing benchmark and the
non-intervention equilibrium, the papers listed in this table have considered one or
more of the following ownership regimes:
• a public toll free road in competition with a privately operated toll road,
• a monopoly, where a single private concessionaire maximising revenue exercises
control over both roads and
• a duopoly, where two independent privately operated toll roads compete for
toll revenues.
The nature of the network used (i.e. two parallel and/or two serial links) is shown by
tick symbol, ✔, in the appropriate column if it was considered in the reference cited
or cross symbol, ✗, otherwise. Furthermore, a tick symbol, ✔, in the column labelled
“Endogenous Capacity Determination” indicates that the reference also considered
the determination of link capacity alongside the choice of the toll level.
Table 2.1: Selection of Literature Discussing Private Concessionaire Toll Road Operation
in highway networks connecting a single OD pair, differentiated by network structure (i.e
parallel or serial links) and whether capacity choice, in addition to tolls, was endogenously
modelled.
Reference Network Structure Endogenous Capacity
Parallel Serial Determination
de Palma and Leruth (1989) ✔ ✗ ✔
de Palma (1992) ✔ ✗ ✗
Mills (1995) ✔ ✔ ✗
Viton (1995) ✔ ✗ ✗
Verhoef et al. (1996) ✔ ✗ ✗
de Palma and Lindsey (2000) ✔ ✗ ✔
Engel et al. (2004) ✔ ✗ ✗
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007a) ✔ ✗ ✗
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007b) ✔ ✔ ✗
de Palma et al. (2007) ✔ ✗ ✔
Small and Verhoef (2007) ✔ ✔ ✔
Mun and Ahn (2008) ✗ ✔ ✗
van den Berg and Verhoef (2012) ✔ ✗ ✗
van den Berg (2013) ✗ ✔ ✔
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As noted in Table 2.1, some authors exclusively considered the determination of
the toll level (e.g. Mills, 1995; Verhoef et al., 1996) treating capacity as fixed while
others study how private operators determine both tolls and capacity of the road(s)
they control. In this latter case, some e.g. de Palma and Leruth (1989), assume
that tolls and capacity are determined in two stages. In these two stage games,
concessionaires decide capacity levels on the link each exercises control over at the
first stage, and tolls are chosen at a second stage, with capacities determined from
the first stage held fixed. Alternatively, tolls and capacities could be optimised
simultaneously (e.g. van den Berg, 2013). In this case, Verhoef et al. (2010) have
shown in a general network context that the link capacity is determined by its flow
in the second best equilibrium which implies that a closed form analytical expression
for the link capacities is available under several widely held technical assumptions
(see also extensions in Wu et al. (2011) and Wang et al. (2013)).
In economic theory, the “short run” is the time period over which the inputs of, at
least, one factor of production cannot be varied (Lipsey and Chrystal, 1999). Thus
models that assume fixed capacity while endogenously determining toll levels can
be regarded as “short run” models. This may be “more realistic, as capacity is a
long run decision while fees can be changed more easily” (van den Berg, 2013, p.
186). Focusing exclusively on the use of tolls as the strategic variable, assuming that
the road capacities remain unchanged, this thesis thus aims at developing short run
models of toll revenue competition.
In terms of modelling of congestion effects, the majority of the literature cited in
Table 2.1 have tended to emphasise the static congestion model where (generalised)
travel time on a link is described by its time-flow relationship and where the build
up of queues is not explicitly considered. Others (e.g. de Palma and Leruth, 1989;
de Palma and Lindsey, 2000; de Palma et al., 2007) take into account dynamics
utilising the “bottleneck” model of Vickrey (1969) (see e.g. Arnott et al., 1990,
1993, for a review of this model). In concert with the majority of the literature, and
for numerical tractability, this thesis will limit focus to the case of static congestion.
A common strand of the literature listed in Table 2.1 is the use of a game theoretic
framework to describe the interactions between competing concessionaires. In tan-
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dem with the multiple agent framework underlying this thesis, this framework lends
weight to the argument of the necessity to take into account decision variables of
all concessionaires who simultaneously exercise control over tolls on their respective
links so as to maximise revenues. The concept of Nash Equilibrium (Nash, 1950a,
1951) is subsequently applied to determine the decision variables offered by each toll
road operator in the resulting non-cooperative game. In concert with this literature,
Chapter 3 of this thesis reviews the relevant game theoretic concepts underpinning
the strategic interactions of these toll road concessionaires.
Toll Setting By Private Concessionaires
Before turning attention to toll setting by concessionaires in networks, Fig. 2.2
illustrates how a concessionaire would decide the toll level on a single link in order
to maximise revenues. Adapted fromWinston (2010), this figure reproduces Fig. 2.1
on p. 18, where the curves labelled D, ASC and MSC remain as previously defined.
To recapitulate, these are the inverse demand, Average Social Cost and Marginal
Social Cost curves respectively. However, this figure also includes an additional
“Marginal Revenue” curve (labelled MR). Applying microeconomic theory (Lipsey
and Chrystal, 1999), each point on the MR curve gives the additional revenue earned
by the concessionaire as a result of the toll levied on an additional unit of traffic.
The MR curve lies below the inverse demand curve, D, because the reduction in toll
required to earn the additional revenue will require lowering the toll not only for
the additional unit of traffic but also for all other units of traffic before it (Lipsey
and Chrystal, 1999).
The industrial economics literature (e.g Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010) emphasises
that a revenue maximiser will set prices from their knowledge of the inverse demand
function at the point where the MR curve intersects the MSC curve. This occurs at
point f on Fig. 2.2 resulting in traffic flow of vp pcus/hr. From their knowledge of the
inverse demand curve, D, reflecting the users’ willingness to pay, the concessionaire
would set the price of the road at p1. At the level of traffic flow vp pcus/hr, the
ASC, reflecting the cost borne by the users themselves is p0. Thus, the toll that the
revenue maximising concessionaire would levy is given as the difference between p1
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Figure 2.2: Illustrating Toll Setting by A Revenue Maximising Toll Road Concessionaire
on a Single Link (Winston, 2010, p. 127)
and p0. On Fig. 2.2, this is given by the line segment marked eg corresponding to
a toll of xp.
It is immediately evident that xp is greater than x*, the toll required to fully in-
ternalise traffic congestion. Thus traffic flow vp pcus/hr is lower than the socially
optimal level v* pcus/hr. The resulting implication is that for all traffic flow between
vp and v* , the Marginal Social Benefits (MSB) is greater than the Marginal Social
Cost of the trips. This results in a welfare loss from revenue maximising pricing
vis-a´-vis first best pricing as shown by the area cef.
As noted earlier (see Section 2.2.1) and reinforced in Fig. 2.2, the equilibrium in
the absence of any tolls, implies the traffic flow of v0 pcus per hour and a welfare
loss given by the shaded area abc. From this discussion, it is ambiguous whether
privatisation increases or reduces welfare vis-a´-vis an unpriced public road (Win-
ston, 2010). Hence when toll setting responsibilities are assigned to private revenue
maximising concessionaires, the fundamental question of interest is whether the cor-
rective effect of internalising the congestion externality intended with toll pricing
(area abc) is larger or smaller than the welfare loss generated by a toll aimed at
maximising revenue (shaded area cef).
Both Verhoef et al. (1996) and de Palma and Lindsey (2000) considered, amongst
other scenarios, a private toll road concessionaire in competition with a toll-free
road. These authors have shown analytically that the revenue maximising toll can
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be decomposed into:
1. the marginal external congestion cost of the link, and
2. a demand related markup.
These two components can be separately identified on Fig. 2.2. Recall that the
toll levied by the private operator is xp which is the line segment marked eg. The
component of the toll reflecting marginal external congestion cost (item 1 above) is
given by the difference between ASC and MSC at traffic flow of vp pcus/hr. In Fig.
2.2, this corresponds to the line segment marked fg. The demand related markup
component, (item 2 above), is given by the difference between the MR and D curves
at traffic flow of vp pcus/hr. Graphically, this component is represented on Fig. 2.2
by the line segment marked ef.
Since the revenue maximising toll includes an element reflecting the marginal ex-
ternal congestion cost, this implies that a private toll road concessionaire has an
incentive to internalise the congestion externality on the toll road, in turn support-
ing a conclusion reached earlier by Edelson (1971). Intuitively, congestion is just
as detrimental for the toll road concessionaire as it is for users since any increase
in the travel time costs that users face due to congestion, ceteris paribus, reduces
the willingness to pay for the use of the toll road. On the other hand, the demand
related mark up is a direct consequence of the revenue maximisation objective of
the concessionaires.
The crucial issue then is what happens in the presence of competition. Does the
welfare loss associated with toll setting by private concessionaires (area cef) grow
or shrink with competition? The literature listed in Table 2.1 has emphasised that
the answer to this question pivots on whether the competition takes place between
parallel links or between serial links. These two cases are considered in turn below.
Toll Competition Between Parallel Links
Two links are said to be parallel “if they connect the same pair of nodes in the same
direction” (Bell and Iida, 1997, p. 22). This graph theoretic definition is convenient
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and clearly applicable in networks that comprise a single OD pair, but as will be
noted later, becomes restrictive in more general networks. It can be seen from Table
2.1 that these networks of parallel links appear to have been studied most frequently
“for no apparent empirical reason” (Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008b, p. 176).
As noted above, the concessionaire’s revenue maximising toll consists of both a
component related to the marginal external congestion cost and a demand related
markup. In these parallel networks, as the number of competing concessionaires
(i.e. the intensity of competition) increases, the component related to the marginal
congestion cost increases while the demand related mark up component diminishes.
Thus in the limit, the toll set by each competing concessionaire will equal that
required to fully internalise congestion. In the case of a single OD pair, this implies
that the competitive toll approaches the (Pigouvian) first best levels. (For a proof,
see Small and Verhoef, 2007, p. 200).
This finding has led Engel et al. (2004) and Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007a), inter
alia, to further hypothesise that when several concessionaires are engaged in toll
revenue competition on parallel links connecting a single OD pair, toll competition
could substitute for toll regulation since in the limit, toll levels would be equal to
the welfare maximising Pigouvian first-best levels. It should be understood that this
limiting result, while theoretically interesting, would not be realised in reality as it
is “impossible to have an infinite number of (parallel) competing roads (van den
Berg and Verhoef, 2012, p. 971, parenthesis as per original).
Toll Competition Between Serial Links
However, the conclusion that toll levels tend toward the welfare maximising levels
as competing operators increase no longer holds true in the case of toll competition
between serial links. Serial interdependencies arise when the journey requires “travel
over a sequence of road links” (Mills, 1995, p. 137). Therefore, travel between
that OD pair necessitates the use of two or more links together highlighting the
complementary nature of such links.
Consider a serial link (such as a corridor) connecting a single OD pair divided into
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2 segments where each segment is controlled by an independent revenue maximising
concessionaire. Then in the competitive equilibrium, each concessionaire would set
a toll that not only internalises the congestion externality of the segment under his
control as in the parallel link case above, but also the congestion externality of the
other segment as well. On top of this, each would add a demand related markup
(Mills, 1995; Small and Verhoef, 2007; Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2007b; Mun and
Ahn, 2008; van den Berg, 2013). The end result is that the toll that has to be paid
to travel between the OD pair is higher than what a concessionaire in control of
both segments together (i.e. a “monopolist”) would charge. This is a result of the
over-internalisation of the congestion externality and the markups being charged for
each individual segment of the serial link.
Originating from the industrial economics literature, such an outcome is known
as “double marginalisation” (Spengler, 1950; Tirole, 1988; Economides and Salop,
1992). Double marginalisation occurs when one concessionaire ignores the effect of
the toll he sets on the revenue of the other concessionaire in the chain leading to
the result that competition between complements results in higher prices. Thus toll
revenue competition between concessionaires on serial links results in higher tolls
for users, lower revenues for each concessionaire and a reduction in social welfare
(Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2007b; De Borger and Proost, 2012; van den Berg, 2013).
In stark contrast to the case of competition between concessionaires controlling par-
allel links, these negative impacts are magnified as the number of serial competitors
(i.e. intensity of competition) increase (for a proof, see Small and Verhoef, 2007, p.
200). Thus it is evident that whether competition between toll operators in the road
network would improve efficiency is intrinsically related to the interdependencies of
the particular links in competition.
Toll Competition In General Networks
In addition to the literature listed in Table 2.1, some authors (Yang and Woo, 2000;
Yang et al., 2009; Koh and Shepherd, 2010), have studied competition between toll
road concessionaires in more general networks (i.e. those comprising both parallel
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and serial road links with multiple OD pairs). When more than two operators are
possible, this is the setting of oligopolistic competition (Lipsey and Chrystal, 1999)
as will be discussed in Chapter 3.
The discussion above has stressed that the network structure (more specifically,
the relationship of the links in competition) plays a crucial role in determining the
welfare implications of competition between toll road concessionaires. Extension of
the analysis to networks raises two key issues, both of which are investigated in this
thesis.
The first issue is the extent of transferability of policy relevant insights gained from
these studies using single OD pair networks to the latter, more general but more
realistic, setting. In a general network context, the graph theoretic definition for
parallel links of Bell and Iida (1997) as given above, while correct, would be lim-
ited, since it neglects the message that “parallel” links in a general network setting
should be interpreted, more generally, to mean that travellers have alternative route
options as “links are substitutes for each other” (Mun and Ahn, 2008, p. 368, italics
added). This more general definition is adopted in the work reported here. Sim-
ilarly, serial links in the context of general networks should emphasise that “links
are complements to each other” (Mun and Ahn, 2008, p. 368, italics added) which
stresses, e.g. with two serial links, that “a user has to use both facilities in order to
consume” (van den Berg, 2013, p. 186, italics added).
In practice, it is recognised that these definitions are not entirely unambiguous
because of the complication that, in reality, a road link in a general network serves
multiple OD pairs so that “the same link can be a substitute for some users and a
complement for others” (De Borger and Proost, 2012, p. 38). Furthermore, when toll
levels change, traffic usually has the opportunity to reroute, and any categorisation
of links based on the untolled base equilibrium reference point could potentially
break down.
The second issue is that an analytical approach (applied in the references cited in
Table 2.1) to determine the toll levels in the resulting competitive equilibrium would
not be feasible as there is no tractable analytical solution in this more general set-
38
ting. To address this, this thesis contributes to the literature by proposing solution
algorithms for the determination of the toll levels in an oligopolistic competitive
equilibrium, explicitly taking into account the route choice of users.
Collusion
Another issue of policy relevance stemming from toll road competition is ensuring
that users of the highway network, who ultimately incur the burden of toll pay-
ments, are not exploited by revenue maximising toll road concessionaires possessing
varying degrees of spatial monopoly power. This motivates a further line of inquiry
investigated in this thesis, which is to investigate the possibilities for collusion be-
tween toll road concessionaires. While Engel et al. (2004) have suggested that toll
competition on parallel links could substitute for toll regulation, this conclusion is
predicated on the assumption that concessionaires do not engage in anti-competitive
practices such as collusion. In his study of private toll roads, Levinson (2006) writes
that “(m)arkets function best when no producer . . . , can collude, to affect the price”
(Levinson, 2006, p. 89, italics added). Thus the open question would be the exis-
tence or otherwise, of incentives for concessionaires to engage in collusion and the
resulting welfare impacts of such actions.
The origin of the study of collusion is very old. Discussions of this issue can be traced
as far back as the founding father of economics, Adam Smith, who warned that
“people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion,
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance
to raise prices” (Smith, 1776, p. 145, para. c27). Similarly, Cournot (see Chapter 3)
writes that if competitors “should come to an agreement so as to obtain the greatest
possible income, the results . . . would not differ, so far as consumers are concerned,
from those obtained in treating of a monopoly” (Cournot, 1838, p. 80). The modern
study of collusion between firms can be found in the industrial economics literature
(e.g. Romp, 1997; Porter, 2005; Peters, 2008; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010).
While overt formal coordination using agreements has been made illegal under ex-
isting anti-trust legislation (Cooper, 1986; Rhodes, 2008; Davis et al., 2010), tacit
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collusion or “conscious parallelism” (Macleod, 1985; Normann, 2000) is still possi-
ble (Davis et al., 2010) because “collusion does not have to be enshrined in formal
agreement if discipline can be maintained without it” (Beesley, 1990, p. 299). As a
result, tacit collusion can be very difficult for regulators to detect (Porter, 2005). In
tacit collusion, oligopolistic firms choose higher prices due to mutual recognition of
their interdependence (Henderson and Quandt, 1980; Cooper, 1986). As there are
likely to be only a few toll road concessionaires operating in the road network at any
one time, it is postulated that they would recognise their mutual interdependence
and thus have an incentive to manipulate the market to increase toll revenues.
Though tacit collusion has been investigated other network industries such as dereg-
ulated electricity markets (Bolle, 1992), telecommunications (Maille´ et al., 2009) and
even between public transport operators (Beesley, 1990; Williams and Martin, 1993),
discussion or analysis of this policy question has hardly surfaced in the literature
on private sector toll road concessionaire competition. Tacit collusion can be char-
acterised by indirect communication where “firms infer rivals’ intentions from their
actions or from market outcomes” (Porter, 2005, p. 148, italics added). Extending
this idea, this thesis addresses this gap in the literature by means of an intuitive
modelling approach to enhance understanding of the possibilities and social welfare
consequences of collusion between toll road concessionaires.
2.5 Governmental Competition for Toll Revenues
Recognising that transportation networks span jurisdictional boundaries, an emerg-
ing literature has argued that jurisdictions are politically motivated to employ tolls
to facilitate “tax exporting”. Tax exporting, a concept originating from the public
economics literature, is “the shifting of tax burdens by a locality to non-residents”
(Wildasin, 1987, p. 591). When applied to transportation systems analysis, this
strand of literature does not suggest that residents are exempted from the tolls
but rather, has emphasised that jurisdictions implementing toll pricing only view
extra-jurisdictional users (i.e. users from outside the local jurisdiction such as non
residents traversing the network) as a source of toll revenue without regard for their
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welfare in the toll setting decisions. As will discussed in this section, this view,
found in a small but growing literature (Levinson, 2001; De Borger et al., 2007,
2008; De Borger and Proost, 2012), further challenges the conventional implicit
assumption of benevolence of jurisdictions introducing toll pricing.
Tax exporting was never raised as an issue in Singapore where a toll pricing scheme
was introduced in 1975 because being a city state, “transport planning in Singapore
is facilitated by the fact that there is only one level of government for the island.
This avoids the problems of overlapping jurisdictions between urban and suburban
areas that are common in, for example, the United States. It also avoids conflicts
over priorities among municipal, state (or county) and national decision makers”
(Watson and Holland, 1978, p. 21). Similarly, conflicts between jurisdictions did
not emerge as an issue during the implementation of London’s Congestion Charging
Scheme introduced in 2003. While “there was opposition London boroughs, this
did not ultimately represent a major hurdle” (Ison and Enoch, 2005, p. 133). This
is due, in part, to the “vertically integrated transportation system” (Manville and
King, 2013, p. 236) where, TfL, the sole agency responsible for the implementation
of the scheme, exercises considerable influence over the road network in Greater
London (Richards, 2005). The structure accorded by the system was “critical to the
introduction of congestion charging” (Livingstone, 2004, p. 491). Furthermore, by
law, the revenues, net of operating costs, from the London scheme must be spent on
measures to further the Mayor’s Transport Strategy applicable across all London
boroughs (House of Commons, 2009).
2.5.1 Multiple Level Governments and Externalities
Yet, the governance of toll pricing in Singapore and London can be regarded as
atypical. More usually, toll pricing schemes are designed and implemented within
a political and institutional setting with multi-level governance structures (Taylor
and Schweitzer, 2005). As a result, there is a division of responsibilities between
sub-national (i.e. state or local) governments and a national (e.g. in UK context)
or federal (e.g. in the US context) level government. For example, in the US,
the responsibility for transportation policy “is shared vertically by local, state and
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federal governments, and horizontally across a wide range of local and regional
governments and agencies” (Manville and King, 2013, p. 230). The mainstream
public economics literature highlights that in the process of making their individual
tax decisions, each level of government generates fiscal externalities (Dahlby, 1996;
Hoyt, 2001; Dahlby and Wilson, 2003; Spahn, 2007) i.e. unintended fiscal impacts
on a different government as a result of a decision a government makes.
Both vertical and horizontal fiscal externalities have been identified in the literature.
A vertical fiscal externality “occurs in a federation when the taxes or expenditures of
one level of government affect the budget constraint of another level of government”
(Dahlby and Wilson, 2003, p. 917). It is important to note that vertical fiscal
externalities act in both directions (Hoyt, 2001). In other words, just as federal
taxes affect state revenues, it is also the case that state taxes affect federal revenues.
For example, in the US, the fuel tax consists of a portion payable to the federal
and another to the state government (FHWA, 2012). This could result in a tax
level that is too high when a state government increases its tax levels ignoring
the reduction in federal tax revenues with the unintended consequence that the
shared tax base is reduced (Flowers, 1988; Besley and Rosen, 1998). In this regard,
Devereux et al. (2007) found evidence of significant interaction in US fuel tax rates
between governments at the state and federal levels.
A horizontal fiscal externality occurs “when two or more jurisdictions at the same
level of government encounter costs, or draw benefits from, some policy or action”
(Spahn, 2007, p. 167). An example is the competition for funds between local
governments for the same tax base (Ferreira et al., 2005). The Tiebout model
(Tiebout, 1956) is a “monopolistically competitive model of many similar commu-
nities differentiated by the offerings of the public sector as well as other amenities
that influence people’s locational choices” (Ulbrich, 2011, p. 41). Assuming perfect
mobility of households, the Tiebout model hypothesises that competition between
jurisdictions is welfare improving because it allows for better matching of diverse
household preferences (De Borger and Proost, 2012), others (Oates and Schwab,
1988; Wilson, 1999) suggests that such competition “induces a race to the bottom
in the relevant tax rates, potentially resulting in inefficiently low provision of public
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goods” (Bru¨lhart and Jametti, 2006, p. 2028). In this way, the fiscal externality
arising from the competition for mobile capital could result in tax rates being too
low. Applying this in the transportation context, De Borger and Proost (2012) note
that faced with elastic demand from traffic passing through its borders (e.g. hauliers
who have the option to refuel elsewhere), having a low fuel tax rate in Luxembourg
increases its tax revenues (Rietveld and van Woudenberg, 2005), potentially at the
expense of its neighbours (Swedish Environment Protection Agency, 2000).
Tax exporting is another instance of a horizontal fiscal externality. There is a po-
litical motivation, because of vote maximisation, for local politicians to tax export
by acting in the interests of their residents (Besley and Case, 1995; Wassmer, 2005)
but disregard (positive or negative) spillovers of local policies on other jurisdic-
tions (Spahn, 2007). Knight (2004) studied US congressional votes in matters of
transportation funding and found empirical evidence that a politician’s probabil-
ity of supporting a transportation project increases in own-district spending but
decreases in the tax burden associated with aggregate spending.
As will be discussed below, tax exporting is intimately related to issues of equity
and in particular, the utilisation of the toll revenues collected from a toll pricing
scheme.
2.5.2 Equity and Revenue Use
As discussed in Section 2.2, the basic justification for the use of tolls as a policy
measure to internalise externalities and correct market failure, is rooted in the pur-
suit of efficiency. More precisely, internalising the congestion externality is viewed
as a Pareto efficient policy under the Kaldor-Hicks criteria (Hicks, 1939; Kaldor,
1939) as long as those who are made better off could potentially compensate those
that made worse off, such that a Pareto improving outcome results (Scitovsky, 1941;
Johansson, 1991). However, there is yet another objective of transport policy that
has been overlooked in this discussion thus far: the issue of distributional fairness
or equity (Rosen and Gayer, 2008; Levinson, 2010).
A review of the literature supports the view expressed in May (1986) that equity
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issues, whether real or perceived, have been used to dismiss restraint proposals
such as toll pricing. Thus equity concerns could partially explain why in many
cities toll pricing may not be on the political agenda, and why schemes have been
considered, but not implemented in cities such as Edinburgh (Raje´ et al., 2004;
Saunders, 2005; Gaunt et al., 2006, 2007), Manchester (Ahmed, 2011), New York
(Schaller, 2010) and Hong Kong (Borins, 1988). There is an increasing consensus
that equity arguments are only a partial explanation for the more general issue of
acceptability of toll pricing as a policy measure (Schade and Schlag, 2000, 2003;
Jaensirisak et al., 2005). Giuliano summarises the issue succinctly in noting that
“distributional equity may present an apparently legitimate basis for opposition that
is actually motivated by other reasons” (Giuliano, 1992, p. 349).
It has been noted that “political acceptability depends very much on the distribu-
tion (and perception of the distribution) of gains and losses to a proposed change”
(Levinson, 2010, p. 33). In particular, three groups of road users will be made
worse off as a result of tolls (Hau, 2005, p. 92): a) users who remain on the tolled
road because they incur the toll charge, b) users who are inconvenienced because
they suppress/retime their trips, divert to alternative routes or modes and c) ex-
isting users of alternative routes/modes who might experience increased congestion
(due to diversions). However, it is the government, in collecting toll revenues, that
is made better off (Hau, 2005). With respect to the aforementioned Kaldor-Hicks
criteria for Pareto improving outcomes, it is the use of this revenue that allows for
the translation of the potential compensation into actual compensation. Thus it
has been consistently emphasised that equity effects, real or perceived, will depend
on how the revenue collected is used (Small, 1992; Armelius and Hultkrantz, 2006;
King et al., 2007; Schuitema and Steg, 2007; May et al., 2010; Levinson, 2010).
Consequently, models of how the toll revenues collected from pricing could be used
have been proposed (Goodwin, 1989; Jones, 1991; Small, 1992). Goodwin (1989)
suggested a three way split sharing the revenues between roads, public transport
and tax reductions. Similarly, Small (1992) proposed a revenue distribution model
to make toll pricing practical and politically viable by monetary reimbursements
to all travellers as a group, substitution of toll pricing revenues for general taxes
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and the provision of new transportation services. In this way, “earmarking” or
“revenue hypothecation” could be used as a means to increase support for toll pricing
proposals. However, there are two often neglected caveats to this argument.
Firstly, it is crucial to bear in mind that the categorisation of users who potentially
lose out from implementation of toll pricing is conducted at the aggregate level.
This does not translate directly into impacts at the individual level (Small, 1992).
For example, in order to encourage local governments in the UK to consider the
use of toll pricing to reduce congestion and to increase the public acceptability of
scheme proposals, provisions in the Transport Act 2000 explicitly permitted local
governments to retain the revenues collected from toll pricing for the purposes of
meeting local transportation needs. However, since transportation networks natu-
rally transcend jurisdictional boundaries, it is inevitable that individuals originating
from outside the jurisdiction implementing the scheme would utilise the road net-
work in the jurisdiction. Therefore “the people who benefit from congestion relief
and revenue use do not neccessarily coincide with those who pay the fees or who
suffer the inconvenience in order to avoid them” (Small, 1992, p. 362).
Secondly, the revenue distribution argument implicitly assumes that jurisdictions
are benevolent and regard the welfare of all users equally. However, it should be
recognised that “[t]he viability of any redistribution plan, in other words, pivots on
the credibility of the institution doing the collecting” (Manville and King, 2013, pp.
230-231). While Manville and King (2013) point out that it is difficult to promote
toll pricing to the public because they do not perceive governments who promise to
recycle the revenues as credible, this thesis looks towards an alternative literature,
discussed below, which argues that if jurisdictions tax export by treating extra-
jurisdictional users traversing their road networks solely as a revenue source but
ignoring their welfare, the implementation of distributed/decentralised toll pricing
schemes can significantly reduce social welfare compared to a cooperative pricing
policy, as will be analysed next.
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Welfare Effects of Tax Exporting
Assuming that the government is “a black box, through which revenue flows in
and out, without diversion or impediment” (Manville and King, 2013, p. 230),
the judicious use of toll revenues can alleviate equity concerns associated with toll
pricing policies. In reality, with tax exporting and the consequent desire to raise rev-
enue from extra-jurisdictional users, jurisdictions would display behaviour similar to
“that of a profit-maximizer with respect to its tolling of foreign travellers” (Ubbels
and Verhoef, 2008b, p. 177). As a result, the studies, to be discussed below, have
concluded that the fundamental insights from private toll road concessionaire com-
petition (as discussed in Section 2.4.2, p. 35), similarly apply when the “operators”
in this context are governments.
Fig. 2.3 reproduces Fig. 2.1 and as before, the MSC and ASC curves refer to the
Marginal Social Cost and Average Social Cost respectively (see p. 18). However,
two inverse demand curves are shown on Fig. 2.3. The first, labelled D(Local),
refers to the inverse demand function pertaining to local (i.e. jurisdiction) traffic
and is equal to the Marginal Social Benefit (MSB) of local users only. The other
curve, D(Total) (equal to MSB(Total)), refers to the inverse demand function (equal
to Marginal Social Benefits) for both local and extra-jurisdictional traffic.
As the Pigouvian rule does not distinguish between local and extra-jurisdictional
users, the welfare maximising traffic flow level should be given at point c where
D(Total) intersects the MSC resulting in a traffic flow of v* pcus/hr. As previously
emphasised, traffic should be charged the first best toll, x*, in order to eliminate the
welfare loss due to the congestion externality as given by the area abc.
Consider next the toll setting decision from the perspective of a local jurisdiction.
The literature, elaborated further below, assumes that the jurisdiction is only con-
cerned with the welfare of local users only and the toll revenues collected from
extra-jurisdictional users. Since the jurisdiction is assumed to be interested in the
MSB experienced by local users only, in setting the toll, they will equate MSC with
MSB(Local).
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Figure 2.3: Illustrating Toll Setting with Tax Exporting Intentions by a Jurisdiction
(Adapted from De Borger and Proost, 2008, p. 331)
This intersection occurs at point f with traffic flow of vj pcus/hr. However, they
are also interested in the toll revenues that can be earned from extra-jurisdictional
users (e.g. through traffic). Assuming that the jurisdiction is unable to discriminate
between local and extra-jurisdictional users, the price the jurisdiction will charge to
all users for the use of the road, will be pj. At the traffic flow of vj, p0 is the costs
users themselves incur in making the trip (as given by the ASC at point g). Thus
the toll, being the difference between pj and p0, is xj (shown on Fig. 2.3 by the line
segment marked eg).
Hence, exactly similar to the situation of toll setting by a revenue maximising toll
road concessionaire (see the discussion on p. 35), a tax exporting jurisdiction levies
a toll that consists of two components. The first is related to the objective of
internalising congestion, stemming from the desire to maximise welfare for local
users only (shown on Fig. 2.3 by the line segment marked fg). This rectifies the
discrepancy between MSC and ASC, i.e. the marginal external congestion costs, at
the traffic flow of vj pcus/hr. The second component, the demand related markup,
similar to that toll road concessionaires levy, is because of the desire to maximise
revenue from extra-jurisdictional users (shown on Fig. 2.3 by the line segment
marked ef). Therefore the toll a tax exporting jurisdiction sets, xj, exceeds x*,
the first best toll intended solely to internalise congestion. As a consequence of the
“profit-maximising behaviour of governments” (Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008b, p. 177),
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this means that MSB exceeds MSC, resulting in a welfare loss vis-a´-vis first best
pricing, given by the area cef.
Since “jurisdictions care for the well being of their citizens, but they are also in-
terested in potential tax and toll revenues” (De Borger and Proost, 2012, p. 35),
the fundamental question of interest is whether the welfare improvments achieved
by internalising the congestion externality through tolls (area abc), is outweighed
by the welfare decreasing fiscal externality of tax exporting (area cef). This is the
underlying theme of the literature reviewed in the following section.
2.5.3 Evidence of Inter-jurisdictional Tax Exporting
The propensity for jurisdictions to engage in tax exporting can be substantiated by
a combination of insights obtained from econometric analysis, reviews of literature
documenting attempts to introduce toll pricing schemes as well as conclusions drawn
from model based studies. These are summarised in this section.
Econometric Analysis
Econometric analysis by Levinson (2001) and Rork (2009) utilising data from the
US, provides empirical evidence supporting the existence of tax exporting behaviour.
Levinson (2001) was interested in the decision of whether a state would introduce toll
pricing or otherwise. He found that the more non-resident workers a state has, the
greater the likelihood of it introducing toll pricing. Furthermore, Levinson (2001)
found evidence of a beggar-thy-neighbour policy effect: for a state with a large
number of residents commuting out of state and if those neighbouring states toll,
it would also likely retaliate by imposing its own tolls. This beggar-thy-neighbour
effect arising as a consequence of predatory tax competition is a phenomenon doc-
umented in the public economics literature (Ambrosanio and Bordignon, 2006, p.
313) and will be observed in the case studies in this thesis.
Rork (2009), building on Levinson (2001), applied econometric techniques to study
the intensity of the inter-jurisdcitional competition for toll revenues. Rork (2009)
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concluded that a 10% increase in per capita toll revenues of neighbouring states was
met with a 4% increase in per capita toll revenues in the home state (Rork, 2009,
p. 137).
Analysis of Proposed Toll Pricing Schemes
Further evidence of tax exporting behaviour can be found in the literature document-
ing attempts to implement various toll pricing schemes around the world. While
the literature on these post mortems have tended to focus on the acceptability of
toll pricing as an instrument of demand restraint (Schade and Schlag, 2000, 2003;
Jaensirisak et al., 2005), this literature also supports the view that perceptions of
tax exporting intentions by the scheme proponents could have exacerbated public
opposition to the proposals.
Tax exporting was one of the issues underlying discussions surrounding Edinburgh’s
congestion charging proposal. Commentators studying the collapse of Edinburgh’s
proposal (Raje´ et al., 2004; McQuaid and Grieco, 2005; Saunders, 2005; Gaunt et al.,
2006), which was rejected by over 70% of voters at the referendum (Saunders, 2005),
have highlighted that the scheme would strongly affect drivers of those vehicles orig-
inating outside the jurisdiction of City of Edinburgh Council (CEC) who proposed
the scheme. For example, “half of the working population of mid-Lothian [sic] travel
into Edinburgh every day for work and would be directly affected by the charge”
(Laird et al., 2007, p. 181). This was further compounded by CEC explicitly provid-
ing an exemption for its own residents from having to pay the toll to cross the outer
cordon (Raje´ et al., 2004; Gaunt et al., 2006; Laird et al., 2007). This exemption
was opposed by three neighbouring authorities (Fife, Midlothian and West Lothian)
who subsequently launched a legal challenge to the scheme (BBC, 2005).
While Scottish legislation facilitates toll pricing proposals, it also requires that toll
revenues are earmarked for transport projects (Laird et al., 2007). Thus simultane-
ous with the toll pricing proposals, CEC had also proposed a revenue sharing scheme
where the toll revenues, net of collection costs, would be used for transport projects
that would benefit residents of adjacent local authorities “in proportion to the trip
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origins of those paying the congestion charge” (Laird et al., 2007, p. 163). With the
revenue sharing proposals, it was forecast that slightly more than half of the charge
payers would originate from within CEC’s jurisdiction, so CEC would retain slightly
more than half of the revenues with the rest being distributed to these adjacent local
authorities for their disbursements on transport schemes (Gaunt et al., 2006, p. 89).
Similarly, Schaller (2010) highlights that local opposition to the charging proposal
for Manhattan (New York City) came from elected officials and civic groups in the
four New York City boroughs outside Manhattan such as eastern Queens and south-
ern Brooklyn. Also it was proposed that the revenue collected from drivers would
be used to fund transit improvements benefiting the residents of New York City
(TRB, 2011, p. 118). This proposal ultimately stalled in the New York senate and
was subsequently abolished. The potential for tax exporting was also raised regard-
ing Manchester’s proposed toll pricing scheme as evidenced in parliamentary debates
(Hansard, 2008) where members of the UK House of Commons emphasised that res-
idents from jurisdictions outside the jurisdiction of the scheme’s proponents would
incur the charges but not necessarily benefit from public transport improvements
associated with the use of toll revenues.
The toll pricing scheme in Stockholm has been in operation since 2007, after a six
month trial culminating in a referendum (Stockholmfo¨rso¨ket, 2006). Studies of the
chronology of events leading to its permanent implementation (Eliasson et al., 2008;
Bo¨rjesson et al., 2012) provide further evidence suggesting that tolls are used (or
perceived as being used) as an instrument of tax exporting. In ascending order of
jurisdiction, the Swedish hierarchy of government comprises the municipality, the
county and the national government, with responsibility for local transportation de-
volved to the municipality (Bo¨rjesson et al., 2012). Thus the city of Stockholm, one
of the 26 municipalities constituting Stockholm County, stressed that it was entirely
within its authority to propose such a scheme and decide on the scheme charac-
teristics as well as restrict voting in the referendum to residents of its municipality
only. On the other hand, neighbouring municipalities within the county opposed the
scheme, highlighting that as the tolls would negatively affect their residents, they
should also be entitled to vote in the referendum (Eliasson et al., 2008; Isaksson and
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Richardson, 2009).
Thus even though “there is no such thing as a regional referendum in Swedish leg-
islation” (Isaksson and Richardson, 2009, p. 255), several (but not all) surrounding
municipalities also organised simultaneous local referenda on the scheme, some of
which were politically motivated. While the official referendum held in the city of
Stockholm returned a majority in favour of the scheme, the overall result of the par-
allel referenda, held in the surrounding municipalities, returned a majority against
(Gullberg and Isaksson, 2009). Under Swedish law, the toll charge is legally inter-
preted as a tax. As Swedish legislation explicitly stipulates that “Swedish munici-
palities cannot levy taxes on other than their own citizens” (Bo¨rjesson et al., 2012, p.
10), the decision was referred to the national government. Consequently, when the
toll pricing scheme was reintroduced on a permanent basis, responsibility for man-
agement of the scheme was transferred from the municipality to the national level
through a newly created National Transport Agency (Transportstyrelsen) (Bo¨rjesson
et al., 2012, p. 10).
The evolution of the Stockholm scheme also raises an underlying question of whether
responsibility for the implementation and management of toll pricing schemes should
rest at the national/federal level or whether toll pricing should be viewed primarily as
a traffic management policy tool with responsibilities devolved to local jurisdictions.
Model Based Studies
From a survey of the literature, Table 2.2 presents several model based studies that
have provided insights on toll competition between governments. This table lists
the references and, apart from Laird et al. (2007) (see later), the nature of the
governmental competition investigated i.e. whether horizontal or vertical compe-
tition or both. As mentioned previously (see Fig. 1.1 on p. 2), “horizontal” or
inter-jurisdictional competition refers to competition between governments at the
same level while “vertical” or inter-governmental competition refers to competition
between governments at different levels.
In addition, for each reference listed, the network representation used in the studies
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as well as the policy instrument(s) available to the parties are identified. As Table
2.2 shows, the entire spectrum of network representation have been considered.
Some studies (e.g. Proost and Sen, 2006) do not utilise any network representation
while others (e.g. De Borger et al., 2005) base their findings on networks with two
links. In addition, toll revenue competition in more general networks i.e. those with
multiple links and OD pairs have also been investigated (e.g Zhang et al., 2011).
The common assumption in the studies shown in Table 2.2 is that governments are
benevolent welfare maximising agents acting to further the interests of their own
residents but they regard extra-jurisdictional users both as a source of revenue and
contributing to congestion in the local network neglecting their welfare.
There are, at least, two similarities between the literature investigating competition
between governments and those that have investigated competition between private
toll road concessionaires (see Table 2.1, p. 31).
Firstly, in both cases there have been a mix of studies that have focused on the use of
tolls alone as the policy instrument and those that have allowed for the endogenous
determination of link capacities as well. In the latter case, in the case of competition
between governments as shown in Table 2.2, the works listed all utilised so-called
“two stage” games i.e. strategic encounters between parties where tolls are chosen
in the second stage after capacity had been determined in the first stage. In the
case of competition between governments, this thesis will focus exclusively on the
development of short run models where tolls are used as the sole instrument of
competition.
Secondly, a common theme in the both the studies shown in Table 2.2, with the
exception of Laird et al. (2007), and the literature on private sector toll road com-
petition, discussed in Table 2.1), is that a game theoretic framework is employed to
describe the interactions between the agents in each case in setting tolls to maximise
some objective function. Thus this observation lends justification to the approach
of modelling the strategic interactions of these two groups of prima facie unre-
lated agents (i.e. toll road concessionaires and jurisdictions), exercising control over
toll levels in transportation networks, within a common unifying framework that is
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adopted within this thesis.
Table 2.2: Overview of Literature Relevant to Competition between Governments Distin-
guished by Nature of Competition, Network Representation and Policy Instruments Alllowed
Reference Nature of Network Policy
Competition Representation Instrument(s)
Laird et al. (2007) - No Network Tolls only
De Borger et al. (2005) Horizontal Two Links Tolls only
(Parallel)
De Borger et al. (2007, 2008) Horizontal Two Links Tolls and
(Serial) Capacity
Ubbels and Verhoef (2008b) Horizontal Two Links Tolls and
(Serial) Capacity
Proost and Sen (2006) Vertical No Network Tolls and
Parking Fees
Gu¨hnemann et al. (2011) Horizontal General Tolls only
Zhang et al. (2011) Horizontal General Tolls only
Gu¨hnemann et al. (2014) Horizontal and General Tolls only
Vertical
Though Laird et al. (2007) did not specifically study competition between gov-
ernments per se, these authors provided insights to enhance understanding of toll
setting behaviour by a jurisdiction implementing toll pricing within a distributed
pricing context. For this reason, it is included in the literature review in Table 2.2.
Using a strategic land-use and transport interaction model, Laird et al. (2007) in-
vestigated the welfare implications stemming from the use of toll revenues if the toll
pricing scheme proposed for Edinburgh, as discussed above, had been implemented.
Laird et al. (2007) showed that if CEC (the scheme proponents) could exercise full
authority over the disbursements of revenues collected, they would be incentivised
to levy a toll up to 4 times higher than if there was additional oversight from a
higher level government such as the Scottish Executive. In addition, CEC would be
inclined to redistribute the revenues collected to their own citizens (e.g. by reducing
local taxation) rather than to invest in transportation that would benefit extra-
jurisdictional users as well. Thus while non-Edinburgh resident users contributed to
the toll revenues, the benefits would be reaped by the residents in CEC’s jurisdiction,
emphasising the possibility of CEC exhibiting tax exporting behaviour.
While De Borger et al. (2005) considered toll revenue competition in a network
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consisting of two links in parallel, De Borger et al. (2007, 2008) studied the same
situation but with two links in series. In all cases, each link was subject to tolls by a
different government. Local traffic circulating within each government’s jurisdiction
was limited to using the link within each jurisdiction. In addition, these works also
allowed for “transit traffic”, i.e. traffic passing through the network but with origins
and destinations outside either jurisdiction. This transit traffic had the option of
using either link in the parallel case but had to use both links in the serial case.
Thus when traversing the network, transit traffic would interact with local traffic i.e.
contribute to and suffer from local congestion. Each government was assumed to be
interested in the welfare of their own jurisdiction as well as revenues from tolls (if
any) on transit. The authors considered three toll pricing regimes: a) differentiated
tolls on transit and local traffic, b) uniform tolls for transit and local traffic and
c) no tolls on transit but tolls on local traffic.
In the case of parallel links, De Borger et al. (2005) concluded that independent (or
non-cooperative) setting of tolls on transit by each government was not detrimental
to welfare. In particular, the scenario with no tolls on transit but tolls being limited
to local traffic fared the worst in welfare terms. In contrast to this, in the serial case,
De Borger et al. (2007, 2008) reported that preventing jurisdictions from individually
deciding toll levels on transit would increase welfare. De Borger et al. (2007, 2008)
attribute this to the double marginalisation problem, discussed previously when
private toll road concessionaires compete for toll revenues on serial links (see p. 37).
In the instances here, each government would set its toll, ignoring the reduction in
revenues to the other government controlling the other link in the series. This would
result in higher tolls with a lower network wide welfare vis-a´-vis a cooperative toll
pricing scheme. This should be contrasted against the substitutability of links in the
parallel case, where the opportunity for rerouting available to transit traffic, would
have cushioned the ability of individual governments to charge very high tolls.
The negative welfare implications of tax exporting were again highlighted in Ubbels
and Verhoef (2008b) who studied competition between a regional government and a
city government. Each government was responsible for setting the toll (and capacity)
of one road each in a two link serial network. In doing so, each jurisdiction was
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assumed to maximise the welfare of its own inhabitants only and the toll revenues
collected. The residents of the region had to use both roads in their commute while
city residents only needed to use the city’s road in their commute. As Ubbels and
Verhoef (2008b) did not allow for reverse commuting (i.e. residing in the city and
working in the region), the set up of the problem they considered was implicitly
asymmetric as the region’s residents would be subject to tolls by the city but the
region was unable to tax export to the city’s residents.
Ubbels and Verhoef (2008b) simulated exhaustive combinations of possible toll pric-
ing strategies by each jurisdiction including the non-cooperative game as well as
situations in which either jurisdiction could act first. In all scenarios, it was shown
that the city was incentivised to set tolls higher than the first best level in order
to extract revenues from residents of the region using the city’s road. While it has
been noted that the toll chosen by the jurisdiction is a “complex expression involv-
ing the relative share of local and transit traffic, the slope of the cost function and
the elasticities of demand” (p. 330, footnote 3, De Borger and Proost, 2008), an
analytical expression for the two link case in Ubbels and Verhoef (2008b) confirms
that beyond internalising the congestion externality (which is expected behaviour
of a welfare maximising government), the city further adds a “demand related mo-
nopolistic mark-up” (Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008b, p. 189). This mark up (shown
previously on Fig. 2.3 on p. 47 as the line segment marked ef), is due to the city
government’s desire to maximise the revenues collected from the extra-jurisdictional
commuters. In one instance, Ubbels and Verhoef (2008b) showed that that the toll
for use of the city road was up to 12 times higher compared to the first best bench-
mark as a result of the demand-related mark up. Note that the cooperative pricing
between jurisdictions is equivalent to the Pigouvian first best as there are only two
roads in their model but this is no longer true in more general networks.
Ubbels and Verhoef (2008b) further concluded that a non-cooperative game between
jurisdictions had particularly negative consequences for overall social welfare in this
serial setting and could, in fact, be worse than not implementing any toll pricing
policies to internalise congestion, resulting in a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (Chapter 3
discusses this game theoretic topic further). This was the consistent message re-
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ported in Zhang et al. (2011) and Gu¨hnemann et al. (2011, 2014) who studied
inter-jurisdictional competition in more general networks with multiple OD pairs
where each government managed a subset of the network.
The “Stackelberg” game (von Stackelberg, 1934, see also further discussion in Chap-
ter 4) is a model of industrial organisation where a dominant firm (Varian, 2010, p.
499) (henceforth, the Stackelberg leader) is able to gain a profit advantage over its
competitors, known as “followers”, by being able to act first as a result of its abil-
ity to anticipate the followers’ reactions to its strategies (Church and Ware, 2000).
Ubbels and Verhoef (2008b) noted that the overall welfare consequences were rela-
tively similar regardless of whether the region or the city assumed the role of the
Stackelberg leader and acted first (i.e. before its rival) when setting the toll level or
whether they acted simultaneously (i.e. at the same time as its rival) when doing
so, as conventionally assumed in a non-cooperative game (see Chapter 3).
In contrast to the previous cases, Proost and Sen (2006) investigated the effects of
vertical competition i.e. revenue competition between different levels of government.
These authors considered an urban government in charge of the city and a regional
government where the city is a part of the region. Thus while the urban government
was interested in the welfare of the urban residents exclusively, the regional govern-
ment was concerned with the welfare of both the commuters (i.e. residents of the
region outside the city) and the city residents. This is in contrast to the set up used
in Ubbels and Verhoef (2008b) who had assumed that the city and region were two
distinct, non-overlapping jurisdictions.
In the first set of tests, Proost and Sen assumed that the city exercised control over
parking fees which its own inhabitants and commuters from the region had to pay
while the regional government controlled a cordon toll payable only by commuters
accessing the city. The revenue from the cordon tolls was redistributed to the
commuters while the city redistributed revenues from parking charges to its own
residents only.
In the non-cooperative game that Proost and Sen tested in a strategic transport
model devoid of network representation, the outcome was only marginally worse
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than the fully cooperative solution. This was because of the jurisdictional overlap as
the region took into account the welfare of the city inhabitants as well. Nevertheless,
because the city exercised full control of the parking charges which it redistributed
to its own residents only, the city continued to have an incentive to tax export by
levying high parking fees on commuters.
Proost and Sen (2006) also considered revenue sharing where the region gave the
city a share of the cordon toll revenues. In this case, the revenue sharing strategy
was shown to reduce the parking charges the city set and thus counteracted the
appetite of the city to tax export.
Gu¨hnemann et al. (2011) studied competition in a large network setting between
two neighbouring jurisdictions (Peak Distict and Sheffield), both located within the
environmentally sensitive Transpennine corridor in northern England using a traffic
assignment model. In the non-cooperative game between these two jurisdictions,
Gu¨hnemann et al. (2011) found that the Peak District would act as a tax exporter
and was incentivised to levy a high cordon toll to extract revenues from extra-
jurisdictional traffic. The ability of the Peak district to do so was due to its strategic
location in the centre of the Transpennine corridor such that alternative routes
avoiding the toll cordon around the jurisdiction were far more costly in terms of
generalised travel time. In a general network context, if extra-jurisdictional users
were able to avoid traversing through toll points controlled by a jurisdiction, this
would reduce the opportunity for tax exporting. This also explains why De Borger
et al. (2005) who studied toll competition between jurisdictions in a parallel two
link setting where possibility for traffic to reroute exists, had concluded that non-
cooperative toll pricing was not detrimental to welfare.
Similar conclusions were reached in Gu¨hnemann et al. (2014) who, extending the
horizontal toll revenue competition model between Peak District and Sheffield de-
veloped in Gu¨hnemann et al. (2011), added a vertical competition scenario. In
Gu¨hnemann et al. (2014), the HA, applying distance-based tolls on the strategic
motorway and trunk roads, took on the role of the “higher level” government agent
taking into account the welfare of the entire network and sharing toll revenues with
the Peak District and Sheffield. The tests showed that a coordinated/cooperative
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pricing strategy would deliver the largest global (i.e. from a network wide perspec-
tive) efficiency gains. The authors also reported that preventing Peak District (the
jurisdiction that stood to gain most by tax exporting) from introducing tolls would
also improve welfare but this would be infeasible because tolls introduced by both
Sheffield and the HA would adversely impact the welfare of Peak District.
Similar to the previous authors, Zhang et al. (2011) studied distributed toll pricing
schemes where toll pricing was implemented within each jurisdictions independently
and schemes where jurisdictions cooperatively decided the toll levels. Zhang et al.
(2011) showed that toll pricing policies introduced by a jurisdiction could have both
beneficial as well as detrimental welfare impacts on another jurisdiction. In other
words, the welfare impact of toll pricing on other jurisdictions is not necessarily
adverse.
Nevertheless, Zhang et al. (2011) highlighted that it was difficult to generalise the
outcome of non-cooperative policies (i.e. whether they would be beneficial or detri-
mental) which is dependent on both the network structure and composition of trip
origins and destinations. While cooperation among regions in the setting of tolls
would improve network wide social welfare, the authors noted that this could mean
some jurisdictions being made better off at the expense of others.
Furthermore, Zhang et al. (2011) also modelled the situation in which one jurisdic-
tion acted as a Stackelberg leader taking into account the reactions of other juris-
dictions when setting their tolls. However, similar to Ubbels and Verhoef (2008b)
discussed above, they showed that the presence of a Stackelberg leader did not have
any material effect on the overall welfare outcome of competition between jurisdic-
tions.
Discussion
It is clear from the review presented thus far that the implementation of toll pricing
in one jurisdiction could have negative impacts on the welfare of another. In this
way, the jurisdiction negatively affected could “retaliate” by introducing a similar
policy in an attempt to alleviate the impacts. However, it is important to note that
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impacts may not always be adverse and a cooperative pricing scheme could equally
result in jurisdiction(s) benefitting at the expense of others.
This literature has consistently highlighted that the incentive for jurisdictions to
tax export. In this way, when setting tolls, jurisdictions pursue two simulta-
neous objectives: “improving transport conditions as far as their own residents
are concerned and generating profit or tax revenue from through traffic” (De Borger
and Proost, 2012, p. 39). To reiterate, the key issue, addressed in this literature
and further investigated in this thesis through the case studies in Chapter 8 and 9,
revolves around the question whether the welfare improvements achieved by using
tolls to (imperfectly) internalise the congestion externality, is outweighed by the
welfare decreasing fiscal externality of tax exporting, brought about by the desire
to maximise toll revenues from extra-jurisdictional users.
De Borger et al. (2008) argue that the serial network structure is more realistic
than the parallel network. For example, the Trans-European Networks for Trans-
port (TEN-T) in the EU (EC, 2014) and the Interstate Highway System in the US
(FHWA, 2014) are networks comprising mainly serial transport corridors. This has
important practical implications. As a result of the double marginalisation prob-
lem stemming from the desire to maximise revenue from extra-jurisdictional users,
overall welfare could be improved if jurisdictions were prevented from introducing
tolls (De Borger and Proost, 2012). In other words, any toll pricing policy should
be coordinated at a federal/national level. However, this would conflict with supra-
national bodies such as the EU, with its commitment to subsidiarity (Voorhees,
2005).
It can be seen that these issues are inseparable from the underlying question as to
what the appropriate level of government for the governance of toll pricing should
be. In other words, whether toll pricing should be instituted at a national level
or whether it should be viewed as a local traffic management tool with respon-
sibility devolved to jurisdictions. While local officials are better able to identify
transportation needs in their jurisdictions than federal officials (Dilger, 2012), they
would neglect inter-jurisdictional spillovers which the federal government would be
best placed to adequately account for while ensuring that national interests are met
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(Banzhaf and Chupp, 2012). From the literature reviewed above, two opposite ends
of the spectrum have been advocated thus far. On the one hand, in Sweden, follow-
ing the permanent reintroduction of toll pricing in Stockholm, responsibility for the
management of the scheme has been transferred to the national level. On the other
hand, in the UK, as facilitated by legislation, the approach adopted is one whereby
toll revenues are hypothecated or earmarked for meeting local needs.
It is well documented in the public economics literature (e.g. Ulbrich, 2011) that
central governments are able to both correct inter-jurisdictional spillovers and in-
fluence the activities of lower level governments using revenue sharing agreements.
For example, in Canada, a country with a federal system of government, the lower
level (provincial) governments receive a share of the federal gas tax revenues (De-
partment of Finance, Canada, 2005). In the toll pricing context, revenue sharing
is of practical relevance since, in the case of Edinburgh (Gaunt et al., 2006; Laird
et al., 2007), CEC had explicitly proposed sharing toll revenues collected from users
originating in neighbouring jurisdictions with these authorities.
Though the public economics literature recognises that revenue sharing can be used
to minimise inter-jurisdictional spillovers (Ladd, 2005; Brillantes and Tiu Sonco,
2007), there is, however, only limited literature regarding the effects of revenue
sharing within a transportation context. While Proost and Sen (2006) showed that
revenue sharing did reduce the incentives for tax exporting, it should be noted
that these authors focused entirely on vertical competition between two levels of
governments with overlapping tax bases. Thus the consequences of revenue sharing,
in the case of horizontal competition investigated in this thesis within the more,
realistic serial network structure remain to be investigated.
Despite the aforementioned similarities between private revenue maximising con-
cessionaires and tax exporting jurisdictions in their toll setting decisions, there is
one crucial difference. While private sector concessionaires intent on engaging in
restrictive practices would be legally prohibited from making binding agreements
to collude, (national and lower level) governments have ample opportunity to par-
take in, and conclude binding bilateral or multilateral agreements (e.g. Keohane,
1990). For example, the ten local governments constituting Greater Manchester,
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UK form the so called Greater Manchester Combined Authority with responsibil-
ities for transportation planning and policy in the region (GMCA, 2014). Thus a
limitation of the majority of the literature above is the assumption that governments
engaging in toll competition play non-cooperative games (see Chapter 3 for further
discussion on Game Theory).
Besides the non-cooperative case, De Borger and Pauwels (2010) have also allowed
for jurisdictions to cooperate, through bilateral bargaining, in the setting of tolls
(and capacities). These authors show that cooperation could reduce the welfare
losses associated with independent uncoordinated toll setting decisions. In this
thesis, the welfare impacts of bilateral cooperative agreements between jurisdictions
with regard to both revenue sharing and toll pricing will be investigated.
Where competition between governments in general networks have been studied
previously (Gu¨hnemann et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2011; Gu¨hnemann et al., 2014),
the resulting toll levels were obtained using grid search methods and heuristic ap-
proaches. This suggests the need for the development of solution algorithms that will
take into account the route choices of the users of the network as the jurisdictions
react to the toll levels chosen by their rivals. This thesis will thus contribute through
the development of solution methods that allow for the determination of toll levels
when these different governments compete for toll revenues from extra-jurisdictional
users while simultaneously maximising welfare of local users.
Several studies reviewed above (Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008a; Zhang et al., 2011) have
shown that allowing a jurisdiction to play the role of the Stackleberg leader which
could act first and decide toll levels before other follower jurisdictions, taking into
account the reactions of these followers, does not have a material effect on the overall
welfare consequences. For this reason, this thesis will not consider the case of any
government acting as a Stackleberg leader and thus assume that the jurisdictions
engage on an “equal footing”.
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2.6 Summary
This chapter began by outlining the argument, advanced by economists (Pigou,
1920; Knight, 1924), for the implementation of toll pricing in traffic networks which
is intended to correct a market failure arising from the discrepancy between private
and social costs of highway use. This strand of literature has emphasised that
tolls are required to ensure that road users take into account the externalities they
impose on others when using the road network. However, the first best pricing
system that this principle dictates, when generalised to a network context, requires
that users are charged a toll for use of all congested roads in a network. Due to
the impracticalities associated with this requirement, large portions of literature has
focused on the second best toll pricing problem where, amongst other second best
issues, only a subset of links are subject to tolls or where links are constrained to
form a cordon around a congested city centre.
The classical argument for toll pricing is predicated on the assumption of a single
benevolent regulator exercising control over all aspects of toll pricing seeking to
maximise welfare for all network users. As a result of both deregulation and the
recognition that in reality, transportation networks transcend jurisdictional bound-
aries, this assumption has been challenged. These observations point to the need to
augment the single regulator paradigm with a framework capable of encompassing
multiple agents in the execution of toll pricing policies.
As traditional fuel tax based financing of infrastructure are found to be insufficient
to satisfy needs for system expansion, private sector participation in the highway
transportation sector has increased. This has led to increased interests in private
toll roads. The multiple agent framework discussed in this chapter allows for a
discussion of competition between toll road concessionaires in highway networks
which is substantiated by practical examples of private toll road competition. As
stressed in this chapter, the answer to the question of whether social welfare is
improved or otherwise as a result of competition between concessionaires pivots on
with the interrelationships of the toll roads in competition i.e. whether they serve
as substitutes or complements in a journey (Engel et al., 2004; Small and Verhoef,
62
2007; Mun and Ahn, 2008; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2012; van den Berg, 2013).
Additionally, the multiple agent framework is essential in evaluating outcomes when
jurisdictions engage in competition for toll revenues in which case the assumption
of benevolence of governments is called into doubt. The literature reviewed in
this chapter has argued that in implementing toll pricing strategies, jurisdictions
might be concerned only with the welfare of their residents but simply regard extra-
jurisdictional users as a source of revenue (e.g De Borger et al., 2005, 2007, 2008;
Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008b; Laird et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2011; De Borger and
Proost, 2012). The general theme of this strand of literature is that this is because
of the incentive of jurisdictions independently implementing a decentralised pricing
scheme to tax export. In seeking to maximise revenues from extra-jurisidictional
users, it was shown that the behaviour of jurisdictions become indistinguishable
from revenue maximising toll road concessionaires when, in setting toll charges,
they also levy a mark up taking the toll level beyond that required to (imperfectly)
internalise congestion. In a decentralised pricing scheme, it is further argued that
strategies for the use of toll revenues which are intended to alleviate equity concerns
of toll pricing strategies may in fact, worsen the tax exporting implications. This
is because while tolls are paid by all users, local users would most likely be the
beneficiaries of use of the toll revenues collected.
With regard to private toll road competition, the first question to be investigated in
this thesis is the extent of transferability of policy relevant insights established in the
case of networks comprising exclusively of a single OD pair to more realistic network
settings with multiple OD pairs. Another policy relevant question is whether toll
road operators would engage in collusion and if so, what the policy implications of
such collusive behaviour would be.
In the setting of inter-jurisdictional competition for toll revenues, the policy relevant
questions investigated in this thesis stem from whether responsibility for toll pricing
should be instituted at the national level or whether it should be viewed as a local
demand management measure with responsibilities for toll setting devolved to local
jurisdictions. While revenue sharing has been used in the public economics literature
to allay inter-jurisdictional spillovers, its effects have not been investigated in the
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transportation context. Hence this research will investigate the welfare impacts of
revenue sharing strategies when jurisdictions compete for toll revenues.
Furthermore, while private sector toll road concessionaires are legally prevented with
existing anti-trust legislation from making binding collusive agreements, it is often
the case that jurisdictions can cooperate in a multitude of ways. Yet this issue has
not been investigated extensively within a toll pricing context. Thus, this thesis will
study the welfare consequences as a result of jurisdictions engaging in a bilateral
cooperative agreements in both toll setting and revenue sharing.
In order to investigate the welfare implications of competition between toll road
concessionaires and between jurisdictions, solution methodologies that are able to
simultaneously take into account both the decision making behaviour of the multiple
agents exercising control over tolls and the route choice decisions of users in a general
traffic network, are needed. This thesis thus seeks to develop solution algorithms
applicable in such a context.
In concert with the literature reviewed herein and the research gaps identified, the
next chapter thus proceeds to draw on elements of game theory to develop a sound
behavioural model applicable to the study of interactions between these multiple
agents when each is confronted with others implementing toll pricing policies simul-
taneously.
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Chapter 3
Elements of Non-Cooperative
Oligopolistic Game Theory
3.1 Introduction
This thesis investigates competition, which requires an understanding of the interac-
tions, amongst multiple agents exercising control over toll pricing policies in highway
transportation networks. A tool most applicable to the study of such interactions
is game theory, which is the “systematic study of how rational agents behave in
strategic situations” (Jehle and Reny, 2011, p. 305), and a “game” is any situation
in which individuals “interact in a setting of strategic interdependence” (MasCollel
et al., 1995, p. 219). The setting of competition between toll road concessionaires
and governmental jurisdictions, discussed in this thesis, is characterised by rivalry
between a small number of these agents. The microeconomic literature terms such
settings of “competition among the few” (Intriligator, 2002, p. 205) as “oligopolistic
competition”. Thus this chapter will also draw extensively from concepts articulated
in the economics of industrial organisation.
The aim of this chapter is to outline elements of game theory that support the
development of a robust model characterising behaviour of toll road concessionaires
and government jurisdictions, when they interact with their rivals, when exercising
control over toll setting decisions in a highway network.
While the route choice model describing behaviour of users in a highway network
is intrinsically intertwined with the interactions amongst these agents when each
independently decides toll levels, this chapter focuses solely on the behaviour of
these agents. In this way, the agents’ behavioural model is, at least temporarily,
65
artificially disentangled from the underlying route choice model. Subsequently, a
model integrating both the behaviour of agents using the game theoretic concepts
outlined in this chapter and the route choice decisions of users in highway networks,
is presented in Chapters 4 and 5 within a unified modelling framework.
3.1.1 Scope of Coverage
As the scope of Game Theory is relatively broad, it is not the intention to utilise
every aspect of this rich field in formulating a framework to study interactions
between decision makers. The boundaries of the game theoretic models developed
in this thesis are demarcated with reference to the classification of games based on
the following generic characteristics as summarised in Zagare and Slantchev (2010):
• Rules that govern play: Two broad categories are distinguished here namely
Non-Cooperative Games and Cooperative Games. The former explicitly as-
sumes that each participant in a game, referred to as a “player” in game theory
parlance, “acts independently, without collaboration or communication with
any of the others” (Nash, 1951, p. 286). Cooperative games are games where
players are allowed to form coalitions and make binding agreements (Friedman,
1983). This thesis focuses primarily on non-cooperative games. However as
will be seen later in this chapter, the non-cooperative outcome may be worse
for players than if they could cooperate. Thus the possibilities for cooperation
to improve the position of all players simultaneously will also be discussed.
• Rewards to players: The rewards to players (known in Game Theory par-
lance as “payoffs”) are either “constant sum” or “variable sum”. When the
players have diametrically opposed interests, i.e. where a gain to one player
immediately implies a loss to the other, a constant sum game is being played
(Raghavan, 1994). In such a game, the payoffs of the player sum to a constant.
The “zero-sum game” is a special case of a constant sum game which has been
normalised such that the payoffs sum to zero (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
On the other hand, in a variable sum game, the players have both competitive
and complementary motives. It has been noted that games “most character-
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istic of economic life are n-person variable sum games. Two person constant
sum games, though much studied by mathematicians working in game theory,
have little or no applicability to economics” (Friedman, 1983, p. 210). Thus
this thesis will be concerned with variable sum games alone.
• Information available: When the payoffs are “common knowledge”, the game
is said to be a one of complete information. Adapting from Aumann (1976),
information is common knowledge among the players if every player knows
it, every player knows that every player knows it, and so on. This thesis
assumes throughout that payoffs are common knowledge and players possess
all necessary information in order to make rational decisions. In addition, the
acquisition of such information is assumed to be free of transaction costs.
• Representation and timing: In strategic games, players make their moves si-
multaneously while players make moves sequentially in so-called “Extensive
Form” games (Hart, 1992). A further distinction is made between “single
shot” games and the class of “repeated games”. In a single shot game, the
strategic encounter is a static “snapshot” of interaction that takes place as a
one off while repeated games are those where “a one shot game is played a
number of times” (Carmichael, 2005, p. 198) and “players interact more than
once” (Carmichael, 2005, p. 198). This thesis will restrict focus to the case of
the various decisions makers, in control of highway transportation networks,
engaged in single shot strategic games.
3.1.2 Definitions
A strategic game, G, is defined by the triplet {N ,X,φ} where N is the set of n
players {1, 2, . . . , n}. X = X1 × X2 × · · · × Xn is the strategy or action space of
these n players. If X is a finite set, then G is a finite game. On the other hand, if
X is a subset of Rn i.e. Euclidean (real) space, then G is referred to as a continuous
game. In general, games employed in economic modelling are continuous games
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Alo´s-Ferrer and Ania, 2001; Reny, 2008). Thus, except
when necessary to emphasise certain key concepts, finite games are not discussed
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at length in this thesis. The action xi ∈ Xi each player takes will be referred to as
her strategy and the collective actions of all players constitutes a strategy profile,
x = (x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn)
⊺.
The game theory literature (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) distinguishes between
strategies and actions. This distinction becomes critical in Extensive Form games
which are not discussed in this thesis. Thus the terms “actions” and “strategies”
will be used synonymously.
φ is the set of payoff functions for the players where each element is the individual
player’s payoff function, φi, and measures what player i,i ∈ N , obtains by taking a
particular strategy which is dependent on the actions which all other players take.
As games where payoffs might depend on the outcomes of exogenous events occurring
with some probability (with consequences not known at the time of taking action)
are not considered in this thesis, the strategy profiles together with the consequent
payoffs are therefore sufficient to determine the outcome of the game.
To focus attention specifically on player i, it will be convenient to use the nota-
tion x−i to emphasise the actions of every player excluding player i i.e. x−i ,
(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)
⊺. With a slight abuse of notation, the collective action
can then be written as x , (xi,x−i). Writing (xi,x−i) must not be taken to mean
that the components of x are reordered so that actions of player i becomes the first
block.
Each player in G acts obeying the “rationality postulate of non-cooperative be-
haviour” (Gabay and Moulin, 1980, p. 272) which means that each player seeks to
maximise individual payoffs and a larger payoff is always preferred to a smaller one.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. To solve a game is to predict the
outcome of the game. Thus following this introduction, Nash Equilibrium (NE),
the most commonly used solution concept in game theory (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991; Sethi, 2008) is discussed. Employing the concept of best responses, the de-
termination of NE in a finite game is demonstrated. As noted, this thesis focuses
on games where players have infinitely many strategies rather than a finite action
set. Thus two models of oligopolistic competition from economics are discussed in
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Section 3.3. The first is that of Cournot competition where players (firms) engage
in non-cooperative determination of production levels. The second model discussed
is Bertrand competition which, by construction, differs from the Cournot model in
that players are assumed to compete in setting prices, rather than prices. While the
economic models of competition serve the primary purpose of emphasising the inter-
dependencies between decision makers in determining outcomes within a continuous
game setting, it will be highlighted that these economic models of competition are
not directly applicable in the highway transportation context as both congestion
costs and toll prices constitute generalised costs which is the key determinant of
users’ route choices in highway networks. By influencing the users’ routing options,
the payoffs of multiple agents are, in turn, affected. However, the application of the
NE solution concept can result in paradoxical outcomes even though the players are
rational utility maximising economic agents. Games may also have more than one
Nash Equilibria and unless players are allowed to randomise over their actions, there
may be no Nash Equilibria. These properties of the Nash non-cooperative outcome
are discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 summarises.
3.2 Nash Equilibria
In this section, the definition of Nash Equilibrium is introduced. It draws attention
to the notion engendered by the term “equilibrium” reflecting a steady state of
play in the game where “each player holds the correct expectation about the other
players’ behaviour and acts rationally” (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, p. 14).
Whilst other solution concepts for games are also available, such as iterative elimina-
tion of dominated strategies (MasCollel et al., 1995), the NE concept is particularly
appealing as it emphasises both to the simultaneity of decisions of players and draws
attention to the individual pursuit of self-interest, encapsulating within this single
principle, the key characteristics of non-cooperative games (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991).
Definition 3.1. Nash Equilibrium (NE) (Nash, 1950a, 1951):
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A combined strategy profile x∗ = (x∗
1
, x∗
2
, ..., x∗n)
⊺ ∈ X is a Nash Equilibrium for the
game G , {N ,X,φ} if for each player i,i ∈ N , x∗i is a best response to the best
response actions of all other players, x∗−i such that Eq. 3–1 is satisfied.
φi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≥ φi(xi,x
∗
−i) ∀xi ∈ Xi ,∀i ∈ N (Eq. 3–1)
Thus the NE is a point of simultaneous best responses where each player is doing
her best given what other players are doing.
Corollary 3.1. At an NE, no player can benefit (increase individual payoffs) by
unilaterally deviating.
Based on Corollary 3.1, as all players do not have an incentive to change strategies
i.e. deviate from their current position, such a point is indeed an equilibrium.
Exploiting the fixed point theorem (Kakutani, 1941), Nash (1950a) showed that an
NE is a fixed point of the so-called “best response functions”. These best response
functions are defined next. Subsequently, Example 3.1 demonstrates how the NE
can be obtained by identifying best responses.
3.2.1 Best Response Function
Definition 3.2. Best Response Function (Shy, 1995, p. 21):
In the game G , {N ,X,φ} , the best response function of player i is the function
Ri(x−i) that, for given actions x−i of all other players i.e. {1, 2, . . . , i−1, i+1, . . . , n},
assigns an action xi = Ri(x−i), xi ∈ Xi, that maximises player i’s payoff, φi(xi,x−i).
To be mathematically precise, a distinction should be made between functions and
correspondences. By definition, a “correspondence from a domain set X to a range
set Y associates each element of the domain set x in X, a non-empty subset of
Y ,Q(x)” (Ali Khan, 2008, p. 270). On the other hand, “a function is a corre-
spondence such that Q(x) is a singleton for each x in X” (Ali Khan, 2008, p. 270,
italics added). In other words, the function mapping is unique but a correspondence
does not assume uniqueness. Thus, the phrase “best response function”, implicitly
assumes that the best response is unique. While this phrase is retained in this the-
sis since it is frequently encountered in the literature, it should be noted that this
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should be better referred to as the “best response correspondence” since, as will be
discussed (see Section 3.4.3 below), uniqueness is, by no means, guaranteed.
Example 3.1. Applying Best Response to identify NE in a Finite Game
In the game shown in Game 3.1 adapted from Gibbons (1992), both Players I and II
have three actions each. This will be indicated as Xi, i ∈ {I, II} where strategy set
XI are the actions {“Top”, “Middle”, “Bottom”} abbreviated T, M, B respectively.
Similarly, XII is the strategy set comprising actions {“Left”, “Centre”, “Right”},
abbreviated L,C,R respectively. This is an example of a finite game with reference to
the finite or countable action space of each player. Following established convention
in game theory literature (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Gibbons, 1992), the first
value in each cell shows the payoff that Player I (the “row” player) would get if he
plays a strategy in the corresponding row. The second value in each cells shows the
payoff that Player II (the “column” player) would get if he plays a strategy in the
corresponding column. For example, if Player I plays T and II plays strategy L then
I gets is 0 and II gets 4. Similarly, if I plays strategy B and II plays C, then I’s
payoff is 3 and II gets 5.
Player I
Player II
L C R
T 0, 4 4, 0 5, 3
M 4, 0 0, 4 5, 3
B 3, 5 3, 5 6, 6
Game 3.1: Example of Matrix Game (Gibbons, 1992, p. 7)
This process of identifying the NE of Game 3.1 proceeds as follows. Firstly, for each
strategy of Player I, determine the optimal action that II should take to maximise
her payoff. Such an action would be II’s best response satisfying Definition 3.2.
Secondly, determine the best response that I should take for each strategy of II. In
more general games, these steps need to be repeated until all best response actions
to all actions of competitors have been identified. The intersection of these best
responses is the NE as this occurs when the action of a player is the best response
to the action of the other following Definition 3.1.
To illustrate the first step, suppose Player I plays T, then the best strategy for II is
to play L as evident from the first line of Game 3.1. This is because Player II can
get a payoff of 4 with action L but a lower payoff with any other. For concreteness,
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consider all other alternatives open to II exhaustively: if II plays C, the payoff to II
would be 0 and playing R leads to a payoff of 3. Based on this line of reasoning, the
best response of II to each and every strategy i.e. {T,M,B} of player I, is summarised
in the left hand panel of Table 3.1. Similarly, the right hand panel of Table 3.1 shows
the best response of I to a given strategy of II.
Table 3.1: (Left)Best Response of Player II to given strategy of Player I in Game 3.1
(Right) Best Response of Player I to given strategy of Player II in Game 3.1
Strategy of Best Response of
Player I Player II
T L
M C
B R
Strategy of Best Response of
Player II Player I
L M
C T
R B
In the payoff matrix in Game 3.2 (which reproduces Game 3.1), these various best
responses are underlined. The only cell where both players’ payoffs are simultane-
ously underlined is cell {B,R} with payoff to each of 6. This is the NE of the game
since both players’ actions are simultaneously best responses to each other.
Player I
Player II
L C R
T 0, 4 4, 0 5, 3
M 4, 0 0, 4 5, 3
B 3, 5 3, 5 6, 6
Game 3.2: Payoff Matrix with Best Response of each Player to opponent’s strategy
underlined (Gibbons, 1992, p: 10)
This section has demonstrated that the process of determining best response actions
can be used to identify NE and thus solve a finite game. In the next section, game
theory applications from economics are introduced. The primary difference is that in
the economic applications, the strategy spaces of the players are more usually subsets
of the real line (Alo´s-Ferrer and Ania, 2001; Reny, 2008) rather than discrete action
spaces that was used in Example 3.1. Nevertheless, the principle that the NE is
the simultaneous best response of all players remains and that at an NE, no player
should have an incentive to unilaterally deviate from their chosen strategies.
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3.3 Economic Models of Competition
This section presents two basic models of oligopolistic competition from microe-
conomic theories of industrial organisation. The first model is that of Cournot
(Cournot, 1838) competition where firms engage in competition to determine the
quantity of production (i.e. output levels) each should make in order to maximise
profits. The second model is that of Bertrand competition (Bertrand, 1883) in which
profit maximising firms compete in prices instead.
3.3.1 Cournot Quantity Competition Model
The Cournot (Cournot, 1838, Ch. 7) model described in this section is a model
of competition between oligopolistic firms (the players in the game) where each
individually decides on the quantity offered for sale for a homogeneous good to
maximise profits. Each firm is assumed to be unaware of the output levels of the
good that its competitors are producing and any communication between firms is
prohibited.
For consistency, throughout this thesis, xi is used to denote the strategic variable
of player i,i ∈ N . Since the Cournot game is a game in quantities, let xi be the
quantity of the good produced by firm i. The payoff in this case is given by a profit
function, which for firm i,i ∈ N gives the difference between the revenue earned
from the sale of the good in question and the costs incurred in its production. The
interdependency between the firms arises since the revenue each earns will depend,
via the inverse demand function, on the output of the other firms. In this way the
profit/payoff function for this firm can be written as shown in Eq. 3–2,
φi(xi,x−i) = P (Q)xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue
−Ci(xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Costs
, (Eq. 3–2)
where Q = xi +
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
xj is total industry output, P (Q) is the inverse demand
function giving price as a function of total industry output, Q, and Ci(xi) is the
production cost function.
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Since other firms in the industry will also be choosing output levels simultaneously,
a Cournot game ensues and the objective is to determine the profit maximising
output levels for each firm. The resulting vector of production levels is known as
a Cournot-Nash Equilibrium. A critical assumption of the Cournot model is the
underlying “conjectural variation” which is how a firm believes its rival(s) will react
to its strategy choice. This is discussed next.
3.3.2 Conjectural Variation
In Chapter 4 (see Section 4.5), more general first order conditions explicitly al-
lowing for the case when a firm’s production level can be zero (xi = 0), resulting
in a complementarity problem formulation (Karamardian, 1971), will be discussed.
However, for simplicity, the current exposition restricts attention to the case when
the production of firm i,i ∈ N is strictly positive (i.e. xi > 0) in the resulting
NE. With this assumption, the first order condition for firm i’s profit maximisation
problem in Eq. 3–2 can be written as Eq. 3–3,
∂φi
∂xi
= P (Q) +
∂P (Q)
∂Q
∂Q
∂xi
xi −
∂Ci(xi)
∂xi
. (Eq. 3–3)
From the definition of Q, the boxed term on the RHS of Eq. 3–3 can be decomposed
into Eq. 3–4,
∂Q
∂xi
= 1 +
∂
( ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
xj
)
∂xi
. (Eq. 3–4)
The partial derivative term on the RHS of Eq. 3–4 is the “conjectural variation”
(Intriligator, 2002; Estrin et al., 2008). In economic models of competition, firm i
has to make an assumption or “conjecture” about how its competitors will react
to its change in output. Specifically, the Cournot model assumes that the firm’s
competitors will not react to its changes in output and thus the conjectural varia-
tion is 0. Though this assumption has been criticised as being naive (Kamien and
Schwartz, 1983), it is consistent with basic economic models of competition and
also underlies much modelling applications in the highway transportation context
(e.g. Williams and Abdulaal, 1993; Yang et al., 2009). Thus the models of com-
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petition between interacting decision makers formulated in this thesis will likewise
assume that the conjectural variation is zero. Example 3.2 demonstrates how the
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium can be determined in such a game setting.
Example 3.2. Cournot Duopoly (Estrin et al., 2008)
This example assumes that the oligopolistic market under consideration is a duopoly
i.e. one where two firms exclusively supply the entire market. Thus N = {1, 2}.
In this market, the inverse demand function adopts a linear form explicitly given
by P (Q) = 100 − Q = 100 − (x1 + x2). Each firm has cost function written as
Ci(xi) = 10xi, i ∈ {1, 2} i.e. fixed costs are zero. Following Eq. 3–2 above, an
explicit expression for Firm 1’s profit function is shown in Eq. 3–5.
φ1(x1, x2) = P (Q)x1 − C1(x1)
= (100 − x1 − x2)x1 − 10x1
= 90x1 − x
2
1 − x1x2
(Eq. 3–5)
Firm 2’s profit function, obtained in a similar fashion, is shown in Eq. 3–6.
φ2(x1, x2) = 90x2 − x
2
2 − x1x2 (Eq. 3–6)
Since it is assumed that the conjectural variation is zero, then by applying the first
order conditions for a profit maxima for each producer in Eq. 3–3 and Eq. 3–4, the
system of equations is given by each sub-equation in Eq. 3–7
∂φ1
∂x1
= 90− 2x1 − x2 = 0
∂φ2
∂x2
= 90− 2x2 − x1 = 0
(Eq. 3–7a)
(Eq. 3–7b)
By rearranging each sub-equation in Eq. 3–7, the best response functions, Ri(x−i),
for each player can be obtained as shown in Eq. 3–8. As noted in Definition 3.2,
these best response correspondences, also known as reaction functions, identify the
optimal action for each player to take to maximise individual profit, given the action
of its rival.
R1(x2)→ x1 = 45−
x2
2
R2(x1)→ x2 = 45−
x1
2
(Eq. 3–8a)
(Eq. 3–8b)
There are two ways to identify the NE (more specifically, a Cournot-Nash Equilib-
rium) in this game. The first is analytical and proceeds by solving the system of first
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Figure 3.1: Producer 1’s Best Response Function to strategies of Producer 2, R1(x2) shown
by continuous line. Producer 2’s Best Response Function to strategies of Producer 1, R2(x1)
shown by broken line. ∗ indicates intersection at Cournot-Nash Equilibrium quantities of
30 units each.
order conditions in Eq. 3–7 simultaneously. Note that the second order conditions
also have to be verified to ascertain that the solution vector thus determined indeed
corresponds to a profit maximum for each producer. An alternative approach to
determine the NE is to graph the best response functions. In Fig. 3.1, the contin-
uous line is the best response function for firm 1 i.e. R1(x2). On the other hand,
the broken line is the equivalent function for firm 2 i.e. R2(x1). The intersection of
these best response functions is the NE of the game as this intersection represents
the point where the best responses of the players coincide.
Applying either method, the NE of x∗1 = x
∗
2 = 30 (Estrin et al., 2008, p. 320) is
obtained. This is highlighted on Fig. 3.1 with an asterisk, ∗. Substitution of the
NE quantities into Eq. 3–7 gives profit to each firm of £900.
3.3.3 Bertrand Price Competition Model
The next economic model of competition discussed is the Bertrand model (Bertrand,
1883). In contrast to Cournot model of interdependent profit maximising firms en-
gaging in quantity competition, the Bertrand model is characterised by oligopolists
competing in prices instead. Such a model will be demonstrated through two exam-
ples involving duopolists presented next. For consistency, throughout this thesis, xi
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is used to denote the strategic variable of player i, i ∈ N . Thus in these examples,
note that xi, i ∈ {1, 2} now represents the price chosen by firm i.
Example 3.3. Bertrand Duopoly with Perfect Substitutes (Church andWare, 2000)
Consider the case of price competition in a setting of firms supplying perfect sub-
stitutes. There are two firms in this competitive price setting duopoly and assume
that neither firm faces a capacity constraint. There are no fixed costs and the per
unit costs of production are equal and written as Ci = Cj = C,i ∈ 1, 2, i 6= j.
As the products are perfect substitutes, it is postulated that buyers will purchase
from the firm offering the lower of the two prices. If firm 1 charges a higher price
than firm 2 (i.e. xi > xj), then no consumer buys from firm 1 and firm 2 captures the
entire market. Similarly, if firm 2 charges a higher price than firm 1 (i.e. xj > xi),
firm 2 makes no sales and firm 1 captures the entire market. If both firms charge
the same price (i.e. xi = xj), then the demand is split equally between the two
firms. The foregoing discussion can be summarised in Eq. 3–9 with d(·) being the
market demand function and the demand faced by firm i is di(·).
di(xi, xj) =


0, if xi > xj, i 6= j
d(x)/2, if xi = xj = x
d(xi), if xi < xj , i 6= j
(Eq. 3–9)
However, Eq. 3–9 also means that the best reply correspondences are discontinuous
and standard calculus techniques cannot be used to identify the NE (Serrano and
Feldman, 2013, p. 235). Instead of applying calculus, the NE (more precisely
the Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium) can be deduced by exhaustively considering the
following six possible cases and identifying whether there exists an incentive, in
each case, to profitably deviate or otherwise (Church and Ware, 2000, p. 257):
1. x1 > x2 > C: This outcome cannot be a NE because firm 1 could profit by
lowering its price, x1, infinitesimally below x2 to capture the entire market.
2. x2 > x1 > C: Similar to Case 1 above, this outcome cannot be a NE because
firm 2 could profit by lowering its price, x2, infinitesimally below x1 to capture
the entire market.
3. x1 > x2 = C: This outcome cannot be a NE because Firm 2 makes zero profit.
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Firm 2 could profitably deviate by increasing its price x2 infinitesimally above
C but still remaining below x1 and thus capturing the entire market.
4. x2 > x1 = C: Similar to Case 3 above, this outcome cannot be a NE be-
cause Firm 1 makes zero profit. Firm 1 could profitably deviate by increasing
its price, x1 infinitesimally above C but still remaining below x2 and thus
capturing the entire market.
5. x1 = x2 > C : This outcome cannot be a NE because either firm could profit by
lowering its price infinitesimally below the other to capture the entire market.
6. x1 = x2 = C: This outcome is the only NE as neither firm can profitably
deviate (cf. Corollary 3.1). If either attempts a lower price, each would capture
the entire market but incur a loss. On the other hand, by increasing its price
above per unit production costs, they would earn zero since all consumers
would buy from its competitor.
Therefore, in the Bertrand model, it can be seen that there is a tendency of each firm
to undercut the other (as noted in Case 5) until price is equal to the per unit cost
of production (i.e. marginal cost) and the two firms share the market equally. Note
that price cannot be lower than marginal costs for in that case, both firms would be
better off shutting down than making a loss. Thus Bertrand competition between
perfect substitutes results in prices that are equal to the marginal cost of production,
obtaining the exact same outcome as in the case of a perfectly competitive market.
This effect has been termed the “Bertrand Paradox” as two firms competing in
prices are sufficient for the perfectly competitive outcome and profits above the cost
of capital are entirely eroded (Shy, 1995; Church and Ware, 2000).
The next example considers the more realistic setting of differentiated products
which are imperfect substitutes i.e. products are similar but not identical. In this
case, even with equal per unit production costs, the Bertrand paradox does not hold.
Example 3.4. Bertrand Duopoly with Differentiated Products (Serrano and Feld-
man, 2013)
As the products are differentiated, they are imperfect substitutes. Unlike the case
with homogeneous products assumed in Example 3.3, the demand facing a firm does
not fall to zero when a firm charges a different price from its rival(s). The demand
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facing firm 1 can be expressed as Eq. 3–10.
Q1 = 50− x1 +
x2
2
(Eq. 3–10)
Analogously, the demand facing firm 2 can be expressed as Eq. 3–11.
Q2 = 50− x2 +
x1
2
(Eq. 3–11)
On the cost side, the per unit production costs are assumed to be equal for both
firms. Thus the total cost function for firm i is Ci(Qi) = 25Qi, i ∈ {1, 2}.
The profit function for firm 1 is the difference between revenues and costs. By
substituting into the profit function, the expression for Q1 from Eq. 3–10, the profit
function is analytically obtained as shown in Eq. 3–12.
φ1(x1, x2) = x1(Q1)− 25(Q1)
= x1(50 − x1 +
x2
2
)− 25(50 − x1 +
x2
2
)
= 75x1 − x
2
1 +
x1x2
2
−
25x2
2
− 1250
(Eq. 3–12)
Analogously, using the expression for Q2 from Eq. 3–11, the profit function for firm
2 can be written as Eq. 3–13.
φ2(x1, x2) = x2(Q2)− 25(Q2)
= 75x2 − x
2
2 +
x2x1
2
−
25x1
2
− 1250
(Eq. 3–13)
The assumption of zero conjectural variation is likewise applicable in the Bertrand
model. In this case, each firm takes the price its rival sets as fixed when setting its
price. In this way, the first order conditions for a profit maximum for each firm are
given by Eq. 3–14.
∂φ1
∂x1
= 75− 2x1 +
x2
2
= 0
∂φ2
∂x2
= 75− 2x1 +
x1
2
= 0
(Eq. 3–14a)
(Eq. 3–14b)
By rearranging these first order conditions, the best response functions of each firm
to its competitor’s prices is shown in the sub-equations in Eq. 3–15.
R1(x2)→ x1 =
75
2
+
x2
4
R2(x1)→ x2 =
75
2
+
x1
4
(Eq. 3–15a)
(Eq. 3–15b)
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The Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium can then be obtained by the simultaneous solution
of the system of equations in Eq. 3–15 giving prices of £50 each (Serrano and
Feldman, 2013, p. 236). Note that the second order conditions also have to be
verified to ascertain that the solution vector thus determined corresponds to a profit
maximum for each producer.
However, it should be pointed out that neither the Cournot nor the Bertrand models
are directly applicable to the study competition in general transportation networks
due to the unique features of transportation networks. While tolls are equivalent to
prices, the difference is that tolls are only one component of overall OD generalised
costs that ultimately determine route choices of the users. This is further elaborated
in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.2). Furthermore, an assumption of the economic models
is that the good in question is sold in a single market. The closest analogue of the
“market” in the highway transportation context would, arguably, be an OD pair
(Verhoef et al., 2010), and in general transportation networks, the traffic on a road
is composed of the flow between multiple OD pairs (Ortuzar and Willumsen, 1994).
Thus when different toll road concessionaires engage in competition for revenues,
they would be implicitly serving multiple markets simultaneously. Nevertheless,
the models articulated here, rooted in the industrial economics literature, serve to
underscore the interdependencies between players since the payoff attainable by a
player is inherently dependent on the strategies chosen by its rivals.
3.4 Properties of Nash Equilibria
The game theory literature (e.g. Myerson, 1991; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) notes
that a game may possess one or more of the following properties:
1. There may be no NE when players are limited to “pure” strategies, or
2. the NE may be (Pareto) inefficient, or
3. there may be multiple NE.
These three properties are discussed in turn in this section.
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3.4.1 Absence of NE in Pure Strategies
In some games, players may choose probability distributions over the set of actions
available to them. When they do so, they are said to be playing “mixed strategies”.
At the opposite end, if players do not engage in any randomisation, they are playing
“pure strategies”. It is thus convenient to view mixed strategies “as random variables
whose values are pure strategies” (Kurz, 1994, p. 1170) since any pure strategy can
be represented as “the mixed strategy that puts zero probability on all of the player’s
other pure strategies” (Gibbons, 1992, p. 33). While Nash (1950a, 1951) proved that
NE will always exist in a finite game when certain technical conditions are satisfied,
this does not preclude the possibility that the NE may exist in mixed strategies and
that they may be no NE when only pure strategies are allowed.
However, it is “hard to motivate games with mixed actions in economic modelling”
(Shy, 1995, p. 34). Some commentators go as far as to suggest that mixed strategies
“have been given much more attention by game theorists than is justified by any
resulting illumination of human behaviour”(Bowles, 2004, p. 34). In any case,
consistent with assumptions made in several microeconomic applications of game
theory (e.g. MasCollel et al., 1995, p. 389), this thesis will also restrict consideration
to cases where decision makers do not randomise over the (continuous) strategy
spaces and only play pure strategies. It should be highlighted that this restriction
did not prevent the identification of NE in the games to be discussed in the case
studies presented in Chapters 6 to 9.
3.4.2 Pareto Inefficiency of NE
Being the outcome of a non-cooperative game, the NE outcome maximises each
individual player’s payoff. However, this can lead to outcomes that are inefficient “in
the sense that there exist alternative outcomes that are both feasible and preferred
by all the players” (Sethi, 2008, p. 375, italics added). Such an alternative is known
as a Pareto Optimal outcome as formally stated in Definition 3.3.
Definition 3.3. Pareto Efficiency (Shy, 1995, p. 22):
In a game G , {N ,X,φ}, let a,b ∈ X be two feasible strategy profiles.
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1. Strategy profile a Pareto Dominates strategy b if the following conditions are
satisfied:
(a) For every player i, φi(a) > φi(b), i ∈ N and
(b) there exists at least one player i such that condition 1a holds with strict
inequality i.e. φi(a) > φi(b), i ∈ N
2. Strategy profile a is Pareto Efficient (also called Pareto Optimal) if there does
not exist any strategy which Pareto Dominates a.
3. Strategy profiles a and b are called Pareto noncomparable if for some player
i, φi(a) > φi(b) but for some other player j, j 6= i, φj(a) < φj(b)
An outcome of a game is Pareto Optimal if it satisfies Definition 3.3. This means
that the payoffs of all players are simultaneously maximised such that no player can
be made better off without making another worse off. These solutions serve as a
benchmark against the NE outcome. As will be shown later (see Example 3.6), the
Pareto Optimal outcome may not be unique.
It should be highlighted that the zero-sum game is an example of a non-cooperative
game in which the NE is also Pareto Optimal. This is because the zero-sum game
is a pure conflict game where the interests of the players are diametrically opposed.
On the other hand, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, in most strategic
situations encountered in practice, elements of common interests as well as conflict
aspects are simultaneously present and are not mutually exclusive (Schelling, 1980;
Bowles, 2004; Zagare and Slantchev, 2010).
As a result of players focusing solely on the pursuit of self-interests/personal gain
in non-cooperative games, common interests could be sacrificed, thereby resulting
in an outcome that is not Pareto Optimal. This section uses two example games to
discuss such an outcome. Example 3.5 demonstrates this in the finite game setting
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, whilst Example 3.6 shows this in the case of the Cournot
game based on the parameters introduced previously in Example 3.2.
Example 3.5. Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod, 1984)
In this game, two suspects are interviewed by the police in relation to a major crime.
They are interviewed separately (e.g. kept in separate cells throughout) and each is
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assumed not to know how the other is responding. Each suspect can either confess
to the crime or deny their involvement. If neither confess, the police are unable
to convict them on the major crime but can still charge them for a lesser offence
carrying a lighter penalty. If just one of them confesses to the major crime, they
can both be convicted. The dilemma arises because if one of the suspects confesses,
but the other one does not, the one confessing will be freed as a reward for acting
as an informer. The payoff matrix (see Game 3.3) shows the years in prison each
has to serve as a result of their joint decisions and thus a lower number of years in
prison served corresponds to a higher payoff.
Player I
Player II
Deny Confess
Deny 1, 1 10, 0
Confess 0, 10 5, 5
Game 3.3: Payoff Matrix for Prisoner’s Dilemma (Carmichael, 2005, p. 59)
Applying the principle of best response to Game 3.3, several deductions can be made.
If Player II denies, the best response for I is to confess. If II confesses, the best
response for I is to confess. Similarly, the best response for I is to confess. As was
done in Example 3.1, these best responses are underlined in Game 3.3. The only cell
that is underlined twice is the cell {Confess,Confess} where each player’s strategy
is the best response to that of the other and thus is a NE satisfying Definition
3.1. However, it is obvious that this outcome is not Pareto Efficient according to
Definition 3.3 since they both could have lower sentences (or higher payoffs) if they
had both denied the crime.
Example 3.6. Profits from Collusion (Friedman, 1983; Peters, 2008)
Suppose the Cournot producers of Example 3.2 were given the opportunity to com-
municate and decide on output levels so that they control the entire market. Thus in-
stead of acting independently/non-cooperatively, it is now assumed that they formed
a cartel to maximise joint profits. The profit function for this cartel is given by Eq.
3–16,
φC(x1, x2) = φ1(x1, x2) + φ2(x1, x2),
= 90x1 − x
2
1 − 2x1x2 + 90x2 − x
2
2,
(Eq. 3–16)
where the profit functions, φ1(x1, x2) and φ2(x1, x2), are exactly as used previously
in Eq. 3–5 and Eq. 3–6. The first order conditions for a profit maximum of this
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cartel are shown in Eq. 3–17,
∂φC
∂x1
= 90 − 2x1 − 2x2 = 0,
∂φC
∂x2
= 90 − 2x1 − 2x2 = 0.
(Eq. 3–17a)
(Eq. 3–17b)
Taken together, these first order conditions imply that as long as the total output
of the cartel is 45 units (vis-a´-vis 60 in total in competition), joint profit would be
maximised. At the total output level of 45, the price will be £55 and total costs are
£450 (since individual production costs are equal), the joint profit would be £2025.
However, the distribution of this joint profit between the two producers cannot be
uniquely determined but should satisfy Eq. 3–18.
φ1(x1, x2) + φ2(x1, x2) = 2025 (Eq. 3–18)
Eq. 3–18 defines the Profit Possibility Frontier, also known as the “Pareto Front”
which identifies, for a given market, “the profit possibilities technically attainable”
(Friedman, 1983, p. 24). This front is shown by the continuous line defined by Eq.
3–18 on each panel of Fig. 3.2. A more detailed discussion on general methods to
identify Pareto Fronts is presented in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.4).
If the two firms were allowed to negotiate, a possibility explicitly prohibited under
the assumptions of non-cooperative game theory, then the share of individual profits
would lie on this Pareto Front. For concreteness, suppose each producer agreed to
produce half of the total joint profit maximising output of 45 units or 22.5 units
each, (which is not unreasonable since each has equal per unit production costs),
then the profits each would obtain would be £1012.5. This point is marked with
an asterisk ∗ and lies on the Pareto Front. Recall from Example 3.2, the profits
obtained with the Cournot-Nash solution were £900 each (this is indicated on each
panel of Fig. 3.2 with a +).
It is clear from both panels of Fig. 3.2 that the Cournot-Nash solution is not
Pareto Optimal. This is because the Cournot-Nash solution lies in the interior of
the Pareto Front. Another way to see this as follows. Holding the profit from firm
1 fixed at the Cournot-Nash profit of £900, one can move upwards (in the direction
of the arrow towards the Pareto Front) and hence increase the profit of firm 2,
without reducing the profit accruing to firm 1. This example once again shows the
Pareto inefficiency of the Cournot-Nash outcome as the joint profit outcome Pareto
Dominates it following Definition 3.3.
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Figure 3.2: (Left): The Pareto Front (continuous line), Profits with Cournot-Nash Solu-
tion (+), Joint Profit Maximisation (∗) (Right): The Cournot-Nash Solution is Not Pareto
Optimal
3.4.3 Multiple NE
The proofs of existence of NE (for finite games (Nash, 1950a, 1951) and for contin-
uous games (Glicksberg, 1952)) do not rule out the possibility of non-uniqueness.
In this section, an example demonstrates the existence of multiple NE in a finite
game. Multiple NE in continuous games are a distinct possibility when the best
response functions are no longer singletons but are instead, multivalued maps or
correspondences. This could arise as a result of a player’s payoff function exhibiting
multiple maxima (Son and Baldick, 2004). Such non-uniqueness will be shown in
the case studies presented in Chapters 6 to 9.
Example 3.7. Multiple NE in Finite Game
In Game 3.4, applying the definition of best responses results in two best responses
depending on the strategy of the other. I’s best response is to play strategy A if II
chooses strategy A and to play strategy B if II chooses strategy B. The same can
be seen from the perspective of II. There are two intersections of the best responses
and therefore two pure strategy NE.
Player I
Player II
A B
A 1, 2 0, 0
B 0, 0 2, 1
Game 3.4: A Game with Multiple NE (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 19)
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As noted above, the definition of the best response function given in Definition 3.2
implicitly assumes that players are either able to locate the global best response
or that the payoff functions are unimodal (i.e. possess a single global maximum).
However, in practical applications, it cannot be assumed that these payoff functions
are indeed unimodal for given strategies of rivals. In such cases, each player could
instead potentially locate a “local maximum of his payoff function given the strate-
gies of other players” (Alo´s-Ferrer and Ania, 2001, p. 167, italics added). Following
Son and Baldick (2004), when payoff functions exhibit multiple maxima, a distinc-
tion has to be made between Local Nash Equilibria (abbreviated LNE) and Nash
Equilibria.
Definition 3.4. Local Nash Equilibrium (LNE) (Son and Baldick, 2004, Definition
2, p. 306):
In a game G , {N ,X,φ}, a combined strategy profile x∗ = (x∗
1
, x∗
2
, . . . , x∗n)
⊺ ∈ X is
a local NE if there exists some ǫ > 0 such that Eq. 3–19 is satisfied,
φi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≥ φi(xi,x
∗
−i) ∀xi ∈ B
ǫ
i (x
∗
i ) ,∀i ∈ N (Eq. 3–19)
where Bǫi (xˆi) = {xi ∈ Xi | ‖xi − xˆi‖ < ǫ}.
Clearly, an NE that satisfies Definition 3.1 is also a local NE satisfying Definition
3.4. However, the reverse is not true. While LNE points satisfy Eq. 3–19 within
a local neighbourhood (defined by Bǫi (xˆi)) of a given solution, they do not satisfy
Definition 3.1 when viewed over the entire strategy space X. Thus, a distinction is
made between LNE and NE solutions with the LNE being a “weaker” condition.
The possibility of such LNE solutions in continuous games will be shown in the case
studies. To give emphasis to the fact that the outcome satisfying Definition 3.1
over the entire strategy space, this outcome is often referred to in this thesis as the
“global NE”.
3.5 Summary
This chapter sought to outline a behavioural model, developed from game theoretic
principles, of how a rational agent would act to maximise individual payoff, in the
86
face of rivals doing the same simultaneously. Abstracting elements from the vast
framework of non-cooperative game theory, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) principle
is highlighted as the relevant solution concept of such strategic interactions. At
the NE, players have no incentive to select an alternative strategy as they cannot
improve their payoff unilaterally, and thus this point is an equilibrium.
An example of determination of NE in a finite game was used to emphasise the
concept of best responses that underlie the NE. In extending this concept to con-
tinuous games, where the strategy spaces of players are subsets of the real number
line, which this thesis focuses on, two examples of competition between oligopolis-
tic producers were highlighted. The first example of Cournot competition focused
on competition when players choose output levels whilst in the second example of
Bertrand competition, price was the strategic variable. In both cases, it was shown
that the NE is the intersection of the best response functions as at that point, every
player is doing the best given the strategies chosen by their rivals. In these simple
models, the intersection could be obtained by the solution of a set of simultaneous
equations representing the best response functions.
At the same time, it was emphasised that economic models of competition are
not directly applicable to transportation networks as route choices of users which
influence the payoffs of decision makers are influenced not by tolls alone but by
the generalised costs of travel where tolls are one component and congestion costs
are yet another. However, the economic models serve to highlight the strategic
interdependencies between players which must be taken into account in establishing
a sound behavioural model studying the interaction of decision makers pursuing
disparate objectives in the transportation network context. The next chapter will
subsequently integrate the game theoretic model introduced here with models of
users’ route choice behaviour thereby setting out a unified modelling framework
applied in the case studies.
However, an NE may not exist when players are restricted to playing pure strategies.
Though a proof of the existence of NE is beyond the scope of the present research, the
existence of NE in the games discussed in this thesis will be demonstrated through
numerical tests reported in the case studies. As pointed out in this chapter, the NE
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could be inefficient as individual players focus only on maximising personal gain and
in so doing, neglect aspects of decision making reflecting mutual interests. In this
context, the Prisoner’s Dilemma was used to show that players could be better off
if they cooperated. Similarly, the Cournot-Nash solution was shown not be Pareto
Optimal as one player could be made better off without making another worse off.
Furthermore, if the payoff function of one or more players exhibits multiple maxima,
multiple NE would exist and a distinction was made between Local Nash Equilibria
(LNE) and NE. The equilibrium point in a LNE is a best response only within a
local neighbourhood while the NE is the best response globally i.e over the entire
strategy space. These characteristics of NE outcomes will be seen in the case studies
presented in this thesis found in Chapters 6 to 9.
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Chapter 4
Deterministic Approaches to
Hierarchical Optimisation
Problems4.1
4.1 Introduction
While this thesis separately discusses both private sector toll road competition
and inter-jurisdictional competition for toll revenues, these two seemingly different
agents can be studied within a common modelling framework. Before any assess-
ment of the welfare implications of such competition can be investigated, robust
algorithms need to be developed and applied in order for the equilibrium out-
comes to be determined and evaluated. Furthermore, the appropriate algorithm
will be dependent on the underlying model describing travellers’ route choices. In
order to address these issues, this chapter firstly outlines a unified mathematical
framework of Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) (Mor-
dukhovich, 2004, 2005) that permits both private operator and inter-jurisdictional
competition/collaboration in highway networks to be investigated within a com-
mon framework before secondly, proposing robust algorithms for their resolution in
this and the subsequent chapter. The proposed methods will then be subsequently
applied in the case studies reported in Chapters 6 to 9.
The EPEC framework has already been applied to study competition in a vari-
ety of disciplines such as investigating competitive practices in European electricity
markets (Pang and Fukushima, 2005; Leyffer and Munson, 2010) as well as in high-
way transportation (Yang et al., 2009). As will be discussed in this chapter, this
4.1This chapter draws extensively on Koh (2013).
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EPEC model is the appropriate mathematical model for two reasons. Firstly, it
is applicable in the context of non-cooperative behaviour between the two groups
of decision makers discussed in this thesis (private toll road concessionaires or local
governments) with each seeking to maximise individual objectives, contingent on the
decisions made by others. Secondly, the model is also applicable in the case when
these players are assumed to cooperate, a relatively neglected area where there is
limited literature and are used as benchmarks in this thesis. At the same time, while
the EPEC represents the most appropriate mathematical formulation for the prob-
lems discussed in this thesis, it should be recognised that the research on solution
algorithms for EPECs has only just begun Steffensen and Bittner (2014).
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Following this introduction, the
Stackelberg model of competition also known as a “Leader-follower” game as pro-
posed in von Stackelberg (1934) is introduced to motivate the mathematical model
of a generic bilevel programming problem (BLPP). While conventionally serving
as the gateway to studying transportation systems management by a single reg-
ulatory agency, this BLPP also simultaneously serves as the building block of the
EPEC model applicable when interacting multiple agents are considered. The EPEC
model is discussed in Section 4.3. As will be highlighted, both BLPPs and EPECs
are mathematical programs characterised by a “hierarchical” structure and thus this
chapter will refer to them collectively as hierarchical optimisation problems. Fur-
thermore, the solution algorithms developed in the context of the single regulator
paradigm can be straight forwardly extended to encompass that of multiple agents.
This extension is discussed in Section 4.4. As shown in Chapter 3, oligopolistic com-
petition has been actively studied in the industrial organisation literature. Thus an
algorithm from that domain can be straightforwardly extended to study competi-
tion in highway transportation systems. This discussion is the subject of Section
4.5. Section 4.6 summarises and sets out the relation of this chapter to the overall
thesis.
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4.2 The Bi-Level Programming Problem
In transportation systems management, it is usually assumed that it is not possible
to dictate or somehow coerce users to select a particular path through a traffic
network to achieve the facility manager’s desired outcome. For example, it is evident
that a toll road operator cannot force traffic to use the road he controls. Instead,
assuming that users make rational decisions, the manager is limited to using the toll
level to influence the travellers’ route choices. Thus the “transmission mechanism”
at work here is as follows: a change in the toll levels would affect the generalised
costs of travel which would in turn influence the equilibrium route choices. This
would then result in a new routing pattern (with implied demand levels) across the
network, manifesting in changes in traffic volumes which would impact on the system
manager’s objectives. For brevity, such as “transmission mechanism” is referred to
as the reaction or response of the highway users to the system manager’s policies.
Therefore, by their choice of appropriate toll levels, system managers can exert
an influence on the route choices of users. This has led the literature (e.g. Fisk,
1984; Friesz and Harker, 1985) to notice the parallels in this regard with the classic
Stackelberg game (von Stackelberg, 1934) first cursorily introduced in Chapter 2. As
noted therein, the Stackelberg model of industrial organisation assumes that there
is a single dominant firm (known as the “leader”) in the market alongside several
smaller firms (referred to collectively as the “followers”). The leader obtains a first
mover advantage (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988), enabling it to earn profits
above the cost of capital by virtue of the fact that it knows how the followers will
react to its strategy. In addition, there is an element of sequential decision making
in this model as the leader is assumed to act first, confident that the followers will
obey their reaction functions, after which the followers react, taking the leader’s
strategy as given. von Stackelberg’s model of behaviour of the leader and follower
firms will be referred to as the “leader-follower” paradigm throughout this thesis.
These behavioural assumptions stand in contrast to the assumptions behind the
Cournot-Nash game discussed in Chapter 3 where each player in the Nash non-
cooperative game acts simultaneously and do so by only reacting to the strategies
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of its rivals.
To complete the analogy, the transportation systems manager should therefore act
as the Stackelberg leader while users of the system are modelled collectively as the
followers (Fisk, 1984). The most important lesson from the Stackelberg analogy
though is that the systems manager has to take the reactions of the users into ac-
count when applying any policy instrument such as tolls (Dickson, 1981; Fisk, 1984;
Harker and Friesz, 1984). Just as in the Stackelberg model, the road users (follow-
ers) treat the leader’s policy/decision variables as an exogenous input in making
their route choice decisions. This requirement of the “leader-follower” paradigm
has important implications for the appropriate mathematical model as well as the
solution algorithms developed in this chapter.
4.2.1 A General BLPP
The Stackelberg model discussed above can be formulated as shown in Eq. 4–1. This
is a specific case of the more general class of multi-level programming/hierarchical
optimisation problems restricted to two levels viz. “upper level” and “lower level”.
The distinguishing feature of BLPPs is that the constraint region of the upper level
problem (Eq. 4–1a) is defined by yet another optimisation problem (a lower level
problem) in Eq. 4–1b. Furthermore, this lower level constraint is always active.
For example, in the case of the Stackelberg model with one follower, the upper
level problem is the optimisation problem faced by the market leader who is taking
into account the reaction of the follower whose optimisation problem appears as a
constraint into the leader’s problem.
BLPP


max
x∈X
U(x,y(x))
subject to
y(x) = argmax
y∈Y
L(x,y)
(Eq. 4–1a)
(Eq. 4–1b)
with U,L : Rn1 ×Rn2 7→ R. X represents the decision space of the upper level prob-
lem (Eq. 4–1a). X = {(x1, x2, . . . , xn1)
⊺ ∈ Rn1 |xi ≤ xi ≤ x¯i , i = {1, 2, . . . , n1}}
Arising from the “leader-follower” analogy of BLPPs, the terms “leader’s variables”
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Figure 4.1: Pictoral Representation of a BLPP adapted from Sumalee (2004a)
and “upper level variables” are interchangeably used when referring to x. Simi-
larly Y represents the decision space for the lower level problem (Eq. 4–1b) with
Y =
{
(y1, y2, . . . , yn2)
⊺ ∈ Rn2
∣∣yj ≤ yj ≤ y¯j , j = {1, 2, . . . , n2}} .
The BLPP has been a subject of extensive research and several monographs on
this subject have been published to date (Luo et al., 1996; Shimizu et al., 1997;
Bard, 1998; Outrata et al., 1998; Dempe, 2002). At the same time, applications of
BLPP can be found in diverse fields ranging from chemical engineering (Gu¨mu¨s¸ and
Floudas, 2001) to robotics (Luo et al., 1996) and transportation systems manage-
ment (Migdalas, 1995). In tandem, there has been much work on the development
of solution methodologies (see Dempe, 2002; Colson et al., 2007, for a review).
Fig. 4.1, adapted from Sumalee (2004a), captures three main characteristics of
BLPP (Wen and Hsu, 1991; Oduguwa and Roy, 2002):
a) the decision-making units are interactive and exist within a hierarchical struc-
ture,
b) decision making is sequential from higher to lower level. The lower level de-
cision maker executes its policies after decisions are made at the upper level,
and
c) each unit independently optimises its own objective functions but is influenced
by actions taken by other units.
.
93
4.2.2 Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints
In this section, a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) is
formally defined emphasising the fact that the MPEC is a special case of the BLPP
with the difference that the lower level program is defined as a Variational Inequality
(VI) Problem.
Variational Inequality
Adapting the definition from Nagurney (1999) to the context of BLPPs, a Varia-
tional Inequality Problem (VIP) is the problem of finding a n2 dimensional vec-
tor y∗, for given and fixed x, such that the condition Eq. 4–2 is satisfied with
A : Rn1 × Rn2 7→ Rn2 and where F defines a feasible region.
VIP
{
A(x,y∗)(y − y∗) > 0,y ∈ F (Eq. 4–2)
With the definition of the VIP from Eq. 4–2, the MPEC is formulated as the BLPP
in Eq. 4–3.
MPEC


max
x∈X
U(x,y(x))
subject to
y(x) ← SOL{V(x)}
(Eq. 4–3a)
(Eq. 4–3b)
In Eq. 4–3, the notation y(x)← SOL{V(x)} is used as shorthand to emphasise that
the lower level variable, y, is obtained as the solution4.2 for a VIP parametrised in
the upper level decision vector, x. As VIPs encapsulate equilibrium conditions
(Nagurney, 1999), the MPEC can be thought of as an optimization problem where
the constraint region specifies an equilibrium in a given parametric system. Note
that the closely related class of Mathematical Programs with Complementarity Con-
straints (Leyffer, 2005) is a special case of the MPEC where the constraint region
4.2In general, the solution of Eq. 4–2 may not be unique. However for the case
study applications considered in this thesis (in Chapters to 6 to 9), uniqueness of
the demands and link flows solution to the VIP encapsulating traffic equilibrium, for
each vector of the leader’s variables x or tolls, is theoretically assured under several
assumptions which will be made explicit in those chapters (Smith, 1979; Cantarella,
1997).
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is defined by a Complementarity Problem (CP) parametrised in x with a CP being
a specific case of the more general VIP (Karamardian, 1971; Nagurney, 1999). The
CP is briefly discussed in Section 4.5.
From BLPP to MPEC and vice-versa
Consider the BLPP in Eq. 4–1. If the lower level problem is replaced by its Karush
Kuhn Tucker (KKT) (Karush, 1939; Kuhn and Tucker, 1951) conditions, then the
MPEC shown in Eq. 4–3 is obtained (Nagurney, 1999, Proposition 1.2, p. 6). When
the lower level problem (Eq. 4–1b) is convex, then the KKT conditions characterise
global optimality (Luo et al., 1996). Conversely, the lower level VIP (Eq. 4–3b) in
the MPEC can be formulated as an optimization problem only if certain symmetry
conditions are met (Nagurney, 1999). Thus the BLPP is obtained.
In transportation systems management, a convex mathematical optimisation prob-
lem resulting in link flows (and demands) over a highway transportation network
that satisfy Wardrop’s DUE condition (Wardrop, 1952) was formulated in Beck-
mann et al. (1956). Similarly, a mathematical optimisation problem for link flows
that satisfy Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE) is formulated in Fisk (1980). In
these optimisation approaches to the determination of equilibrium link flows and
demands, the bilevel program for the system manager adopts the form of Eq. 4–
1 where the y(x) is the vector of link flows satisfying the equilibrium conditions
predicated on the system manager’s control vector x.
Subsequently, it has been shown (Smith, 1979) that Wardrop’s equilibrium condition
can be formulated as a VIP. This VIP formulation is more general and allows situ-
ations where the separability assumption4.3 does not hold such as the asymmetric
traffic assignment problem (Dafermos, 1980). When this separability assumption is
violated, the VIP can no longer be formulated as an optimisation problem. Though
this case is not considered in this thesis, the bilevel program of the system manager
must be modelled as an MPEC.
4.3This assumption means that the link’s generalised travel time is dependent on
its own link flow alone and independent of the link flow(s) of all other links.
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Furthermore, under the assumption of travellers choosing routes according to the
SUE routing model, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, the equilibrium link flows
and demands can be obtained as the solution of a non linear system of equations
(Cantarella, 1997) (see Section 7.2). Such a system of equations, parametrised in
the leader’s variables, is another instance of a VIP (Nagurney, 1999, Proposition
1.1, p. 5). Once again, because the leader’s problem is constrained by a VIP, her
optimisation problem can also be expressed in the form of the MPEC in Eq. 4–3.
In view of the above, the MPEC formulation is more general than the BLPP for-
mulation. Another reason to focus on the MPEC representation is related to the
core theme of this thesis. The MPEC formulation extends naturally to the case of
multiple leaders, and emphasises that the actions of these leaders are constrained by
a condition specifying equilibrium in the transportation network under study. This
extension is discussed later in this chapter (see Section 4.3).
4.2.3 Computational Difficulties of MPECs
When all functions (both objectives and constraints) in both upper and lower level
problems of the BLPP are linear, the resulting BLPP is known as a linear BLPP.
However, even in this deceptively “simple” case, this BLPP is still Nondeterministic
Polynomial time hard (NP hard) (Ben-Ayed and Blair, 1990). This means that
an exact solution cannot be found in polynomial time. Even if both the upper
level and the lower level are convex programs, the resulting BLPP itself can be
non-convex (Ben-Ayed, 1993). Non convexity suggests the possibility of multiple
optima. Ben-Ayed and Blair (1990) demonstrated the failure of both the Parametric
Complementarity Pivot Algorithm (Bialas and Karwan, 1984) and the Grid Search
Algorithm (Bard, 1983) to locate the optimal solution of the linear-BLPP. Since
then, progress has been made in solving the linear-BLPP and techniques including
implicit enumeration (Candler and Townsley, 1982), penalty based methods (Aiyoshi
and Shimizu, 1981) and methods based on KKT conditions (Fortuny-Amat and
McCarl, 1981) have been developed. See Wen and Hsu (1991) for a review of the
algorithms available for the linear-BLPP.
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In transportation systems management, with the exception of relatively restrictive
cases, no explicit formulation is generally available for responses of the users at
the lower level (Fisk, 1984, p. 304). The lower level model thus incorporates the
leader’s strategies but only implicitly. This contributes to the difficulty with solving
the BLPP and thus requiring algorithmic approaches for its resolution.
One proposal to solve the general BLPP was the Iterative Optimisation Algorithm
(IOA) (Allsop, 1974; Steenbrink, 1974) which some authors (e.g. Migdalas, 1995,
p. 395) term “Block Coordinate Descent”. This method involves solving the upper
level problem for fixed y and using the solution thus obtained to solve the lower
level problem, and repeatedly iterating between the upper and lower level programs
until some convergence criterion is met. However, the IOA was later shown to be
an exact method for solving a Cournot-Nash game (Fisk, 1984; Friesz and Harker,
1985) rather than the Stackelberg game that the BLPP is meant to reflect. This is
because the design of the IOA implicitly assumes that the leader is myopic as he
does not take into account the follower’s reaction to her policy (Dickson, 1981; Fisk,
1984; Friesz and Harker, 1985) and thus violates the “leader-follower” paradigm of
the Stackelberg model where as emphasised, the leader must be modelled as being
endowed with knowledge of the follower’s reaction function which the leader knows
the follower will obey.
Another difficulty with solving MPECs stems from the fact that they fail to satisfy
certain technical conditions (known as constraint qualifications) at any feasible point
(Chen and Florian, 1995; Scheel and Scholtes, 2000). The penalty interior point algo-
rithm was proposed for MPECs in Luo et al. (1996). However, a counter example in
Leyffer (2005) showed that this algorithm could in fact converge to a non-stationary
point. Subsequent research has led to the development of many other techniques
to solve the MPEC such as the piecewise sequential quadratic programming (Luo
et al., 1996), branch-and-bound (Bard, 1988), nonsmooth approaches (Dempe, 2002;
Outrata et al., 1998) and smoothing methods (Facchinei et al., 1999).
Migdalas (1995) outlines several transportation systems management problems that
can be posed as MPECs, formulated on the assumption of a single regulator at the
upper level applying policy instruments to influence the route choices of users. These
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encompass the network design problem (Friesz et al., 1992; Chiou, 2005), the traffic
signal setting problem (Fisk, 1984; Teklu et al., 2007), the OD matrix estimation
problem (Maher et al., 2001) and also most relevant to this thesis, the optimal toll
pricing and design problem (Shepherd and Sumalee, 2004; Sumalee, 2004a,b; Koh
et al., 2009).
The Cutting Constraint Algorithm (CCA) (Lawphongpanich and Hearn, 2004) will
be used to solve the MPECs that are formulated in the case studies described in
Chapters 6 and 8. In the CCA, the MPEC is first reformulated as a single level
optimisation problem with additional constraint(s). At the first step, a first ad-
ditional constraint reflects the VI representation of the Wardrop’s DUE condition
(Smith, 1979) as a convex combinations of extreme points. These extreme points are
generated by solving an auxiliary shortest path problem and additional constraints
are added iteratively until the entire system satisfies Wardrop’s DUE condition at
termination. A more detailed description of the CCA can be found in Chapter 6
(see Section 6.4).
4.3 Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints
This equilibrium constraint and hierarchical structure is also present in the class
of Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints (EPECs) depicted in Fig.
4.2. The EPEC may be thought of as a multi-leader generalization of the Stack-
elberg game (Sherali, 1984; Mordukhovich, 2005; Leyffer and Munson, 2010; Hu
and Fukushima, 2012). Compared to an MPEC, the EPEC aims at “finding some
equilibrium (rather than minimum) points subject to constraints described by the
parametric variational systems” (Mordukhovich, 2005, p. 379).
In this regard, researchers have conjectured that there could be two possible be-
haviours of the leaders at the upper level (Outrata, 2004; Mordukhovich, 2005).
At one extreme, the leaders could act cooperatively which can be modelled as a
Multiobjective Optimisation Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (MOPEC) (Ye
and Zhu, 2003; Mordukhovich, 2004). Equilibrium in the upper level in this latter
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case can then be characterised by the principle of Pareto Optimality (see Definition
3.3). The rest of this chapter focuses on the NCEPEC while a discussion of the
MOPEC is found in Chapter 5.
At the other extreme, the leaders could act non-cooperatively and engage in a Nash
non-cooperative game amongst themselves resulting in a Non-Cooperative EPEC
(NCEPEC) with the equilibrium of the upper level leaders characterised by the
NE condition (Definition 3.1). Furthermore, as the Nash non-cooperative game
between the leaders can be formulated as a VIP (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, p. 24),
and the lower level problem is another VIP parametrised in the vector of leaders’
variables, some authors have coined the term “Bilevel Variational Inequality”(Yang
and Huang, 2005; Yang et al., 2009) for the NCEPEC. It must be emphasised that
in the NCEPEC, each leader anticipates the reactions of the followers only when
making its decisions. However, in the relationship between the leaders themselves,
no leader is assumed to have any dominant or leadership position over the others.
Therefore, leaders engage each other in the Nash non-cooperative game on an equal
footing. As noted previously, the situation where one leader is able to act as a
Stackleberg leader with respect to the others, by anticipating their reactions to his
actions, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Taking into account both the Nash
non-cooperative game between the leaders and the “leader-follower” relationship
between the followers, the NCEPEC can be viewed as a game which aims to “find
an equilibrium point where no leader can improve his objective given the strategies
chosen by the other leaders and those chosen by the other followers” (Zhang, 2010,
p. 119, italics added).
4.3.1 The Non-Cooperative EPEC
In the discussion of games in Chapter 3, it was assumed that each player’s actions
were chosen from some discrete (as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, see p. 83) or contin-
uous (as in the Cournot game, see p. 73) action space. In these cases, the action a
player chooses does not affect the actions available to all other players. Thus each
player acts in an “unconstrained action space” i.e. the actions open to each player
are not affected by strategies chosen by their competitors. However, the NCEPEC
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints
is a special case of these Nash non-cooperative games discussed in Chapter 3. In
the NCEPEC, each player’s action is specifically constrained by a condition that
dictates an equilibrium, formulated as a VIP, in the parametric system under study
(Mordukhovich, 2004, 2005; Hu and Ralph, 2007; Soon, 2011; Hu and Fukushima,
2012).
Given both the Stackelberg relationship between leaders and followers as well as
the Nash non-cooperative game between the leaders themselves, the terms “player”
and “leader” are used synonymously in this thesis. Recall, from Chapter 3 that x−i
denotes the strategies of all other players in the game excluding that of player i i.e.
−i , i ∈ N\i. Then the optimisation problem facing player/leader i selecting her
optimal strategy to maximise her payoff, given the strategies chosen by all other
leaders and taking into account responses of the followers may be represented by
the MPEC in Eq. 4–4.
∀i ∈ N , Player i solves:


max
xi∈Xi
φi(xi,x−i,y)
subject to
y← SOL{V(xi, x−i)}
(Eq. 4–4)
The constraint in Eq. 4–4 emphasises the VIP specifying an equilibrium problem
parametrised in the strategies of all players in the game i.e. the strategy of leader i
as well as all other leaders. Furthermore, as player i takes into account the responses
of the followers, player i’s payoff is dependent on the solution of the lower level VIP.
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Hence the NCEPEC is in essence a series of interrelated MPECs with the coupling
constraint, that all players jointly face, being defined by a VIP. A solution of Eq.
4–4, if it exists, should be an NE satisfying Definition 3.1 (Mordukhovich, 2005).
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to prove the existence of an NE (or even the
weaker LNE condition as stated in Definition 3.4) in a general NCEPEC, an is-
sue which continues to require further research (Pang and Fukushima, 2005; Yang
and Huang, 2005; Facchinei and Kanzow, 2010). Thus, following the approach in
Ehrenmann (2004), its existence will be numerically shown and verified (employ-
ing numerically estimated best response correspondences as discussed in Chapter
3) in the case studies reported in Chapters 6 to 9 when applied to several games
formulated as NCEPECs. To find the LNE solutions of these games, two possible
algorithms are described in the rest of this chapter.
4.4 Fixed Point Iteration
The first class of algorithms for solving NCEPECs discussed is based on Fixed
Point Iteration (FPI). This category covers numerical methods that have already
been successfully applied to solve Equilibrium Programming problems (Ortega and
Rheinboldt, 1970; Zangwill and Garcia, 1981) in the absence of a binding equilibrium
constraint.
While the algorithm was initially suggested to solve a Cournot-Nash game in Harker
(1984), it has been adapted to identify LNE in the NCEPEC (Su, 2005; Leyffer and
Munson, 2010). It should be remarked that one of the earliest NCEPECs model
was that of intercity carrier competition where the upper level players are competing
shipping firms who optimise profits engaged in a Nash non-cooperative game subject
to a combined mode choice and highway assignment model represented as a VIP
at the lower level (Fisk, 1984, 1986). The FPI algorithm was suggested for the
resolution of the problem but no numerical results were presented.
The pseudocode of the FPI algorithm, which solves the NCEPEC as a series of in-
terrelated MPECs of |N | leaders, is given in Algorithm 4.1. Starting with an initial
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strategy vector, each leader’s MPEC is solved in turn, with all other players’ strate-
gies held fixed. This means that in applications of the FPI algorithm, a separate
algorithm to solve each player’s MPEC (termed the “inner MPEC”) at each iteration
is required. The strategy vector is then updated. If a convergence criteria e.g. one
based on a proximity measure such as the euclidean norm of difference in strategy
vectors between successive iterations being less than a pre-specified tolerance, ǫ, the
algorithm is deemed to have converged and the algorithm terminates. Otherwise,
the iteration counter is updated and the process is repeated. In the updating process
Algorithm 4.1 Fixed Point Iteration (FPI) for NCEPECs
1: Input: Maximum Iterations, G
2: Input: Termination Tolerance, ǫ(> 0)
3: g ← 0
4: Choose initial xg = {xg1, . . . , x
g
i , . . . , x
g
n}⊺
5: while g < G do
6: for i = 1 to |N | do
7: Solve MPEC for player i in Eq. 4–4 for xg+1i
8: end for
9: if ‖xg+1i − x
g
i ‖ ∀i ∈ N 6 ǫ then
10: Terminate
11: else
12: g ← g + 1
13: end if
14: end while
of the vector of strategies at iteration g, two slightly different variants have been
proposed viz. Gauss-Seidel and Gauss-Jacobi (Ehrenmann, 2004; Su, 2005). With
the Gauss-Seidel variant, updated values are used as soon as they are obtained while
in the latter, updated values are used only after all |N | MPECs have been solved.
By way of illustration of the differences between each variant, suppose that the
algorithm reaches a point where the next step would be to solve player i’s problem.
To get to this point, the algorithm would have solved all preceding players’ (i.e.
1, 2, . . . , i − 1) MPECs. In the Gauss-Seidel variant, the strategy vector treated as
fixed when solving player i’s problem, written as x−i is the vector comprising the
elements xg−i = {x
g+1
1 , . . . , x
g+1
i−1 , x
g
i+1, . . . , x
g
n}⊺. On the other hand, with the Gauss
Jacobi variant, updating of the strategy vector only occurs when all |N | individual
MPECs have been solved. Therefore in solving player i’s problem, the strategy
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vector treated as fixed is xg−i = {x
g
1, . . . , x
g
i−1, x
g
i+1, . . . , x
g
n}⊺.
Research into the application of FPI to NCEPECs has suggested that the Gauss-
Seidel variant outperforms the Gauss-Jacobi variant (Su, 2005, p. 33). Thus in
this thesis, the Gauss-Seidel FPI variant will be applied to the numerical examples
reported in the case studies.
Interestingly, the FPI algorithm closely resembles that of the IOA, wrongly suggested
as the way to tackle BLPPs and MPECs. The subtle but important difference
though is that instead of iterating between the upper level and lower level problems
which the IOA does, the iteration in the FPI is over each leader’s MPECs, with the
strategies of all others held fixed. It has been pointed out that the FPI algorithm
directly relates to the intuitive reasoning behind the concept of NE. In each iteration
of the algorithm, each leader treats as fixed all the other leaders’ strategies whilst
maximising her individual objective. When all leaders have computed their own
strategies, the game then moves onto a new vector of strategies to which each leader
must again react. The game ends when no firm has an incentive to change strategy
which is precisely the definition of NE as given in Definition 3.1 (Harker, 1984;
Ehrenmann, 2004).
In fact, this algorithm has been used by several authors to solve similarly structure
NCEPECs encountered in the modelling of deregulated electricity markets (Hu and
Ralph, 2007; Ehrenmann and Neuhoff, 2009; Zhang, 2010). While convergence re-
mains to be proved for general cases, the literature suggests that the FPI algorithm
converge to an LNE when each player’s payoff function satisfies a technical condition
known as “diagonal strict concavity” (Cardell et al., 1997; Contreras et al., 2004).
Intuitively interpreted, this condition requires that “each player has more control
over his payoff than other players have over it” (Contreras et al., 2004, p. 197).
Since it is beyond the scope of this thesis to prove that payoff functions for the
players in the NCEPECs considered in this thesis do in fact satisfy this condition,
the FPI algorithm can only be regarded as a heuristic procedure for solving the
NCEPEC.
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4.5 Sequential Linear Complementarity Problem Algo-
rithm
Based on the KKT conditions that characterise the optimality conditions for each
player in a Cournot game introduced in Chapter 3, an alternative algorithm for
solving the NCEPEC is developed. This section outlines the theoretical basis of the
proposed method concluding with an outline of the solution procedure.
4.5.1 Oligopolistic Competition as a Complementarity Problem
Consider the optimisation problem facing player i,i ∈ N engaged in a Cournot game
discussed in Chapter 3 where the payoff function is given by Eq. 3–2. Thus the
player faces the optimisation problem in Eq. 4–5.
max
xi∈Xi
φi(xi,x−i) = φi(x) (Eq. 4–5)
It is assumed throughout that player i’s payoff/objective function, φi(xi,x−i), i ∈ N ,
is concave if opponents’ strategies, x−i, are held fixed. This assumption was also
made in Yang et al. (2009)(p. 41) and has indeed been verified to hold in the games
that will be formulated in Chapters 6 to 9.
Quantity (≥ 0)
Pr
of
it
Quantity (≥ 0)
Pr
of
it
Figure 4.3: Complementarity Case 1 (left): Optima of the payoff function in the positive
orthant. Complementarity Case 2 (right): The payoff function, being concave, must have
decreasing slope in the positive orthant.
Focusing on player i, the two (and only) possibilities for a payoff maxima for this
player’s payoff function that can arise are illustrated in the left and right panels
of Fig. 4.3. In the left panel, the maxima of the profit function occurs where
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output is strictly positive i.e. ∂φi(xi,x−i)/∂xi = 0 when xi > 0. The notation R+
to emphasise that xi is strictly positive. On the other hand, it could be that the
maximum is attained in the negative space. Recall that the Cournot-Nash game is
a game in quantities (see Section 3.3.1), thus production levels cannot be negative.
Hence with values of x < 0 being ruled out, the only possibility, given concavity of
the profit function, is that the the profit curve must be falling or equivalently that
derivative of the profit curve with respect to player i’s output must be negative i.e.
∂φi(xi,x−i)/∂xi < 0 when output is 0. The so called “complementarity conditions”
allow for these two possibilities to be simultaneously taken into account. These
conditions are summarised in Eq. 4–6.
CP


Fi(xi) = −
∂φi(x)
∂xi
> 0
xi
∂φi(x)
∂xi
= 0
xi > 0

 ∀i ∈ N (Eq. 4–6)
Eq. 4–6 defines a Complementarity Problem (CP) (Karamardian, 1971; Kolstad and
Mathiesen, 1991; Facchinei and Pang, 2003; Konnov, 2007) which can be viewed as
a special case of the more general VIP (Nagurney, 1999, Proposition 1.4, p. 9).
Written in vector form, the CP is to find x ∈ Rn+ where F : Rn → Rn such that the
three conditions, in Eq. 4–7 are satisfied.
F(x) > 0
xF(x) = 0
x > 0
(Eq. 4–7)
4.5.2 Solution Algorithm
The first order Taylor expansion of F(x) at x0 (some arbitrary starting vector) can
be written as LF (x|x0) = F(x0) +∇xF(x
0)(x − x0). Then, following Kolstad and
Mathiesen (1991), the resulting Linear Complementarity Program (LCP(M, z)) is
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to find x ∈ Rn+ such that the system in Eq. 4–8 is satisfied.
LCP(M, z)


LF (x|x0) = z+Mx > 0
x⊺(z+Mx) = 0
x > 0,
(Eq. 4–8)
where
z = F(x0)− x0∇xF(x
0), (Eq. 4–9)
and
M = ∇xF(x
0), (Eq. 4–10)
where ∇xF(x
0) is the Jacobian of F(x) evaluated at some arbitrary vector x0 i.e.
a matrix of the partial derivatives of F(x) with respect to x. The diagonals of
∇xF(x
0) are ∂Fi(xi)/∂xi and the off diagonals are ∂Fi(xi)/∂xj , j 6= i.
Thus Kolstad and Mathiesen (1991) proposed to solve the Cournot game by iter-
atively solving a sequence of linear complementarity problems taking the form of
Eq. 4–8. Hence this method is known as the Sequential Linear Complementarity
Problem (SLCP) Algorithm. However, it is important to emphasise that the algo-
rithm was originally proposed for the classical Nash non-cooperative game where the
players’ strategies are not coupled by an equilibrium constraint. Nevertheless, with
little modification, SLCP can be applied to compute LNE strategies for NCEPECs.
The pseudocode in Algorithm 4.2 outlines the SLCP algorithm to solve NCEPECs
with an emphasis on the required modifications to the original proposal of Kolstad
and Mathiesen (1991). Starting with an initial vector of strategy variables, the lower
level VIP is solved to determine the first and second order derivatives (i.e. F(xg)
and ∇F(xg) at iteration g respectively) of each leader’s objective/payoff function
(see lines 5 to 6 of Algorithm 4.2). These derivatives can be obtained by either
numerical finite differencing techniques (Morton and Mayers, 2005) or sensitivity
analysis (Yang and Huang, 2005) and thus allow the computation of z and M using
Eq. 4–9 and Eq. 4–10 respectively. These serve as inputs to the LCP to be solved
to obtain a revised strategy vector as a starting point input into the next iteration.
The resulting LCP can be solved by application of Lemke’s algorithm (Cottle et al.,
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2009). If the absolute maximum of the elements in the vector of first order derivatives
of each leader’s payoff function is less than some pre-specified (small) termination
tolerance (ǫ), the algorithm is deemed to have converged and SLCP terminates.
Otherwise, the iteration counter is incremented and the process repeated.
It is evident that by explicitly incorporating the resolution of the lower level VIP for
a given vector of the leader’s strategies (Line 5 in Algorithm 4.2) to enable compu-
tation by z and M (Lines 7 and 8) at each iteration, the SLCP algorithm continues
to respect the leader-follower paradigm critical in the NCEPEC. Compared to the
FPI algorithm, instead of cyclically solving each leader’s MPEC until the system
converges, the SLCP algorithm solves all leaders’ strategies simultaneously. This
suggests that SLCP should be more computationally efficient vis-a´-vis any of the
FPI variants. Though the SLCP algorithm will be extensively applied in the case
studies reported in this thesis, it should be emphasised that it is beyond the scope
of this thesis to theoretically establish convergence of the algorithm to a LNE point
of the NCEPEC in Eq. 4–4.
Algorithm 4.2 Sequential Linear Complementarity Problem (SLCP)
1: Input: Termination Tolerance, ǫ(> 0)
2: g ← 0
3: Choose initial xg = [xg1, . . . , x
g
i , . . . , x
g
n]⊺
4: while Not Converged do
5: Solve Lower Level VI with xg
6: Obtain F(xg) and ∇F(xg)
7: Compute M using Eq. 4–10
8: Compute z using Eq. 4–9
9: Solve LCP(M, z) in Eq. 4–8 for xg+1
10: if max
∣∣F(xg+1)∣∣ 6 ǫ then
11: Terminate
12: else
13: g ← g + 1
14: end if
15: end while
4.6 Summary
This chapter has discussed the bilevel programming problem (BLPP) based on the
Stackelberg game from economics. The Stackelberg game is characterised by the
107
leader-follower relationship where the leader implements her strategy, taking into
account the reactions of the follower(s). The emphasis has been on the requirement
in modelling of toll pricing problems that the system manager is modelled as the
Stackelberg leader with the road users collectively playing the role of the followers.
The single leader Stackelberg game can be extended to that of multiple leaders
in the form of an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC). It is
emphasised that this is the common modelling framework, appropriate for separately
studying the problems of both a) private toll road concessionaires in competition
and b) jurisdictions in competition. constituting the principle topics investigated
in this thesis. Furthermore, the EPEC framework allows for the case where either
these leaders act cooperatively or engage in Nash non-cooperative game amongst
themselves.
In the case when the leaders’ are engaged in a Nash non-cooperative game, a simple
Fixed Point Iteration (FPI) algorithm was outlined as a solution methodology to
determine the LNE strategies. In addition, an algorithm based on solving a sequence
of Linear Complementarity Problems (SLCP) was proposed. The SLCP algorithm
was originally proposed for solving oligopolistic games from economics. However, by
ensuring that the Stackelberg leader-follower paradigm is adhered to, the original
proposal can be easily adapted to solve EPECs. In contrast to the FPI algorithm
solving each leader’s MPEC iteratively until the entire system converges, the SLCP
attempts to solve the entire NCEPEC simultaneously. Both the FPI and SLCP
algorithms are implemented to determine LNE in NCEPECs in the case studies in
Chapters 6 to 9.
In the next chapter, the situation when leaders are assumed to cooperate, which can
be modelled as a Multiobjective Optimisation Problem with Equilibrium Constraints
(MOPEC) is discussed. In addition, an alternative algorithm for identifying LNE
in games where leaders act non-cooperatively in the NCEPEC is also outlined.
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Chapter 5
Evolutionary Approaches to
Hierarchical Optimization
Problems5.1
5.1 Introduction
It has been recognised that the various hierarchical optimisation problems formu-
lated in Chapter 4 “are intrinsically nonsmooth and require the use of generalized
differentiation for their analysis and applications” (Mordukhovich, 2004, p. 479).
In this thesis, an alternative approach, based on Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs), is
suggested.
In recent years, several EAs have been proposed and applied to optimisation prob-
lems in a multitude of disciplines. These EA variants include Genetic Algorithms
(GA) (Goldberg, 1989), Evolution Strategies (Schwefel, 1995), Particle Swarm Op-
timization (Kennedy et al., 2001) and Differential Evolution (DE) (Storn and Price,
1997).
The differences between conventional/classical optimisation methods and EAs when
applied to optimisation problems are outlined to support the application of EAs to
EPECs. Classical methods generally operate on a single trial point, transforming
it using search directions computed based on first (and possibly, second) order con-
ditions until a criteria indicating convergence to a stationary point is met (Bazaraa
et al., 2006; Luenberger and Ye, 2008; Nocedal and Wright, 1999). The ability to
5.1Large portions of this chapter are based on Koh (2013), Section 5.5 draws on
Koh (2012) and Section 5.6 is new.
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exploit derivative information is a double edged sword. On the one hand, derivative
information allows for verification of the algorithm’s convergence to a stationary
point thereby theoretically guaranteeing that a (local) minimum has been found
when the algorithm converges. On the other hand, in the case of many multimodal
problems encountered in practice, these derivative based algorithms are unable to
distinguish between local and global minima. EAs differ from these classical meth-
ods in three key aspects (Michalewicz, 1999; Deb, 2001; Yu and Gen, 2010).
Firstly, to generate search directions, canonical EAs rely only on function evaluations
and obviate the use of derivatives. Thus EAs are applicable to nonsmooth and non-
differentiable optimisation problems such as MPECs and EPECs. There have been a
large number of successful applications of EA to problems of these nature (e.g Wang
et al., 2007; Amjady and Nasiri-Rad, 2010; Deb et al., 2013). In this respect alone,
EAs are thus similar to other “direct search methods” (see e.g. Lewis et al., 2000,
for a review) so named as they essentially rely only on objective function evaluations
to generate search directions. Techniques such as the pattern search algorithm of
Hooke and Jeeves (1961) or the method of dividing rectangles proposed in Jones
et al. (1993) are examples of direct search techniques that are not classed as EAs.
Secondly, EAs generally operate with a population of trial points instead. The prin-
ciple behind the EA is that of improving each member of the population throughout
the operation of the algorithm by way of an analogy with Darwin’s theory of evolu-
tion. Details of an EA’s population based structure are discussed in this Chapter.
Thirdly, classical methods are “deterministic” in the sense that they do not utilise
any randomisation to assist in the generation of the next trial point. These algo-
rithms tend to converge to an optimum closest to the initial trial point specified. By
using a population of trial points with random search directions based on function
evaluations, EAs are generally more suited to exploring the entire problem surface
and are intended therefore to identify the global optimum rather than just an arbi-
trary local optimum. However for an EA to do this, extensive function evaluations
are required which implies an increased computational burden vis-a´-vis classical
methods. It should be noted that there may be no convergence proof that EAs
are indeed able to locate the global (or even a local optimum) except under certain
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restrictive assumptions (Rudolph, 1994). This is why EAs are usually regarded as
heuristics. At the same time, the proposed EA for solving NCEPECs introduced in
this chapter is, in fact, uniquely endowed with a theoretical convergence proof that
an NE has been found, vindicating to some extent its computational burden.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, the template of a
generic EA is outlined to provide an overview of its operation and its key operators.
Section 5.3 shows how the EA variant used in this thesis, DE, can be tailored to solve
MPECs. By modifying its operating mechanism, DE can then be extended to solve
MOPECs. These modifications are discussed in Section 5.4. In a similar way, and a
novel contribution of this thesis, a DE based approach to identify NE in NCEPECs
is proposed as discussed in Section 5.5. On the one hand, the NCEPEC assumes that
players focus on the relentless pursuit of self-interest in a Nash non-cooperative game
and in so doing sacrifice elements of mutual interests and, as discussed in Chapter 3
(see Section 3.4.2), could result in Pareto sub-optimal outcomes. On the other hand,
as this chapter will highlight, the solution of the MOPEC, reflecting the outcomes
available to players should they co-operate instead, is not generally unique. While
there are potentially gains for all parties from moving from the NCEPEC outcome
to the cooperative outcomes obtained as solutions to the MOPEC, the remaining
question is how these gains should be shared between the players. To this end,
Section 5.6 provides an overview of axiomatic bargaining theory that provides a
framework for answering this question. Section 5.7 summarises.
5.2 Generic Evolutionary Algorithm
In an EA, denote the trial population at iteration or generation g by Pg which
comprises π ≡ |P| members. An illustration of such a population is given in Eq.
5–1. Each individual or member of Pg, is a single trial point, also known as a
“chromosome” in the EA literature (Goldberg, 1989; Deb, 2001) and denoted by
xgk = (x
g
k,1, . . . , x
g
k,n1
), k = {1, . . . , π}, of n1 dimensions that represents the leader’s
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variables in an MPEC.
Pg =


xg1
...
xgk
...
xgπ


=


xg1,1 x
g
1,2 · · · x
g
1,n1
...
...
. . .
...
xgk,1 x
g
k,2 · · · x
g
k,n1
...
...
. . .
...
xgπ,1 x
g
π,2 · · · x
g
π,n1


(Eq. 5–1)
Algorithm 5.1, adapted from Michalewicz (1999), gives the template of a generic
EA for optimisation. The user specifies a termination criteria such as the maximum
number of iterations allowed, G, the number of members of the population of trial
points, π, as well as control parameters specific to the EA variant utilised. These
control parameters are discussed later.
At the start of the algorithm, an initial parent population is randomly gener-
ated (Line 3 of Algorithm 5.1). These population members are evaluated and the
“fittest”5.2 population member is identified. The fittest population member is the
chromosome in the population corresponding to the lowest (highest) value of the
objective function for a minimisation (maximisation) problem.
Subsequently, the parent population is used to produce a child population, Cg, by
application of recombination operators (Line 6 of Algorithm 5.1). Each member of
this child population is evaluated and subsequently, a selection operator (Line 8)
picks members of Cg to becomes the parents for the next generation Pg+1. Line 9
ensures that the fittest population member found at each iteration is retained to be
a parent for the next generation. The process is repeated until some criteria, such
as the maximum number of iterations allowed, is reached.
Algorithm 5.1 reflects the typical operation of an EA and highlights that the two key
procedures in an EA are the recombination and selection operators. These specific
operators in the DE variant are detailed in the next section. To adapt the canonical
DE to solve MOPECs and NCEPECs, additional modifications to the selection
operator are required as will be highlighted in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 respectively.
5.2The term “fittest” used in EAs is derived from its analogy with evolution where
Darwin’s concept of survival of the fittest is a cornerstone.
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Algorithm 5.1 Outline of a Generic Evolutionary Algorithm for Optimisation
(Michalewicz, 1999)
1: Input: Maximum Iterations, G,Population Size, π, Control Parameters
2: g ← 0
3: Randomly generate Parent Population P0
4: Evaluate fitness of P0
5: while g < G do
6: Cg
Recombination
←−−−−−−−−− Pg
7: Evaluate fitness of Cg
8: Pg+1
Selection
←−−−−− Cg
9: Retain the fittest population member found at iteration g
10: g = g + 1
11: end while
5.3 Differential Evolution
Differential Evolution for Bi-Level Programming (DEBLP) was suggested in Koh
(2007) to solve MPECs in transportation systems management. It extends the GA
Based Approach (Yin, 2000; Sumalee, 2004a) by replacing the use of binary coded
GA strings with real coded DE chromosomes (Price et al., 2005) as the search
mechanism. DE is a simple algorithm that utilises perturbation and recombination
to optimise multi-modal functions and has already demonstrated remarkable success
when applied to the optimisation of numerous real-world problems (Storn and Price,
1997; Price, 1999; Price et al., 2005).
A description of the operation of DEBLP to solve the MPEC outlined in Chapter 4
(see Eq. 4–3) is given in the rest of this section. Recall that the lower level problem
of the MPEC in transportation systems management (Eq. 4–3b) is a VIP stipulating
the followers’ route choice equilibrium condition in a highway transportation system.
Thus for a fixed vector of the leader’s strategies x, this VI can be solved by executing
a (DUE/SUE) traffic assignment where the lower level vector, y, in this context,
encapsulates equilibrium link flows and demands.
This consideration motivated the development of the DEBLP heuristic which sought
to integrate DE’s well-documented global search capability to optimise the upper
level problem with existing (DUE/SUE) traffic assignment algorithms. Most cru-
cially, DEBLP continues to respect the crucial “leader-follower” paradigm of the
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MPEC.
5.3.1 Generate Parent Population
When the algorithm begins, real parameters in each dimension i of each member k
of P, constituting the parent population, are randomly generated within the lower
and upper bounds of the domain of the upper level variables of the BLPP as given
by Eq. 5–2 where rand(0, 1) is an operator returning a pseudo random number
generated from an uniform distribution between 0 and 1.
xk,i = rand(0, 1)(x
u
i − x
l
i) + x
l
i, k ∈ {1, ..., π}, i ∈ {1, ..., n1}. (Eq. 5–2)
Thus each chromosome, xk, represents a possible vector of the leader’s decision
variables in the MPEC.
5.3.2 Evaluation
The evaluation process used to determine the fitness of each trial point in Pg has
to be developed bearing in mind the “leader-follower” paradigm of the Stackelberg
model. As stressed in Chapter 4, this implies that the leaders have to be modelled
as taking into account the response (reaction) of the followers to his strategy x. This
can be accomplished by a “two stage” or hierarchical evaluation procedure shown
in Algorithm 5.2.
Algorithm 5.2 Hierarchical Evaluation of Chromosome xk,k ∈ P
1: Input xk
2: Execute (DUE/SUE) Traffic Assignment to obtain y(xk)
3: Evaluate Uk = U(xk,y(xk))
In the first stage, each individual k vector of the leader’s decision variables xk, a
(DUE/SUE) traffic assignment is executed resulting in equilibrium link flows and
demands represented here by y. With y so obtained, the upper level objective U can
be evaluated to obtain the value of the upper level objective function in the MPEC,
Uk, measuring the fitness of chromosome xk. Thus in relation to the description
114
of the operation of the algorithms discussed in this thesis, it is implicitly assumed
that all references to evaluation implies that evaluation is carried out following the
manner of Algorithm 5.2.
It is emphasised that this procedure differs from the IOA described in Chapter 4
(see Section 4.2) as the evaluation procedure obviates any iteration between the up-
per and lower level problems. Instead, entirely consistent with the “leader-follower”
paradigm, the leader’s vector xk being manipulated by DE is an input to the lower
level traffic assignment. One obvious drawback of doing this is the resulting in-
crease in computational burden which has been significantly reduced by advances
in computing power.
5.3.3 Recombination Operator in DE: Mutation and Crossover
The recombination process in DE is achieved through the mutation and crossover
process which aims to produce a child vector wk from the parent. This is accom-
plished by stochastically adding to the parent vector, the factored difference of two
other randomly chosen vectors from the population as shown in Eq. 5–3 (Storn and
Price, 1997).
wk,i =

 xs1,i + λ(xs2,i − xs3,i)xk,i
if rand(0, 1) < χ or i = intr(1, n1)
otherwise
(Eq. 5–3)
In Eq. 5–3, s1,s2 and s3 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , π} are randomly chosen population indices
distinct from each other and also distinct from the current population member index
k. rand(0, 1) is an operator that returns a pseudo random real number between 0
and 1. Similarly, intr(1, n1) is an operator that returns a pseudo random integer
between 1 and n1, i.e. the number of upper level decision variables in the MPEC.
The mutation factor, λ, between 0 and 2 (Storn and Price, 1997, p. 344), is a
parameter controlling the magnitude of the perturbation and, χ, is the probability
(between 0 and 1) that controls the ratio of new components in the offspring. Both
λ and χ are user-defined control parameters. The or condition in Eq. 5–3 ensures
that the child vector wk will differ from its parent xk in at least one dimension. Note
that the mutation and crossover strategy shown in Eq. 5–3 is not the only possible
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methods available though this is the one used in this work. Other techniques are
found in the literature (Storn and Price, 1997; Price, 1999; Price et al., 2005). Thus,
the aim of the recombination operator in DE is to create the child vector wk “by
adding the weighted difference between two population vectors to a third vector”
(Storn and Price, 1997, p. 343).
5.3.4 Enforce Bound Constraints
Application of the recombination process described in Section 5.3.3 above, however,
can generate child vectors that lie outside the bound constraints of the leader’s
decision variables (i.e. wk,i < xi or wk,i > x¯i). There are several ways to ensure
satisfaction of these constraints. One could set each dimension violated equal to the
bound of the variable violated or regenerate it within the bounds. However, apply-
ing these methods could lead to a loss of diversity which could lead to premature
convergence. Instead, a compromise proposed in Price (1999) is used where out of
bound values in each dimension i are reset to half way between its pre-mutation
value and the bound violated as shown in Eq. 5–4.
wk,i =


(xk,i + xi)/2 if wk,i < xi
(xk,i + x¯i)/2 if wk,i > x¯i
wk,i otherwise
(Eq. 5–4)
Thus in DE, an individual child vector is created by application of the recombination
operators (mutation and crossover) as discussed in Section 5.3.3 and the enforcement
of bound constraints in Section 5.3.4. This is summarised in Algorithm 5.3.
Algorithm 5.3 Creation of Child Chromosome with Differential Evolution
1: Input: Current Population P, Index k of current population member, Mutation
Factor λ, Probability of Crossover χ
2: Randomly choose 3 integer indices s1, s2, s3 between 1 and π such that s1 6=
s2 6= s3 6= k.
3: Apply Recombination (Mutation and Crossover) using Eq. 5–3.
4: Enforce Bound Constraints using Eq. 5–4.
5: Output: child vector wk
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5.3.5 Selection
Each child chromosome wk is then evaluated using Algorithm 5.2 to obtain its
fitness. This fitness can then be compared with that of its parent xk. In other
words, comparison takes place between the same kth member of the child population,
Cg, and the same kth member of the parent population, Pg. The chromosome
that returns a larger value of the upper level objective between the two (assuming
maximisation) is then selected to become a member of the parent population in the
next generation. This procedure is summarised in Eq. 5–5.
xg+1k =

 w
g
k
xgk
if U(wgk, L(•)) ≥ U(x
g
k, L(•))
otherwise
(Eq. 5–5)
The DE-specific techniques of child/trial vector creation as summarised in Algorithm
5.3 serves as the building block of two further algorithms designed to address EPECs
which are then applied to the case studies. These two algorithms will be discussed
in the rest of this chapter.
5.4 Multiobjective Optimisation Problems with Equi-
librium Constraints
As pointed out in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.3), the multiple leader-follower EPEC
model in which the upper level leaders are assumed to cooperate can be formulated
as a Multiobjective Optimisation Problem with Equilibrium constraints (MOPEC)
(Mordukhovich, 2004). Such a program is shown in Eq. 5–6.
MOPEC


Maximise
x∈X
Φ(x,y(x)) = (φ1(x,y(x)), . . . , φn(x,y(x)))
⊺
subject to
y(x) ← SOL{V(x)}
(Eq. 5–6a)
(Eq. 5–6b)
In contrast to usual optimisation programs which optimise an objective function
returning a scalar value (a “scalar objective function”), the objective function in
the MOPEC, Φ(x), is a vector, and can be viewed as the “concatenation” of the
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set of N individual objective functions i.e. Φ : Rn1 × Rn2 7→ Rn.
The upper level problem (Eq. 5–6a) is a standard Multiple Objective Optimisation
Problem (MOP) that has been extensively discussed in the literature (Cohon, 1978;
Chankong and Haimes, 1983; Sawaragi et al., 1985; Osyczka, 1998; Deb, 2001; Miet-
tinen, 2001; Marler and Arora, 2004; Ehrgott, 2005). The specific difference in the
MOPEC is that this upper level MOP is constrained by a VIP (Eq. 5–6b) which,
as emphasised in Chapter 4, specifies an equilibrium condition in the parametric
system predicated on the upper level decision vector x. Therefore, any solution
methodology for MOPECs must continue to obey the leader-follower paradigm of
Stackelberg games and this can be achieved by applying the hierarchical evaluation
procedure outlined in Algorithm 5.2.
In single objective optimisation problems e.g. Bazaraa et al. (2006), the goal is to
find a single optimal solution. However, in MOPs including MOPECs, due to the
potential contradiction of objectives, there is usually no single “best” solution (Mi-
ettinen, 2001). Instead, the solution concept for MOPs is based on the principle of
Pareto Optimality stated in Definition 3.3. Thus optimality in the context of MOPs
means that solutions are optimal if each component of the objective function can-
not be improved without deterioration to at least one other component (Miettinen,
2001; Marler and Arora, 2004; Ehrgott, 2005). In general, it is expected that there
are a number of these Pareto Optimal solutions known as the “Pareto Front” (when
viewed in objective function space) or “Pareto Set” (when viewed in solution space).
Thus, the twin goals of solving MOPs are firstly, to identify the Pareto Front per-
taining to the problem at hand and secondly, to find solutions as diverse as possible
on this Pareto Front (Deb, 1999, 2001; Robicˇ and Filipicˇ, 2005; Tan et al., 2005).
5.4.1 Interpretation of Multiobjective Formulation
While MOPECs in the form of Eq. 5–6 have been previously formulated in the
transportation systems management literature (Friesz, 1981; Friesz et al., 1993; An-
derson et al., 1998; Taber et al., 1999; Yin, 2002; Balling et al., 2003; Cantarella and
Vitetta, 2006; Sumalee et al., 2009), it is crucial to stress that these works have all
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focused their investigations on the choices facing a single regulator confronted with
multiple, conflicting objectives. Friesz (1981) formulated and Friesz et al. (1993)
simulated a model of the tradeoffs, faced by a regulator, taking into account con-
flicting objectives of user costs, travel distance, land take required in the network
design problem and proposed two potential solution algorithms. Taber et al. (1999)
applied a GA to a model of Provo, Utah, USA to consider three conflicting objec-
tives of minimising travel time, per capita cost and land use changes in the network
design problem while Sumalee et al. (2009) constructed a GA to design toll cordons
that maximise both efficiency and toll revenues but minimizing distributional equity
impacts within the context of a sole regulator.
In the aforementioned works, each element of Φ(x,y) reflects a different objective of
the single regulator. However, in concert with the principle theme of this thesis, each
element of Φ(x, y) reflects the objective of a different agents exercising control over
toll pricing strategies in the highway network. Therefore while the model formulation
of the MOPEC in Eq. 5–6 is the same as in antecedent literature, the underlying
paradigm of this thesis that motivates the formulation itself represents a departure
from the previous studies. Here, the focus is instead on the Pareto Optimal tradeoffs
among multiple decision makers with conflicting objectives.
5.4.2 Classical Techniques for MultiObjective Problems
In this section, two classical methods for solving MOPs are reviewed. Both methods
share in common the feature that the objective function in the MOPEC in Eq. 5–6
is transformed such that it returns a scalar instead of a vector. The first approach
is the weighting method, proposed in Zadeh (1963). This method aggregates all n
objectives into a single objective function that could potentially be optimised by
classical techniques. The second approach is the ǫ constraint method, proposed
in Haimes et al. (1971), which also operates by operates by selecting in turn, one
component objective from Φ(x, y) to serve as the objective function while the other
objectives enter as constraints to the reformulated optimisation problem.
Note that these two methods are not the only two available for MOPs in the litera-
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ture. However, the literature (Miettinen, 1999; Deb, 2001; Miettinen, 2001; Marler
and Arora, 2004; Ehrgott, 2005) indicates that these methods are the most suit-
able for the application of classical optimisation techniques which were designed to
handle scalar objective functions.
Weighting Method
When applied to MOPECs, the weighting method first associates each objective
function with a weighting coefficient, ̟i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and then subsequently max-
imises the resulting weighted sum of objectives (Miettinen, 1999). This procedure
thus transforms the original MOPEC into the Weighted MOPEC in Eq. 5–7 with a
scalar objective function.
Weighted MOPEC


Maximise
x∈X
n∑
i=1
̟iφi(x,y(x))
subject to
y(x) ← SOL{V(x)}
(Eq. 5–7a)
(Eq. 5–7b)
where ̟i > 0 and
n∑
i=1
̟i = 1. It can be proven that the optimal and unique solution
of Eq. 5–7, for a given weight combination, is Pareto Optimal (Miettinen, 1999, p.
79, Theorem 3.1.1). This implies that an MPEC solver can be used to solve the
MOPEC to determine a single Pareto Optimal solution. It follows from this idea
that repeated solution of Eq. 5–7 with a different set of weights each time could be
used to generate the entire Pareto Front.
Though this idea seems simple and promising, at least three caveats are necessary.
Firstly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to verify that the solution of Eq. 5–7 is
unique, which is a required condition for a solution discovered to be a Pareto Optimal
point. Secondly, this approach succeeds in getting points from all parts of the Pareto
Front only when the Pareto Front is convex. (Das and Dennis, 1997). However, as
stressed in Chapter 4, the general MPEC is non-convex (Luo et al., 1996). Therefore,
there is no a priori reason to expect that the Weighted MPEC formulated would
be convex and thus not all Pareto Optimal solutions can be identified by repeated
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application of this method. Thirdly, the use of an evenly distributed set of weights
does not result in an even spread of points on the Pareto Front (Das and Dennis,
1997; Miettinen, 1999; Marler and Arora, 2004).
Despite these drawbacks, the weighting method has been applied to the solution of
MOPECs in the transportation systems management literature and elsewhere (Mar-
ler and Arora, 2004). For example, Friesz et al. (1993) applied the weighting method
to identify Pareto Optimal points in a multiobjective network design problem.
ǫ-Constraint Method
In the ǫ-Constrained Method, one of the objective functions in Φ(x, y) is selected
to be optimised and all other objective functions are converted into constraints by
setting a lower bound (in the case of simultaneous maximisation of all objectives) for
them (Chankong and Haimes, 1983; Miettinen, 1999; Deb, 2001). Thus the MOPEC
may be formulated as shown in Eq. 5–8 with the other objectives constrained to
achieve some minimum “target” value, Ti, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} , i 6= ν.
ǫ Constraint


Maximise
x∈X
φν(x,y(x))
subject to
φi(x,y(x)) > Ti, i ∈ N , i 6= ν
y(x) ← SOL{V(x)}
(Eq. 5–8a)
(Eq. 5–8b)
(Eq. 5–8c)
While it can be proven that the ǫ constraint method is indeed able to identify Pareto
Optimal solutions (Miettinen, 1999, p. 86, Theorem 3.2.3), the main difficulty is that
the above proof holds with the qualification that the solution of Eq. 5–8 is unique.
As is the case with the weighting method, in practical applications, verification that
this uniqueness condition is satisfied is likely to be difficult. In practice, deciding
the appropriate value of the target values Ti, i ∈ N , i 6= ν for some objectives would
be difficult and problem dependent. It is inevitable that the choice of some target
values Ti, i ∈ N could result in an infeasible optimisation problem (Deb, 2001).
Other methods to solve MOPs, that can be adapted to solve MOPECs, can be found
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in the literature (Stadler, 1988; Osyczka, 1998; Miettinen, 1999; Deb, 2001; Marler
and Arora, 2004; Ruzika and Wiecek, 2005; Ehrgott, 2005). Techniques include
goal programming (Charnes et al., 1955; Schniederjans, 1995) and the weighted
Tchebycheff method (Steuer and Choo, 1983). In addition, a nonsmooth method
for solving MOPs has also been proposed (Haarala et al., 2007) and applied to solve a
MOPEC formulated in Mordukhovich et al. (2007). In general, in common with both
the weighting and ǫ-constraint methods, these techniques operate by transforming
the MOP into a mathematical optimisation problem amenable to application of
classical optimisation methods.
5.4.3 Multiobjective Evolutionary Algorithms (MOEAs)
Another particular area where extensive research has been undertaken is in the ap-
plication of EAs to MOPs. As highlighted earlier, the aim in solving MOPs is not
to identify just a single solution but as many diverse Pareto Optimal solutions as
possible (Deb, 2001; Yin, 2002; Coello Coello et al., 2007). In this respect, as EAs
operate with populations of trial solutions (Eq. 5–1 refers), EAs offer the potential
for conducting simultaneous parallel search. This is an important feature giving EAs
an advantage over the classical methods. Though a MOEA is a heuristic, lacking
any theoretical proof that an EA can indeed identify one Pareto Optimal solution,
it has been highlighted that the “ability of an EA to find multiple optimal solu-
tions . . . makes EAs unique in solving multiobjective problems” (Deb, 2001, p. 8).
This accounts for the rapid expansion of research into Multiobjective Evolutionary
Algorithms (MOEA).
One of the earliest MOEAs was the Vector Evaluated Genetic Algorithm (Schaffer,
1985). Since then, a multitude of MOEAs have been proposed. These have included
the Non Dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm (Srinivas and Deb, 1994; Deb et al.,
2002), Niched Pareto Genetic Algorithm (Horn et al., 1994), Multiobjective Genetic
Algorithm (Fonseca and Fleming, 1998), Strength Pareto Archived Evolution Strat-
egy (Zitzler and Thiele, 1999) and Pareto Archived Evolution Strategy (Knowles
and Corne, 2000), amongst others. At the same time, literature documenting suc-
cessful applications of MOEA in a multitude of disciplines abound. These have
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ranged from the medical sciences (Yu, 1997), truss optimization in civil engineer-
ing (Narayanan and Azarm, 1999), hydrology (Kollat and Reed, 2006) as well as
MOPECs in transportation systems management (Yin, 2002; Sumalee et al., 2009).
As a result of the rapid developments in MOEA, it is recognised that “evolutionary
techniques constitute probably the most successful approach for solving MOPs in
practice” (Ehrgott and Wiecek, 2005, p. 707). In view of this, the MultiObjective
Self Adaptive Differential Evolution (MOSADE) Algorithm, a DE based MOEA
proposed by Huang et al. (2007), will be used to generate the Pareto Fronts for the
MOPECs formulated in this thesis.
MOSADE is a MOEA that operates in a similar way to a generic EA (Algorithm
5.1) but with two key differences. The first difference is in the selection operator. In
solving MOPs, it is no longer possible to compare fitness of two chromosomes using
Eq. 5–5 as there are multiple objectives. Instead, the selection process that deter-
mines which chromosome is “fitter” is based on the principle of Pareto Optimality
(as given in Definition 3.3).
The second difference is the use of an “archive” as a repository to store potentially
Pareto nondominated solutions discovered as the algorithm proceeds. It is envisaged
that solutions contained in this archive would approximate the Pareto Front at
termination. However, because of the stochastic nature of EAs, it is possible that
the application of recombination operators could eliminate such solutions if they are
not set aside during the intermediate stages (Knowles and Corne, 2000; Marler and
Arora, 2004). As the algorithm proceeds, this archive is updated so that a store
of “good” solutions discovered is retained. Such an archiving strategy reflects the
“elitism” principle of the EA literature (Goldberg, 1989; Michalewicz, 1999) which
recommends retention of high quality solutions discovered during the operation of
the algorithm.
The operation of MOSADE is described with reference to Algorithm 5.5 as fol-
lows. When MOSADE begins, a parent population, P0, is randomly generated and
evaluated. At the same time, the external archive, A, is initialised with P0. Subse-
quently, a child population, Cg, is generated using the DE recombination operators
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of mutation and crossover (Algorithm 5.3) and these are evaluated.
In the selection phase, a Pareto Domination (Definition 3.3) comparison between
parent(x) and child (w) chromosomes takes place. If the parent dominates the child
(x ≺ w), the child is discarded and the algorithm moves on to perform Pareto
Domination comparison on the next member in the population (Lines 18 to 20 in
Algorithm 5.5). However, in the cases when the child either Pareto Dominates the
parent (w ≺ x) or is Pareto Incomparable with respect to the parent (w ‖ x), the
child becomes the parent for the next generation (Lines 22 and 25). The next step
in this case is to decide if the child enters the archive. This decision process for this
step is shown in Algorithm 5.4.
As can be seen, a candidate, w, enters the archive if it either a) Pareto Dominates
any existing member of the archive or b) is Pareto Incomparable with respect to any
member of the archive. In the former instance, the existing members in the archive
that are dominated by w will be removed from the archive.
As noted above, an additional aim in solving MOPs is to identify as many diverse
solutions of the Pareto Front as possible. Thus returning to Line 30 of Algorithm
5.5, should the size of the archive (|A|) exceed the user specified size, A¯, the kth
Nearest Neigbour technique (Friedman et al., 1977) is applied to identify the closest
(in terms of euclidean distance) neighbours to a chromosome in function space.
These neighbours identified are then removed from the archive.
Additionally, MOSADE dynamically updates the mutation factor, λ, and probability
of crossover, χ, so that fewer control parameters are required from the user. Details
of this process can be found in Huang et al. (2007).
5.5 Evolutionary Algorithms for NCEPECS
This section describes the development of an EA to find solutions of NCEPECs. As
noted in Chapter 4, such a solution should be a LNE satisfying Definition 3.4. Thus
as a first step, EA methods for identifying LNE are discussed. As EAs rely only
on function evaluations, the methodologies proposed can be adapted to determine
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Algorithm 5.4 Update Archive A (Huang et al., 2007)
1: Input: vector entering into the archive w
2: if any archive member Pareto Dominates w then
3: discard w
4: else if w Pareto Dominates a subset of existing archive members then
5: accept w into Archive.
6: delete the dominated members.
7: else if w is Pareto Incomparable with existing archive members then
8: accept w into Archive.
9: end if
10: Output: Updated Archive A
LNE in the NCEPEC (Eq. 4–4) as long as the evaluation of chromosomes is carried
out following the hierarchical evaluation method discussed in Algorithm 5.2.
5.5.1 Literature Review
The ability of EAs to optimise nonsmooth and non-differentiable functions has re-
sulted in the development of an EA version of the FPI Algorithm discussed in
Chapter 4 (see Section 4.4). The algorithm operates as outlined in the Algorithm
4.1 with the only difference being that an EA, rather than a conventional gradient-
based optimisation method, is used to solve each player’s optimisation problem (Son
and Baldick, 2004; Chen et al., 2006; Razi et al., 2007; Rajabioun et al., 2008; Ha-
jimirsadeghi et al., 2009; Ladjici and Boudour, 2010).
Another stream of research has exploited the principle of co-evolution which ab-
stracts from host-parasite or predator-prey co-evolution observed in nature. The
idea is summarised thus: “There are many examples in nature of organisms that
evolve defense to parasites that attack them only to have the parasites evolve in
ways to circumvent the defenses, which results in the hosts’ evolving new defenses,
and so on in an ever-rising spiral-a “biological arms race””(Mitchell, 1996, p. 20).
In applying the co-evolutionary concept to the detection of NE, each sub-population,
embodying the strategies of a single player, player i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is evolved sep-
arately. However, the fitness of each member of a single sub-population is deter-
mined by evaluation against all other sub-populations. By analogy with co-evolution
observed in nature, the aim is to evolve fitter individuals/strategies in each sub-
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Algorithm 5.5 MultiObjective Self Adaptive Differential Evolution (Huang et al.,
2007)
1: Input: π, G, payoff functions
2: Input: Maximum Archive Size A¯
3: g ← 0
4: A← ∅
5: Randomly initialize a population of π parent strategy profiles P
6: Evaluate payoffs to players with P
7: A← P0
8: while g < G do
9: for j = 1 to π do
10: use Algorithm 5.3 to create child strategy profiles vector wj
11: Cgj ← wj
12: end for
13: Evaluate payoffs to players with C
14: for j = 1 to π do
15: x← Pgj
16: w ← Cgj
17: Apply Definition 3.3 to determine if x ≺ w
18: if x ≺ w then
19: discard w
20: Pg+1j ← x
21: else if w ≺ x then
22: Pg+1j ← w
23: Use Algorithm 5.4 to decide if w enters A
24: else if x ‖ w then
25: Pg+1j ← w
26: If x 6∈ A, use Algorithm 5.4 to decide if x enters A
27: Use Algorithm 5.4 to decide if w enters A
28: end if
29: end for
30: if |A| > A¯ then
31: Use kth Nearest Neighbour algorithm (Friedman et al., 1977) to delete near-
est neighbours in function space from A
32: end if
33: Update DE Control Parameters: χ and λ
34: g ← g + 1
35: end while
36: Output: Pareto Optimal Solutions
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population to counter the fitter strategies of the opponent populations as they too
evolve. Algorithm 5.6 outlines the search algorithm for locating the NE that incor-
porates the concept of co-evolution.
Algorithm 5.6 Coevolutionary Algorithm for Identifying NE
1: Input: Maximum Iterations, G
2: g ← 0
3: Initialize n sub-populations of size π, Pi, {i = 1, 2, . . . , n}
4: Randomly select one member from each Pj as the initial strategy:
x0 = (x0
1
, x0
2
, . . . , x0n)
5: while g < G do
6: for i = 1 to n do
7: Apply EA to evolve Pi
8: Update strategy vector xg with the fittest member of Pi
9: end for
10: g ← g + 1
11: end while
In Algorithm 5.6, each sub-population Pi, {i = 1, 2, . . . , n} comprising π members
each, encodes the strategies of each player in the game. Thus there are as many
sub-populations as players. An EA is subsequently used to evolve each separately
for a number of specified iterations (Line 7 of Algorithm 5.6). However, as pointed
out in Pedroso (1996), the best solution of each population Pi, {i = 1, 2, . . . , n}
found at iteration g may not necessarily be the best when the strategy vector is
updated (Line 8). Hence at the start of next iteration, it is essential to evaluate
the entire population again to determine the fittest member following the revelation
of all player’s strategies. One of the first applications of this method to several
examples from economics such as the Cournot game as discussed in Chapter 3 can
be found in Curzon Price (1997). It should be pointed out that a Particle Swarm
based co-evolutionary algorithm for the NCEPEC was proposed in Koh (2010).
In practice, there have been opposing views with regards to the performance of
co-evolutionary methods as outlined in Algorithm 5.6. Son and Baldick found that
simple co-evolutionary algorithms failed to converge to the LNE in one instance
(Son and Baldick, 2004, p. 310) while produced misleading results in another (Son
and Baldick, 2004, p. 314). On the other hand, both Razi et al. (2007) and Koh
(2010) did not report such difficulties in their applications of the co-evolutionary
concept.
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In this thesis, another proposal for the identification of NE, known as Nash Domi-
nation, is discussed. The attractiveness of Nash Domination is its close theoretical
relationship to the definition of NE itself and in particular, Corollary 3.1. Nash
Domination can be further integrated into an EA, enabling NE strategies to be iden-
tified. In addition, the application of Nash Domination provides theoretical proof
of convergence of the algorithm to an NE and is a unique feature of the proposed
EA.
5.5.2 Nash Domination Evolutionary Multiplayer Optimisation
As noted in Corollary 3.1 in Chapter 3, at an NE, players would not benefit from
unilaterally deviating from their current strategies. This observation has led Lung
and Dumitrescu (2008) to define Nash Domination, a concept analogous to Pareto
Domination employed as the selection criteria in MOPECs as discussed in Section
5.4. This section defines Nash Domination before outlining an EA to identify the
NE in an NCEPEC which explicitly embodies this concept.
In comparing two strategy profiles, the Nash Domination principle operates by
counting the number of players that could potentially benefit if each player de-
viates from one profile to the other unilaterally. Then the strategy profile resulting
in fewer players being incentivised to unilaterally deviate away from it is deemed
to be closer to an NE following Corollary 3.1.
Let a and b be two strategy profiles, a,b ∈ X where a ≡ {a1, a2, . . . , ai, . . . , an}
⊺
and b ≡ {b1, b2, . . . , bi, . . . , bn}
⊺. Then the strategy profile written as (bi,a−i) has
the interpretation that player i uses strategy bi while every other player uses strate-
gies from a i.e. (bi,a−i) ≡ {a1, . . . , ai−1, bi, ai+1 . . . an}
⊺. Similarly, (ai,b−i) ≡
{b1, . . . , bi−1, ai, bi+1 . . . bn}
⊺.
Let Ψa be the number of players that could benefit by unilaterally switching to bi
when everyone else plays a−i. Similarly, let Ψb be the number of players that could
benefit by unilaterally switching to ai when everyone else plays b−i.
It should be obvious that 0 6 Ψa,Ψb 6 n, since there may be either none or anywhere
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up to a maximum of all n players that could benefit from unilateral deviation. The
procedure to determine Ψa and Ψb is given in Algorithm 5.7.
Algorithm 5.7 Nash Domination Comparison
1: Initialise Ψa = 0, Ψb = 0
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: if φi((bi,a−i),y) > φi(a,y) then
4: Ψa = Ψa + 1
5: else if φi((ai,b−i),y) > φi(b,y) then
6: Ψb = Ψb + 1
7: end if
8: end for
Applying Algorithm 5.7, one, and only one, of the following outcomes must be true
(Lung and Dumitrescu, 2008, Remark 4, p. 365):
1. Ψa < Ψb =⇒ a Nash Dominates b, written as a ≺N b, or
2. Ψb < Ψa =⇒ b Nash Dominates a, written as b ≺N a, or
3. Ψa = Ψb =⇒ a and b are Nash Non Dominated with respect to each other,
written as a ‖N b.
Proposition 5.1. All Nash Non Dominated chromosomes are NE.
Proof. See Lung and Dumitrescu (2008), Proposition 9, p. 366.
Proposition 5.1, therefore, theoretically assures that the solution found by applica-
tion of the Nash Domination principle will not just be a LNE but also the NE when
viewed in the full strategy space. Thus based on Proposition 5.1, an EA for deter-
mination of NE in NCEPECs known as Nash Domination Evolutionary Multiplayer
Optimisation (NDEMO), was proposed in Koh (2012). The crucial change required,
compared to the Generic EA given in Algorithm 5.1, is in the selection operator.
Each chromosome represents a strategy profile i.e. strategies of all players in the
game. A chromosome is now judged to be “fitter” compared to another if it Nash
Dominates its competitor.
NDEMO operates as shown in Algorithm 5.8. The user specifies the maximum num-
ber of iterations, G, the population size, π, the termination tolerance, ǫ(> 0), the
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control parameters of DE i.e. Mutation Factor, λ, and Probability of Crossover, χ,
and a procedure to evaluate payoffs. An initial population at iteration g = 0 of par-
ent strategy profiles, Pg, is generated randomly and then evaluated. Subsequently,
a child population of strategy profiles, Cg, are created by applying the DE operators
given in Algorithm 5.3 and these are evaluated.
At each iteration, parent and child strategy profiles are compared one by one, fol-
lowing the Nash Domination Comparison procedure of Algorithm 5.7. Again, as in
canonical DE, the Nash Domination comparison takes place between the same kth
member of the child population, Cg, and the same kth member of the parent popula-
tion, Pg. It should be noted that this procedure can be computationally demanding
when applied to the NCEPECs discussed in this thesis since this necessitates a sep-
arate traffic assignment for each unilateral deviation so as to compute Ψa and Ψb
to determine the Nash Domination status.
From this procedure, chromosomes identified as Nash Non Dominated are placed in
a temporary population T . However, this also means that the size of T (denoted
|T |) could potentially exceed the user defined population size, π. If this happens,
T is randomly trimmed so that there will always be only π parents for the next
generation (lines 28 to 30 of Algorithm 5.8). Convergence is checked by computing
the standard deviation of the population (σ). If σ is less than ǫ, the population is
judged to have converged and the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, the counter is
increased and the process is repeated.
5.6 Bargaining
While Pareto Optimality (cf. Definition 3.3) means that the outcomes to the play-
ers acting cooperatively would lie on the Pareto Front, this still “leaves open a
large number of possibilities since the Pareto Frontier usually contains many points”
(Bergin, 2005, p. 281) and is not, in general, unique. Thus even after some com-
putational effort had been expended to identify the Pareto Front, it would still be
necessary to “ specify how colluding firms select a point” (Schmalensee, 1987, p.
357) on this front. In general, the key question of interest in the study of bargaining
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Algorithm 5.8 Nash Domination Evolutionary Multiplayer Optimization
(NDEMO) Koh (2012)
1: Input: π, G, Termination Tolerance ǫ(> 0), DE Control Parameters, payoff
functions
2: g ← 0
3: Randomly initialise a population of π parent strategy profiles Pg
4: Evaluate payoffs to players with Pg
5: Compute standard deviation (σ) of Pg
6: while g < G or σ > ǫ do
7: for j = 1 to π do
8: Apply Algorithm 5.3 to create child strategy profiles vector b
9: Cgj ← wj
10: end for
11: Evaluate payoffs to players with C
12: T ← ∅
13: for j = 1 to π do
14: x← Pgj
15: w ← Cgj
16: Apply Algorithm 5.7 to determine if x ≺N w
17: if x ≺N w then
18: discard w
19: T ← x
20: else if w ≺N x then
21: discard a
22: T ← w
23: else
24: T ← x
25: T ← w
26: end if
27: end for
28: if |T | > π then
29: Randomly trim T until |T | = π
30: end if
31: Compute standard deviation (σ) of Pj
32: if σ 6 ǫ then
33: Terminate
34: else
35: P(g+1) ← T
36: g ← g + 1
37: end if
38: end while
39: Output: Nash Non Dominated Solutions
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is how the “surplus” or gains, obtained by moving from the non-cooperative out-
come to the cooperative outcome on the Pareto Front, should be divided between
the participants (Serrano, 2008).
There are two approaches to the problem of surplus division between parties (Nash,
1953; Serrano, 2008). In the first, or strategic approach, “the cooperative game is
reduced to a non-cooperative game” (Nash, 1953, p. 129). This approach is con-
cerned with the evolution of the bargaining process; namely, the “exact specification
of the details of negotiation . . . and the identification of behaviour that would occur
in those protocols” (Serrano, 2008, p. 371). This approach is not investigated in
this thesis. Instead, the focus is on the second, or normative approach, through Ax-
iomatic Bargaining Theory. This approach operates by outlining “properties that
it would seem natural for the solution to have” (Nash, 1953, p. 129) and then pro-
ceeds to identify a solution that agrees with those principles. In the literature, these
principles are known as “axioms”.
In this thesis, the focus is on the bargaining problem restricted to only two parties
“who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than one way”
(Nash, 1950b, p. 155). Clearly, the negotiations between the parties may breakdown
but so long as “there are feasible outcomes which all the participants prefer to the
disagreement outcome, then there is an incentive to reach an agreement” (Roth,
1979, p. 5). The disagreement outcome is synonymously referred to as the “Status
Quo Point” (Schmalensee, 1987; Napel, 2002; Serrano, 2008) which, following Fisher
et al. (1991), may also be referred to as the “Best Alternative To a Negotiated
Agreement” (abbreviated BATNA). The BATNA corresponds to the players’ payoff
in the (fully competitive) non-cooperative NE outcome and thus can be interpreted
as the “backstop payoffs” (Dixit and Skeath, 2004, p. 569) to the parties should
negotiations fail and an agreement not be reached. Outcomes of bargaining are
therefore either “cooperation agreements specifiying a surplus distribution or final
disagreement” (Napel, 2002, p. 10).
To select an outcome, amongst the many on the Pareto Front, two axiomatic bar-
gaining paradigms are explored in this thesis. These are:
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1. Utilitarian Solution: Under the classical utilitarian principle, which dates back
to the mid-19th century (Thomson, 1994), this solution aims at “maximizing
the sum of the individual agents’ utilities” (Moulin, 1988, p. 13). Extending
this notion, the utilitarian view argues that “a society is just if it maximizes
the total or average utility of the society” (Cudd, 1996). A philosophical dis-
cussion of notions of fairness, a hotly debated and subjective topic, is outside
the scope of this thesis. An example of the utilitarian approach had, in fact,
been previously illustrated in Example 3.6 in Chapter 3 (see p. 83). In that
example, the discussion had explicitly assumed that the colluding firms, form-
ing a cartel, would maximise joint profits (see Eq. 3–16). Furthermore, as the
colluding parties were entirely symmetric (i.e. with equal production costs),
it was assumed that they would also share these joint profits equally. Two
drawbacks can be identified with this solution. Firstly, this solution might not
be unique (Thomson, 1994). Secondly, “the utilitarian solution may require a
very unequal distribution” (Bergin, 2005, p. 284) of outcomes.
2. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) (Nash, 1950a) is obtained by “maximis-
ing the product of utility gains from the disagreement point”(Thomson, 1994,
p. 1243). The NBS is further elaborated in the next section.
It should be emphasised that the term “Utilitarian Solution” should not be inter-
preted as referring to utility as a measure of social welfare. If the intention is to
indeed to refer to social welfare, this will be made clear in any discussions.
Though not examined in this thesis, there are a number of other paradigms, which
postulate how the gains from cooperation may be allocated between the players
(see e.g. the discussions in Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975; Roth, 1979; Perles and
Maschler, 1981; Schmalensee, 1987; Thomson, 1994; Binmore, 1998; Muthoo, 1999;
Napel, 2002; Binmore, 2007). For example, the Egalitarian Solution argues that
the best way is to ensure that gains are shared equally between parties. However,
applying this solution concept could potentially require a very large reduction in
welfare of one party for a small gain in welfare of the other (Bergin, 2005).
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5.6.1 Nash Bargaining and Nash Bargaining Problem with Equi-
librium Constraints (NBPEC)
In this section, the Nash Bargaining Problem (Nash, 1950a), a normative approach
to surplus division based on Axiomatic Bargaining Theory, is discussed. Several
definitions and assumptions are in order. Formally, a bargaining problem is defined
by the tuple (B,φN) where B is a set of feasible payoffs (the Bargaining Set) and
φN ,
(
φN1 , φ
N
2
)⊺
is the vector of BATNAs i.e. payoffs each would obtain in the
non-cooperative outcome. Following Thomson (1994), it is assumed that the set
B is bounded and closed. The boundary of B constitutes the Pareto Front. For a
non-trivial solution, it is assumed that there is at least one point in B that strictly
Pareto dominates φN.
The axioms that the NBS (often called “Nash Axioms”) satisfy are as follows:
1. Individual Rationality: This axiom requires that “all agents should strictly
gain from the compromise” (Thomson, 1994, p. 1248).
2. Pareto Optimality: This axiom requires that all feasible gains from coop-
eration should be exhausted and thus “no available mutual gain should go
unexploited” (Dixit and Skeath, 2004, p. 572).
3. Scale Invariance: This axiom requires that linear rescaling should have no
effect on payoff calculations and no effect on outcomes (Thomson, 1994).
4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: This axiom requires that eliminating
feasible alternatives, other than the BATNA, that would not have been chosen,
should not affect the bargaining solution (Myerson, 1991).
Adapting from Nash (1950b) and Theorem 7.4.1 (p. 144) in van Damme (1991), the
2-person Nash Bargaining Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (NBPECs) can be
formulated in Eq. 5–9. Therefore, this NBPEC is also another instance of the class
of MPECs as discussed in Chapter 4 since it incorporates a VIP predicated on the
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upper level decision vector.
Maximise
x∈X
Z(x,y(x)) = (φ1(x,y(x)) − φ
N
1 )(φ2(x,y(x)) − φ
N
2 )
subject to y(x)← SOL{V(x)}
φ1(x,y(x)) > φ
N
1
φ2(x,y(x)) > φ
N
2
(Eq. 5–9)
As noted previously, the objective function in the NBPEC maximises the product of
the gains to both parties vis-a´-vis the BATNA. Aside from the VIP constraint, the
other constraints stipulate that in the solution, both parties obtain, at least, their
BATNAs. This thus ensures that Axiom 1 of Individual Rationality, as defined
above, is satisfied. In passing, it should be pointed out that in contrast to the NBS,
the Utilitarian Solution does not satisfy this axiom (Thomson, 1994, p. 1248) since
it is quite possible that one party may obtain lower payoff vis-a´-vis the BATNA.
In bargaining problems without the VIP constraint that have been previously stud-
ied, Nash (1950a) proved that the solution of Eq. 5–9 is the only solution satisfying
Axioms 1 to 4 above. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to prove that these axioms
are met when the bargaining problem under consideration includes an equilibrium
constraint. Despite this, the formulation will be applied heuristically in this work
and it will be demonstrated, through the numerical examples, that in the solution
to the NBPEC, that at the very least, Axioms 1 and 2 can be seen to be satisfied.
In other words, it will be shown that the solution of the NBPEC will illustrate that
not only will the agents improve their outcomes vis-a´-the BATNA (Axiom 1) but
also that it is Pareto Optimal (Axiom 2).
Thus, this formulation, whilst applied heuristically in this work, serves to bridge the
gap between the outcome obtained from the non-cooperative pursuit of self-interest
underlying the NCEPEC formulation in Eq. 4–4 and the cooperative paradigm of
mutual interest underscoring the MOPEC formulation in Eq. 5–6.
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5.7 Summary
This chapter proposed the use of Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) for the resolu-
tion of the hierarchical optimisation problems formulated in Chapter 4 which are
recognised to be difficult optimisation problems characterised by nonsmoothness,
non-differentiability and multimodality. By design, EAs do not utilise derivative in-
formation to generate search directions when solving optimisation problems. Thus
EAs are applicable to a variety of nonsmooth problems including EPECs.
A generic template of an EA for optimisation was outlined focusing on both its
population based structure and its mechanism for generation of search directions
by the iterative application of recombination and selection operators. Subsequently,
Differential Evolution (DE), a member of the class of EAs, was detailed. Two crucial
aspects of DE when applied to VIP constrained hierarchical optimisation problems
were emphasised. Firstly, by ensuring that the fitness of a trial vector is evalu-
ated using a hierarchical evaluation strategy, DE could be applied to solve MPECs
whilst maintaining the crucial leader-follower relationship characterising Stackelberg
games. Secondly, DE’s recombination and selection mechanisms were described.
DE’s recombination operator subsequently formed the basis of two further algo-
rithms ,introduced in this chapter, designed to solve MOPECs and NCEPECs.
By tailoring the selection mechanism to ensure that the fitness of trial vectors, or
chromosomes, were compared on the basis of Pareto Domination criteria, DE could
be easily extended to identify the Pareto Fronts in MOPECs. Following a review of
several techniques to solve Multiple Objective Problems, the DE based MOSADE
algorithm proposed by Huang et al. (2007) was outlined. MOSADE will be applied
to generate Pareto Fronts in the case studies discussed in subsequent chapters of
this thesis.
Subsequently, as a novel contribution in this thesis, a DE based approach to iden-
tify NE in NCEPECs was described. The idea is based on the principle of Nash
Domination proposed in Lung and Dumitrescu (2008). When comparing “fitness”
of two strategy profiles, this principle means that the strategy profile resulting in
fewer players having an incentive to unilaterally deviate away from it is judged to
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be closer to an NE.
By making a change to the selection operator of EAs to ensure that fitness of strategy
profiles was assessed utilising the Nash Domination principle, a DE based algorithm
(NDEMO) was proposed for the identification of NE in NCEPECs where the lead-
ers were assumed to act non-cooperatively. In particular, it was highlighted that
convergence to the NE and not merely an arbitrary LNE, is theoretically assured
by the application of the Nash Domination principle and this is a unique feature of
the proposed EA.
When moving from the Nash non-cooperative outcome of the NCEPEC to the Pareto
Front generated as a solution of the MOPEC, surplus to the players will be created.
How should the surplus be shared between the players? This is the question of
interest in (two person) Axiomatic Bargaining Theory. The aim of this normative
approach to bargaining is not to explain the evolution of the bargaining process per
se but to understand how bargaining should be resolved between rational parties
according to some desirable criteria or axioms. Two of the many possible answers
to this question as elucidated in the literature were introduced. In the Utilitarian
view, the total gains should be maximised. On the other hand, the Nash Bargaining
Solution (NBS) (Nash, 1950b) seeks to maximise the product of gains to the two
parties. In this chapter, adapting the methodology from the literature, this chapter
proposed the Nash Bargaining Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (NBPEC) to
bridge the gap between the solution of the NCEPEC and the Pareto Front of the
MOPEC.
The effectiveness of MOSADE and NDEMO will be subsequently assessed when
applied to the case studies formulated in Chapters 6 to 9.
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Chapter 6
Competition between Toll Road
Concessionaires: Part I6.1
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is the first of two chapters that studies toll revenue competition between
toll road concessionaires in a highway network with multiple OD pairs. In line with
the research objectives of this thesis, the purpose of this chapter is three-fold.
Firstly, the welfare and revenue impacts of competition between revenue maximis-
ing toll road concessionaires are assessed against two alternative toll pricing policies:
a) a second best welfare maximising toll pricing policy, providing an indication of
the upper bound of the welfare gains attainable, with tolls charged on the set of
pre-specified tollable links and b) a revenue maximising concessionaire, termed a
“monopolist”, deciding toll levels on all tollable links in the network, giving an in-
dication of the upper bound of the revenues attainable. As discussed in Chapter 2,
whether competition is socially beneficial, or otherwise, vis-a´-vis monopoly control,
depends critically on the intrinsic interrelationships between the links in competi-
tion i.e. whether competition takes place between concessionaires controlling either
parallel or serial links and this distinction will be maintained through the numerical
tests reported in this chapter.
Secondly, several algorithms for the identification of the LNE toll vector, when
concessionaires are in competition, are applied and their performance evaluated.
As described in Chapter 4, these algorithms included the Fixed Point Iteration
(FPI) and the Sequential Linear Complementarity Problem (SLCP) approach. In
6.1This chapter draws extensively on Koh and Shepherd (2010).
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addition, the Synchronous Iterative (SI) algorithm introduced by Yang and Huang
(2005) will be described and tested in this chapter. It is shown that the SLCP
algorithm, a novel contribution of this thesis, is effective and and computationally
efficient in locating LNE. In addition, the ability of the proposed Nash Domination
Evolutionary Multiplayer Optimisation (NDEMO) algorithm, to locate LNE points
in NCEPECs, as described in Chapter 5, is assessed.
Thirdly, to address a gap identified in the literature review from Chapter 2, the
possibility for tacit collusion between toll road concessionaires is investigated. To
do so, this chapter outlines an intuitive modelling approach that allows a toll road
concessionaire to infer its rival’s intentions from its observation of market outcomes.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section introduces the
additional notation required to mathematically formulate the various toll pricing
policies tested in this chapter. In Section 6.3, the MPEC models of second best
welfare maximisation as well as revenue maximisation by a monopolist are devel-
oped. Subsequently, the mathematical model of toll revenue competition between
concessionaires is outlined and this is shown to be an instance of a NCEPEC. As
highlighted in Chapter 4, the MPECs and the NCEPEC are hierarchical optimi-
sation problems characterised by the presence of a binding equilibrium constraint
surfacing in the form of a VIP. More specifically, this chapter assumes that the lower
level VIP reflects users’ route choices obeying Wardrop’s DUE principle. While this
principle is extensively employed in transportation network analysis, it suffers from
the drawback that DUE link flows are not necessarily differentiable everywhere (Pa-
triksson, 2004). Thus the MPEC and NCEPEC models formulated in this chapter
are characterised by a nonsmooth active DUE constraint. Consequently, specialised
algorithms have to be applied to solve the resulting formulations in order to deter-
mine the optimal toll levels in each case. Thus Section 6.4 describes the Cutting
Constraint Algorithm (CCA) which will be used to solve the MPEC formulations.
Since the NCEPEC model of competition between concessionaires can be decom-
posed into a series of inter-related MPECs, CCA can also be embedded within the
FPI algorithm to solve the problem to determine (L)NE tolls. Section 6.5 describes
the network that used for the numerical tests in this chapter before presenting the
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results of the algorithms and assessing the welfare implications of the alternative
toll pricing policies. In order to address a research gap highlighted in Chapter 2,
Section 6.6 investigates the possibilities for collusion between toll road concession-
aires. It is shown that when moving from no collusion through partial collusion to
full collusion, a path is drawn from the NCEPEC (Nash non-cooperative) to the
Utilitarian Solution/monopoly outcome. Interestingly, in the presence of LNE, it
is found that collusion could be welfare enhancing. In addition, tests of the Nash
Bargaining Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (NBPEC) introduced in Chapter
5, directly extending the approach proposed in Nash (1950b), is tested as an alter-
native paradigm as to how the surplus created by moving from to solution under
competition to the monopoly solution could potentially be allocated amongst the
concessionaires. Section 6.7 summarises.
6.2 Notation
This section outlines the notation used in this chapter where they have not been
previously defined.
In the Nash non-cooperative game discussed in Chapter 3, N denoted the set of
players in a game. Since the specific game considered in this chapter is between toll
road concessionaires, this set of concessionaires will similarly be denoted by N .
With regards to the highway network, let L represent the set of all links. The
subset of these links upon which a toll can be levied (referred to as “tollable” links)
is denoted by the set J , J ⊆ L. The location of these tollable links are assumed
to have been pre-defined and summarised in a |L| × |J | incidence matrix Ξ ,with
elements Ξlj equal to 1 if and only if link l,l ∈ L is tollable link j,j ∈ J , 0 otherwise.
With one exception to be discussed in the next chapter (see Section 7.5), it will be
assumed in the numerical tests when competition is discussed, that each toll road
concessionaire can only decide the toll level on a single link in the highway network.
Thus the number of concessionaires, in the competitive scenarios to be examined, is
equal to the number of tollable links in the network, i.e. |N | = |J |.
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Let x be the vector of link tolls, x = [xi], i ∈ N . The decision space of such tolls
is denoted by Xi = {xi : 0 6 xi 6 x¯i}, i ∈ N with x¯i being a pre-specified upper
bound of tolls on the link. It is assumed that tolls are measured in time units of
seconds.
Let v be the vector of link flows of all links in the network where each element is
vj , j ∈ L. The travel time will depend, through congestion, on the flow on the
link. For each link j, j ∈ L, this can be represented as a monotonically increasing,
continuous function tj(vj) of the flow vj on link j only. Thus the generalised travel
time function cj(vj , xj), given link flow, vj , and toll level, xj, is given by Eq. 6–1.
cj(vj , xj) =

 tj(vj) + xj, j ∈ Jtj(vj), otherwise (Eq. 6–1)
This generalised travel time function can be collected in vector form as c(v,x).
The network also contains OD movements in a set K, with qk, k ∈ K denoting
the travel demand for OD movement k and q collects all demands in a vector.
As only a single user class is considered, it is assumed that all travellers in the
network perceive travel times in the same way, regardless of socio-economic status.
Following Yang and Huang (2005), it is assumed that the OD demand is a function
of the equilibrium OD generalised travel times between that OD pair only and that
this function is strictly monotone, invertible and decreasing function of generalised
travel times, µk. The exposition will be concerned primarily with its inverse which
returns OD generalised travel times as a function of the demand for OD pair k
which can be written as d−1k (qk), k ∈ K. In this way, d
−1(q) represents the vector
of inverse demand functions.
Let R = {1, 2, . . . , |R|} denote the index set of all acyclic routes with Rk ⊆ R being
the subset of such routes that serve OD pair k, k ∈ K. The relationship between
routes and links is specified through the |L| × |R| link-route incidence matrix ∆,
with elements ∆jr equal to 1 only if link j is part of route r, and equal to 0 otherwise
(j ∈ L; r ∈ R). Similarly, the relationship between routes and OD movements is
specified by the |K| × |R| OD-route incidence matrix Γ with elements Γkr equal to
1 if r ∈ Rk and equal to 0 otherwise (k ∈ K; r ∈ R). Finally, let f be a |R| vector
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of route flows.
6.3 Problem Formulation
In this section, the mathematical formulation of the various toll pricing policies
described in the introduction, namely second best welfare maximisation, monopoly
revenue maximisation and competition between toll road concessionaires, are out-
lined. As has been extensively discussed in Chapter 4, these toll pricing models are
examples of the class of hierarchical optimisation problems which are characterised
by a constraint expressed as a VIP, stipulating an equilibrium condition in a given
parametric system.
In this chapter, the VIP takes the form of Wardrop’s DUE route choice principle
(Wardrop, 1952). This principle stipulates that in equilibrium, the generalised travel
times of all used routes connecting an OD pair are equal and routes with higher
generalised travel times are not used. It will be further assumed that the demand
for travel for each OD pair is responsive to the generalised travel times experienced
by that OD pair. Thus the DUE route choice model with elastic demand can be
represented by the VI in Eq. 6–2,
c (v∗,x)⊺ (v − v∗)− d−1 (q∗)⊺ (q− q∗) > 0, ∀ (v,q) ∈ D (Eq. 6–2)
where D is the set of feasible link flows and demands defined by a linear equation
system of flow conservation constraints of the traffic assignment program (Beckmann
et al., 1956; Sheffi, 1985) as defined by Eq. 6–3.
D =
{
(v,q) : v =∆f and q = Γf where f > 0, f ∈ R|R|
}
(Eq. 6–3)
It has been established (Smith, 1979; Dafermos, 1980) that the solution to the VI
in Eq. 6–2, given toll vector, x, results in unique vectors of link flows, v∗(x) and
demands, q∗(x) satisfying Wardrop’s DUE route choice principle. In what follows,
the notation in Eq. 6–4 is used to specifically denote such a vector of link flows and
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demands that solves the VIP stipulated in Eq. 6–2, given some given toll vector, x.
{v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{V(x)} (Eq. 6–4)
Following the literature (e.g. Yang et al., 2009), the costs associated with toll col-
lection are ignored.
6.3.1 Welfare Maximising Second Best Toll Pricing
The social surplus or welfare, measures the difference between what users are willing
to pay, as given by the area under the inverse demand functions, and the total gen-
eralised travel time (excluding tolls) experienced by users in their journeys through
the network (Yang and Huang, 2005) as shown in Eq. 6–5.
WDUE(x) =
∑
k∈K
∫ qk
0
d−1k (w)dw −
∑
j∈L
vjtj(vj) (Eq. 6–5)
Therefore, in the case of welfare maximising second best tolls, toll levels are chosen,
for each link in the set of tollable links, J , to maximise such a welfare measure,
subject to link flows and demand satisfying the DUE route choice principle. The
resulting MPEC is formulated as shown in Eq. 6–6.
Maximise
x∈X
WDUE(x) =
∑
k∈K
∫ qk
0
d−1k (w)dw −
∑
j∈L
vj(x)tj(vj(x))
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{V(x)}
(Eq. 6–6)
As the optimisation problem in Eq. 6–6 is constrained by a VIP, this problem is
thus an MPEC as discussed in Chapter 4. Eq. 6–6 can be solved by a variety
of algorithms as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. For the purposes of the numerical
tests reported in Section 6.5, the Cutting Constraint Algorithm (CCA), to be further
elaborated in Section 6.4, was applied to solve the problem.
6.3.2 Monopoly
If a single revenue maximising monopolist was permitted to decide toll levels on all
tollable links in the network, then the set of concessionaires, N would collapse to
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a singleton. The mathematical optimisation problem facing this monopolist with
revenue function φM : R
|J |×R|J | 7→ R, can be represented by Eq. 6–7. This problem
is also an MPEC and in the numerical tests to be discussed in Section 6.5, CCA
was applied to solve this problem.
Maximise
x∈X
φM(x,v(x)) =
∑
j∈J
xjvj = (Ξx)
⊺v(x)
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{V(x)}
(Eq. 6–7)
6.3.3 Oligopolistic Competition Between Toll Road Concession-
aires
Having laid out the models of second best welfare maximisation and of monopolistic
ownership of toll roads, the model of competition between concessionaires is devel-
oped in this section. Each concessionaire’s optimisation problem can be framed as
the MPEC in Eq. 6–8.
∀i ∈ N , concessionaire i solves:


Maximise
xi∈Xi
φi(x,v(x)) = vi(x)xi
subject to
{v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{V(x)}
(Eq. 6–8)
Each concessionaire seeks to maximise the toll revenue from levying a toll on the
link under his control. The revenue attainable will depend on the equilibrium link
flows and demands as reflected in the DUE constraint. Furthermore, these link
flows and demands will also be affected by the toll levels chosen by other conces-
sionaires exercising control over other tollable links elsewhere in the network. In
this way, the formulation in Eq. 6–8 points to the interdependencies amongst these
concessionaires, who are players engaged in a toll setting game. This inter-play
of the concessionaires in each aiming to maximise individual revenues, reacting to
the other concessionaires’ toll levels, while anticipating the route choices of network
users, results in a NCEPEC as discussed in Chapter 4. Thus while there is a Nash
non-cooperative game amongst the concessionaires, there is a Stackelberg game be-
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tween each concessionaire and the travellers. As noted in Chapter 4, solving the
NCEPEC entails identifying an NE toll vector satisfying Definition 3.1.
6.4 Solution Algorithms
Since the lower level VIP constraint to the MPECs formulated in Eq. 6–6 and Eq.
6–7 both describe equilibrium route choices obeying the DUE principle, the equi-
librium link flows may not be differentiable everywhere (Patriksson, 2004). It was
pointed out in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.2.3 ) that MPECs do not satisfy certain
”constraint qualifications” (Chen and Florian, 1995; Scheel and Scholtes, 2000) that
are necessary regularity conditions for solving non-linear optimisation problems.
For these reasons, these MPECs cannot be simply solved as single-level non-linear
optimisation problems by embedding the VIP directly as constraints. Thus, a spe-
cialised algorithm has to be applied to solve these MPECs. In this section, the
Cutting Constraint Algorithm (CCA) (Lawphongpanich and Hearn, 2004), used to
solve the MPECs (Eq. 6–6 and Eq. 6–7) formulated in Section 6.3 above, is de-
scribed. Furthermore, when applied to the identification of (L)NE points in the
NCEPEC describing toll revenue competition, the FPI algorithm operates by iter-
atively solving each concessionaire’s revenue maximisation problem (Eq. 6–8) for
fixed vector of tolls of all other concessionaires, in turn, until the entire sequence
converges. Since each concessionaire’s optimisation problem is an MPEC, CCA can
also be used in this case. Following discussion of the CCA, the Synchronous Iterative
(SI) Algorithm (Yang and Huang, 2005) specifically designed to solve the NCEPEC
formulation only is described.
6.4.1 Cutting Constraint Algorithm
From convex set theory (Bazaraa et al., 2006, Theorem 2.1.6, p. 43), the feasible
set of link and demand flows, (v,q) ∈ D, can be defined as a convex combination of
the set of extreme points. Exploiting this idea, Lawphongpanich and Hearn (2004)
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show that the VI in Eq. 6–2 can be reformulated as Eq. 6–9.
c (v∗,x)⊺ (ue − v∗)− d−1 (q∗)⊺ (he − q∗) > 0 ∀e ∈ E (Eq. 6–9)
where (ue,he) is the vector of extreme link and demand flows indexed by the su-
perscript e, and E is the set of all extreme points of D .
Together with an initial extreme point, generated by solving an initial shortest path
problem (e.g. all or nothing assignment), and the constraints defining feasible flows,
the single level problem (labelled P0) in Eq. 6–10 is solved to find the optimal tolls
at iteration g.
P0


Maximise
(x,v,q)
U (x,v,q)
subject to
(v,q) ∈ D
c (v,x)⊺ (ue − v)− d−1 (q)⊺ (he − q) > 0 ∀e ∈ E
(Eq. 6–10)
Subsequently, new extreme points are found by solving Problem P1 in Eq. 6–11
given solutions of Problem P0. Problem P1 is in effect a shortest path problem. If
the gap function is positive at the end of this step (indicating that the Wardrop’s
DUE condition is satisfied), the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, the iteration
counter is incremented and the process repeated.
P1


Minimise
(u,h)
c (v,x)⊺ u− d−1 (q)
⊺
h
subject to (u,h) ∈ D
(Eq. 6–11)
The CCA is summarised in Algorithm 6.1.
6.4.2 Synchronous Iterative Algorithm
Chapter 4 described two deterministic (i.e. gradient-based) methods that can be
used to identify (L)NE points of the NCEPEC model of toll revenue competition be-
tween concessionaires. The first was the Fixed Point Iteration (FPI) algorithm (see
Section 4.4) and the second was the Sequential Linear Complementarity Problem
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Algorithm 6.1 Cutting Constraint Algorithm (Lawphongpanich and Hearn, 2004)
1: g ← 0
2: Solve P1 to obtain (ug,hg)
3: Include (ug,hg) into E
4: while Not Converged do
5: Solve P0 with all Extreme Points in E to obtain (xg,vg,qg)
6: Solve P1 with (xg,vg,qg) to obtain (ug+1,hg+1)
7: if c (vg,xg)⊺
(
ug+1 − vg
)
− d−1 (qg)⊺
(
hg+1 − qg
)
> 0 then
8: Terminate
9: else
10: Include (ug+1,hg+1) into E
11: g ← g + 1
12: end if
13: end while
(SLCP) approach (see Section 4.5).
In addition to these two algorithms, this section details the Synchronous Iterative
(SI) algorithm proposed by Yang and Huang (2005). The SI algorithm begins by
recognising that the first order conditions of the revenue maximisation problem for
player i as stated in Eq. 6–8, for given toll level strategies of all other players, x−i,
can be written as Eq. 6–12.
∂φi(xi,x−i,v)
∂xi
=
∂vi(xi,x−i)
∂xi
xi + vi(xi,x−i) = 0 (Eq. 6–12)
Note that this assumption is only valid if the toll level chosen by concessionaire i, xi,
is strictly positive (interior optimum) (Yang et al., 2009, p. 27). By rearranging Eq.
6–12, an expression for the concessionaire i’s toll as shown in Eq. 6–13 is obtained.
xi = −vi(xi,x−i)
(
∂vi(xi,x−i)
∂xi
)−1
(Eq. 6–13)
The toll level, xi, in Eq. 6–13 is only optimal for fixed x−i. Thus as other com-
petitors update their tolls, the toll satisfying Eq. 6–13 from the perspective of
concessionaire i would also change. In order to take this into account, Algorithm
6.2 was suggested in Yang and Huang (2005).
The proposed method works as follows. Starting from an arbitrary initial toll vector
at iteration g, a traffic assignment is carried out in order to obtain the derivative
term i.e. (∂vi(xi,x−i)/∂xi) , i ∈ N . The derivative then facilitates the computation
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of an “auxiliary” toll vector, x˜i. using Eq. 6–13.
Subsequently, the Method of Successive Averages (MSA) (Line 9 of Algorithm 6.2)
is employed to combine the current toll vector and auxiliary toll vector to form
the toll vector for the next iteration and the process is repeated until convergence
is met. The convergence criteria was not explicitly specified in Yang and Huang
(2005). Thus, for consistency with the criteria utilised in the FPI algorithm (see
Algorithm 4.1), in the numerical results reported in the next section, convergence
was deemed to have been achieved when the change in the toll vector obtained
between successive iterations was less than some pre-specified tolerance, ǫ.
Algorithm 6.2 Synchronous Iterative Algorithm (Yang and Huang, 2005)
1: Input: Termination Tolerance, ε(> 0)
2: g ← 0
3: Choose initial xg = {xg1, . . . , x
g
i , . . . , x
g
n}⊺
4: while Not Converged do
5: Execute (DUE) Traffic Assignment given xg to obtain link flows v
6: for i = 1 to N do
7: Compute ∂vi(x
g
i ,x
g
−i)/∂xi
8: Compute x˜i using Eq. 6–13
9: Compute xg+1i = x
g
i +
1
g+1(x˜i − x
g
i )
10: end for
11: if ‖xg+1i − x
g
i ‖ 6 ε ∀i ∈ N then
12: Terminate
13: else
14: g ← g + 1
15: end if
16: end while
6.5 Numerical Tests
This section first describes the highway network and its associated demand param-
eters. Subsequently, the scenarios tested are detailed. Finally, the results of tests
conducted are presented.
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6.5.1 Highway Network and Demand Parameters used in Tests
The highway network, upon which the numerical tests were conducted, is shown
in Fig. 6.1. Each link in this network has a travel time function of the form
tj = t
0
j+βj(vj/κj)
ρj where t0j , βj , κj , ρj refer to the free flow travel time, coefficient,
capacity and the power respectively associated with link j. These parameters are
given in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Link travel time parameters for network in Fig. 6.1 used in numerical tests
Link j A node B node t0j βj κj ρj
(secs) (pcus/hour)
1 1 2 45 9.55 1800 4.5
2 2 1 45 9.55 1800 4.5
3 2 3 108 108 1100 3
4 2 4 120 120 1100 3.1
5 3 6 270 57.27 1100 3.5
6 3 2 108 108 1100 3
7 3 5 90 90 1100 3.2
8 4 6 274.5 58.23 1100 3
9 4 2 120 120 1100 3.1
10 4 5 96 96 1100 3.1
11 5 3 90 90 1100 3.2
12 5 4 96 96 1100 3.1
13 5 6 72 72 1100 3.1
14 6 3 270 57.27 1100 3.5
15 6 4 274.5 58.23 1100 3
16 6 7 45 9.55 1800 4.5
17 6 5 72 72 1100 3.1
18 7 6 45 9.55 1800 4.5
1
2
3
6 11 7
94
5
14
13
17
16
18
15
8
10 12
1 2 5
3
4
76
Figure 6.1: Highway Network Used for Studying Competition between Toll Road Conces-
sionaires (DUE) Koh and Shepherd (2010)(Link numbers are indicated on arcs.)
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On the demand side, the demand function, giving trips as a function of the gen-
eralised costs, adopts the “power law” form with a constant elasticity of demand
given by Eq. 6–14,
qk = q
0
k
(
µk/µ
0
k
)ηk , k ∈ K, (Eq. 6–14)
where q0k, µ
0
k are respectively, the demand and generalised travel times for each
OD pair in the base (i.e. no toll equilibrium) respectively and ηk is an exogenous
parameter. The details of the base demands and base generalised travel times are
given in Table 6.2. While more generally, ηk could adopt different values for different
OD pairs, it is assumed here that ηk is -0.58 for all OD pairs. If origin nodes 1 and
7 are viewed as residential suburbs and destination node 5 is viewed as the CBD,
then the base demand matrix can be interpreted as capturing the typical morning
commuting patterns within a monocentric city (Mun et al., 2003).
Table 6.2: Base OD Demands and Generalised Travel Times for Network shown in Fig.
6.1 used in numerical tests
Origin Destination Base Demands Base Generalised
Node Node (q0k) Travel Times (µ
0
k)
(pcus/hr) (secs)
1 5 637 1125
1 7 1027 1050
5 1 522 675
5 7 391 600
7 1 964 1050
7 5 442 850
The power law demand function in Eq. 6–14 finds support in transport planning
guidance issued by the Department for Transport (DfT) in the UK (HA, 1997). This
functional form has a “a well-behaved formulation that is simple to apply” (DfT,
2013b, p. 58). However, this demand function is endowed with a property that can
potentially be a drawback when applying it to the study of revenue maximising toll
road ownership. In economic theory (e.g. Lipsey and Chrystal, 1999), the elastic-
ity of demand is defined as the percentage increase/decrease in quantity of a good
(equivalently trips in this instance, qk) demanded as a result of a percentage de-
crease/increase in price (equivalently generalised travel times in this context, µk)
6.2.
6.2Under the standard assumption of downward sloping demand curves, generalised
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For the power law demand function in Eq. 6–14, the elasticity of trip demand with
respect to generalised travel times is constant throughout the entire range of the
demand function and given by ηk. For this reason, the power law demand function
is synonymously referred to as the constant elasticity demand function.
The elasticity ηk =-0.58, ∀k ∈ K used is consistent with real world estimates (see
e.g. de Jong and Gunn, 2001, Table 3, p. 146, where short run elasticities of car
kilometres with respect to car travel times in the range of -0.52 to -0.62 are reported).
With ηk =-0.58, this implies inelastic demand and so a 1% increase in the toll level
results in a 0.58% reduction in travel demand. Since the increase in the toll outweighs
the decrease in travel demand, total revenue rises. In general then, with inelastic
demand, the revenue always increases, as the toll increases, ceteris paribus and
thus the revenue curve, from the perspective of the concessionaire, does not have
a maximum point. In this way, the upper bound of the toll level becomes active
and constrains the (revenue maximising) toll solution. This analysis of the demand
formulation is vastly simplified because it has thus far ignored the interactions with
the travel time flow curves (reflecting the “supply side” component of the system)
in the demand supply equilibrium and it is the interactions of these two components
that ultimately determine the resulting demand levels. These interactions will be
investigated in the numerical tests to follow.
6.5.2 Description of Scenarios
In the numerical tests, two parallel and two serial link scenarios were considered. In
each scenario, the links mentioned are the only links in the network designated as
tollable.
In Scenario 1, links 3 and 4 in Fig. 6.1 are the only tollable links and no toll
free alternative route is available for some trips, such as those from origin node 1.
In Scenario 2, links 7 and 10 are the only tollable links with a toll-free link (link
17) available for trips to destination node 5. Competition involving serial links are
studied in Scenario 3, which involves tolls on both links 3 and 7 where there is the
travel times and the volume of travel (demand level) are inversely related.
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possibility for users to avoid both links and in Scenario 4, tolls links 1 and 3 where
there is no alternative route for trips from origin node 1 to avoid the toll on link 1.
It should be pointed out that in the numerical tests, the maximum allowable toll
for each tollable link x¯i, i ∈ N is 5000 seconds. The bound of 5000 was chosen as
this translates into a practical toll level of approximately £66.3 which is considered
to be reasonable maximum on the basis of acceptability for a toll on one link.
6.5.3 Results of Tests
In this section, the results obtained by application of the three algorithms used to
identify the NE toll vector when the concessionaires engage in toll revenue com-
petition are first discussed. Subsequently, the welfare impacts of competition are
assessed against outcomes obtained under both a second best welfare maximising
toll pricing policy and a monopolistic revenue maximising policy.
Competitive Tolls obtained by Different Algorithms
Table 6.3 shows the resulting tolls, number of iterations and CPU times required for
each algorithm tested to converge to the NE solution. The FPI algorithm was judged
to have converged when the change between tolls between successive iterations,
defined by the tolerance parameter, ǫ, was less than 0.0001 (see Algorithm 4.1). In
the SLCP algorithm, the termination criteria is based on the absolute maximum
of the elements in the vector of numerically estimated first order derivatives of
each player’s payoff function (see Algorithm 4.2) and this was set to 0.0001 as well.
Figures in the column labelled “Iterations” refer to the number of iterations required
to converge to the above defined criteria. As shown the resulting tolls are almost
identical when comparing across algorithms. However, the toll, obtained by FPI,
on link 7 in scenario 3, is somewhat different. This could likely be a result of the
imprecision in CCA when applied to solve each player’s inner MPEC within FPI.
6.3The parameters of the model used here, originated from Sumalee (2004a) where
a value of time of 7.63 pence per minute was assumed. This implies that the bound
of 5000 seconds is equal to £6.35.
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The difference in computational times obtained by FPI and SLCP are relatively
pronounced for all scenarios tested. SLCP used much fewer iterations and is consid-
erably faster than FPI, requiring less than 1% of the CPU time taken by the former.
The SI algorithm also performed fairly efficiently but it is slowed down considerably
by the use of MSA embedded within the formulation of the algorithm.
Welfare Impacts of Competition
Table 6.4 reports the tolls, revenues and the change in social welfare for each sce-
nario under a) competition, b) monopoly and c) (second best) welfare maximisation.
Throughout, the column labelled “Welfare Change” reports the difference in social
welfare with tolls under the relevant toll pricing policy, computed using Eq. 6–5,
and the welfare in the base untolled equilibrium and this is measured in generalised
seconds.
This table shows that when there are no alternative routes available (as in the case of
Scenario 1 where links 3 and 4 are tolled), the monopolist can charge the maximum
toll allowable for link 3. In fact, the upper bound of the toll here is a binding
constraint on the toll in the monopoly case. The toll on link 4 is lower due to the
slightly longer free-flow travel time. A check with both tolls set at 5000 seconds
showed that the total revenue was indeed lower than shown in Table 6.4 (being only
3,555,289 seconds). As may be expected with the monopolistic case, the impact on
welfare is negative. As noted above previously, the monopolist’s toll attaining the
bound, in the case of link 3, could be attributable to the inherent characteristic of
the power law demand function form assumed as discussed previously. However,
in the case of two competing concessionaires, each player has no alternative but to
succumb to the strategy charged by the other and hence ultimately both are only
able to charge a much lower toll (around 10% of what the monopolist would charge).
The overall welfare change for Scenario 1 under competition is close to that of second
best social welfare maximisation, but is as expected marginally lower.
The more interesting case emerges in Scenario 2 when there is a toll free alternative
(link 17 in Fig. 6.1) available for travel into destination Zone 5. In this situation,
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Table 6.3: Results of NE tolls in competition game between concessionaires obtained by 3 alternative algorithms: FPI, SLCP and SI
FPI SLCP SI
Links Toll Iterations CPU Time Toll Iterations CPU Time Toll Iterations CPU Time
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
Scenario 1 3 530.63 25 1213.7 530.55 6 9.8 529.99 78 29.3
4 505.65 505.62 505.04
Scenario 2 7 141.37 25 1200.8 141.36 6 9.5 143.36 89 33.5
10 138.29 138.29 139.41
Scenario 3 3 248.62 23 1211.2 248.65 5 8.3 248.63 54 20.3
7 97.84 92.54 95.50
Scenario 4 1 5000 19 914.9 5000 5 8.8 5000 40 15.0
3 35.30 35.22 35.29
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Table 6.4: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare Change under Alternative Toll Pricing Policies
Competition Monopoly Second Best Welfare Maximisation
Link Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare
Change Change Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
Scenario 1 3 530.63 461,882 87,633 5000 2,543,530 -1,581,256 510.93 449,583 87,818
Parallel 4 505.65 420,293 4986.7 1,013,577 488.13 407,301
Total Revenue 882,175 3,557,108 856,883
Scenario 2 7 141.37 105,295 187,422 713.19 280,255 150,587 181.83 116,209 202,311
Parallel 10 138.29 100,848 709.53 266,465 179.30 110,580
Total Revenue 206,143 546,720 226,783
Scenario 3 3 248.65 146,756 -88,020 242.01 147,209 -76,956 0 0 95,795
Serial 7 98.52 54,309 92.54 54,275 141.89 74,027
Total Revenue 201,065 201,482 74,027
Scenario 4 1 5000 3,552,057 -1,590,050 5000 3,553,670 -1,585,945 488.21 836,935 87,818
Serial 3 35.2 11,122.00 26.73 10,513 22.74 20,008
Total Revenue 3,563,179 3,564,184 856,943
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even a monopolist controlling both links 7 and 10 together cannot charge the max-
imum allowed toll of 5000 seconds on each link to maximise his revenue. Here the
tolls are limited to around 700 seconds (though the impact on welfare is positive
even under monopoly control). In the case of competition, Table 6.4 shows that the
tolls charged and the total revenue earned are even lower than under the second
best welfare maximising toll level. Thus it could be concluded that where there
is an untolled alternative, competition could have the effect of driving tolls down
even below the socially optimal level which was not the case for Scenario 1 where
there was no untolled alternative. This possibility of tolls being driven down below
the second best welfare maximising level does not seem to have been highlighted
previously in the literature.
The first two scenarios have focused on parallel competing links. Since parallel links
are the equivalent of substitutes in the route choice decisions of users, the findings
thus supports insights from the literature discussed in Chapter 2 (See Section 2.4.2)
that competition between substitutes could be welfare enhancing and result in lower
tolls vis-a´-vis monopoly ownership.
Serial competition is considered in both Scenarios 3 and 4. In these cases, tolls are
higher under competition than if a monopolist were able to exercise control over both
links. In this case, competition results in lower welfare compared to monopolistic
control. This observation is in line with the literature discussed in Chapter 2 and is
a manifestation of the double marginalisation problem, as serial concessionaires are
incentivised to internalise the congestion externality not only of the segment under
his control but also that of other segments in the series before each adding a demand
related markup.
It is also worth noting that where there are alternative free routes, as in Scenario
3, then the tolls are relatively low even under monopoly, whereas in scenario 4,
where link 1, exclusively used by trips originating from origin node 1, has no toll
free alternative, then the upper bound constrains the solution. In this way, the
concessionaire on link 1 exerts some degree of “power” over the concessionaire on
link 3. The toll on link 1 in scenario 4, in both the competitive and monopolistic
cases, attaining the upper bound of 5000 seconds, is again most likely to be a result
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of the power law demand functional form assumed. In the serial cases, both the
competitive and monopolistic solution results in a negative welfare change compared
to the second best welfare maximising tolls implying that with competition, society
is worse off which has crucial implications for policy makers. Thus the results suggest
that regulators should not allow direct competition in the serial link cases as it could
potentially be worse for social welfare than doing nothing.
The welfare impacts of each scenario under competition, monopoly and welfare
maximisation may be summarised using the unitless index of relative welfare im-
provement, ω (Verhoef et al., 1996). This index can be computed according to Eq.
6–15 and gives an indication of the welfare gains attainable under each toll pricing
policy relative to the theoretical first best benchmark. With first best pricing (i.e
marginal cost tolls on every link (see Chapter 2)), the social welfare change relative
to the untolled base equilibrium is 460,853 secs.
ω =
Welfare in scenario under study− Base Welfare
Welfare from First Best Pricing− Base Welfare
=
Welfare change in scenario under study
Welfare change from First Best Pricing
(Eq. 6–15)
Table 6.5: Index of Relative Welfare Improvement ω under Competition, Monopoly and
Second Best Welfare Maximisation in Each Scenario
Competition Monopoly Second Best
Welfare Maximisation
Scenario 1 (Parallel) 0.19 -3.43 0.19
Scenario 2 (Parallel) 0.41 0.33 0.44
Scenario 3 (Serial) -0.19 -0.11 0.21
Scenario 4 (Serial) -3.45 -3.44 0.19
For each scenario tested in this chapter, Table 6.5 reports the index of relative welfare
improvement under competition, monopoly and second best welfare maximisation.
Emphasising the previous discussion, this table shows that the welfare obtained
under competition between the parallel link pairs tested (Scenarios 1 and 2) is
always higher than that obtained under monopoly and thus shows that competition
in this case is welfare enhancing vis-a´-vis monopolistic control. This confirms the
insights from the literature discussed in Chapter 2. On the other hand, in the case
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of competition between serial link pairs (i.e. Scenarios 3 and 4), the index of relative
welfare improvement is always lower under competition compared to monopolistic
control, supporting insights from the literature that competition in this case is would
deteriorate social welfare.
6.5.4 Tests with NDEMO
While both SLCP and SI produced results broadly similar to that obtained with FPI,
it must be borne in mind that the former methods require first (and in the case of
SLCP, second) order derivatives. In the implementation of the numerical tests, finite
differencing, used in much numerical work in the engineering sciences, was applied to
determine these derivatives. However, the very existence of such derivatives has been
challenged when traffic routing obeys Wardrop’s DUE principle (Patriksson, 2004).
Thus despite their superior computational efficiency vis-a´-vis FPI as demonstrated
in these examples, both SLCP and SI should only be regarded as heuristics for the
NCEPEC formulation. The heuristic nature of the SI algorithm is also acknowledged
in Yang and Huang (2005).
This observation motivated the application of the alternative evolutionary algo-
rithm (Nash Domination Evolutionary Multiplayer Optimisation or NDEMO), as
described in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.5) to identify NE points in the NCEPEC but
obviating the need for derivative information. While it was highlighted the NDEMO
is theoretically guaranteed to identify an NE (see Proposition 5.1 in Chapter 5),
NDEMO is envisaged to be computationally demanding. In this section, tests of
NDEMO for finding NE in the case of Competition in Scenarios 1 and 2 as defined
above are reported. NDEMO requires several user specified parameters as outlined
previously and these are summarised in Table 6.6. As mentioned in Chapter 5 (see
Algorithm 5.8), NDEMO terminates when the standard deviation of the population
of chromosomes, encoding tolls strategies of all players, is at least equal to some
termination tolerance, ǫ.
As NDEMO is a population based stochastic algorithm, the population means (i.e.
toll levels) and standard deviations are tracked at each iteration. The population
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Table 6.6: Parameter Settings for NDEMO
Parameter Value
Maximum Number of Iterations 400
Population size(π) 20
Mutation amplification factor (λ) 0.45
Crossover factor (χ) 0.35
Termination tolerance (ǫ) 1.00E-06
means are displayed in the left hand panels of Fig. 6.2 and Fig. 6.3 for Scenarios
1 and 2 respectively. At the same time, the right hand panels show, for both
scenarios, the standard deviation of the population, σ, at each iteration until the
termination tolerance, ǫ, is met. The results reported in Table 6.7 are from the last
run of NDEMO. 120 iterations were required to achieve this tolerance in the case of
Scenario 1 while 84 iterations were required for Scenario 2. However, comparing the
CPU times taken in Table 6.7 with those reported in Table 6.3, it is noticeable that
NDEMO takes much longer than either SLCP or SI to converge to an NE, reflecting
the heavier computational burden expended applying NDEMO.
Table 6.7: Results obtained by application of NDEMO to Scenarios 1 and 2
Solution of SLCP CPU time
Scenario Link NDEMO Algorithm in Table 6.3 (secs)
1 3 530.63 530.63 1273
4 505.61 505.65
2 7 141.36 141.37 728
10 138.28 138.29
159
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
440
460
480
500
520
540
560
Iteration
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
M
ea
n 
(se
cs
)
 
 
Population Mean: Toll Link 3
Population Mean: Toll Link 4
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
50
100
150
200
250
Iteration
St
an
da
rd
 D
ev
ia
tio
n 
σ
 
 
Standard Deviation σ : Toll Link 3
Standard Deviation σ : Toll Link 4
Figure 6.2: Population Mean (Left Panel) and Standard Deviation (Right Panel) at each
Iteration of NDEMO for Scenario 1: Competition on Links 3 and 4
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Figure 6.3: Population Mean (Left Panel) and Standard Deviation (Right Panel) at each
Iteration of NDEMO for Scenario 2: Competition on Links 7 and 10
6.6 Collusion
The numerical tests presented in Section 6.5 have shown that competition between
parallel links results in lower tolls and revenues accruing to the concessionaires and
higher welfare is obtained by society. Based on this finding, the policy conclusion
endorses fundamental insights from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 (see Section
2.4.2). However, this conclusion rests on the crucial assumption that toll road
concessionaires do not engage in anti-competitive practices in order to increase their
revenues.
Arguably, since there would usually be a small number of toll road concessionaires
operating in the road network, it is inevitable that they would recognise their mutual
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interdependence and engage in some form of collusion. From the perspective of the
concessionaires, the competitive outcome reported in each scenario above is not
Pareto Optimal since one concessionaire would be able to increase his revenues
without making the other worse off. However, if the concessionaires were assumed
to cooperate instead, then a different set of outcomes (i.e. tolls/revenues/welfare
impacts) would result. Thus the potential for and consequences of collusion are
investigated in this section.
6.6.1 Multiobjective Optimisation Problem with Equilibrium Con-
straints
As discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4 refers), cooperation between concessionaires
facing the DUE route choice constraint can be modelled as a Multiobjective Opti-
misation Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (MOPEC). As noted therein, the
solution of the MOPEC is the identification of the Pareto Front. This front shows
the Pareto Optimal (see Definition 3.3) revenue combinations such that any point
on this front, viewed in revenue space, satisfies the condition that one concessionaire
cannot increase his revenues without reducing the revenues to the other.
By the definition that the revenues attained under monopoly as reported in Table
6.4 maximises the total revenues attainable, it is hypothesised that will lie on this
Pareto Front. In the context of collusion, this solution can also be interpreted as a
“merger” between the concessionaires of the erstwhile independent concessionaires
who aligned their interests totally.
In this and the next chapter, because the scenarios studied will involve two conces-
sionaires exclusively, the MOPEC considered can be written as Eq. 6–16.
Maximise
x∈X
Φ(x) = (φ1(x,v(x)), φ2(x,v(x)))
⊺
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{V(x)}
(Eq. 6–16)
As noted in Chapter 5, the MOSADE algorithm (Algorithm 5.5) will be used to
solve Eq. 6–16 so as to identify the Pareto Front. However, non uniqueness of this
front implies that there is, in fact, an entire range of possibilities for bargaining
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and negotiation between the two parties (assuming that it was not illegal to do so).
Faced with so many possibilities, how would two concessionaires collude in practice
in order to settle on a point on this Pareto Front? A closely related question is
whether they would be willing to do so. In order to “specify how colluding firms
select a point” (Schmalensee, 1987, p. 357) on this front, two approaches based on
Axiomatic Bargaining Theory, as discussed Section 5.6, are investigated. The first,
in the next section, is based on “signalling” to achieve the outcome predicted by
the Utilitarian Solution i.e. a solution that maximises the total revenues, through
an intuitive approach to modelling tacit collusion. The second, discussed in Section
6.6.3, is to identify the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS).
To aid discussion, Table 6.8 identifies the correspondence between key terms encoun-
tered in the Axiomatic Bargaining Theory literature (e.g. Roth, 1979; Moulin, 1988;
Bergin, 2005) and their equivalent terminology encountered in the Industrial Organ-
isation literature. Firstly, the Pareto Front, obtained from solving the MOPEC in
Eq. 6–16, can be viewed as the upper boundary of the “Bargaining Set” (Bergin,
2005, p. 283). Secondly, the non-cooperative NE solution of the NCEPEC charac-
terising competition between the concessionaires is synonymous with the BATNA
since in the absence of any cooperative agreement, each party would obtain this
payoff. Finally, the monopoly solution obtained using Eq. 6–7 is analogous to the
Utilitarian Solution6.4 which, by definition, seeks to maximise the total gains to
concessionaires. The last column in this table, relating to the collusion parameter
α, will be discussed in Section 6.6.2.
6.6.2 Utilitarian Approach to Collusion
As noted in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.4.2), one possibility of modelling tacit collu-
sion is to extend the idea that “firms infer rivals’ intentions from their actions or
from market outcomes” (Porter, 2005, p. 148). This section describes an intuitive
6.4As noted previously in Section 5.6, an inevitable confusion arises from the ter-
minology used in the Axiomatic Bargaining Theory and the work reported here. To
reiterate the point made previously, it should be emphasised that the term “Utilitar-
ian Solution” does not refer to utility as a measure of social welfare. If the intention
is to indeed to refer to social welfare, this will be made clear in the discussions.
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Table 6.8: Equivalence of Terminology in Axiomatic Bargaining Theory and Industrial
Organisation Literature
Notation Axiomatic Industrial Collusion
Bargaining Organisation Parameter
Literature Literature α
Boundary Boundary of Pareto NA
of B Bargaining Set Front
φNi , Status Quo Point or (Fully) Competitive 0
i ∈ N Best Alternative to NE Outcome
A Negotiated Agreement
(BATNA)
φM Utilitarian Solution Monopoly Solution 1
(Fully) Collusive Outcome
modelling approach to achieve this goal. Specifically, the objective function of each
highway concessionaire in Eq. 6–8 is modified by introducing a (unitless) param-
eter, α, 0 6 α 6 1, in order to represent the degree of cooperation between the
concessionaires. Therefore when setting tolls, they do not only maximise their own
revenues but also α proportion of the revenues of their rivals, taking their rival’s
tolls as fixed 6.5. It is implicitly assumed that each concessionaire reciprocate the
actions of their rival and would do likewise.
Since the tests reported below are conducted on the same Scenarios 1 to 4 as used
previously involving two concessionaires, the revised NCEPEC in this case can be
explicitly written as Eq. 6–17.
Maximise
x1∈X1
φ1(x1, vj1) = vj1(x)x1 + αvj2(x)x2, j1, j2 ∈ J , j1 6= j2
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{V(x)}
(Eq. 6–17a)
Maximise
x2∈X2
φ2(x2, vj2) = vj2(x)x2 + αvj1(x)x1, j1, j2 ∈ J , j2 6= j1
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{V(x)}
(Eq. 6–17b)
It can be seen that when α = 0, each equation collapses to the form of Eq. 6–8. In
6.5This is not unrealistic possibility since toll rates are openly available information.
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the case when α = 1, the objective of each player becomes one of maximising the total
toll revenue of both players i.e. the Utilitarian Solution. Therefore, it is expected
that when α = 1, the solution of this system, for which the SLCP algorithm can
be applied, should result in the same monopoly tolls and revenues as that reported
in Table 6.4. Furthermore, the link revenues accruing to each concessionaire should
lie on the Pareto Front. When α 6= 0, each is assumed to take a proportion (as
specified by α) of the other concessionaire’s revenue into consideration in individual
toll setting decisions. Thus by their charging of different set of tolls, obtained from
solving the system in Eq. 6–17, each concessionaire can be interpreted as sending a
“signal” to the other that there is an intent to collude for mutual gain.
In the following exposition, it is necessary to distinguish between “full” and “partial”
collusion. Partial collusion can be thought of as the situation when α is strictly
less than 1 and full collusion refers to the case where α = 1. In this same vein,
full competition corresponds to the case when α = 0 and this is the same as “no
collusion”.
6.6.3 Nash Bargaining
The Nash Bargaining Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (NBPEC) was intro-
duced in Chapter 5 (Section 5.6.1 refers). Bearing in mind the nonsmooth nature
of the NBPEC in Eq. 5–9 due to the binding DUE constraint, this NBPEC can be
solved by adapting the Cutting Constraint Algorithm (CCA) (Lawphongpanich and
Hearn, 2004) (see Algorithm 6.1). In the results reported below, Nash Bargaining
will be investigated in Scenarios 1 and 2.
6.6.4 Collusion and Nash Bargaining in Scenario 1: Links 3 and 4
In this section, collusion between concessionaires in Scenario 1 between links 3 and
4 is investigated. The left panel of Fig. 6.4 depicts the Pareto Front and confirms
that there is a spectrum of possible outcomes that could be reached through some
form of collusion depending on the bargaining possibilities between the two players.
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Superimposed on the Pareto Front shown on the left panel of Fig. 6.4 are the
revenues to each concessionaire in the fully competitive case (which is the situation
when α = 0, marked by +) and in the the monopoly solution (α = 1, marked by *,
from Table 6.4). This figure confirms two predictions. Firstly, the fully competitive
solution is not Pareto Optimal as it lies in the interior of the Pareto Front. Secondly,
the monopoly solution does indeed lie on the Pareto Front. It is clear that there
is a relatively large difference between these two solutions in terms of individual
revenues to players. Thus there seems to be some scope whereby concessionaires
can collude to increase their revenues.
Furthermore, from the left panel of Fig. 6.4, it can be seen that at the fully com-
petitive solution with α = 0, both concessionaires earn relatively similar amounts
of around 400,000 secs each. However, when α = 1, the revenues attainable from
link 3 is much higher compared to that from link 4. Examination of the network
parameters in Table 6.1, shows that both the free flow travel time and power pa-
rameter for link 3 are marginally lower than that of link 4. This means that, ceteris
paribus, comparing between the two, link 3 is the “faster” link. Therefore, in this
sense, the concessionaire on link 3 can be considered the “stronger” player in this
game. This accounts for the higher revenues under full collusion attainable by the
concessionaire on link 3.
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Figure 6.4: Left: Scenario 1-Collusion on link 3 and link 4: Pareto Front, NE (α = 0) and
Monopoly (α = 1) solutions. Right: Revenues to concessionaire on link 3 and link 4 as α
varies between 0 and 1
To investigate this issue further, the revenues for link 3 and 4 as well as the total
revenues, when the collusion parameter, α, is varied between 0 and 1 are plotted
on the right panel of Fig. 6.4. Two facts are evident from this figure. Firstly, as
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α increases, both the revenue from tolls on link 3 and total revenues increase in
accordance with intuition. Secondly, the revenue from link 4 rises up till α = 0.99
but then drops off as indicated. The reason is that, when moving from a collusion
level (α) of 0.99 to 1.0, the maximum allowable toll (of 5000 secs) becomes active
on link 3 (see Table 6.9). While this bound is theoretical and possibly attributable
to the characteristics of the power law demand functional form assumed, it is often
the case that for acceptability reasons, concessionaires would cap the maximum toll
levels concessionaires can charge (Go´mez-Iba´n˜ez et al., 1991; Tsai and Chu, 2003).
In such this case, to generate more total revenues, the concessionaire on link 4 is
compelled to accept a reduction in revenues. This is because, as noted above, link 4is
the weaker of the two concessionaires due to the link characteristics. It is possible to
conjecture then that this weaker concessionaire might not be incentivised to collude
fully without an explicit revenue sharing arrangement.
As noted previously, full competition between parallel links results in higher welfare
compared to monopoly. Thus even if only partial collusion is reached, the welfare
attainable with any α 6= 0 is lower than under the fully competitive solution. As seen
in Table 6.9, the index of relative welfare improvement ω computed according to Eq.
6–15 deteriorates compared to the fully competitive outcome whenever α 6= 0. This
implies that any collusion (partial or full) for this link pair results in a deterioration
of welfare.
Table 6.9: Tolls on Links 3 and 4 and Index of Relative Welfare Improvement as α varies
α Link 3 Toll Link 4 Toll Index of Relative Welfare
(secs) (secs) Improvement ω
0 530.63 505.65 0.19
0.2 591.52 567.77 0.18
0.4 677.67 655.00 0.16
0.6 814.69 793.00 0.11
0.9 1455.48 1434.98 -0.35
0.95 1910.25 1889.84 -0.75
0.99 3523.17 3502.64 -2.21
1 5000.00 4986.73 -3.43
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Nash Bargaining
As noted above, collusion between concessionaires to achieve the Monopoly outcome
is unlikely to take place as with a cap of the maximum toll allowed, then in order to
generate more revenues, the weaker player (link 4) would have to accept a reduction
in revenues.
Table 6.10: Scenario 1: Revenues under Competition, Monopoly and Nash Bargaining
Revenue (secs)
Link Competitive Monopoly %Share NBS %Share
(BATNA) (Utilitarian) Monopoly NBS
(see Table 6.4)
3 461,882 2,543,530 72% 1,804,294 51%
4 420,293 1,013,557 28% 1,749,223 49%
Total 882,175 3,557,108 3,553,517
Table 6.10 confirms this. It is clear that both players can gain by making a move
from the competitive outcome to the Utilitarian outcome through colluding since
there is substantial revenue to be earned by doing this. But in collusive agreements
is the share or proportion of the total each would get. These shares are shown in the
column labelled “% Share Monopoly” and each cell shows the percentage of the total
monopoly profits each concessionaire receives. In terms of the total monopoly profit,
the concessionaire on link 3 gets a 72% share but the concessionaire on link 4 gets
only a 28% share. Therefore, this supports the finding above that collusion towards
achieving the Utilitarian Solution would likely be difficult as the concessionaire on
link 4 is unlikely to agree to this much smaller revenue share.
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Next consider the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) which was determined by using
CCA to solving the NBPEC in Eq. 5–9. With the NBS, total profits are not
maximised but rather the product of the two parties gains vis-a´-vis their individual
BATNAs. The interesting finding with NBS is that the revenue share each gets as a
proportion of the total is almost equal. Thus the 28% share of the total monopoly
revenues becomes a 49% share of the Nash Bargaining Revenues for the weaker
player. However, the concessionaire on link 3 would prefer the Utilitarian Solution
as it obtains nearly twice as much compared to the NBS. In addition, both the left
and right panels of Fig. 6.5 confirm that the NBS solution, indicated on each panel
of these charts by 9, is Pareto Optimal as it lies on the Pareto Front.
Note that the NBS, like the Utilitarian/Monopoly Solution (see Table 6.5) also re-
sults in a social welfare loss. In both cases, the index of relative welfare improvement
ω (Verhoef et al., 1996) is -3.43.
6.6.5 Collusion and Nash Bargaining in Scenario 2: Links 7 and 10
In this section, tests involving collusion between concessionaires in Scenario 2 (Links
7 and 10) is discussed. The Pareto Front obtained as the solution to Eq. 6–16 as
generated by MOSADE, is shown on the left panel of Fig. 6.6. This plot also shows
the implied link revenues to each concessionaire at both the monopoly solution and
the fully competitive solution (cf. Table 6.4).
However, in contrast to that which had been hypothesised, as illustrated on the right
panel of Fig. 6.6, the optimal toll revenues implied by the solution of Eq. 6–17 with
α = 1 does not in fact lie on this Pareto Front. The reasons for this is investigated
in this section.
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Figure 6.6: Left: Scenario 2: Collusion between Concessionaires on link 7 and link 10:
Illustration of Pareto Front alongside solutions for fully competitive NE (indicated by +)
and Monopoly (indicated by *), Right: Solutions obtained with SLCP when α = 1 does
not lie on the Pareto Front.
The left and right panels of Fig. 6.7 respectively show the tolls on links 7 and 10 as
the collusion parameter varies from α = 0 to α = 1 in steps of 0.1. It can be seen
from these diagrams that the toll level obtained by SLCP and NDEMO are similar
up until 0.6. However, beyond α = 0.7, the tolls obtained by these algorithms differ.
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Figure 6.7: Toll levels as α varies for link 7 (Left) and link 10 (Right)
Restricting attention to the situation when the tolls obtained by the two algorithms
differ (i.e. for values of α > 0.7), Table 6.11 shows the tolls and revenues obtained
by SLCP compared to that obtained by NDEMO. It is clear that the revenues ob-
tained by NDEMO are higher and this suggests that the SLCP algorithm located a
LNE instead of the global NE. To understand this further, best response functions,
following Definition 3.2, were numerically estimated as the derivative of each con-
cessionaires’ objective in Eq. 6–17 with respect to each concessionaire’s toll level for
each value of α considered. As previously highlighted in Chapter 3, the intersection
of these best response functions represent LNE points.
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Table 6.11: Toll Revenues with tolls (in parenthesis) found by SLCP and NDEMO for
α > 0.7
SLCP NDEMO
Link 7 Link 10 Link 7 Link 10
α (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
0.7 114,544 109,659 117,637 110,212
(171.96) (168.99) (229.54) (226.74)
0.8 115,404 110,461 146,556 136,936
(177.56) (174.54) (297.84) (295.05)
0.9 115,986 111,002 203,663 188,776
(183.49) (180.40) (449.62) (446.78)
1 116,198 111,206 280,255 266,465
(189.76) (186.57) (713.19) (709.53)
These plots are shown in Figs. 6.8 to 6.9 for values of α from 0.7 to 1 in steps of 0.1.
In each plot, the continuous line is the best response function for the concessionaire
on link 7 while the broken line is the best response function for the concessionaire
on link 10. It is clear from these figures that two LNE exist.
Fig. 6.10 which plots the total revenue surface as tolls vary on links 7 and 10 in
turn. It can be seen that the solution obtained by SLCP with α = 1 turns out to
be the local optimum of this total revenue function. Thus the solutions found by
SLCP is an LNE that satisfies Definition 3.4 while NDEMO found the global NE
and this can be verified in the surface plot in Fig. 6.10.
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Figure 6.8: Best response function for Concessionaire on Link 7 (continuous line) and
for Concessionaire on Link 10 (broken line) for two different α. Solutions found by SLCP
indicated by + while solution found by NDEMO indicated by *. (Left): α = 0.7 (Right):
α = 0.8
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Figure 6.9: Best response function for Concessionaire on Link 7 (continuous line) and
for Concessionaire on Link 10 (broken line) for two different α. Solutions found by SLCP
indicated by + while solution found by NDEMO indicated by *. (Left): α = 0.9 (Right):
α = 1.0
Figure 6.10: Surface Plot of Total Revenues from Tolls on both links 7 and 10 when α = 1.
Solution found by SLCP with α = 1 is a local optimum. Solution found by NDEMO with
α = 1 is the global optimum.
A policy implication arising from this analysis is that if concessionaires move away
from the competitive outcome toward the local monopoly outcome, the increase in
the toll could be relatively small. If this is the case, these revisions might not be
enough to attract the attention of regulators which would make the task of detecting
collusive behaviour even more difficult. At the same time, even if the concessionaires
fail to identify the global solution, they would still be able to increase revenues
compared to being in full competition.
Next, the welfare impacts of the two LNE arising from collusion in this scenario are
considered. Recall that the toll levels in the fully competitive outcome were lower
than that obtained under second best social welfare maximisation (cf. Table 6.4).
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As shown in Fig. 6.7, the tolls obtained by SLCP and NDEMO are similar until
α > 0.6. Thus the index of relative welfare improvement ω for all α 6 0.6, computed
according to Eq. 6–15, will be identical as shown in the first four rows of Table 6.12.
Table 6.12: Index of Relative Welfare Improvement ω under Two Different LNE as collu-
sion parameter α varies
α ω ω
(SLCP Solution) (NDEMO Solution)
0 0.41
0.2 0.42
0.4 0.43
0.6 0.43
0.7 0.44 0.41
0.8 0.44 0.41
0.9 0.44 0.40
1 0.44 0.33
Interestingly, in this scenario, it is found that the tolls obtained by SLCP under
partial collusion could be welfare improving. Under full competition i.e. α = 0,
the index of relative welfare improvement ω is 0.41. In contrast, it is found that
all LNE solutions found by SLCP results in a higher ω (second column of Table
6.12). Recall that in this scenario, the tolls under competition were lower than the
second best welfare maximising tolls (see Table 6.4). The higher tolls obtained with
some degree of collusion here results in a welfare increase. However, it is important
to bear in mind that the welfare increase is not due to collusion per se but only
because collusion resulted, in the LNE case, in toll levels that were closer to those
of a (second best) welfare maximising level. Had the concessionaires managed to
locate the global NE, it is also clear from Table 6.12 that in that case, welfare would
be lower (ω = 0.33) compared to the fully competitive outcome (ω = 0.41).
Nash Bargaining
Table 6.13 reports the revenues accruing to the players with full competition (i.e. the
BATNA), the Monopoly outcome (i.e. Utilitarian Solution) and the NBS. Because
of the local optima obtained in full collusion, as discussed above, the link based
revenues to concessionaires under the Monopoly is taken directly from Table 6.4
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Figure 6.11: Left: NBS for Scenario 2 Right: Zoom in of NBS for Scenario 2
(p. 155). The key question in Axiomatic Bargaining is how the surplus should
be distributed between the parties. As mentioned above, the columns labelled “%
Share Monopoly” and “% Share NBS” show the percentage share each concessionaire
obtains as a percentage of the total revenue achieved under the Monopoly Solution
and the NBS respectively.
Comparing the NBS with the Utilitarian Solution/Monopoly in Table 6.13, it can
be seen that total revenue is not maximised under the NBS. This means that the
Monopoly solution is not only a Pareto Optimal outcome (see Fig. 6.11 where this
solution is indicated by *) but it also ensures that the total surplus is maximised.
Next, as verified in Figure 6.11, the NBS lies on the Pareto Front as indicated by
the9 marker. This ascertains that that Axiom 2 of Pareto Optimality holds in the
NBS.
Table 6.13: Scenario 2: Revenues under Competition, Monopoly and Nash Bargaining
Revenue (secs)
Link Competitive Monopoly %Share NBS %Share
(BATNA) (Utilitarian) Monopoly NBS
(see Table 6.4)
7 105,295 280,255 51.3% 274,484 50.2%
10 100,848 266,465 48.7% 272,214 49.8%
Total 206,143 546,720 546,698
From an inspection of the network parameters shown in Table 6.1 (p. 149), the
free flow travel time of link 7 is 90 secs and its capacity is 1100 pcus/hr. With the
same capacity, the free flow travel time on link 10 is 96 secs. Thus, ceteris paribus,
link 7 is the faster of the two links, and should be more attractive to users. In this
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way, link 7 is the “stronger” player and receives 51.3% slice of the surplus under the
Utilitarian Solution. Thus this approach to the allocation of surplus suggests that
the stronger concessionaire in control of the “faster” link, at least on the basis of
free flow time alone, should receive a higher share.
On the other hand, with the NBS, the percentage share of the surplus obtained
by link 7 decreases, albeit marginally to 48.7%. The network parameters in Table
6.1 show that the power of the link travel time function for link 10 is lower at
3.1 and thus, the congestion effect of link 10 is lower than for link 7 at 3.2. This
could be used to justify the higher percentage share of the surplus allocated to
link 10 under the NBS. However, it can be seen that the Utilitarian Solution and
the NBS are not significantly different which makes this example less interesting.
More significant differences will be encountered in examples to follow in this and
the subsequent chapter. The more interesting question is whether the Utilitarian or
the NBS division of surplus, if any, are viewed as fair or equitable. The answer to
this is subjective and beyond the scope of the current research. Nevertheless, the
social welfare change under the NBS, as measured by the index of relative welfare
improvement, ω is 0.33 which is the same as that under the monopoly solution.
This is the same as that under monopoly, discussed above and represents a decrease
over that obtained in competition (0.41) (see Table 6.12). The adverse impact on
welfare as a result of Nash Bargaining as demonstrated in Scenarios 1 and 2 thus
underscores the need for regulators to prevent bilateral bargaining between toll road
concessionaires controlling parallel toll roads.
6.6.6 Collusion in Scenario 3: Links 3 and 7
In this test, collusion is considered between the concessionaires controlling the se-
rially interdependent links 3 and 7. The Pareto Front, produced by MOSADE, on
the assumption that players cooperate is shown in Fig. 6.12. The revenues obtained
with full collusion between the concessionaires (i.e. α = 1) is also indicated on this
figure indicated by a *. In contrast to Scenario 2 above, this is exactly the same
as the monopoly solution reported in Table 6.4 as there is no evidence of a local
optimum.
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Figure 6.12: Left: Pareto Front, Monopoly and (fully) Competitive NE Revenues in
Scenario 3 Right: zoom of region of interest on left panel.
It can be seen that the fully competitive NE outcome, although not Pareto Optimal,
lies very close to the monopoly solution. For this reason, the right panel of Fig. 6.12
zooms in on the region of interest. The proximity of these two solutions suggests
that in this scenario, the benefits of collusion and bargaining are, in fact, small6.6.
Examining the network topology, it is evident that traffic has ample opportunity
to avoid the toll on link 7. In comparison, link 4 (untolled in this scenario) is the
only opportunity to avoid the toll on link 3. As discussed above, in any case, link 3
has both a lower free flow time and a lower power parameter vis-a´-vis link 4. Taken
together, this suggests that link 3 is the stronger player in this scenario.
Regardless of whether total revenues increase, the existence of otherwise or incentives
to collude depend on whether the concessionaire individually are better off than
their status quo position. As the collusion parameter α varies from 0 to 1, the
revenues accruing to each concessionaire from collusion is plotted. This is termed the
“collusion path” and this is shown in Fig. 6.13. It can be seen that while link 3 is a
strong player as noted above, the collusion path also suggests that the concessionaire
on Link 7 might not be incentivised to collude fully. This is because the revenue
to this concessionaire in full collusion is lower compared to that attainable under
partial collusion. This arises, since as noted in Chapter 5, there is no guarantee that
Axiom 1 of Individual Rationality would be satisfied in the monopoly/Utilitarian
Solution.
6.6For this reason, Nash Bargaining is not discussed in this scenario and the next.
More interesting cases are presented in the next chapter.
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Consider now the impacts on welfare if there was in fact collusion. Table 6.14
presents the index of relative efficiency ω. This confirms, as expected, that welfare
losses are reduced as α increases.
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Revenues to Concessionaires on Link 3
(x-axis) and 7 (y-axis) as α varies from
0 (Competitive Solution) to 1 (Monopoly
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Table 6.14: Scenario 3: Index of Rela-
tive Welfare Improvement ω as degree of
collusion increases
Collusion Index of Relative Welfare
Parameter Improvement
α ω
0 -0.19
0.2 -0.18
0.4 -0.18
0.6 -0.17
0.8 -0.17
1 -0.17
Thus in this serial setting, while it is better for social welfare if concessionaires did
collude (compare social welfare under competition against monopoly for this link
pair in Table 6.4), full collusion to aim for the Utilitarian Solution of maximising
total revenues is unlikely to take place. This once again emphasises the divergence
between private (profit maximising incentives) and social (welfare maximising in-
centives).
6.6.7 Collusion in Scenario 4: Links 1 and 3
In this section, collusion between the concessionaires on links 1 and 3 is described.
In this scenario, as the collusion parameter α varies from 0 to 1, the toll on link
1 remains constant at 5000 seconds (the upper bound). This is because trips from
Origin Zone 1 has no other alternative but to use this link for travel to the rest of
the network. Thus route choice is not an option for these trips. However, the toll
for link 3 decreases smoothly towards the monopoly toll as shown in Fig. 6.14.
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Figure 6.14: Scenario 4: Toll and revenue to concessionaire on link 3 as collusion parameter
(α) varies between 0 and 1
This figure also shows the revenue for link 3, which decreases as the level of collusion
increases. This is the same effect as was seen for Scenario 1 with the stronger player
(link 1 in this case) being constrained by the maximum allowable toll. Again, it
can be seen that in order to generate more revenue in total, the weaker player must
accept a lower revenue. Thus, there is no incentive for the concessionaire on link 3
to collude here without an explicit revenue sharing agreement.
Looking at the outcomes in boths Scenario 1 and Scenario 4 (where the upper bound
on the toll becomes active), the results suggest that if a concessionaire is limited
by some upper bound on the toll level, or more generally, if there is a cap on the
maximum possible toll, then there might be no incentive for the other concessionaire
to collude.
6.7 Summary and Policy Implications
Comparing competitive, monopolistic and second best welfare maximising solutions
for both parallel and serial link toll operation, these tests confirmed that in the case
of competition between parallel links, competitive tolls are lower than monopoly tolls
and are close to second best welfare tolls. In the serial link case, the experiments
confirmed that the competitive tolls were greater than (or equal to) the monopoly
tolls and that the welfare level is lower under competition than under monopoly.
This suggests that regulators should not allow direct competition in the serial link
case. Such findings are fully in line with the literature as discussed in Chapter 2.
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However, in general networks, with both the serial and parallel cases, it was also
shown that the presence of untolled alternatives would reduce the toll levels and so
reduces opportunities for monopolistic behaviour.
Furthermore, this chapter investigated the performance of several alternative algo-
rithms for locating the NE of the NCEPEC describing competition between revenue
maximising toll road concessionaires. The first was a Fixed Point Iteration (FPI)
algorithm which solves the NCEPEC by decomposing it into a series of inter-related
MPECs. These MPECs are solved using the Cutting Constraint Algorithm (CCA)
for toll pricing. The next algorithm, a novel contribution of this thesis, is the exten-
sion of an existing Sequential Linear Complementarity Problem (SLCP) approach
to find NE in games where players are bound by an equilibrium constraint. Finally,
the Synchronous Iterative (SI) algorithm (Yang and Huang, 2005; Yang et al., 2009)
was also tested and it was found that the reliance on the Method of Successive
Averages (MSA) inherent in the algorithm slowed down the algorithm considerably.
Both SLCP and SI were found to give similar solutions as the FPI approach but
with significantly lower computation time. This is attributable to the fact noted by
Zhang (2010) that the FPI is a single solution approach as it solves each MPEC
individually until the entire system converges, while both SLCP and SI aim to solve
each problem in the NCEPEC simultaneously. At the same time, both SLCP and
SI rely on derivative information whose existence has been questioned in the liter-
ature. In order to counter this drawback, an alternative Evolutionary Algorithm
NDEMO was developed and tested on 2 scenarios. Furthermore, it was shown that
SLCP terminated at a LNE when applied to one instance in the study of collusion
between toll road concessionaires while NDEMO could locate the NE. While there is
theoretical assurance regarding NDEMO’s ability to locate the NE (see Proposition
5.1), the algorithm was found to be computationally demanding from experiences
with the numerical tests.
This chapter also applied a MOEA to demonstrate that the solution obtained un-
der monopoly is one solution amongst a number of solutions that maximise the
objectives of two concessionaires simultaneously. This set of solutions constitute
the Pareto Front when viewed in revenue space (combinations of tolls that max-
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imise both concessionaire’s revenues simultaneously) satisfying the condition that
one concessionaire could not increase revenue without the other incurring a reduc-
tion in revenue. It was highlighted that this example of simultaneous maximisation
of revenues subject to the DUE condition was an instance of a MOPEC when the
toll concessionaires were assumed to cooperate as discussed in Chapter 4.
The Pareto Front was subsequently used as a benchmark to study collusive be-
haviour amongst toll road concessionaires, an issue that has not been discussed in
the literature. It was shown that there is an entire spectrum of Pareto Optimal
revenue combinations that could be attained through collusion. In order to achieve
one of these solutions in practice, an intuitive formulation was developed using a
collusion parameter, α, that was used to reflect the degree of cooperation between
two concessionaires. It is recognised that this approach is the equivalent of the Util-
itarian Solution in Axiomatic Bargaining Theory. Implicit in the assumption was
that concessionaire would be willing to reciprocate the action of the other through
signalling behaviour. Even for the simple examples presented, there is potential for
multiple equilibria to be obtained in collusion.
In the scenarios tested, it was found that as collusion increases from none (α = 0)
through to full collusion (α = 1) then the tolls map from the fully competitive
outcome to the monopoly solution. Where a local monopoly solution exists then
the collusive behaviour can also map toward this local monopoly rather than the
global one, which could be more acceptable to the public in terms of toll levels and
welfare changes. It is quite possible that the global monopoly solution may not be
stable and could explain why it may not be located by SLCP. At the same time, it
could also make collusion more difficult for regulators to detect because the resulting
toll changes could be relatively small.
In general, collusion between parallel links in competition was found to be welfare
deteriorating while collusion between serial links was found to be welfare increasing.
However, if competition resulted in toll levels being below the second best welfare
maximising levels (as shown in Scenario 2, see p. 172), it is possible that collusion
could be welfare enhancing even in the case of competition between parallel links.
It is emphasised that this is not because of collusion per se but because collusion
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resulted in tolls that were closer to the (second best) welfare maximising level. In
cases where the one concessionaire is limited by an upper bound on the toll level
(which could occur in practice as regulators, for acceptability reasons, cap the toll
charges), then to increase total revenue the other concessionaire might have to accept
a reduction in revenue. Thus in such an instance, there would be limited incentive
to collude without some form of agreement to share revenues set up in advance.
Such an agreement might be facilitated through knowledge of the Pareto Front.
The Utilitarian Solution was shown to be both Pareto Optimal and maximises the
total possible surplus available to be allocated between the bargaining parties. On
the other hand, it suffers from the drawback that it can result in one party being
made worse off i.e. attaining lower revenues vis-a´-vis their individual BATNAs.
This motivated the application of the Nash Bargaining Problem with Equilibrium
Constraints (NBPEC) which can also be solved using the CCA. While the Nash
Bargaining Solution (NBS) does not aim to maximise total surplus, in the examples
where it was tested, it was shown to lead to Pareto Optimal outcomes as well as
ensuring that the parties are not made worse off than under full competition.
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Chapter 7
Competition between Toll Road
Concessionaires: Part II
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapter applied several algorithms to study competition between toll
road concessionaires where assuming that travellers routed in the network following
Wardrop’s DUE principle principally with a view to examining the transferability of
insights from the literature regarding competition between toll road concessionaires
to networks with multiple OD pairs. Consistent with the insights from economic
theory discussed in Chapter 2, it was demonstrated that the welfare impacts of com-
petition were intrinsically dependent on the relationships between the tolled links
in competition. In the case of competition between concessionaires controlling links
parallel to each other (i.e. parallel competition), it was shown that competition
could result in tolls that were lower vis-a`-vis a monopolist controlling both links
together. Furthermore, the tolls under parallel competition approached the level
determined by a benchmark second-best welfare maximising policy but, interest-
ingly, could also be lower than the latter due to concessionaires undercutting each
other. On the other hand, in the case of serial competition (i.e. competition between
links in series), the results of the numerical tests showed that competitive tolls were
either greater than or equal to the tolls set by a revenue maximising monopolist.
Serial competition thus resulted in welfare even lower than that if a monopolist
could exercise control over the links. These findings resonate well with economic
theory which attributes the decrease in social welfare to the double marginalisation
problem arising from the serial concessionaires who in their toll setting decisions,
ignore the reduction in revenues to other links in the series, thereby setting tolls
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that are too high. The main policy conclusion demonstrated was that serial com-
petition could be welfare deteriorating while parallel competition could be welfare
improving.
However, due to the size of the network used in the last chapter, there was insufficient
opportunity to study the effects of increases in the intensity of competition. The
scenarios investigated therein only focused on two concessionaires. In this chapter,
with a much larger network being used, it would be possible to investigate the effects
of increased competition on welfare.
As noted in the last chapter, the problem of determining NE tolls in the case of
competitive toll concessionaires is an instance of a NCEPEC which could be solved
by adapting the Sequential Linear Complementarity Problem (SLCP) approach fol-
lowing that discussed in Chapter 4. The numerical comparisons against other algo-
rithms presented in the previous chapter suggest that this algorithm was the most
computationally efficient when compared against the Fixed Point Iteration (FPI)
approach and the Synchronous Iterative (SI) algorithm. The NDEMO algorithm,
whilst able to successfully identify the NE, did so at the expense of imposing a heavy
computational burden.
These policy findings were all developed under the assumption that the binding
equilibrium constraint governing the routing (and demands) in the transportation
network was specified by an elastic demand Deterministic User Equilibrium (DUE)
model. Fundamental to the DUE model is Wardrop’s principle (Wardrop, 1952)
which stipulates that, in equilibrium, all used paths between an O-D pair have equal
and minimum generalised travel times while all unused paths have greater or equal
generalised travel times. Wardrop’s DUE principle implicitly assumes that users
are endowed with perfect knowledge (Fisk, 1980; Bell and Iida, 1997) and are thus
fully aware of the generalised travel times of all alternative routes connecting each
OD pair. However, for various reasons such as habit and hysteresis (Goodwin, 1977;
Blase, 1980) or familiarity with the network (Lotan, 1997), this assumption is clearly
restrictive. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that both habit and knowledge
of the network are equally significant determinants of route choice behaviour (Li and
Wong, 1994; Prato et al., 2012). In any case, it is unrealistic to expect that road
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users possess perfect information when shaping their route choice decisions.
Thus, in this chapter, the assumption that only the lowest generalised travel time
routes connecting each OD pair are used in an equilibrium, is relaxed. In particular,
travellers are assumed to vary in their perception of generalised travel times. Rather
than generalised route travel times assumed to be “deterministic” reflecting perfect
information across users, there is, instead, a stochastic variation in the perception
of these generalised travel times across users. The analogous concept of equilibrium
relevant in this context, that of Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE), is subsequently
formulated as the binding constraint when the interactions and strategies of com-
petitive toll road concessionaires are studied.
The adoption of an SUE framework allows for the exploitation of two inter-related
advantages. Firstly, the mathematical construct of the SUE problem, as discussed
below, assures smoothness and differentiability. This allows for further exploitation
of the derivative based algorithms such as SLCP, explored in the previous chapter,
to compute NE toll levels when toll concessionaires compete for toll revenues on
the highway network. Secondly, this allows for an investigation of whether the
policy recommendations developed under the strict Wardropian DUE principle are
valid when routing in the network is characterised by variations in travel time costs
perceptions of users.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, the SUE traf-
fic assignment model is detailed. This will serve, in place of the Wardropian DUE
formulation as the binding equilibrium constraint, facing various decision makers
exercising control over toll pricing policies to maximise their respective objectives.
As in the previous chapter, these objectives are namely (second best) welfare max-
imisation and revenue maximisation where a monopolist decides toll levels on each
link in the set of predefined tollable links. These scenarios will also serve as welfare
and revenue benchmarks when oligopolistic competition, featuring a number of con-
cessionaires, each controlling a single link in the network engage in a game amongst
themselves to maximise individual toll revenue. These toll pricing models are for-
mulated in Section 7.3. As demonstrated in the last chapter, the SI algorithm was
slowed down by the MSA procedure inherent in the algorithm. Thus in this chap-
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ter, the SI algorithm is excluded from the tests. Instead, FPI, SLCP and NDEMO
will be applied to the resolution of the game between competitive concessionaires,
applied to a network of Edinburgh7.1, UK as reported in Section 7.4. While 12
scenarios are studied, NDEMO was only applied to a selection of these due to the
lengthy run time requirements.
In addition, as described in Section 7.5, a test was conducted which allowed for toll
road concessionaires to manage multiple links in the network, thereby emphasis-
ing both the interdependencies between links and the policy repercussions on the
assignment of concessions to concessionaires. Collusion between toll road conces-
sionaires is investigated in this network setting in Section 7.6 with a (cooperative)
EPEC solution as a benchmark by means of the Pareto Front generated by appli-
cation of the MOSADE Multiobjective Evolutionary Algorithm. In addition, the
NBPEC formulation describing the Nash Bargaining approach to the division of
surplus from colluding concessionaires is investigated. Section 7.7 summarises the
insights obtained and draws conclusions.
7.2 Stochastic User Equilibrium Traffic Assignment
Recall, as defined in Chapter 6 (see Section 6.2), R denotes the index set of all acyclic
routes in the network. Let Rk ⊆ R be the subset of such routes serving OD pair k,
k ∈ K. Similarly, the |L| × |R| link-route incidence matrix is ∆, with elements ∆jr
equal to 1 only if link j is part of route r, and equal to 0 otherwise (j ∈ L; r ∈ R).
Lastly, the OD-route incidence matrix Γ has dimensions |K|×|R|, again each element
of Γ, Γkr equal to 1 if r ∈ Rk and equal to 0 otherwise (k ∈ K; r ∈ R). All other
notation, having been previously defined, will not be repeated again.
7.1This network model, as used in Sumalee (2004a), comprises 550 OD pairs and
344 one way links. The tests conducted on such a network serve a two-fold purpose.
Firstly, utilising a larger network compared to that used in Chapter 6, allows for
an investigation of the policy implications of increasing the intensity of competition
(i.e. beyond scenarios involving two competitors). Secondly, the performance of the
proposed algorithms can be evaluated within a more realistic setting.
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7.2.1 Mathematical Formulation
It is assumed that rational road users are utility maximisers or more appropriately in
this context, (generalised travel) time minimizers. Thus, individuals choose routes
amongst those available in proportions specified by a random utility model. Fol-
lowing the literature (Sheffi, 1985; Yang and Huang, 2005), the utility Ur,k of a
representative traveller on route r connecting OD pair k, is given by Eq. 7–1.
Ur,k = −θcˆr,k + ξr,k (Eq. 7–1)
Eq. 7–1 implies that travellers choose routes on the basis of its observable charac-
teristics (namely its generalised route travel times, cˆr,k with a scaling parameter θ)
as well as unobservable route specific characteristics, the latter being represented by
ξr,k. Consistent with the previous chapters, it is assumed that these (generalised)
link travel times are continuous, differentiable and monotonically increasing func-
tion of link flows v. The generalised travel times (including tolls xj if any) on link
j, j ∈ L is, as defined in the previous chapter (see Eq. 6–1), given as cj(vj , xj). It
is assumed that generalised link travel times are additive such that the generalised
travel time of route r,r ∈ Rk is simply the sum of the generalised travel times of
each link that comprise the route. Then the generalised route travel times for OD
pair k, k ∈ K can be mapped to these link travel times by means of Eq. 7–2.
cˆk =∆
⊺c(v,x), k ∈ K (Eq. 7–2)
If it is assumed that the unobservable route specific characteristics, ξr,k, in Eq. 7–
1 are normally distributed variables, then one would obtain the probit-based route
choice model (Connors et al., 2007). On the other hand, the focus in this thesis is on
the more tractable multinomial logit-based route choice model. Such a model arises
if ξr,k are assumed to be independently and identically distributed Gumbel variates
(see e.g. McFadden, 1974). Then, for each OD movement k ∈ K, let pk(cˆk; θ)
denote the vector function with individual elements pr(cˆk; θ), r ∈ Rk; these elements
denoting the proportion of travellers who select route r on OD movement k given
the scaling/dispersion parameter, θ. In the multinomial logit model, these elements
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are given by Eq. 7–3.
pr(cˆk; θ) =
exp(−θcˆr)∑
z∈Rk
exp(−θcˆz)
r ∈ Rk k ∈ K (Eq. 7–3)
Then p(cˆ; θ) is the vector representation of pk(cˆk; θ) i.e. with elements p(cˆ; θ) =
(p1(cˆ1; θ),p2(cˆ2; θ), . . . ,p|K|(cˆ|K|; θ))
⊺, k ∈ K. Associated with the choice probabil-
ity, sk(ck; θ) gives the expected maximum utility for travellers on OD movement k
(Sheffi, 1985; Bell and Iida, 1997). This is sometimes referred to synonymously as
either “composite costs” (e.g. Leurent, 1997) or “satisfactions” (e.g. Maher, 1998).
In this thesis, sk(ck; θ) is referred to as “composite generalised travel time” for OD
pair k,k ∈ K. In the logit model, this composite generalised travel time function,
has a closed form expression7.2 as given by Eq. 7–4. This can be collected in vector
form as Eq. 7–5 where ln(.) and exp(.) denote element-by-element application of
these functions on the input argument.
sk(cˆk; θ) = −
1
θ

ln(|Rk|∑
r=1
Γkr(exp(−θcˆk)))

 , k ∈ K (Eq. 7–4)
s(c; θ) = −θ−1 ln(Γ exp(−θcˆ)) (Eq. 7–5)
On the demand side, a demand function dk(sk) for each OD pair k,k ∈ K, gives
the level of demand, qk, as a function of the composite generalised travel time,
sk. It is assumed that this demand function is monotonically decreasing in sk,
separable and a function solely of the composite generalised travel time of OD pair
k. Such assumptions mean that its inverse, d−1k (.) exists. Hence dk(sk) = qk and
d−1k (qk) = sk, k ∈ K.
7.2.2 SUE route choice model
A stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) is attained in the network when no user can
reduce perceived generalised travel times by unilaterally changing routes (Daganzo
and Sheffi, 1977; Sheffi, 1985). Additionally, since the demand for travel for each OD
7.2Amongst others, Connors et al. (2014) note that, in contrast to the logit model
assumed here, an analytical expression for the composite generalised travel time
function does not exist in a probit-based SUE assignment.
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pair is responsive to the composite generalised travel time experienced by that OD
pair, the resulting route choice model is a SUE model with elastic demand (Maher,
2001). It can be shown that the Wardrop’s DUE principle is a special, limiting case
of SUE (Sheffi, 1985; Yang and Huang, 2005)7.3.
The convex set of feasible demands and link flows to a traffic assignment program
was defined in Chapter 6 (see Equation Eq. 6–3). Note that the definition of
this feasible set is independent of whether routing satisfies a Wardrop’s DUE (as
discussed in Chapter 6 or the (logit) SUE principle as used here. For completeness,
the definition of this feasible set is restated in Eq. 7–6.
D =
{
(v,q) : v =∆f and q = Γf where f > 0, f ∈ R|R|
}
(Eq. 7–6)
Cantarella (1997) shows that for any given vector of tolls x, there is a corresponding
unique SUE vector of link flows (and demands), (v∗,q∗) ∈ D, that solves the system
of equations S(x) in Eq. 7–7, parametrised in the toll vector x.
S(x)


v∗(x) =∆qp(∆⊺(t(v) + (Ξx)); θ)
q∗(x) = d(−θ−1 ln (Γ exp (−θ∆⊺(t(v) +Ξx))))
{v,q} ∈ D
(Eq. 7–7)
For brevity, the shorthand notation in Eq. 7–8 will be used to denote specifically
such a unique vector of link flows (and demands) that solves Eq. 7–7 given toll
vector x.
{v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{S(x)} (Eq. 7–8)
As S(x) represents a system of equations, this is a special case of the more general
VI (Nagurney, 1999, Proposition 1.1, p. 5).
In contrast to the SUE principle described here, Wardrop’s DUE principle implies
that some paths may not be used at equilibrium for some demand level. Nevertheless
7.3A larger θ,ceteris paribus, implies a lower variance in perception of generalised
route travel times across users. In the limiting case, the effects of the random compo-
nent ξr,k in Eq. 7–1 is dominated by the measured route travel time component cˆr,k
implying that users choose routes based only on cˆr,k, thereby recovering Wardrop’s
DUE principle.
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it is possible that as demand increases, these hitherto unused paths get used. This
implies that there is a discontinuity in the path flows and thus the response surface
of the path flows to generalised travel time differences is not necessarily continuous
or differentiable (Bell and Iida, 1997, p. 85). On the other hand, in a logit model
typified by Eq. 7–3, there is a non-zero probability7.4 of path utilisation. As a
result, the SUE map in Eq. 7–7 is smooth and differentiable (Davis, 1994; Bell and
Iida, 1997; Connors et al., 2007). This is the key characteristic distinguishing the
MPECs and EPECs examined in this chapter from those constrained by Wardrop’s
DUE presented in Chapter 6. The smoothness of the logit assignment model is
a feature that can be exploited when applying derivative based algorithms for the
determination of tolls under the alternative toll pricing models.
Note that the logit model satisfies the axiom known as Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (McFadden, 1974, Axiom 1, p.109). which is also assumed in the Nash
(Nash, 1950b) Bargaining Model (see Axiom 4 in Section 5.6.1). This axiom means
that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing one alternative to that of choosing
another is independent of the probability of choosing other available alternatives
(Florian and Fox, 1976; Ortuzar and Willumsen, 1994). As shown in Florian and
Fox (1976), this is a disadvantage of applying the multinomial logit model to the
traffic assignment problem, and can bias the assignment results. This drawback is
highlighted in situations featuring overlapping routes (i.e. where a link is part of
more than a single route). Proposals to remedy this undesirable property include the
use of the nested and cross-nested logit models (Vovsha, 1997; Vovsha and Bekhor,
1998; Prashker and Bekhor, 1999, 2004). At a more general level, the probit model
(Connors et al., 2007; Uchida et al., 2007) could be used as an alternative SUE
model as it does not suffer from this drawback of the logit model but still retains
the smoothness of the SUE formulation. On the other hand, van der Weijde et al.
(2013) demonstrate that the differences between the logit variants and the probit
models in realistic applications are, in fact, relatively small, particularly in relation
to assessing the welfare impacts critical to guiding policy analysis. In view of this
observation and the advantage that the logit model has over the probit in that the
7.4van der Weijde et al. (2013) highlight that although that the probability that a
route is used can approach zero, it never reaches it.
188
former is endowed with a closed form expression for the composite generalised travel
time function (see Eq. 7–4), this thesis will restrict the focus of SUE assignment to
that specified by the simple multinomial logit model.
7.3 Problem Formulation
Following the brief overview of the SUE traffic assignment model, this section math-
ematically formulates the three models of toll pricing decision making investigated
in this chapter. These models serve as benchmarks of the NCEPEC model of com-
petition between toll road concessionaires. The first two models are MPECs which
feature, in each case, a single regulator deciding tolls on the set of tollable links, J ,
aiming to maximise their respective objective. These are the model of welfare max-
imising second best toll pricing which assumes that a regulator aims to maximise
social welfare, giving a benchmark on the upper bound of efficiency gains achievable
and the model of revenue maximisation by a single concessionaire i.e. the monopo-
list, giving a benchmark on the upper bound of revenues achievable. Subsequently,
the third model formulated is that of competition between revenue maximising con-
cessionaires. Note that these are all hierarchical optimisation problems constrained
by the VIP in Eq. 7–7, parameterised in the leader’s toll variables, stipulating that
users’ route choice adhere to the SUE principle.
7.3.1 Welfare Maximising Second Best Toll Pricing
With a SUE assignment, social welfare can be measured using Eq. 7–9.
WSUE(x; θ) =
∑
k∈K
qk∫
0
d−1k (w)dw − q
⊺s(c; θ) + (Ξx)⊺v(x) (Eq. 7–9)
Eq. 7–9 can be interpreted as follows. The inverse demand function pertaining to
OD pair k, k ∈ K gives the marginal benefit of an additional unit of travel between
that OD pair and so its integral (the first term in Eq. 7–9) is the total measure
of travellers’ benefits from travel between the OD pairs. The second term gives
the total composite generalised travel times (inclusive of tolls) incurred in doing so.
189
Finally, the third term reflects the fact that toll revenues are a transfer payment
(from the users of the tolled links to the collecting agency) and therefore, do not
represent real resources and so do not affect social surplus. Therefore these toll
revenues have to be added back in the computation of social welfare measured at
the aggregate level.
Therefore in the situation, of a (second-best) welfare maximising toll pricing policy,
toll levels are chosen, for each link in the set of pre-defined tollable links, to maximise
such a welfare measure. Mathematically, the resulting optimisation problem facing
the regulatory authority implementing such a policy can be formulated as the MPEC
shown in Eq. 7–10 with the SUE conditions in Eq. 7–7 constituting the (always)
binding equilibrium constraint.
Maximise
x∈X
WSUE(x; θ) =
∑
k∈K
qk∫
0
d−1k (w)dw − q
⊺s(c; θ) + (Ξx)⊺v(x)
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{S(x)}
(Eq. 7–10)
7.3.2 Monopoly
Aside from the equilibrium constraint reflecting that traveller’s route choices follow a
SUE elastic demand model instead of DUE, the MPEC of a single toll concessionaire,
the “monopolist”, deciding toll levels on each pre-defined tollable link in the network
does not differ from that given in Chapter 6 (see Eq. 6–7 in Section 6.3.2). The
revenue maximisation problem facing such a monopolist is set forth in Eq. 7–11.
Maximise
x∈X
φM(x,v(x)) = (Ξx)
⊺v(x)
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{S(x)}
(Eq. 7–11)
7.3.3 Oligopolistic Competition Between Toll Road Concession-
aires
As stated in Chapter 6 (see Section 6.3.3), in oligopolistic competition, there are,
a minimum of two, competing concessionaires, defined by an index set N . Each
concessionaire is assumed to choose toll levels on the link which he exercises control
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over in order to maximise revenue by solving Eq. 7–12, responding to the toll levels
set by all other concessionaires but taking into account the reaction of the users.
∀i ∈ N , Concessionaire i solves:


Maximise
xi∈Xi
φi(x,v(x)) = vi(x)xi
subject to
{v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{S(x)}
(Eq. 7–12)
As all other toll concessionaires are envisaged to be doing the same simultaneously,
a game thus ensues. The objective then is to determine the NE toll vector satisfying
Definition 3.1 such that no concessionaire can improve his payoff by unilaterally
deviating from his chosen toll level. As stressed throughout this thesis, this problem
is an NCEPEC since each concessionaire’s payoff are jointly coupled through the
active SUE constraint.
7.3.4 Solution Methods
In the numerical tests to be reported in the next section, because of the smoothness
and differentiability of the SUE assignment model mentioned in Section 7.2, and in
contrast to the DUE formulation of these equivalent problems described in Chapter
6, each of the MPECs in Eq. 7–10 and Eq. 7–11 can be solved as standard non-
linear programming problems by embedding the SUE conditions in Eq. 7–7 directly
as constraints without the need for specialised algorithms such CCA. The ability to
embed gradients directly in the optimisation problem is something distinctive about
adopting a SUE as opposed to DUE approach.
In the case of competition between the toll road concessionaires, when the FPI
algorithm is applied, the “inner MPEC” (line 7 of Algorithm 4.1) i.e. the revenue
maximisation MPEC for concessionaire i, i ∈ N with all other concessionaires’ tolls
held fixed, can also be solved as a standard non-linear optimisation problem with
the SUE conditions as constraints. In the application of the SLCP algorithm, the
smoothness of the SUE constraints allows for first and second order derivatives i.e.
F(x) and ∇F(x) (see Section 4.5) to be computed without difficulties.
In this thesis, the IPOPT interior point solver (Wa¨chter and Biegler, 2006) available
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as an option in the freely available OPTI toolbox for MATLAB (Currie and Wilson,
2012) is used as the non-linear programming solver.
7.4 Numerical Tests
The network of Edinburgh with 550 OD pairs, as used in Sumalee (2004a), was
used for the numerical tests reported in this chapter. Each of the 344 links in this
network has a travel time function specified by tj = t
0
j + βj(vj/κj)
ρj . Details of the
link parameters are available in Sumalee (2004a). The logit dispersion parameter θ
was set at 0.01. Two demand functions were considered. For consistency with the
previous chapter, the first demand function used in the numerical tests was based
on the power law functional form shown in Eq. 7–13, with q0k and s
0
k being the
demand and composite generalised travel time for each OD pair in the base (i.e. no
toll) equilibrium respectively. Following Sumalee (2004a), ηk was set to -0.58 for all
550 OD pairs.
qk = q
0
k
(
sk/s
0
k
)ηk , k ∈ K (Eq. 7–13)
To overcome any possible limitations of the power law demand function as mentioned
in Chapter 6, an additional set of tests were conducted with the exponential demand
function (Eq. 7–14). In this function, γk was set to 0.0005 for all 550 OD pairs to
both replicate similar welfare changes attainable with first best pricing relative to
the base under both demand functions and similar elasticities in the base case.
qk = q
0
k exp(−γk(sk − s
0
k)) (Eq. 7–14)
This alternative functional form was chosen as it has been used by several authors
in the literature (e.g. Mills, 1995; Yang et al., 2009, inter alios). Furthermore,
besides the power law form in Eq. 7–13, it is an alternative functional form finding
support in UK transport planning guidance (HA, 1997; DfT, 2013b). In addition,
the exponential demand function “fits conveniently with the logit choice model”
(Bell and Iida, 1997, p.139).
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7.4.1 Base Network Characteristics
While the base demands, q0k, were the same as that used in Sumalee (2004a), the
composite generalised travel times in the base, s0k, were obtained from a fixed de-
mand SUE assignment (using the Optimal Step Length algorithm of Maher (1998))
of the base demands. In all other assignments, the Elastic Demand SUE model
was solved using the algorithm described in Maher (2001) with the base composite
generalised travel times obtained. During the network building stage, 20 paths were
generated for each of the 550 OD pairs by application of Yen’s K-shortest path algo-
rithm (Yen, 1971). Due to the structure of the network, 2 of these OD pairs had 3
and 4 paths each. In total, 10967 paths were generated which were used consistently
in all tests reported here.
7.4.2 Description of Test Scenarios
In total, 12 test scenarios were developed. Fig. 7.1 gives an overview of the locations
of these links within the Edinburgh network while Table 7.1 shows the link flows
and volume/capacity ratios for the first set of 6 primary link pairs from the base
(no toll) SUE assignment. These ranked amongst the highest in the network in the
untolled base equilibrium.
Figure 7.1: Highway Network of Edinburgh from Sumalee (2004a) showing location of
first 6 link pairs tested.
In order to investigate the effects of increasing the intensity of competition, the
remaining 6 scenarios were formed through combination and extensions of these
first 6 link pairs. The tolled links tested in Scenarios 7 and 8 were formed through
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incremental combination of Scenarios 1 and 2 as shown in the left and right panes
of Fig. 7.5. Likewise, Scenarios 9 and 10 were created as incremental combinations
of Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 as shown in Fig. 7.6. These scenarios all involve links
that are parallel to each other, topologically providing alternative routes for traffic
from the south of the network to access the city centre of Edinburgh. Scenario 11
is obtained by adding link 143 to Scenario 4 while Scenario 12 is obtained by a
southward extension of Scenario 6 which involve toll competition between links in
series (see Fig. 7.7).
As reported in Sumalee (2004a) and consistent with the assumption used in Chapter
6, the value of travel time assumed was 7.63 pence per minute and in the numerical
tests, the upper bound on the toll level x¯j, j ∈ J was 5000 secs (approximately £6).
Table 7.1: Link flows and volume capacity ratios in the no toll base equilibrium of links
that constitute the first 6 scenarios in numerical tests
Scenario Link Link Flows Volume Capacity
(pcus) Ratio
1 284 4,268.35 2.85
285 4,990.69 3.33
2 258 3,986.60 2.66
259 2,606.43 1.74
3 229 1,503.17 1.50
230 2,473.09 1.65
4 284 4,268.35 2.85
286 2,942.73 1.96
5 243 3,601.43 2.40
247 4,805.46 3.20
6 291 2,731.47 1.82
296 4,095.47 2.73
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Figure 7.2: Links Constituting Scenarios 1 (left) and 2 (right) (Arrows show direction of
travel upon which a toll is levied with link numbers indicated alongside.)
Figure 7.3: Links Constituting Scenarios 3 (left) and 4 (right) (Arrows show direction of
travel upon which a toll is levied with link numbers indicated alongside.)
Figure 7.4: Links Constituting Scenarios 5 (left) and 6 (right) (Arrows show direction of
travel upon which a toll is levied with link numbers indicated alongside.)
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Figure 7.5: Links Constituting Scenarios 7 (left) and 8 (right) (Arrows show direction of
travel upon which a toll is levied with link numbers indicated alongside.)
Figure 7.6: Links Constituting Scenarios 9 (left) and 10 (right) (Arrows show direction of
travel upon which a toll is levied with link numbers indicated alongside.)
Figure 7.7: Links Constituting Scenarios 11 (left) and 12 (right) (Arrows show direction
of travel upon which a toll is levied with link numbers indicated alongside.)
7.4.3 Results of Alternative Algorithms to determine Nash Equi-
librium Tolls
For the case of the power law demand function, the FPI and SLCP algorithms
were applied to all scenarios tested to determine the NE tolls. The results are
shown in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4. The FPI algorithm was terminated when the
change between successive iterations was less than 0.0001 (see Algorithm 4.1). In
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Table 7.2: Equilibrium tolls in competition game between concessionaires for Scenarios 1 to 6 with Power Law Demand Function obtained by 3
algorithms: FPI, SLCP and NDEMO
FPI SLCP NDEMO
Scenario Link Toll Iterations CPU time Toll Iterations CPU time Toll Iterations CPU time
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
1 284 1,088.48 11 680 1,088.48 6 304 1,088.48 61 35,112
285 1,132.19 1,132.19 1,132.19
2 258 1,432.40 5 817 1,432.40 6 353 NOT RUN
259 855.16 855.16
3 229 611.21 8 702 611.21 4 187 611.21 58 30,437
230 912.02 912.02 912.02
4 284 732.37 6 868 732.37 4 187 732.37 59 31,707
286 691.06 691.06 691.06
5 243 467.17 7 1,566 467.17 4 246 NOT RUN
247 497.79 497.79
6 291 501.60 8 1,125 501.60 5 255 501.59 52 30,206
296 740.21 740.21 740.21
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Table 7.3: Equilibrium tolls in competition game between concessionaires in Scenarios 7 to 9 obtained by 3 algorithms: FPI, SLCP and NDEMO
FPI SLCP NDEMO
Scenario Link Toll Iterations CPU time Toll Iterations CPU time Toll Iterations CPU time
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
7 284 1,114.27 11 1,487 1,114.52 5 554 1,114.52 92 113,672
285 1,161.91 1,162.20 1,162.20
259 735.19 742.47 742.47
8 284 1,124.72 18 3,482 1,124.72 17 2,627 1,124.75 189 180,437
285 1,173.83 1,173.83 1,173.84
258 1,429.66 1,429.66 1,432.95
259 905.36 905.36 904.91
9 284 1,127.28 12 3,590 1,127.28 5 1,684 1,127.28 124 269,336
285 1,175.54 1,175.54 1,175.54
258 1,449.73 1,449.73 1,449.73
259 989.70 989.70 989.70
229 789.69 789.69 789.69
198
Table 7.4: Equilibrium tolls in competition game between concessionaires in Scenarios 10 to 12 obtained by 3 algorithms: FPI, SLCP and NDEMO
FPI SLCP NDEMO
Scenario Link Toll Iterations CPU time Toll Iterations CPU time Toll Iterations CPU time
10 284 1,220.04 13 4,226 1,224.12 7 2,339 1,224.12 162 347,420
285 1,276.03 1,280.21 1,280.21
258 1,474.98 1,482.61 1,482.61
259 1,044.94 1,063.70 1,063.70
229 805.44 941.61 941.61
230 1,198.81 1,231.31 1,231.31
11 284 730.14 10 2,134 730.14 6 603 NOT RUN
286 697.41 697.41
143 243.43 243.43
12 238 221.67 16 3,753 221.67 20 1,628 NOT RUN
285 761.25 761.25
291 894.73 894.73
296 639.65 639.65
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the SLCP algorithm, the termination criteria is based on the absolute maximum of
the elements in the vector of first order derivatives of each player’s payoff function
(see Algorithm 4.2) and this was set at 0.0001 as well. These were exactly the same
convergence criterion used in each algorithm to that used in Chapter 6. In addition,
NDEMO (using control parameters as given in Table 6.6) was also applied to a
selection of these scenarios. However, it was not applied in all scenarios due to the
lengthy CPU times as shown in the tables. As an illustration of the computational
burden, in Scenario 10, (the scenario with the largest number of parallel competing
concessionaires), NDEMO took over 340,000 seconds (approximately 4 days) to
satisfy the convergence criterion based on the standard deviation of the population,
σ was less than the termination tolerance, ǫ, of 1.00E-06.
Compared to FPI and SLCP, the NDEMO algorithm as discussed in Chapter 5 does
not rely on derivative information but uses instead a pairwise comparison procedure
(Algorithm 5.7 refers) to determine Nash Dominance status of the chromosomes
(which encode the strategic variables of the competing concessionaires) that requires
extensive function evaluations in each iteration for each member of the population.
Since there is a need to solve a SUE traffic assignment each time such a Nash
Dominance check is performed, this added to the computational burden intrinsic in
the design of NDEMO. Though there is theoretical assurance in NDEMO’s ability
to locate a Nash Equilibrium in the EPEC, should one exist, the evidence presented
in these tables overwhelmingly suggest that NDEMO is the most computationally
demanding of the three tested. This finding supports the insight of Fletcher (1987)
who notes that “it must be appreciated that the existence of convergence and order of
convergence results is not guarantee of good performance in practice” (Fletcher, 1987,
p. 20, italics added). Nevertheless, in the scenarios where it was applied, the results
of NDEMO agrees very well with those obtained by the alternative algorithms.
While the results in all 12 scenarios obtained by the different algorithms were similar,
the SLCP algorithm was found to be the most computationally efficient in all 12
scenarios tested. The results obtained by the SLCP algorithm are subsequently
verified using numerical estimates of the best response functions. A selection of
these best response functions are included in Appendix A. These figures are used
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to demonstrate that the solution found by the SLCP algorithm reported in Tables
7.2 to 7.4 coincide with the intersections of these functions. It should be noted that
there is no evidence to suggest the existence of multiple NE in any of these scenarios
tested.
In the case of competition between parallel links, the best response function for each
concessionaire is positively related (i.e. upward sloping best response functions).
This arises since any increase in the toll by a competitor operating on a parallel link,
results in traffic rerouting to the alternative i.e. substitute link. Ceteris paribus, this
increases the traffic flow and thereby, the congestion externality and hence increases
the revenue maximising toll level (De Borger and Van Dender, 2006). This is brought
out in the tests (see e.g. Fig. A.1 in Appendix A).
On the other hand, in the case of serial links, the best response functions are
negatively sloped (van den Berg, 2013). The economic insight for this observation is
as follows: an increase in the toll set by a serial competitor would increase generalised
travel times which decreases overall demand for travel. Reduction in demand also
implies, ceteris paribus, that the congestion externality is reduced. Since a revenue
maximising concessionaire internalises the congestion externality in setting the toll,
the optimal revenue maximising toll would also be consequently reduced as a result.
This implies a negative relationship between each concessionaires’ tolls in the case
of serial links (see e.g. Fig. A.3 in Appendix A).
In the scenarios which involve competition between more than 2 concessionaires (i.e.
Scenarios 7 to 12), the procedure to numerically estimate the best response functions
have to be adapted. In these scenarios, the toll levels for all other players (except
for the two being considered) were held fixed at the NE levels obtained by SLCP
shown in Tables 7.3 and 7.4), during the grid search for the 2 players shown on
the respective axes. In all scenarios, it is noted that the solution obtained by SLCP
reported in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 do indeed coincide with the intersection of the best
response functions thus verifying that an NE, being mutual best responses, has been
found. Note that in this case, only a subset of the best response functions are shown
due to space constraints as the number of graphs required to illustrate all possible
combinations exhaustively would increase exponentially with the number of links in
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competition. For example, in Scenario 1 with 2 concessionaires in competition, a
single figure would suffice but in Scenario 10, with 6 concessionaires in competition,
15 figures would be required.
Table 7.5: Equilibrium tolls in competition game between concessionaires for Scenarios 1
to 6 with Exponential Demand Function obtained by SLCP
Scenario Link Toll Iterations CPU time
(secs) (secs)
1 284 924.98 7 355
285 976.71
2 258 1,155.65 8 470
259 728.46
3 229 535.66 4 187
230 868.48
4 284 656.12 4 187
286 625.87
5 243 374.05 5 308
247 417.75
6 291 396.44 9 458
296 613.57
As the numerical tests with the power law demand function suggest that the SLCP
approach was the most computationally efficient, SLCP was the only algorithm used
when these same scenarios were rerun with the Exponential Demand function (Eq.
7–14). The results of these tests are shown in Tables 7.5 and 7.6. Numerical best
response functions were subsequently constructed to verify the solutions obtained
by SLCP as shown in Appendix B. These diagrams verify that the competitive tolls
obtained by SLCP as reported in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 occur at the intersections of
the best response functions and are thus judged to be NE. As was the case with the
power law demand function, it should be again noted that there is no evidence to
suggest the existence of multiple NE for any of these scenarios tested.
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Table 7.6: Equilibrium tolls in competition game between concessionaires for Scenarios 7
to 12 with Exponential Demand Function obtained by SLCP
Scenario Link Toll Iterations CPU time
(secs) (secs)
7 284 947.79 8 887
285 1,008.68
259 748.74
8 284 949.08 10 1545
285 1,009.39
258 1,154.47
259 723.98
9 284 939.85 9 3031
285 998.64
258 1,174.66
259 782.59
229 637.41
10 284 1,039.56 15 5012
285 1,099.51
258 1,183.96
259 776.49
229 720.50
230 1,071.05
11 284 655.49 8 803
286 624.99
143 192.34
12 238 574.26 7 570
285 677.97
291 1,281.69
296 501.86
7.4.4 Comparison of Results against Benchmarks
Tables 7.7 to 7.11 show the outcomes (tolls/revenues/social welfare) under the com-
petitive, monopolistic and the (second best) social welfare maximisation toll pricing
policies for the 12 scenarios where the power law demand function was applied.
Throughout, the column labelled “Welfare Change” reports the difference in social
welfare with tolls under the relevant toll pricing policy, computed using Eq. 7–9,
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Table 7.7: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare Change under Alternative Toll Pricing Policies (Scenarios 1 to 3) with Power Law Demand Function.
Figures in parentheses show percentage change vis-a´-vis the scenario’s (second best) welfare maximising policy.
Second Best
Competition Monopoly Welfare Maximisation
Scenario Links Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare
Change Change Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
1 284 1,088.48 3,232,453 240,924 5,000.00 6,364,178 -8,308,684 571.75 2,047,543 1,014,578
Parallel 285 1,132.19 3,766,563 (24%) 5,000.00 7,089,031 (-819%) 592.72 2,446,491
Total 6,999,015 13,453,209 4,494,035
2 258 1,432.40 3,234,617 -355,956 1,568.36 3,328,708 -1,089,205 722.59 2,255,224 896,010
Parallel 259 855.16 1,319,808 (-40%) 1,070.87 1,300,102 (-122%) 298.58 689,137
Total 4,554,425 4,628,810 2,944,361
3 229 611.21 621,424 -381,503 833.92 630,120 -918,079 236.23 307,948 185,217
Parallel 230 912.02 1,316,558 (-206%) 1,104.27 1,400,895 (-496%) 329.11 698,975
Total 1,937,982 2,031,015 1,006,922
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Table 7.8: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare Change under Alternative Toll Pricing Policies (Scenarios 4 to 6) with Power Law Demand Function.
Figures in parentheses show percentage change vis-a´-vis the scenario’s (second best) welfare maximising policy.
Second Best
Competition Monopoly Welfare Maximisation
Scenario Links Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare
Change Change Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
4 284 732.37 1,513,602 -914,658 696.74 1,525,342 -667,162 222.48 799,352 412,225
Serial 286 691.06 946,824 (-222%) 630.86 947,772 (-162%) 308.87 709,976
Total 2,460,425 2,473,115 1,509,327
5 243 467.17 709,773 -754,928 401.52 718,251 -414,301 184.05 519,499 313,508
Serial 247 497.79 1,067,251 (-241%) 448.31 1,089,051 (-132%) 158.79 624,211
Total 1,777,024 1,807,303 1,143,710
6 291 501.60 494,533 -1,413,203 287.32 417,584 -801,316 171.42 389,562 213,934
Serial 296 740.21 1,318,943 (-661%) 720.67 1,496,607 (-375%) 174.20 611,981
Total 1,813,476 1,914,191 1,001,543
205
Table 7.9: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare Change under Alternative Toll Pricing Policies (Scenarios 7 and 8) with Power Law Demand Function.
Figures in parentheses show percentage change vis-a´-vis the scenario’s (second best) welfare maximising policy.
Second Best
Competition Monopoly Welfare Maximisation
Scenario Links Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare
Change Change Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
7 284 1,114.52 3,351,923 -202,169 5,000.00 6,365,683 -9,076,178 584.67 2,091,616 1,089,981
Parallel 285 1,162.20 3,909,451 (-19%) 5,000.00 7,089,249 (-833%) 606.29 2,499,420
259 742.47 1,020,120 834.45 1,230,429 189.64 441,094
Total 8,281,494 14,685,360 5,032,131
8 284 1,124.72 3,401,150 229,470 5,000.00 6,372,641 -9,552,256 602.23 2,150,752 1,991,997
Parallel 285 1,173.83 3,965,619 (12%) 5,000.00 7,094,206 (-480%) 624.18 2,569,037
258 1,429.66 3,293,525 1,629.44 3,531,484 744.08 2,322,012
259 905.36 1,475,641 1,244.99 1,754,459 353.94 810,736
Total 12,135,935 18,752,790 7,852,537
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Table 7.10: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare Change under Alternative Toll Pricing Policies (Scenarios 9 and 10) with Power Law Demand
Function. Figures in parentheses show percentage change vis-a´-vis the scenario’s (second best) welfare maximising policy.
Second Best
Competition Monopoly Welfare Maximisation
Scenario Links Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare
Change Change Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
9 284 1,127.28 3,412,232 719,020 5,000.00 6,377,526 -10,628,481 613.33 2,188,670 2,196,977
Parallel 285 1,175.54 3,983,479 (33%) 5000.00 7,098,548 (-484%) 636.04 2,615,396
258 1,449.73 3,465,418 1,918.35 4,075,024 805.97 2,513,122
259 989.70 1,891,792 1,716.96 2,467,479 485.60 1,111,322
229 789.69 868,713 1,465.87 975,834 400.81 509,565
Total 13,621,635 20,994,412 8,938,075
10 284 1,224.12 3,893,576 2,123,552 5,000.00 9,041,630 -12,539,583 803.31 2,809,258 2,958,360
Parallel 285 1,280.21 4,543,821 (72%) 5000.00 11,008,641 (-424%) 830.69 3,348,242
258 1,482.61 3,610,747 2,344.31 6,170,362 901.21 2,806,585
259 1,063.70 2,121,671 5,000.00 801,944 665.75 1,500,231
229 941.61 1,367,956 5,000.00 1,556,683 722.87 920,413
230 1,231.31 2,228,962 5,000.00 6,363,112 820.01 1,676,656
Total 17,766,732 34,942,373 13,061,385
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Table 7.11: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare Change under Alternative Toll Pricing Policies (Scenarios 11 and 12) with Power Law Demand
Function. Figures in parentheses show percentage change vis-a´-vis the scenario’s (second best) welfare maximising policy.
Second Best
Competition Monopoly Welfare Maximisation
Scenario Links Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare
Change Change Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
11 284 730.14 1,503,877 -1,092,202 695.61 1,518,038 -797,020 222.50 799,403 412,229
Serial 286 697.41 913,784 628.87 915,419 308.87 709,969
143 243.43 120,913 208.41 121,090 0.06 71
Total 2,538,574 2,554,547 1,509,443
12 238 221.67 145,153 -3,265,676 136.59 190,439 -1,258,087 38.33 89,690 437,866
Serial 285 761.25 1,689,647 709.37 1,825,144 269.01 1,116,212
291 894.73 390,144 215.04 312,663 145.40 332,242
296 639.65 821,238 526.77 1,102,102 105.5173 372,704
Total 3,046,182 3,430,348 1,910,848
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and the welfare in the base untolled equilibrium and this is measured in generalised
seconds.
These tables show that despite pricing being able to raise a substantial revenues from
tolls, the possibility of large social welfare losses cannot be ignored. This reflects
the potential divergence between commercial revenue interests and social welfare
interests highlighted in Mills (1995).
Comparing across Tables 7.7, 7.9 and 7.10, it is inferred that as the number of paral-
lel links are added, the social welfare increases. In Scenario 1, when concessionaires
on Links 284 and 285 are in competition, the change social welfare relative to the
untolled base equilibrium, whilst positive (240,924 secs) is only 24% of that achiev-
able by the second best welfare maximising toll pricing policy. As the number of
competitors, reflecting the increased intensity of parallel competition, increase (from
2 competitors in Scenario 1 to 6 in Scenario 10), the social welfare gains achievable
from competition tends to that achievable with a second best welfare maximising toll
pricing policy. For example, in Scenario 10 with 6 competing concessionaires, the
resulting social welfare under oligopolistic competition is approximately 2.1 million
seconds or 72% of the second best social welfare (of 2.9 million seconds). This sug-
gests that insights discussed in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.4.2) are supported in a more
realistic network with multiple OD pairs. The policy implication is that competi-
tion should be encouraged between links that could potentially serve as (imperfect)
substitutes.
Recall that in Chapter 6 (in particular, Scenario 2 in Section 6.5.3), the results
indicated the possibility of tolls under competition being lower than those of a sec-
ond best welfare maximising policy when there was an untolled alternative. In this
case, while there are a multitude of untolled alternatives in the network, the results
show that all the competitive tolls, (regardless of the demand function assumed),
are always higher than under a second best welfare maximising policy. From the
numerical tests, there is no indication that competition reduced toll prices. Instead,
the opposite was found and that increased intensity of competition could lead to
an increase in toll prices. This can be observed in the NE toll levels for Links 284
and 285. These two links competed against themselves in Scenario 1 and each was
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involved in Scenarios 7 to 10 where the number of links in parallel competition was
increased from 3 to 6. As Fig. 7.8 illustrate, for both case of power law demand
function(left panel) and exponential demand function (right panel), the tolls on links
284 and 285, in fact, increase, rather than decrease, as competition increases.
Figure 7.8: NE tolls may rise as the number of links in competition increases (Left): Power
Law Demand Function (Right): Exponential Demand Function
A plausible explanation for the rise in toll levels as the intensity of competition
increases is that when more links are in competition, there is less opportunity for
users, travelling in the general direction facilitated by these links, to avoid the tolls
and this means that more congestion is internalised. As noted in Chapter 2 (see Sec-
tion 2.4.2), because concessionaires take congestion into account in setting revenue
maximising tolls, the congestion internalisation component of the toll also increases
and therefore the toll rises. At the same time, more congestion is internalised and
therefore the welfare gain increases as a result of the increased intensity of compe-
tition.
Now consider the scenarios involving competition between serially interdependent
links (see Scenarios 4 to 6 in Table 7.8 and Scenarios 11 and 12 in Table 7.11),
the social welfare under competition is lower than that obtained under monopolistic
control where a single concessionaire decides toll levels over all tollable links in a
series. Again, this endorses findings from the economics literature within a SUE
framework. The reason for the lower social welfare vis-a´-vis monopoly is due to
the phenomenon of double marginalisation (Economides and Salop, 1992; Small and
Verhoef, 2007) as discussed in the Chapter 2. The double marginalisation problem
arises when a toll concessionaire sets the toll level on a link without taking into
account the reduction in revenues to other links in the series. This results in tolls
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that are too high.
When the intensity of serial competition is increased, the consequences of double
marginalisation are clearly magnified. This can be inferred by comparing the social
welfare change under competition in Scenarios 4,5 and 6 with similar from Scenarios
11 or 12. For example, in Scenario 4 (Table 7.8) with links 284 and 286 in serial
competition , the welfare change under competition was slightly over -900,000 secs.
On the other hand, in Scenario 11 (Table 7.11), when an additional link (143) par-
ticipated in the serial competition in this set, the welfare change under competition
exceeded -1,000,000 secs.
In these scenarios, the resulting tolls from the game between competitive conces-
sionaires exceeds the toll levels a revenue maximising monopolist would set. Even
after taking into account the mathematical characteristics of the power law demand
function as discussed in Chapter 6, none of the tolls in these scenarios ever attain
the upper bounds for the monopolist pursuing a revenue maximising policy. It is
also clear that the welfare changes associated with a monopolist operating these
serial links is higher (despite being negative) when compared to the competitive
outcomes. The policy implication is thus that, regardless of the routing paradigm
assumed, toll competition between links exhibiting strong serial interdependence
should be discouraged.
However, it is not possible to assess the implications of the competitive outcomes
vis-a´-vis the monopoly outcomes in the case of Scenarios 7 to 10 as the tolls are
constrained by the pre-specified upper bound, a possibility envisaged with the use
of the power law demand function. Thus as mentioned, the tests were additionally
carried out with the exponential demand function (see Eq. 7–14). The results
(alongside the monopolistic outcomes and the social welfare maximising outcomes)
are presented in Tables 7.12 to 7.16. As predicted, with the exponential demand
function, it can be observed that, in these cases, the upper bound (on tolls) of 5000
secs is never active.
Firstly, the insights obtained with the power law demand function are confirmed
by the exponential demand function. This suggests that the policy insights are
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independent of the functional form of the demand and welcome news as “the demand
curve is usually unknown and difficult to estimate in practice” (Yang et al., 2004,
p. 478).
Secondly, for the case of parallel links, the social welfare change is consistently higher
in the case of competition than that attainable by allowing a revenue maximising
monopolist the opportunity to decide the tolls on all tollable links. This stands in
stark contrast to that of the situations involving competition between serial links. In
the latter case, the social welfare change is higher comparing monopolistic control
versus competition. In such cases, a monopolist will be incentivised to take into
account the effects of the toll on a given link on other links in the series in his
revenue maximising decisions and in so doing, obviate the double marginalisation
problem associated with competition.
The welfare impacts of each scenario under competition, monopoly and welfare max-
imisation are summarised using the index of relative welfare improvement (Verhoef
et al., 1996), ω, as used in Chapter 6 (see Section 6.5.3). These are shown in Ta-
bles 7.17 and 7.18 for the power law and exponential demand functions respectively.
Recall that ω is computed using Eq. 6–15 and thus measures the efficiency improve-
ment in each scenario relative to the first best theoretical benchmark. As mentioned
previously (see Section 7.4), both demand functions were calibrated to produce sim-
ilar elasticities in the base to obtain similar welfare changes attainable with first
best pricing of approximately 35,189,300 seconds.
Not surprisingly the numbers are relatively small because there are few tollable links
relative to the 344 links in the network. Nevertheless, Tables 7.17 and 7.18 emphasise
the key messages discussed above. Firstly, in the scenarios of competition between
parallel links, relative efficiency is always higher (or less negative) compared to
that attainable with monopoly control. In the case of serial competition, monopoly
control is better for efficiency in that ω always higher (or less negative) than under
competition. Secondly, as intensity of competition (i.e. more links are involved)
increases in the parallel case, welfare improves and tends towards the second best
welfare maximising case. At the same time, increased intensity of serial competition
magnifies the negative impacts of serial competition.
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Table 7.12: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare Change under Alternative Toll Pricing Policies (Scenarios 1 to 3) with Exponential Demand Function.
Figures in parentheses show percentage change vis-a´-vis the scenario’s (second best) welfare maximising policy.
Second Best
Competition Monopoly Welfare Maximisation
Scenario Links Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare
Change Change Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
1 284 924.98 2,672,041 2,053,008 1,496.62 2,987,978 1,103,258 757.09 2,380,040 2,173,221
Parallel 285 976.71 3,204,289 (94%) 1,463.68 3,804,961 (51%) 787.79 2,889,708
Total 5,876,330 6,792,940 5,269,748
2 258 1,155.65 2,665,336 1,846,973 1,286.47 2,752,474 1,625,080 961.26 2,475,564 1,947,271
Parallel 259 728.46 1,084,157 (95%) 889.19 1,095,758 (83%) 539.90 958,286
Total 3,749,493 3,848,232 3,433,850
3 229 535.66 543,514 600,858 757.75 551,687 317,598 436.18 444,458 724,644
Parallel 230 868.48 1,395,379 (83%) 1,066.57 1,496,714 (44%) 602.74 1,214,319
Total 1,938,893 2,048,401 1,658,777
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Table 7.13: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare Change under Alternative Toll Pricing Policies (Scenarios 4 to 6) with Exponential Demand Function.
Figures in parentheses show percentage change vis-a´-vis the scenario’s (second best) welfare maximising policy.
Second Best
Competition Monopoly Welfare Maximisation
Scenario Links Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare
Change Change Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
4 284 656.12 1,386,411 223,260 625.74 1,397,016 370,871 343.27 1,084,686 798,586
Serial 286 625.87 863,314 (28%) 575.27 864,518 (46%) 386.55 774,946
Total 2,249,725 2,261,534 1,859,632
5 243 374.05 568,909.93 390,246 310.88 566,495 570,677 220.01 516,934 754,842
Serial 247 417.75 974,626.00 (52%) 387.16 1,007,640 (76%) 259.86 887,195
Total 1,543,536 1,574,135 1,404,129
6 291 396.44 521,404 12,111 294.01 492,338 262,231 273.66 583,547 614,230
Serial 296 613.57 1,206,198 2% 587.31 1,291,667 (43%) 272.91 851,065
Total 1,727,602 1,784,005 1,434,611
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Table 7.14: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare Change under Alternative Toll Pricing Policies (Scenarios 7 and 8) with Exponential Demand
Function. Figures in parentheses show percentage change vis-a´-vis the scenario’s (second best) welfare maximising policy.
Second Best
Competition Monopoly Second Best Welfare Maximisation
Scenario Links Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare
Change Change Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
7 284 947.79 2,758,783 2,081,963 1,493.79 3,061,110 1,252,529 623.10 2,173,280 2,357,105
Parallel 285 1,008.68 3,302,079 (88%) 1,461.63 3,921,258 (53%) 732.64 2,694,546
259 748.74 823,671 778.26 850,120 271.27 530,452
Total 6,884,533 7,832,488
8 284 949.08 2,762,647 4,013,608 1,534.30 3,092,086 2,750,127 795.47 2,475,811 4,185,122
Parallel 285 1,009.39 3,303,718 (96%) 1,502.66 3,959,607 (66%) 829.50 3,002,706
258 1,154.47 2,663,498 1,306.25 2,882,043 964.87 2,485,149
259 723.98 1,100,078 1,166.66 1,091,278 553.36 979,012
Total 9,829,942 11,025,014
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Table 7.15: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare Change under Alternative Toll Pricing Policies (Scenarios 9 and 10) with Exponential Demand
Function. Figures in parentheses show percentage change vis-a´-vis the scenario’s (second best) welfare maximising policy.
Second Best
Competition Monopoly Second Best Welfare Maximisation
Scenario Links Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare Toll Revenue Welfare
Change Change Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
9 284 939.85 2,724,320 4,681,989 2,007.11 3,086,386 1,787,564 785.75 2,443,001 4,799,102
Parallel 285 998.64 3,256,881 (98%) 1,987.84 3,851,851 (37%) 820.14 2,960,083
258 1,174.66 2,785,456 1,441.28 3,069,301 1,072.43 2,756,427
259 782.59 1,427,347 1,273.00 1,640,883 776.04 1,387,964
229 637.41 676,967 1,097.52 743,653 664.17 671,822
Total 10,870,971 12,392,074
10 284 1,039.56 3,052,075 6,243,958 2,360.73 3,827,390 3,462,055 1,194.71 3,216,445 6,467,290
Parallel 285 1,099.51 3,655,649 (97%) 2,358.19 4,860,276 (54%) 1,202.80 3,972,027
258 1,183.96 2,820,894 1,586.85 3,624,678 1,156.56 2,972,889
259 776.49 1,448,421 1,842.30 1,503,827 937.90 1,563,296
229 720.50 976,487 1,979.76 1,154,237 1,012.75 986,377
230 1,071.05 1,878,779 2,202.47 2,775,705 1,193.99 2,149,903
Total 13,832,305 17,746,113
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Table 7.16: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare Change under Alternative Toll Pricing Policies (Scenarios 11 and 12) with Exponential Demand
Function. Figures in parentheses show percentage change vis-a´-vis the scenario’s (second best) welfare maximising policy.
Second Best
Competition Monopoly Welfare Maximisation
11 284 655.49 1,384,083 124,918 624.51 1,394,793 280,329 342.14 1,081,998 799,485
Serial 286 624.99 861,748 (16%) 573.68 862,933 (35%) 387.89 776,654
143 192.34 124,345 188.27 124,790 23.24 23,349
Total 2,370,176 2,382,516
12 238 574.26 86,827 -1,252,895 575.71 86,951 -1,010,856 650.99 100,870 421,779
Serial 285 677.97 1,585,513 (-297%) 656.37 1,623,793 (-240%) 373.11 1,343,668
291 1,281.69 281,940 1,346.85 300,845 298.06 437,673
296 501.86 595,093 397.78 568,837 195.66 519,542
Total 2,549,374 2,580,426
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Table 7.17: Index of Relative Welfare Improvement ω under Competition, Monopoly and
Second Best Welfare Maximisation in Each Scenario with Power Law Demand Function
Scenario Number of Competition Monopoly Welfare
Competitors Maximisation
Parallel Competition
Scenario 1 2 0.01 -0.24 0.03
Scenario 2 2 -0.01 -0.03 0.03
Scenario 3 2 -0.01 -0.03 0.01
Scenario 7 3 -0.01 -0.26 0.03
Scenario 8 4 0.01 -0.27 0.06
Scenario 9 5 0.02 -0.30 0.06
Scenario 10 6 0.06 -0.36 0.08
Serial Competition
Scenario 4 2 -0.03 -0.02 0.01
Scenario 5 2 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
Scenario 6 2 -0.04 -0.02 0.01
Scenario 11 3 -0.03 -0.02 0.01
Scenario 12 4 -0.09 -0.04 -0.04
Table 7.18: Index of Relative Welfare Improvement ω under Competition, Monopoly and
Second Best Welfare Maximisation in Each Scenario with Exponential Demand Function
Scenario Number of Competition Monopoly Welfare
Competitors Maximisation
Parallel Competition
Scenario 1 2 0.06 0.03 0.06
Scenario 2 2 0.05 0.05 0.06
Scenario 3 2 0.02 0.01 0.02
Scenario 7 3 0.06 0.04 0.07
Scenario 8 4 0.11 0.08 0.12
Scenario 9 5 0.13 0.05 0.14
Scenario 10 6 0.18 0.10 0.18
Serial Competition
Scenario 4 2 0.01 0.01 0.02
Scenario 5 2 0.01 0.02 0.02
Scenario 6 2 0.00 0.01 0.02
Scenario 11 3 0.00 0.01 0.02
Scenario 12 4 -0.04 -0.03 0.01
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7.5 Multiple Links Per Concessionaire
Thus far, it has been assumed that under competition, each concessionaire exercises
control only on a single link in the network. This may have resulted in an impression
that the SLCP approach is only applicable in this particular special case. In this
section, a modified SLCP approach is applied to study the case when a concessionaire
exercises control over two links in the network. For brevity, the results reported
below were only conducted with the exponential demand function (Eq. 7–14).
7.5.1 Nash Game Variants Considered
Allowing multiple links per concessionaire facilitates the development of three inter-
related Nash non-cooperative game variants which enable a study of the policy
implications arising from the assignment of links to toll road concessionaires.
This specific test is applied to four tollable links shown in the Fig. 7.9 numbered
as 281, 286, 291 and 296. In the case of competition, the four exhaustive possibil-
ities for assignment of control (i.e. toll setting responsibilities) over these links to
concessionaires are as follows:
1. “Disaggregated (non-cooperative) Nash Game”: there are 4 concessionaires
controlling one link each
2. “Integrated Parallel Competition”: there are 2 concessionaires (labelled A and
B) such that A controls links 284 and 286 and B controls links 291 and 296
3. “Extended Serial Competition - Variant I”: there are 2 concessionaires (la-
belled X and Y) such that X controls links 284 and 291 and Y controls links
286 and 296
4. “Extended Serial Competition - Variant II”: there are 2 concessionaires (la-
belled X and Y) such that X controls links 284 and 296 and Y controls links
286 and 291
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Figure 7.9: Left: Location of Links in Network Right: Location of Links close up
7.5.2 Results, Verification and Policy Insights
The outcomes (tolls/revenues/welfare changes) of each variant of the non-cooperative
Nash game as described above are shown in Tables 7.19 and 7.20. In addition, by
applying numerically estimated best response functions, the NE tolls in these games
obtained by SLCP are verified in Appendix C (see Figs. C.1 - C.4). In these fig-
ures, the dashed line in each diagram shows the numerical estimates of the best
response function for the player indicated on the x-axis while the continuous line
shows the numerical estimates of the best response function for the player indicated
on the y-axis. It can be observed from these diagrams that the solution of the SLCP
approach coincides with the intersection of these best response functions in all the
Nash non-cooperative game variants investigated.
In addition, Table 7.21 shows the outcomes associated with a monopolist (i.e. con-
trolling all four links) as well as under a (second best) social welfare maximising pol-
icy which, as usual, form benchmarks in terms of the revenue and welfare possibilities
to support an assessment of the various game variants. The main insights from this
test are summarised thus. While the Disaggregated Nash (non-cooperative) Game
is welfare enhancing, obtaining 41% of the maximum second best welfare gain, the
Integrated Parallel Competition scenario seems to be the most socially beneficial
way of link assignment to the concessionaires. It is also seen that the tolls are lower
when either player controls both serial links than when there are serial links engaged
in competition. As a recurring theme indicated in this and the previous chapter,
this is once again a manifestation of the double marginalisation problem.
While competition seems to be welfare enhancing in both the Integrated Parallel
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Table 7.19: Tolls, Link Revenues and Social Welfare Change: Disaggregated (non-
cooperative) Nash Game and Integrated Parallel Competition. Figures in parentheses gives
percentage changes in welfare for the scenario relative to the second best welfare maximisa-
tion scenario shown in last section of Table 7.21.
Link Toll Link Revenue Welfare Change
(secs) (secs) (secs)
Disaggregated Nash Game
284 567.97 1,104,746 724,351
286 882.78 1,438,825 (41%)
291 416.95 533,670
296 660.90 1,487,939
Total Revenue 4,565,180
Link Toll Link Revenue Welfare Change
(secs) (secs) (secs)
Integrated Parallel Competition
Concessionaire A: 284 and 286
284 537.22 1,139,301 1,144,043
286 846.14 1,408,684 (65%)
Revenue A 2,547,985
Concessionaire B: 291 and 296
291 295.24 492,331
296 632.81 1,597,377
Revenue B 2,089,708
Total Revenue 4,637,693
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Table 7.20: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare Change: Extended Serial Competition
variants. Figures in parentheses gives percentage changes in welfare for the scenario relative
to the second best welfare maximisation scenario shown in last section of Table 7.21.
Link Toll Link Revenue Welfare Change
(secs) (secs) (secs)
Extended Serial Competition - Variant I
Concessionaire X: 284 and 291
284 533.01 939,388 410,243
291 352.33 323,747 (23%)
Revenue X 1,263,135
Concessionaire Y: 286 and 296
286 1354.78 1,775,663
296 1197.04 1,589,772
Revenue Y 3,365,435
Total Revenue 4,628,570
Link Toll Link Revenue Welfare Change
(secs) (secs) (secs)
Extended Serial Competition - Variant II
Concessionaire X: 284 and 296
284 532.56 1,103,952 -824,265
296 612.27 1,438,007 (-47%)
Revenue X 2,541,959
Concessionaire Y: 286 and 291
286 879.56 1,426,383
291 464.86 569,848
Revenue Y 1,996,231
Total Revenue 4,538,189
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Table 7.21: Tolls, Link Revenues and Social Welfare Change: Monopoly and Second Best
Welfare Maximisation. The figure in parentheses gives the percentage change in welfare for
the Monopoly scenario relative to the second best welfare maximisation scenario.
Link Toll Link Revenue Welfare
(secs) (secs) Change(secs)
Monopoly
284 414.99 934,756 557,101 (32%)
286 1334.99 1,773,822
291 0.00 0
296 1140.54 2,112,278
Total 4,820,856
Link Toll Link Revenue Welfare
(secs) (secs) (secs)
Second Best Welfare Maximisation
284 250.53 784,566 1,763,486
286 719.79 1,322,903
291 216.13 464,574
296 459.81 1,465,097
Total 4,037,139
Competition and Disaggregated (non-cooperative) Nash Games scenarios (both ob-
tain higher percentages of the second best welfare maximising outcome compared
to monopoly), it is clear that the structure of concessionaire control in terms of the
assignment of links to concessionaires also has significant social welfare implications.
As can be observed, the results indicate that Extended Serial Competition could
be the worst strategy amongst the control possibilities tested for policy makers to
pursue. Both variants of Extended Serial Competition involve concessionaires each
controlling multiple but geographically separate portions of road links exhibiting a
high degree of serial interdependence/complementarity. In this case, because each
controls two of such serial links, the problem of double marginalisation is further
exacerbated with a reduction in social welfare social welfare. The problem of double
marginalisation not only affects users and society at large with welfare losses but
also adversely impacts the concessionaires since revenues are lower in both of these
game variants vis-a´-vis Integrated Parallel Competition.
In the worst case of Variant II, the Extended Serial Competition game also results in
a negative social welfare change. This implies that pursuit of this particular variant
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is worse than taking no action. Thus, it might be even better, choosing between the
two, to hand control over to the revenue maximising monopolist, since there is the
possibility of a 32% social welfare gain, than to allow such competition.
For each scenario tested, Table 7.22 summarises the index of relative welfare im-
provement ω which, as noted previously, measures the welfare change from each
scenario relative to the theoretical first best welfare benchmark. By definition, the
second best welfare maximisation scenario would attain the highest measure of rela-
tive efficiency. Aside from this, the Integrated Parallel Competition scenario results
in the next highest ω. Furthermore, the monopoly scenario results in a similar
magnitude of efficiency changes as the Disaggregated (non-cooperative) Nash game
variant. It is also clear that either variants of Extended Serial Competition fare the
worst in welfare terms compared to the monopoly solution as discussed above.
Table 7.22: Index of Relative Welfare Improvement ω for Each Multiple Link Scenario
Scenario ω
Second Best Welfare Maximisation 0.05
Integrated Parallel Competition 0.03
Monopoly 0.02
Disaggregated Nash 0.02
Extended Serial Competition - Variant I 0.01
Extended Serial Competition - Variant II -0.02
In summary, the policy implications arising from the numerical tests conducted in
this section serves to affirm the premise that “private operators, if allowed on a
network, should serve full-length corridors but should face competition when doing
so” (Small and Verhoef, 2007, p. 201) in a realistic network situation with route
choices described by an elastic demand SUE model.
7.6 Collusion and Nash Bargaining
The previous chapter examined both the potential for collusion between two con-
cessionaires and the normative approach to Nash Bargaining in a DUE setting. The
correspondence between the terminology utilised in the Axiomatic Bargaining lit-
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erature and equivalent terminology in the Industrial Organisation literature were
given in Table 6.8 and these terms will also be utilised in this section.
It was noted that the relevant benchmark to study the possibilities for collusion
between concessionaires is based on the principle of Pareto Optimality (cf. Definition
3.3) and it was emphasised that, as reflected in the Pareto Front, there is an entire
range of potential outcomes attainable by each through engaging in some form of
collusion and bargaining. It was shown that the NE revenues attainable under
the (fully) competitive regime would not be Pareto Optimal as one concessionaire
could increase his revenues without reducing that accruing to the other. In this
chapter, with route choice following the SUE principle, the benchmark MOPEC
under consideration can be expressed as Eq. 7–15.
Maximise
x∈X
Φ(x) = (φ1(x,v(x))), φ2(x,v(x)))
⊺
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{S(x)}.
(Eq. 7–15)
In addition, an intuitive approach was developed, adhering to the Utilitarian ap-
proach to the division of gains with total revenues being maximised, in order to
model the situation in which erstwhile independent concessionaires could move from
the non-Pareto Optimal point to the monopoly solution on the Pareto Front through
a form of “signalling” behaviour, allowing them to infer rivals’ intentions from ob-
servation of market outcomes. Such signalling could take the form of setting tolls
in such a way that would signal, to their rivals, their intention to collude and mu-
tual reciprocation was assumed. This was achieved by the use of a unitless scalar
parameter, α, 0 6 α 6 1, to represent the degree of cooperation between the con-
cessionaires. With the two concessionaire scenarios, the modified NCEPEC, taking
into account SUE route choices, can be explicitly written as the system in Eq. 7–16.
Maximise
x1∈X1
φ1(x1, vj1) = vj1(x)x1 + αvj2(x)x2, j1, j2 ∈ J , j1 6= j2
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{S(x)}
(Eq. 7–16a)
Maximise
x2∈X2
φ2(x2, vj2) = vj2(x)x2 + αvj1(x)x1, j1, j2 ∈ J , j2 6= j1
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{S(x)}
(Eq. 7–16b)
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This framework would allow policy makers to study the possibilities of such tacit
collusion tactics by examining the existence or otherwise of incentives for conces-
sionaires to engage in “concious parallelism”(Macleod, 1985).
However, a drawback of the Utilitarian Solution to the division of gains is that it
could result in one concessionaire being made worse off, thereby violating the Ax-
iom 1 of Individual Rationality (see Section 5.6.1). In such a situation, the party
that could lose out would not be willing to collude since they could, individually,
do better by playing the non-cooperative game. As a result, an alternative Nash
Bargaining Solution (NBS) (Nash, 1950b) was introduced that would satisfy this ax-
iom. For completeness, the Nash Bargaining Problem with Equilibrium Constraints
(NBPEC) considered in this chapter, specifically taking into account users’ route
choices obeying the SUE principle, may be cast as Eq. 7–17,
Maximise
x∈X
Z(x,v(x)) = (φ1(x,v(x)) − φ
N
1 )(φ2(x,v(x)) − φ
N
2 )
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{S(x)}.
φ1(x,y(x)) > φ
N
1
φ2(x,y(x)) > φ
N
2 .
(Eq. 7–17)
In this section, collusion and Nash Bargaining between toll road concessionaires,
again concentrating exclusively on scenarios with two concessionaires (i.e. Scenarios
1 to 6), are investigated. Firstly, taking the perspective of the concessionaires, the
revenue impacts of the Utilitarian Solution achieved by the signalling behaviour, as
represented by Eq. 7–16, is used to identify the existence of incentives, or otherwise,
for parties to move through to fully collusive outcome. Subsequently, tests are
conducted to identify the NBS. Finally, the the welfare consequences of collusion
and Nash Bargaining are summarised.
As was done in the previous chapter, the Pareto Fronts are generated by application
of the MOSADE algorithm (Algorithm 5.5 refers) to heuristically solve Eq. 7–15.
The tests will be carried out for the Exponential Demand function only. Further-
more, because of the smooth and differentiable properties of the SUE map discussed
in Section 7.3.4, the NBPEC in Eq. 7–17 can be solved by embedding the SUE
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constraints directly within the IPOPT interior point solver (Wa¨chter and Biegler,
2006), a standard non-linear programming solver.
7.6.1 Revenue Impacts of the Utilitarian Approach to Collusion
The Pareto Fronts serving as benchmarks for the 6 scenarios tested are shown in
the left panes of Figs. 7.10 to 7.15. These figures confirm two predictions. Firstly,
the monopolist solution (equivalent to the situation when the collusion parameter,
α, is equal to 1) reported in Table 7.12 all lie on the Pareto Front as indicated by
the * on these diagrams. Unlike in Scenario 2 in Chapter 6 (see p. 169), there is
no evidence to suggest the existence of multiple optimum in this case. Secondly,
the fully competitive NE outcome is not Pareto Optimal (in terms of individual
revenues attainable by each the players) as that revenue tuple lies in the interior of
the Pareto Front.
It is important, however, to distinguish between total revenue and individual revenue
in investigating the possibilities for collusion. While the total revenue increases as
α increases from 0 at the (fully competitive) NE solution to 1 in the fully collusive
solution, the revenue accruing to each concessionaire does not increase linearly.
Plotted on the right pane in Figs. 7.10 to 7.15 is the corresponding “collusion
path”. This plots the implied revenues to each concessionaire, obtained by using
the SLCP algorithm to solve Eq. 7–16, varying α between 0 and 1 in steps of
0.2. Such a path shows the resulting distribution of revenues between the players if
they were to collude so as to move from the fully competitive outcome to the fully
collusive Monopoly outcome.
In the case of parallel competition, the numerical tests suggest that players are
incentivised to collude. In all three scenarios as shown in the right hand panes of
Figs. 7.10 to 7.12, the revenue accruing to either player increases as α increases.
However, in exactly such a case as discussed above, collusion would be detrimental
for societal welfare. At the same time, they may not collude fully since the collusion
path is an inverted U shaped as shown in the right hand panes of Figures 7.10
to 7.15. This implies that the maximum revenue accruing to each concessionaire
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individually could occur at a point before full collusion (i.e. α = 1) is reached since
one party could in fact lose out in terms of obtaining lower revenues one could get
if they were to collude fully. In such cases, there is little incentive to collude fully
unless there is an explicit revenue sharing agreement to enforce collusion. However,
if a comparison is made by only comparing the revenues attainable by each in the
fully competitive outcome (α = 0) vis-a´-vis the fully collusive outcome (α = 1),
it is clear that in the scenarios involving parallel competition, both concessionaires
would be made better off.
On the other hand, collusion in serial links would be potentially positive for social
welfare since it has been highlighted that the monopolistic outcome in these cases
was shown to lead result in lower tolls and, correspondingly, more positive (or at the
very least, less detrimental) welfare impacts as the double marginalisation problem
is avoided. However, the results show that there may not always be an incentive for
concessionaires to collude fully in this case. While Fig. 7.13 (Scenario 4) suggests
that both players could increase their revenues by moving towards the fully collusive
outcome, Figs. 7.14 and 7.15 (Scenarios 5 and 6 respectively) show that the link
revenue under full collusion obtained by one player (indicated on the x-axis) is in
fact less than that obtained in the fully competitive NE. Thus, there may be no
incentive for players to move to full collusion even if it would improve social welfare
(as discussed in Section 7.6.3 below).
Therefore the evidence suggests that while it would be, in fact, welfare improving
for concessionaires to collude in the serial link case, the numerical examples high-
light the fact that they are may not be incentivised to do so. On the other hand,
concessionaires might potentially be incentivised to collude in the parallel link case
which results in negative social welfare consequences. Thus regulators need to be
aware of such possibilities particularly in the case of links that serve as alternative
connections between OD pairs.
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Figure 7.10: (Left) Scenario 1: The fully competitive NE (+) is not Pareto Optimal
while the monopoly solution (*) lies on the Pareto Front. (Right): The “Collusion Path” as
competitors move from the fully competitive NE (α = 0) to the monopoly solution (α = 1).
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Figure 7.11: (Left) Scenario 2: The fully competitive NE (+) is not Pareto Optimal
while the monopoly solution (*) lies on the Pareto Front. (Right): The “Collusion Path” as
competitors move from the fully competitive NE (α = 0) to the monopoly solution (α = 1).
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Figure 7.12: (Left) Scenario 3: The fully competitive NE (+) is not Pareto Optimal
while the monopoly solution (*) lies on the Pareto Front. (Right): The “Collusion Path” as
competitors move from the fully competitive NE (α = 0) to the monopoly solution (α = 1).
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Figure 7.13: (Left) Scenario 4: The fully competitive NE (+) is not Pareto Optimal
while the monopoly solution (*) lies on the Pareto Front. (Right): The “Collusion Path” as
competitors move from the fully competitive NE (α = 0) to the monopoly solution (α = 1).
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Figure 7.14: (Left) Scenario 5: The fully competitive NE (+) is not Pareto Optimal
while the monopoly solution (*) lies on the Pareto Front. (Right): The “Collusion Path” as
competitors move from the fully competitive NE (α = 0) to the monopoly solution (α = 1).
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Figure 7.15: (Left) Scenario 6: The fully competitive NE (+) is not Pareto Optimal
while the monopoly solution (*) lies on the Pareto Front. (Right): The “Collusion Path” as
competitors move from the fully competitive NE (α = 0) to the monopoly solution (α = 1).
7.6.2 Nash Bargaining Solution
In the scenarios of collusion involving parallel links (i.e Scenarios 1 to 3), comparing
the fully competitive outcome with the fully collusive outcome alone (ignoring the
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intermediate points of α), it was noted that the concessionaires could, arguably,
agree to the Utilitarian Solution to division of the surplus obtained from cooperation.
This deduction is based on recognising that moving from competition to monopoly,
both gain and neither would lose out compared to the BATNA.
However, for collusion involving the serial link pairs (i.e Scenarios 4 to 6), it is not
possible to draw the same broad brush conclusion. The revenues accruing to each
concessionaire controlling each link in the serial scenarios in the case of competition
and monopoly are reproduced in the third and fourth columns of Table 7.23. The
column labelled “% Change A” measures the percentage change in revenue between
monopoly and competition relative to the competitive outcome.
In Scenario 4, both concessionaires gain when they move from the fully competitive
outcome (α = 0) to the fully collusive/monopoly outcome (α = 1) and so in this
scenario the Utilitarian Solution satisfies the axiom of Individual Rationality (Axiom
1 in Section 5.6.1). However, this is still not sufficiently convincing since as shown
in Table 7.23, with full collusion, the concessionaire controlling link 284 finds that
the revenue earned increases by around 10,000 secs (i.e. 1,397,016 secs in monopoly
versus 1,386,411 secs in competition) or 0.8% vis-a´-vis the fully competitive outcome
but the concessionaire controlling link 286 finds that with full collusion, the increase
in revenue amounts to only 1,000 secs (864,518 secs under monopoly versus 863,314
secs under competition) or 0.1% compared to that attainable under full competition.
Thus in this case, it is highly unlikely, in the absence of any side payment, that
the concessionaire controlling link 286, obtaining roughly 10 times lower than the
increase obtained by the concessionaire on link 284 will be willing to accept this
outcome based on the Utilitarian approach to the division of revenue.
However, in Scenario 5 and 6, it is clear that in this case, Axiom 1 is not satisfied
under the Utilitarian Solution to the division of gains. This is because one con-
cessionaire (link 243 in Scenario 5 and link 291 in Scenario 6) loses out with full
collusion. As shown in the column labelled “% Change A” in Table 7.23, these
concessionaires face a 0.4% and 5.6% reduction in revenue respectively vis-a´-vis the
fully competitive outcome. Thus even though total revenues have increased with
collusion, the gains accrue to the other concessionaire in the series. Thus a rational
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concessionaire that obtains lower revenues than the BATNA would not be willing
to agree to the Utilitarian Solution. This sets the scene for the alternative Nash
Bargaining approach.
Table 7.23: Revenues under Competition, Monopoly and Nash Bargaining for Scenarios
4, 5 and 6
Revenues (secs)
Scenario Link Competitive Monopoly % Change NBS % Change
(α = 0) (α = 1) A B
4 284 1,386,411 1,397,016 0.8% 1,392,591 0.4%
Serial 286 863,314 864,518 0.1% 868,617 0.6%
Total 2,249,725 2,261,534 2,261,208
5 243 568,910 566,495 -0.4% 583,044 2%
Serial 247 974,626 1,007,640 3.4% 989,466 2%
Total 1,543,536 1,574,135 1,572,511
6 291 521,404 492,338 -5.6% 536,235 3%
Serial 296 1,206,198 1,291,667 7.1% 1,239,092 3%
Total 1,727,602 1,784,005 1,775,328
With Nash Bargaining, total revenues are not maximised. Instead, the objective is
to maximise the product of the gains relative to the BATNA and to ensure that
the parties do not attain lower revenues than the BATNA. Figs. 7.16 to 7.17 su-
perimpose on the Pareto Fronts, the revenues accruing to each concessionaire in the
NBS, obtained by solving Eq. 7–17, reported in Table 7.23. The results show that
the NBS, indicated on Figs. 7.16 to 7.17 with a 9 does indeed satisfy the Axiom
2 of Pareto Optimality in that all the gains from cooperation are exhausted and no
concessionaire can be made better off without making another worse off.
With the Utilitarian Solution (indicated by a * marker), none of the concessionaires
in Scenario 4 lose out, relative to the competitive outcome, by moving to this so-
lution. However, in Scenarios 5 and 6, at least one concessionaire would lose out.
In Table 7.23, the column labelled “% Change B” reports the percentage change in
revenue between NBS and competition relative to the competitive outcome. This
emphasises that with the NBS that none of the concessionaires lose out. For exam-
ple, in Scenario 6, instead of suffering a 5.6% decrease relative the BATNA with the
Utilitarian Solution, the concessionaire on link 291 gains by 3%. It is interesting that
in the three scenarios tested, all concessionaires benefit by approximately the same
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proportion relative to their individual BATNAs. This suggest another advantage of
Nash Bargaining in that it seems to incentivise the player who could be worse off
with the Utilitarian Solution as the surplus seems to be shared more equally. Table
7.24 shows that the percentage share of total revenues or “slice of the revenue pie”
each gets is similar under either of these axiomatic bargaining paradigms.
While the question of whether the NBS to sharing gains is viewed as fair or just is
a subjective issue outside the scope of this research, it is evident that attaining the
NBS in practice would be possible in Scenarios 5 and 6 given that none lose out.
Thus the concessionaires would have an incentive to work towards that outcome.
Furthemore, as will be seen in Section 7.6.3, the NBS is also positive for social
welfare.
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Figure 7.16: Left: Pareto Front, NBS, Monopoly and Competitive Solutions (Scenario 4)
Right: Pareto Front, NBS, Monopoly and Competitive Solutions (Scenario 5)
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Figure 7.17: Pareto Front, NBS,
Monopoly and Competitive Solutions
(Scenario 6)
Table 7.24: Percentage Share in Rev-
enues under Monopoly and NBS
Scenario Link %Share %Share
Monopoly NBS
4 284 62% 62%
286 38% 38%
5 243 36% 37%
247 64% 63%
6 291 28% 30%
296 72% 70%
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7.6.3 Welfare Impacts of Utilitarian Collusion and Nash Bargain-
ing
In this section, the welfare impacts of collusion are summarised. This may again be
assessed using the index of relative welfare improvement ω (Verhoef et al., 1996) as
the collusion parameter, α, varies from 0 to 1. The left panel of Fig. 7.18 focuses
on collusion in the case of parallel competition (Scenarios 1 to 3) while the right
panel focuses on collusion in the case of serial competition (Scenarios 4 to 6). Each
of these figures shows how ω varies as α varies.
Welfare Impacts of Utilitarian Collusion
In the case of parallel competition, it can be seen that ω decreases as the degree of
cooperation/collusion increases (i.e α increases from 0 to 1) where the concession-
aires moving towards the Utilitarian Solution. It is clear that even if there is partial
collusion, welfare will deteriorate compared to the fully competitive outcome. On
the other hand, in the case of serial competition, ω increases as the degree of col-
lusion increases. Thus welfare improves even with partial collusion. However, as
noted above for Scenarios 5 and 6, concessionaires in the case of serial competition
may not be incentivised to collude fully if that resulted in one of these concession-
aires receiving lower revenues from collusion in the absence of a revenue-sharing
agreement.
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Figure 7.18: Index of Relative Welfare Improvement as Collusion Parameter, α, varies for
Parallel Competition Scenarios (Left) and Serial Competition Scenarios (Right)
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Welfare Impacts of Nash Bargaining
As discussed above, in Scenarios 4 to 6 with serially interdependent links, welfare
is enhanced by ensuring that a monopolist controls the entire both links together,
obviating the double marginalisation problem, rather than allowing competition.
Table 7.25 compares the welfare change (relative to the untolled base equilibrium)
achieved under the Utilitarian (Monopoly) solution and NBS and also reports the
index of relative welfare improvement in each case. As this index is identical in both
scenarios, it is evident that both of these solutions are better for social welfare than
allowing competition in this case.
Table 7.25: Tolls and Welfare Change under Monopoly (Utilitarian) and Nash Bargaining
Monopoly NBS
Scenario Link Toll Welfare ω Toll Welfare ω
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
4 284 625.74
370,871 0.011
618.51
375,504 0.011
286 575.27 584.36
5 243 310.88
570,677 0.016
327.76
574,797 0.016
247 387.16 372.22
6 291 294.01
262,231 0.007
347.38
233,970 0.007
296 587.31 566.24
Combining this result with the possibility of the NBS being an acceptable solution
to the parties as discussed previously, collusion and bargaining in this case could
turn out to be welfare enhancing. This illustrates a possible rare instance where
the commercial (revenue maximising) objectives and social (welfare maximising)
objective are not at odds with each other.
7.7 Summary and Policy Implications
In the previous chapter, with routing in a congested network is characterised by
Wardrop’s Deterministic User Equilibrium (DUE) principle, it was demonstrated
that concessionaires engaged in competition between links offering alternatives for
travel between OD pairs would be positive for social welfare. On the other hand,
competition between links that exhibit serial interdependencies i.e. where the travel
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journey could not be completed without using the entire route, would lead to dete-
rioration of social welfare. The impacts of such serial competition could be worse
than assigning responsibility for toll setting to a monopolist.
In this chapter, link flows and demands described by an elastic Stochastic User
Equilibrium (SUE) model served instead as the active VI constraint in the NCEPEC
formulation of the game between competing concessionaires. In addition, tests of a
monopolist granted the right to collect tolls on all predefined tollable links in the
network as well as the paradigm of a (second best) welfare maximising toll pricing
policy were used as benchmarks. These benchmarks allowed for the determination
of the extent of both the revenue as well as social welfare impacts of competition in
a network with users routing according to the SUE principle, allowing for stochastic
variation in perceptions of generalised route times across users. As part of the
numerical tests, both the power law and exponential demand function were also
used to study 12 scenarios. The primary differentiation between the scenarios was
whether the tollable links served as alternatives for travel (i.e. parallel links) or
whether they exhibited strong serial interdependencies (e.g. links that comprise a
corridor). Furthermore, with the larger network used in this chapter, the scenarios
investigated competition scenarios involving up to 6 concessionaires. This allows for
an investigation into the effects of increasing the intensity of the competition in this
way extending the insights from the previous chapter.
The overwhelming policy implication from the results of numerical tests conducted
in both chapters is that, regardless of the demand function (power law or exponen-
tial) and routing paradigm assumed (DUE or SUE), competition between parallel
links should be encouraged. It was also observed that that tolls could rise as a re-
sult of increased intensity of competition and this is attributable to the congestion
internalisation component of the toll which increases welfare. When two links in a
realistic network are the only links where tolls are charged, there is ample opportu-
nity for traffic to reroute away from these links. When more links serving the same
general direction of traffic movement are tolled, this reduces the opportunity for
rerouting. When more traffic is captive to the tolls as intensity of competition in-
creases, the congestion internalisation component of each concessionaire’s toll would
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also increase. At the same time, as a direct result of increased competition, the de-
mand related markup would fall. This explains why although tolls increase with
increased intensity of competition, welfare also increases.
At the same time, competition between links that exhibit serial interdependencies
should be restricted or curtailed. It was shown numerically that a monopolist in
control of these links together would charge a lower toll resulting in better welfare
gain. Although the toll increases with increased intensity of serial competition (as
was the case with increased intensity of parallel competition), this is not due to more
congestion being internalised but due to the the double marginalisation problem with
the demand related markup being charged for each segment of a serial corridor. This
explains why welfare decreases in the case of increasing competition between serial
links.
These results were further emphasised in an additional test which allowed conces-
sionaires to control a corridor comprising multiple links. It was shown that the
allowing concessionaires the right to manage a corridor comprising serial links but
facing competition from others doing the same on other corridors was a far more
socially beneficial policy than allowing unbridled competition between serial links
or monopolistic operation. Yet the worst strategy in terms of social welfare change
vis-a´-vis the no toll base, amongst the cases examined, was the assignment of such
rights to concessionaires to set tolls on multiple but disparate portions of links
that showed a high degree of serial interdependence. A clear message stemming
from the numerical examples was the potential deterioration in social welfare with
competition between serial links due to the double marginalisation problem as a con-
cessionaire operating independently does not take into account, in his toll setting
decisions, the reduction in revenues he would have on other links in the series.
Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter applied MOSADE, a DE-based Multi-
Objective Evolutionary Algorithm to benchmark the revenue possibilities of coop-
eration between toll road concessionaires. It demonstrate that the link revenues
obtained under monopoly is one solution amongst a number that maximise the ob-
jectives of two concessionaires simultaneously. Such solutions constituted the Pareto
Front. It was shown that the Nash non-cooperative game solution was not Pareto
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Optimal. This is because at the fully competitive outcome, one player could increase
his revenues without his opponent suffering a loss.
The formulation, introduced in Chapter 6, was used to reflect the degree of coop-
eration between two concessionaires with α = 0 representing the fully competitive
outcome and α = 1 representing the fully cooperative outcome. By repeatedly ap-
plying the SLCP algorithm each time for different α values, it was shown that the
collusion path characterising the move across the spectrum could be traced. It was
previously established in the tests that monopoly formation in the case of parallel
links could be detrimental to social welfare but such monopoly formation in the
case of serial links, on the other hand, could be positive. In all cases, it was shown
that as collusion increases from none (α = 0) through to full collusion (α = 1) then
the revenues accruing to each player maps from the NE solution to the monopoly
solution. In the case of parallel links, it was shown that there was an incentive for
concessionaires to collude. Unfortunately this would be detrimental to social wel-
fare. Thus regulators should be aware of the potential for concessionaires to engage
in collusion through such signalling behaviour.
In the case of serial links, it was demonstrated that with full collusion, while total
revenues increase, the revenue earned by one concessionaire could be below that
obtained at the fully competitive NE. This would act as a disincentive to the player
who would then be worse off to collude unless a revenue sharing agreement was set up
in advance. This motivated the study of bilateral Nash Bargaining as an alternative
to Utilitarian Collusion. It was demonstrated that the Nash Bargaining Solution
(NBS) could be obtained as the solution of the proposed Nash Bargaining Problem
with Equilibrium Constraints (NBPEC). The numerical results verified that the NBS
was not only Pareto Optimal but both parties to the NBS bargaining agreement
would obtain higher returns than under the non-cooperative solution. In this way,
the NBS would counter the disincentive (to one concessionaire) of the monopoly
(equivalently Utilitarian) solution. The numerical tests point to the advantage of
the NBS in that it seemed to result in more equal allocation of the surplus created. In
addition, welfare improvements could be obtained with the NBS because it alleviates
the double marginalisation problem associated in competition between serial links.
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In this case, the NBS is beneficial from both the concessionaires’ perspective as well
as society’s perspective.
In terms of the algorithmic implementations, it was demonstrated that the approach
that solves the NCEPEC as a Sequential Linear Complementarity Problem (SLCP)
seemed to be the most computationally efficient when compared against both the
Fixed Point Iteration (FPI) and the NDEMO algorithm. As noted previously, the
SLCP approach solves the NCEPEC simultaneously while the FPI solves each con-
cessionaire’s revenue maximisation problem in turn until the entire system converges.
This accounts for why the SLCP approach outperforms the FPI algorithm in com-
putational efficiency. It is vital to reiterate that the ability to apply the SLCP
approach is primarily due to the smoothness of the SUE equilibrium constraints.
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Chapter 8
Inter-jurisdictional Toll
Competition: Part I8.1
8.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the problem of toll revenue competition between jurisdictions.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, individual jurisdictions have an incentive to engage
in tax exporting as the toll revenues it can raise from extra-jurisdictional users
traversing its network would contribute to its local welfare. It is shown that this
problem of inter-jurisdictional toll competition can be formulated as a NCEPEC.
The toll revenue competition game is studied using a small network model with
travellers’ route choices described by the elastic demand Wardropian DUE principle
(Wardrop, 1952). Subsequently, applying simple grid search techniques and making
use of tools of game theory discussed in Chapter 3, the existence of LNE in this
game is investigated numerically. The existence of multiple LNE is shown to exist
under a range of assumptions.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The additional notation required
to describe toll competition between jurisdictions is developed in the next section
to model the competition in the simplest possible setting of two adjacent regulatory
authorities. The network representation described in Section 8.3 allows for an ex-
amination of the response surfaces i.e. how one authority would react to the other
authority’s choice of toll levels. Two cases are considered. The first, discussed in
Section 8.4, assumes that the cities are identical with respect to both trip demands
and network topology. The second case, discussed in Section 8.5 subsequently in-
troduces asymmetry by considering the impacts of competition should one of the
8.1Large portions of this chapter is based on Koh et al. (2013).
240
cities be more attractive as a destination vis-a´-vis the other. In all cases, it is
demonstrated that incentivised by revenues from extra-jurisdictional users, author-
ities have an incentive to set high tolls to tax export. As a consequence, the welfare
enhancing corrective effect of tolls aimed at internalising the congestion externality
could be offset by the welfare decreasing fiscal externality of tax exporting. In the
extreme case, social welfare would be higher had the authorities not introduced tolls
in the first instance.
As discussed in Chapter 2, revenue sharing between jurisdictions has been suggested
in the Edinburgh toll pricing scheme proposals (Gaunt et al., 2006; Laird et al.,
2007). However, within a horizontal toll revenue competition context, the welfare
implications of revenue sharing have not been investigated. Therefore, Section 8.6
investigates this issue which has both theoretical and practical relevance. One of
the aims of the analysis is to understand the extent to which revenue sharing can
alleviate the impacts of the fiscal externality of tax exporting.
Aside from the special case discussed, revenue sharing is shown not to result in
Pareto Optimal outcomes. The reason for this is because while revenue sharing
reduces the welfare loss from the fiscal externality of tax exporting, it cannot ad-
dress the welfare loss stemming from the fact that jurisdictions only regard extra-
jurisdictional users as adding to congestion in the network but not paying attention
to their welfare. Finally, relaxing the assumption of non-cooperative behaviour un-
derlying the NCEPEC, jurisdictions are allowed to engage in bilateral bargaining.
It is shown that that the Nash Bargaining Solution may not be unique but unlike
revenue sharing, Nash Bargaining can result in Pareto Optimal outcomes. Section
8.7 summarises.
8.2 Notation and Problem Formulation
In this section, the second best toll pricing problem (SBTP) is formulated in two
forms. Firstly, to benchmark the welfare level attainable with a practical scheme, it
is assumed a high level regulator/independent arbitrator sets tolls to maximise wel-
fare for the entire network. Subsequently, the situation of two jurisdictions engaged
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in toll revenue competition is formulated. Unless new notation are introduced, all
remain defined as previously used.
8.2.1 Global Regulator Problem
For a set of links in a traffic network L, a subset of these J , J ⊆ L have been
predefined to be tollable. Thus in this case, toll levels are chosen for each tollable
link to maximise welfare subject to travellers routing according to Wardrop’s DUE
condition. The objective function reflects the difference between the benefits users
receive from travel between the OD pairs and the generalised travel times costs
expended in doing so.
This MPEC is termed a “Global Regulator Problem” (abbreviated as GRP) to
distinguish it from the local variant to be discussed in the next section. This SBTP
problem therefore corresponds to a “centric” pricing scheme (Zhang et al., 2011, p.
298) as it models the setting of a single regulator deciding the toll levels on each
link in J in order to maximise the benefit for all users i.e. regardless of origin or
destination. This model is formulated in Eq. 8–1.
GRP


Maximise
x∈X
WDUE(x) =
∑
k∈K
∫ qk
0
d−1k (w)dw −
∑
j∈L
vjtj(vj)
subject to {v∗,q∗} ← SOL{V(x)}
(Eq. 8–1)
As an MPEC, the (always) active constraint to the GRP is a VI. This is written as
{v∗,q∗} ← SOL{V(x)}. As introduce in Chapter 6 (see Section 6.3, p. 143), this
expression is read as meaning that the unique vector of link flows v∗, and demands,
q∗, satisfying Wardrop’s DUE route choice principle (Wardrop, 1952), are obtained
as the solution of the VIP formulation for the static traffic assignment problem,
parametrised in the regulator’s toll vector x.
8.2.2 Inter-jurisdictional Toll Revenue Competition
In this section, the model is extended to allow for toll revenue competition between
jurisdictions which are termed “authorities”. To this end, it will be assumed that
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there are two regulatory authorities (labelled A and B), each authority having their
own pre-defined subset of network links over which they may charge a toll. For
simplicity, it is assumed that each authority i has a single toll level xi > 0 that it
chooses to levy on a predefined set of links in the network. Together, the tolls to be
determined can be collected in the vector x = (xA, xB)
⊺. The decision space of the
single toll level decided by each authority is denoted by Xi = {xi : 0 6 xi 6 x¯i}, i ∈
{A,B}. It follows that x ∈ XA ×XB.
It is assumed that each authority can only decide the toll level on the links in its
subnetwork over which it exercises jurisdiction. The definition of the subnetwork is
assumed to be predefined. Thus the highway network containing the set of links L
can be further partitioned such that
1. Li refers to the set of links within the subnetwork of Authority i, i ∈ {A,B}
such that LA ∩ LB = ∅ and L = LA ∪ LB and
2. Ji, Ji ⊆ Li refers to the set of tollable links in Authority i, i ∈ {A,B}.
As noted in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.5.3, p. 48), each authority is interested in the
welfare of its jurisdiction’s residents. Following Zhang et al. (2011), it is assumed
that these residents correspond to trips that originate from zones located within
its spatial jurisdictional boundaries. On this assumption, the OD movements are
partitioned into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets, such that Ki is the
index of OD movements originating in Authority i, i ∈ {A,B} with K = KA ∪ KB
and KA ∩ KB = ∅.
In addition, the link flow vector v is partitioned such that v˜ji denotes the flow on
link j of demand originating in Authority i (which will be referred to as “authority
link flows”), clearly with vj = v˜jA+ v˜j B, j ∈ L. In vector notation, if the authority
link flows are collected in a |L| × 2 matrix V˜ then they are related to the aggregate
link flow vector by v = V˜ 1 where 1 = (1, 1)⊺.
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Authority A’s objective function is given by Eq. 8–2.
φA(x) = φA(xA, xB) =
∑
k∈KA
qk∫
0
d−1k (z)dz −
∑
j∈L
v˜jAtj(v˜j A + v˜j B)
+ δ
∑
j∈JA
xAv˜j B − δ
∑
j∈JB
xBv˜jA
(Eq. 8–2)
This measure of social welfare for Authority A in Eq. 8–2 is analogous to the objec-
tive function of the GRP in Eq. 8–1 but restricted to the subnetwork of Authority A.
This function is equivalent to objective functions found elsewhere in the literature
(e.g. Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008b; Zhang et al., 2011) and is intended to encapsulate
the idea introduced in Chapter 2 (see, p. 59), that in setting the tolls, jurisdictions
pursue two simultaneous objectives. To recapitulate, these are as follows: “improv-
ing transport conditions as far as their own residents are concerned and generating
profit or tax revenue from through traffic” (De Borger and Proost, 2012, p. 39).
The first term in Eq. 8–2 is the Marshallian measure of trips made from origins
zones located within Authority A’s subnetwork. The second term represents the
generalised travel times (excluding tolls) for traffic with an origin in Authority A’s
jurisdiction. Thus the net effect of the first and second terms is a measure of
the social surplus for users originating from zones located within A’s subnetwork
only. Therefore this accounts for the jurisdiction’s desire to use tolls to internalise
congestion and improve the transport conditions for its own residents. As can be
seen, the social surplus of extra-jurisdictional users (i.e. those traversing its network)
does not enter into the social surplus calculations.
The third and fourth terms together reflect the jurisdiction’s desire to raise revenues
from extra-jurisdictional users. The third term represents the toll revenue spent by
residents from Authority B within Authority A; this is a transfer payment that
increases the welfare of Authority A at the expense of Authority B. Similarly, the
fourth term represents the toll revenue spent by residents from Authority A on links
controlled by Authority B, i.e. those with origins in Authority A and travelling
on tolled links in Authority B. Again, this is a transfer payment and increases the
welfare of Authority B at the expense of Authority A. The parameter δ, δ ∈ (0, 1) is
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a tax exporting parameter, for which shall be assumed to be common value for both
authorities. Therefore, the net effect of the third and fourth term is the revenue
gained from (or lost to, if negative) Authority B.
For the moment, the tests assume that δ = 1 which means that both Authority A
and B are concerned with the net effect of the revenues gained from the counterpart
jurisdiction. Variations in δ are explored in Section 8.6.
Authority B’s objective function is exactly analogous, mutatis mutandis, and the
details are discussed below. As toll revenues are transfer payments, they cancel
at the aggregate (i.e. network wide) level (Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008a, p. 179).
Therefore, Eq. 8–3 holds at the aggregate network level for given toll vector x and
with δ being equal for both jurisdictions.
φA(x) + φB(x) =WDUE(x) (Eq. 8–3)
Given the objective function in Eq. 8–2, the optimisation problem facing Authority
A can now be stated. Authority A is assumed to maximise social welfare of its own
residents by adjusting the toll level of links over which it has control, anticipating
the impact of the toll on travellers’ route and demand decisions, but reacting to
the toll level levied by Authority B. Thus it is assumed that Authority A does
not anticipate the effect that its toll will have on Authority B’s response, but it
simply reacts to the toll set by Authority B. This means that neither of them
possess superior information to enable them to act as a Stackelberg leader taking
into account the reactions of the other authority in its toll setting. Therefore, A
and B are assumed to play a Nash non-cooperative game. Assume, for the moment,
that Authority B has already decided its toll level τB ∈ XB, and that this is known
to Authority A. Authority A is then supposed to determine its own toll level xA by
solving the MPEC formulated as shown in Eq. 8–4.
Maximise
xA∈XA
φA(x) = φA(xA, τB)
Subject to
(Eq. 8–4a)
c
(
V˜ 1,x
)⊺
·
(
v − V˜ 1
)
− d−1 (q∗)⊺ (q− q∗) > 0, ∀ (v,q) ∈ D (Eq. 8–4b)
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While the optimisation problem in Eq. 8–4 has a similar bilevel structure to the
GRP, the key difference is that Eq. 8–4 is defined in terms of link flows disaggre-
gated by authority. In general networks, for any given toll vector, uniqueness of the
authority link flows cannot be guaranteed, even though the assumptions guarantee
uniqueness of the total link flows. Therefore, if applied in a general network, Eq.
8–4 maximises social welfare in two ways: partly through the toll, but additionally
by assuming that the authority link flows can be controlled over-and-above the toll
effect. In this chapter, attention will be restricted in the numerical tests reported
below to special network structures in which the uniqueness of the total link flows
automatically assures uniqueness of the authority link flows. On this restrictive
assumption, it will be assumed that network structure ensures uniqueness of the au-
thority link flows and that link flows and demands (V˜,d) are uniquely determined
by the VI constraint for a given toll vector x.
In an analogous way to the behaviour of Authority A, Authority B determines its
toll level, xB, conditional on the toll level of Authority A by considering its own
counterpart to objective function Eq. 8–2. This is shown in Eq. 8–5.
φB(x) = φB(xA, xB) =
∑
k∈KB
qk∫
0
d−1k (w)dw −
∑
j∈L
v˜j Btj(v˜j A + v˜j B)
+ δ
∑
j∈JB
xBv˜jA − δ
∑
j∈JA
xAv˜j B
(Eq. 8–5)
This objective function has a similar interpretation to the welfare objective of Au-
thority A (see Eq. 8–2) as discussed previously. The first and second terms measure
the social surplus of trips with origins in B’s subnetwork. The third term measures
the revenue “gained” from Authority A’s users who incur the charge it levies while
the fourth term measures the revenue “lost” to Authority A by its users.
Directly analogous to the competition between highway concessionaires discussed
previously, the inter-play of these two authorities in each aiming to maximise its
jurisdictional welfare measure by setting a toll, conditional on the other authority’s
toll, while anticipating the impact on the travellers, leads to another example of a
NCEPEC. In this game, a vector of tolls, x∗, is an NE when neither authority is
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able to increase its jurisdictional welfare by unilaterally deviating from its chosen
toll level such that the condition in Eq. 8–6 is satisfied.
φi(x
∗) = φi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≥ φi(xi,x
∗
−i) ∀xi ∈ Xi , i ∈ {A,B} (Eq. 8–6)
Note that each authority’s optimisation problem assumes that the authorities can
only determine their own toll, within each authority’s decision space, conditional
on the toll set by its counterpart authority, but places no further restriction on the
admissible tolls. That is to say, the conditions require that, as far as one authority
is concerned, their toll gives a global optimum solution to their individual MPEC,
conditional on the other authority’s toll setting.
However, if rather than each authority determining a global optimum toll conditional
on the other authority’s toll choice, there is the possibility that each authority only
determines a local optimum to their individual MPEC. In this case, the condition in
Eq. 8–6 need only to hold within a local neighbourhood of a given toll vector leading
to the condition in Eq. 8–7. Following Definition 3.4 (see p. 86), points that satisfy
Eq. 8–7 are Local Nash Equilibria (LNE). Thus for an LNE, each authority only
needs to establish optimality within a neighbourhood of the given solution, Bǫi (xˆi).
φi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≥ φi(xi,x
∗
−i) ∀i,∀xi ∈ B
ǫ
i (x
∗
i ) , i ∈ {A,B} (Eq. 8–7)
where Bǫi (xˆi) = {xi ∈ Xi | ‖xi − xˆi‖ < ǫ}.
Since the LNE conditions are weaker, the solution set to the NE problem is con-
tained within the solution set to the LNE. Both kinds of solution are relevant for
investigation, since it is not clear which is a more realistic representation of the
behaviour of authorities in setting their tolls. This is an issue highlighted in the
numerical tests reported in the next section.
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8.3 Numerical Tests
Thus jurisdictions could set tolls non-cooperatively with the goal of individually
maximising an individual jurisdiction welfare measure (Eq. 8–2 and Eq. 8–5). This
section reports the results of tests conducted on a traffic network to determine the
LNE in this game.
8.3.1 Highway Network and Demand Parameters used in Tests
Fig. 8.1 shows the highway network used for the numerical tests. Each link in this
network takes the form tj(vj) = t0(1 + 0.15(vj/κj)
4), j ∈ L where t0j and κj refer to
the free flow travel time and capacity associated with link j. The free flow travel
time t0j is 450 seconds for all links except of links 2,5,8 and 11 which is 1000 secs.
The capacity parameter κj is 1500 pcus/hr for all links except for 2,5,8 and 11 which
is 3000 pcus/hr. Links 2,5,8 and 11 therefore represent a high capacity bypass that
avoids travel through the town centre.
Figure 8.1: Highway Network for Numerical Tests (Link Numbers indicated on arcs)
There are 12 OD pairs and all nodes excluding Node 3 are origin or destination
zones. There are two Central Business Districts (CBD) (zones 2 and 4) located
within each authority respectively. The dotted line through Node 3 in Fig. 8.1
demarcates the boundary of jurisdiction of the two authorities. The base demand
represents a typical morning peak with dominant flows to the CBDs from the suburb
of each local authority (zones 1 and 5). However, demand to and from other zones
is also present to represent the associated problems of through traffic. Travellers
are assumed to respond to generalised prices using a demand function based on the
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power law form (Eq. 8–8), where, as before, q0k and µ
0
k are the base (i.e. untolled
equilibrium) demands and generalised travel times for OD pair k respectively and
ηk, k ∈ K is the elasticity parameter of -0.58, assumed to be equal for all OD pairs.
qk = q
0
k
(
µk/µ
0
k
)ηk , k ∈ K (Eq. 8–8)
Authority A is assumed to set a uniform common toll8.2 on links 1 and 6 to simulate
a cordon into its CBD zone 2 while Authority B sets a separate uniform common
toll on links 7 and 12 to simulate a cordon for travel into its CBD zone 4. In this
way, a situation which may arise in reality is represented, namely that of cities who
both wish to set up a cordon charge around their CBD with the aim of maximizing
the welfare of their residents. The notation {xA, xB} is used to indicate the toll
levied on links 1 and 6 and the other single toll on links 7 and 12 respectively.
As noted in Section 8.2, a key property required of the problem formulation is
uniqueness of link flows disaggregated by authority, at any given toll vector. This is
established for the particular network under consideration in Appendix D, requiring
some mild additional assumptions that are readily verifiable during the numerical
tests, and indeed have been verified to hold. Considering Authority A’s network
(by symmetry, analogous implications can be drawn for Authority B’s network),
uniqueness is established by a combination of a) identifying routes that would never
be efficient under Wardrop’s DUE conditions; b) applying conservation-of-flow at
the authority level and c) noting where authority flows do and do not mix. In the
case of Authority A’s network (analogous properties hold for Authority B’s network,
by symmetry), there is mixing of the flows between authorities on links 1, 3 and 6
only, whereas links 2 and 4 carry flows from origins in Authority A exclusively and
link 5 carries flow from origins in Authority B exclusively.
In the tests, two different cases are considered. While the network as shown in Fig.
8.1 was used in both cases so as to preserve symmetry between the sub-network
within Authority A and Authority B, the difference is the trip matrix used in each
8.2The uniform common toll means that the tolls on either tollable entry (inbound)
link into each CBD are equal.
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case. In Case 1, the base demand is symmetric and so represents the case where
cities are equal in both production and attraction and network supply. In Case 2,
the base demand is adjusted so that the city in Authority A is seen as stronger in
terms of its ability to attract users. Details of the matrix used in each case are given
in the relevant sections.
8.4 Tests with Symmetric Demands: Case 1
This section reports on numerical test carried out on the assumption that the base
demands (and base generalised travel times) are symmetric in both cities. Table
8.1 shows the matrix used. With these demand parameters, the welfare change
with theoretical first best pricing benchmark (i.e. marginal cost pricing on all links)
relative to the untolled base is approximately 21,468 seconds.
Table 8.1: Base Trips and Base Costs used for Case 1
Origin Destination Base Trips Base Generalised
d0k Travel Times µ
0
k
(pcus/hr) (secs)
1 2 1000 488.08
1 4 200 1,389.75
1 5 100 1,839.86
2 1 100 450.11
2 4 100 901.67
2 5 100 1,351.78
4 1 100 1,351.78
4 2 100 901.67
4 5 100 450.11
5 1 100 1,839.86
5 2 200 1,389.75
5 4 1000 488.08
8.4.1 Case 1: Solution to the GRP
As a benchmark against other solutions to be discussed, it is assumed that a single
regulator is in place to determine the uniform toll on both Links 1 and 6 and another
uniform toll on Links 7 and 12 resulting in the GRP defined by Eq. 8–1. The GRP
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Figure 8.2: Case 1: Surface Plot of Total Welfare (secs) (GRP Toll and Total Welfare as
shown in Table 8.2 indicated by ∗).
can be solved with the Cutting Constraint Algorithm (CCA) described in Chapter
6 (see Algorithm 6.1, p. 147).
The welfare surface of the GRP for Case 1 is shown in Fig. 8.2. Notice that
the surface plots points to the existence of a single global optimum around a toll
combination of {79.88,79.88} secs. Beyond toll levels of around 90 seconds from
either authority, there is a reduction in benefits which continues to be the case as
toll levels are increased to 1000 seconds.
Table 8.2 shows the tolls and welfare obtained in the GRP. As expected, due to
symmetry, both authorities’ welfare increases by the same amount vis-a´-vis the base
no toll equilibrium and that tolls are equal on links in both jurisdictions. The last
column of Table 8.2 shows the relative welfare improvement ω, which as noted in
Chapter 6 measures the welfare change attained by the GRP relative to first best
pricing computed according to Eq. 6–15. As the second best GRP tolls are almost
able to fully internalise congestion in this network, the index of relative welfare
improvement is very close to 1.
8.4.2 Case 1: Inter-jurisdictional Toll Revenue Competition
For the NE problem defined by Eq. 8–6 and assuming that δ = 1 (i.e. no revenue
sharing), a grid search method was used to allow for a detailed exploration of the
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Table 8.2: Tolls and Welfare under GRP for Case 1 obtained by CCA
Toll A Toll B Total Welfare Welfare Welfare ω
Change Change A Change B
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
79.88 79.88 20,296 10,148 10,148 0.95
response surfaces. To explore the potential solutions, the welfare for each authority
was evaluated for a given toll pair with tolls ranging between 0-1000 seconds. Sub-
sequently, the best response functions for each authority to the toll set by the other
can be numerically estimated. As noted in Chapter 3, the intersections of these
best response functions are possible LNE. These are shown in Fig. 8.3 where the
continuous lines are the best response functions for Player A for any given toll of
player B i.e. RA(xB) and the broken line are the best response functions for Player
B for any given toll of player A i.e. RB(xA) following Definition 3.2. It can be seen
that the best response functions intersect at 4 distinct points.
Figure 8.3: Case 1: Numerical Estimates of Best Response Functions. The continuous
lines are best response functions for Authority A, (RA(xB) while broken lines are best
response functions for Authority B (RB(xA))
Based on the welfare surfaces provided by the grid search and best response function
plots, Table 8.3 gives the local welfare for each authority associated with each of
these solutions. In this table, the figure in parentheses next to the local welfare
measure gives the preference ranking, from the perspective of the authority, for a
given outcome in the game. The last column of Table 8.3 summarises the relative
welfare index, ω computed according to Eq. 6–15 which measures the network wide
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welfare change relative to first best pricing.
Table 8.3: LNE Tolls, Welfare and Index of Relative Welfare Improvement for LNE Solu-
tions in Case 1, Figures in parenthesis indicate Authority’s preference ranking (δ = 1)
Solution Toll Toll Welfare Welfare Total ω
Number A B Change A Change B Welfare Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
1 85 85 9,096 (2) 9,096 (2) 18,192 0.85
2 505 85 24,076 (1) -101,839 (4) -77,763 -3.67
3 505 505 -86,872 (3) -86,872 (3) -173,744 -8.18
4 85 505 -101,839 (4) 24,076 (1) -77,763 -3.67
It is clear that the tolls obtained in each and every LNE solution in Table 8.3 is
higher than the GRP reported in Table 8.2. This is, as noted in Chapter 2 (see
p. 47), the toll a jurisdiction sets, when attempting to raise revenues from extra
jurisdictional users, as implied by its payoff functions (Eq. 8–4 and Eq. 8–5),
contains a demand related markup (Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008b). It is this markup
that takes the toll above the level required to imperfectly internalise congestion. The
consequence of this higher toll, as a result of the fiscal externality of tax exporting,
is the lower welfare for all LNE solutions vis-a´-vis the GRP outcome, as evidenced
by a reduction in the index of relative welfare improvement ω. Thus in general, the
consequence of both jurisdictions simultaneously attempting to extract revenues
from extra-jurisdictional can have a adverse impact on welfare.
As both players begin to toll then, from Table 8.3, Authority A would clearly prefer
Solution 2 while Authority B would prefer the diametrically opposed, Solution 4. If
it is assumed that the authorities have full information about the change in welfare
over the full range of tolls, then for a given toll of their opponent, they would move
towards a toll of around 505 secs. In response, the second mover would also set a
toll of around 505 secs and the authorities would end up at Solution 3 which results
in a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma (see Example 3.5, p. 82), where both authorities end
up worse off than in the no toll case or if they had cooperated. In other words, the
fiscal externality has such a negative impact that it outweighs the welfare improving
corrective effect of tolls intended to imperfectly internalise congestion. As noted
in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.5.3, p. 48), similar conclusions have been reported by
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others (e.g. Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008b; Zhang et al., 2011; Gu¨hnemann et al., 2011).
As the authorities are entirely symmetric, discussion can be focused entirely on
Authority A. Fig. 8.4 shows how welfare for Authority A varies with its own toll,
for given values of tolls set by Authority B (i.e. 85 secs and 505 secs as identified in
Table 8.3). Notice that there is a local maximum around a toll of 85 secs followed
by a minimum then another maximum around a toll of 505 secs. It is worth noting
here that the best response of player A and B do not appear to be affected by the
toll set by the other authority above a toll of 85 secs. This suggests that there is
little or no interaction between the players in the high toll regime. Section 8.4.3 will
further explore the reasons behind this.
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Figure 8.4: Welfare of Authority A showing 1) Local Optimum at 85 secs 2) Global
Optimum (Larger Asterisk) at 505 secs when Authority B levies a toll of 85 secs. Right:
Welfare of Authority A showing 1) Local Optimum at 85 secs 2) Global Optimum (Larger
Asterisk) at 505 secs when Authority B levies a toll of 505 secs
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Figure 8.5: Left: Vector fields around toll vector of {85,85} secs for Case 1 (δ = 1) where
some arrows point away from this solution when tolls exceed 100 seconds. Right: Vector
fields around toll vector of {505,505} secs for Case 1 (δ = 1) where arrows point towards
this solution.
To examine these solutions, the vector fields around the reaction functions at each
point on the grid are plotted in Fig. 8.5. The arrows in each plot plot show the finite
differenced approximations to the gradients of the welfare surfaces for each player
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with respect to their own toll and point towards the direction each player should
move when selecting their toll levels given the current tolls to maximise its objective
(Eq. 8–2 or Eq. 8–5). The left panel of Fig. 8.5 shows the vector fields centred
on the LNE labelled Solution 1 with the toll tuple of {85, 85} secs, while the right
panel shows the vector fields centred on the LNE labelled Solution 3 {505, 505} secs.
From inspection of these vector fields it can be seen that these are LNE satisfying
Eq. 8–7. Furthermore, it is evident from these figures that the basin of attraction is
smaller around Solution 1 (the left panel of Fig. 8.5) and as a toll set by the other
player moves beyond 100 seconds the players may well be attracted to Solution 3.
Similar plots show that the basin of attraction around Solutions 2 and 4 are also
relatively small and that Solution 3 is the only solution which satisfies Eq. 8–6.
Solutions 1, 2 and 4 are therefore only NE in a local neighbourhood i.e. LNE
satisfying Definition 3.4 and Eq. 8–7.
An alternative way to view the outcome of each authorities’ decision making and
whether or not they act in a local neighbourhood or otherwise when setting tolls
is to use a pay-off matrix approach as introduced in Chapter 3. Game 8.1 shows
the pay-off matrix in terms of welfare changes for Authorities A and B given the
tolls can only be set at values of 0, 85 or 505 (taken from the knowledge of where
the possible LNE occur as identified above). Based on established convention in
game theory literature (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Gibbons, 1992), the first value
in each cell shows the payoff that Authority A (the “row” player) would get if it
uses a strategy in the corresponding row and Authority B uses the strategy in the
corresponding column.
Authority A
Authority B
0 85 505
0 0, 0 −40.4, 50.7 −150, 66.8
85 50.7,−40.4 9.1, 9.1 −101.8, 24.1
505 66.8,−150 24.1,−101.8 −86.8,−86.8
Game 8.1: Case 1: Pay-off matrix (thousand seconds) near each LNE solution (Welfare A,
Welfare B)
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It is noticeable that both players have an incentive to move away from the no toll
situation, assuming that the other player does not charge. That is, both have a
first mover incentive. If player A moves first, then player A has an incentive to
move through to toll of 85 and then to a toll of 505. Player B would then respond
accordingly and with these limited decisions available to the players the outcome is
always the NE solution which satisfies the condition in Eq. 8–6i.e. it supports the
view that solution 3 is the NE rather than just an LNE.
Next, the payoff matrix is widened to include some more local decisions around the
solution at {85,85} secs as shown in Game 8.2. If either authority only considers
local moves around tolls of 85 secs, then it is possible to remain in solutions 1,2 and
4, i.e. the {85,85} secs solution or one of the other {85,505} secs solutions. This can
be seen for example by examining the local decision around the {85,85} secs pay-off
cell. From this cell, there is no benefit for either player to increase or decrease the
toll and so this is an LNE. However, it is noticeable that as soon as one authority
charges above 90 seconds then they are incentivised to move towards solution 3 i.e.
the NE solution.
A
B
0 80 85 90 505
0 0,0 -38.0,49.4 -40.4,50.7 -42.7,49.5 -150,66.8
80 49.4,-38.0 10.1,10.1 7.7, 11.5 5.4,10.2 -104.4,26.5
85 50.7,-40.4 11.5,7.7 9.1, 9.1 6.7, 7.8 -103.0,24.1
90 49.5,-42.7 10.2,5.4 7.8, 6.7 5.4, 5.4 -104.4,21.7
505 66.8,-150 26.5,-104.4 24.1, -103.0 21.7,-104.4 -86.8,-86.8
Game 8.2: Case 1: Pay-off matrix (thousand seconds) with local moves around {85, 85}
secs (Welfare A, Welfare B)
From a policy perspective, it is interesting that Solution 1 with tolls set at {85,85}
secs is in the vicinity of the GRP solution (see Table 8.2, p. 252) such that both
authorities experience an increase in welfare. It could be argued that such a solution
may be found if the upper bounds of the toll sets considered were somehow restricted
to within the range 0-90 seconds. As this is only a theoretical network example, it
is difficult to conclude more generally about the scale issue but it is argued that in
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reality, there is usually an upper bound on the toll determined by, amongst other
factors, public and political acceptability. Otherwise as solutions 1, 2 and 4 are
only NE in a local neighbourhood (i.e. LNE) then these are unlikely to be obtained
in a game with full information. Since acquiring information to support decision
making may be costly, these LNE solutions could also be relevant as others studying
NCEPECs elsewhere have noted that “limits to rationality or knowledge of players
may lead to meaningful local Nash equilibria” (Hu and Ralph, 2007, p. 818).
Application of NDEMO
The section reports the results of obtained by NDEMO when it was applied to
determine the LNE of this inter-jurisdictional game. The control parameters of
NDEMO used for this test were the same as those used in tests in Chapters 6 and
7 (see Table 6.6). As NDEMO is a population based algorithm, the population
mean (i.e. toll levels corresponding to each player) are tracked at each iteration.
These are displayed in the left hand panel of Fig. 8.6. As mentioned in Chapter
5 (Algorithm 5.8 refers), NDEMO terminates when the standard deviation of the
population (encoding the strategic variables of each player in the game) satisfies
the termination tolerance criteria. Thus the right hand panel of Fig. 8.6 shows the
evolution of the standard deviation of the population at each iteration. In this test,
NDEMO required 80 iterations (and 1284 cpu secs) to converge to the pre-specified
tolerance criteria. Note that the results reported in Table 8.4 is the mean of each
population (encoding each player’s strategies) at the final iteration.
Table 8.4: Case 1: Tolls and Welfare obtained by application of NDEMO
Toll A Toll B Welfare Welfare Total Welfare
Change A Change B Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
504.85 504.97 -88,006 -88,005 176,011
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Figure 8.6: Case 1-Population Mean (Left Panel) and Standard Deviation (Right Panel)
at each Iteration of NDEMO
The results in Table 8.4 lend further justification to the view that the tuple of ap-
proximately {505,505} secs as determined by the grid search is the NE satisfying Eq.
8–6 and not just an LNE satisfying Eq. 8–7. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised
that the ability of any algorithm to detect the NE does not necessarily reflect realis-
tic decision making behaviour, for which further research is required. Furthermore,
the development of an algorithm to identify all possible equilibria in a game with
continuous strategy spaces continues to be a subject for further research.
8.4.3 Case 1: Exploring the potential for multiple LNE
As noted earlier the optimal toll for Authority A does not appear to be affected by
the toll set by Authority B in the high toll regime. This section first of all explains
how this comes about by focussing on flow regimes and then explores which other
factors can influence whether or not multiple LNE may exist.
Figure 8.7: Flow regimes with alternative toll tuple {xA, xB} combinations superimposed
on numerical estimates of each player’s best response functions
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Figure 8.7 shows where the flows on the network can be decomposed into 4 “regimes”
depending on the toll tuple {xA, xB} and that these flow regimes correspond to the
contours from Figure 8.3. The following insights can be drawn regarding traffic flows
in these 4 regimes.
• When there are no tolls, the bypass links are not used at all. Hence all traffic
regardless of destination utilise links through the town centre. This is due to
the difference in free-flow travel times for using the bypass compared with the
town centre route. Within regime 1, as the tolls are increased then eventually
some users begin to use the bypass links 2 and 11 and hence obtain a “mixed
traffic regime” i.e. flows on both the town centre route and flows on the bypass.
Regime 1 is characterized by the set of tolls below 100 secs.
• In Regime 2, once the tolls set by Authority B (on links 7 and 12) increase
beyond 100 secs, all through traffic in Authority B’s subnetwork uses the
bypass links. That is, a toll greater than 100 seconds invokes the use of
links 8 and 11 (the links that comprise the bypass in Authority B) but not
links 2 or 5 which is still a function of tolls set by Authority A. The only
traffic using the tolled links 7 and 12 are effectively captive (as in equilibrium
they have no competitive alternative route across the range of feasible toll
levels) to those links and there is a separated regime in B’s subnetwork. This
means that subnetworks such as link 8 versus links 7 and 10 do not have the
same cost at equilibrium and this is obtained by segregation of OD demands.
By symmetry, Regime 3 is similar, mutatis mutandis, to flow regime 2 but
responds to (Authority A’s) tolls exceeding 100 secs on links 1 and 6.
• In Regime 4, all bypass links are used and the traffic using the tolled routes
is only “captive traffic” i.e. traffic that have destinations within the tolled
area i.e. zone 2 or zone 4 which do not have any competitive alternative route
across the range of feasible toll levels. All other traffic uses the bypass links.
Each sub-network is in equilibrium but with higher costs for through traffic.
These regimes all come about because of the extremely low delays experienced on
the bypass links relative to those on the through links. With the base demands
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it seems that the delays which result on the bypass links are negligible compared
to the free flow travel times of 1000 seconds and that the assignment becomes an
all-or-nothing assignment in regimes 2 to 4.
Understanding these regimes helps explain why the optimal toll set by A does not
appear to be affected by the toll set by B in the high toll regime. Solution 3 lies
in the separated flow regime so that the toll is in effect only affecting captive users
and no more re-routing in response to a toll is possible. This separated regime
implies that the optimal toll for player A is dependent only on the demand towards
the central zone (node 2) and that the welfare function can only be increased by
affecting the consumer surplus of own residents heading towards node 2 and the
congestion experienced on link 1 plus the amount of revenue collected on link 6
from those non-residents travelling to node 2. All other flows and link costs are
fixed once the tolls exceed 100 seconds. This sub-problem faced by player A is
not influenced by the toll set by player B as all those who enter A’s network from
authority B have not been charged a toll in B’s network by definition. They have
either come from zone 4 via link 9 without charge or have come from zone 5 via the
bypass link 11 again with no charge. This explains why there is no interaction effect
between players once we are in this separated regime. The next section investigates
how the number of LNE solutions varies as the elasticity of travel demand varies.
8.4.4 Case 1: Number of Potential LNE with changes in Elasticity
of Demand
As mentioned in Chapter 6 (see p. 150), the power law demand function (Eq. 8–
8) used for this network implies a constant elasticity of demand specified by the
parameter ηk, k ∈ K. This parameter represents the percentage change in demand
as a result of a percentage increase in generalised travel times (inclusive of tolls)
for each OD pair k. Thus ηk can be varied to assess the impact of an (absolute)
increase in elasticity on the number of potential LNE in the network.
In this test, from the base elasticity of demand of -0.58, this was varied in steps of
0.25 between -0.75 to -1.75 (applied to all OD pairs equally). Figures 8.8 to 8.10
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show the resulting numerically estimated best response functions. In these figures,
the continuous lines show best response functions for Authority A, RA(xB) and
broken lines show the best response functions for Authority B, RB(xA).
It is evident from Figures 8.8 to 8.10 that for elasticities up to -1.5, there are four
LNE solutions, and with elasticity of -2, there is a single LNE solution (in the mixed
flow regime). This demonstrates that there can exist combinations of network and
elasticity values which exhibit only one LNE (and hence one NE) solution and that
in this case, there would not be a “Prisoner’s Dilemma”.
Figure 8.8: Left Panel: Best Response Functions for Case 1 with ηk = −0.75,∀k ∈ K
Right Panel: Best Response Functions for Case 1 with ηk = −1,∀k ∈ K
Figure 8.9: Left Panel: Best Response Functions for Case 1 with ηk = −1.25,∀k ∈ K
Right Panel: Best Response Functions for Case 1 with ηk = −1.5,∀k ∈ K
Figure 8.10: Left Panel: Best Response Functions for Case 1 with ηk = −1.75,∀k ∈ K
Right Panel: Best Response Functions for Case 1 with ηk = −2,∀k ∈ K
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The figures also show that as demand becomes more elastic, the NE solution tends
towards the low toll regime rather than the high toll regime. The left panel of
Fig. 8.11 shows the graph of welfare for Authority A as the toll it sets varies (with
Authority B’s toll held fixed) in the case when the elasticity is kept at the base
value of -0.58. It is noted that that the global optimum of welfare (as its own toll
varies) in this case occurs to the right of the local optimum and is in the high
toll regime. In contrast, the right panel of Fig. 8.11 shows the same graph with
elasticity of -1.25. In this case, it is observed that the global optimum occurs to the
left of the local optimum in the low toll regime. This demonstrates that as demand
becomes more elastic, the NE solution moves from a high toll regime to a low toll
one. This has the policy implication in that if (absolute) elasticity is higher then the
authorities are less likely to end up in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, the users will face lower
tolls and residents could see an increase in total welfare. A similar conclusion was
also obtained by Ubbels and Verhoef (2008b) who also concluded that the negative
welfare impacts of inter-jurisdictional competition would be reduced with a higher
(absolute) elasticity of travel demand.
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Figure 8.11: (Left) Global optimum of own authority welfare is in the high toll regime
and to the right of the local optimum at elasticity of -0.58 (base case) as own authority toll
varies. (Right) Global optimum of own authority welfare is in the low toll regime and to
the left of the local optimum at elasticity of -1.25 as own authority toll varies.
It is also noticeable that the low toll LNE does not change as elasticity increases.
This is again down to the specific parameters in the network and in particular it is
related to the very small impact on delay on the bypass links as a small proportion
of the flow is diverted from link 1 to link 2 for example. With low levels of through
traffic, the congestion impact on the bypass links is only a fraction of a second so
that the optimal toll is always in the same integer range. This is network specific
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and is not expected to be generalised.
8.5 Tests with Asymmetric Demands: Case 2
In constructing the asymmetric case, the number of trips originating from each zone
is held constant as in Case 1, but these are re-distributed these so that the CBD
in Authority A is now seen as more attractive relative to the CBD in Authority B.
Specifically, as shown in Table 8.5, the total number of trips from A to B is reduced
from 500 to 200 while the number from B to A increases from 500 to 800. The
results reported in this section thus utilise this matrix with the network parameters
(and topology) as in Case 1. Given these demand parameters, the first best welfare
change relative to the untolled base is approximately 22,571 seconds.
Table 8.5: Base Trips and Base Costs used for Case 2
Origin Destination Base Trips Base Generalised
d0k Travel Times µ
0
k
(pcus/hr) (secs)
1 2 1300 488.08
2 1 100 450.34
2 4 100 900.04
2 5 100 1,350.06
4 1 100 1,361.26
4 2 100 910.92
4 5 100 450.02
5 1 200 1,849.35
5 2 400 1,399.00
5 4 700 488.08
8.5.1 Case 2: Solution to the GRP
The welfare surface of the GRP for Case 2 is shown in Fig. 8.12. In addition,
searching over the entire surface confirms that similar to Case 1, there exists only
a single maximum at a toll of {90,80} secs. The results are summarised in Table
8.6. It is interesting that Authority B suffers from a welfare reduction (vis-a´-vis the
untolled base equilibrium) even in the GRP. The last column of Table 8.6 shows
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Figure 8.12: Case 2: Surface Plot of Total Welfare (secs) (optimum toll and welfare as
shown in Table 8.6 indicated by ∗).
Table 8.6: Tolls and Welfare under the GRP for Case 2 found by CCA
Toll A Toll B Total Welfare Welfare Welfare ω
Change Change A Change B
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
90.36 79.99 21,418 62,012 -40,593 0.95
the relative welfare improvement index ω which as noted in Chapter 6 measures the
welfare change attained by the GRP relative to first best pricing computed according
to Eq. 6–15. As with Case 1, the high ω, close to 1, is due to tolls being charged
on the most congested links in the network.
8.5.2 Case 2: Inter-jurisdictional Toll Revenue Competition
Following the same procedure described in Section 8.4.2, numerically estimate best
response functions were obtained in order to identify the LNE solutions. These
numerically estimated best response functions are shown in Fig. 8.13 where the
continuous lines are the best response function for Player A for any given toll of
player B i.e. RA(xB) and the broken lines are the best response function for Player
B for any given toll of player A i.e. RB(xA) following Definition 3.2. It is clear that
once again there are 4 LNE solutions that satisfy the condition in Eq. 8–7.
It is the case that in all 4 LNE, the impact on B’s welfare is adverse, recall that
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Figure 8.13: Case 2: Numerical Estimates of Best Response Functions. Continuous lines
show best response functions for player A. RA(xB) while Broken lines show best response
functions for player B RB(xA)
Table 8.7: LNE Tolls, Welfare and Index of Relative Welfare Improvement for LNE Solu-
tions in Case 2, Figures in parenthesis indicate Authority’s preference ranking (δ = 1)
Solution Toll Toll Welfare Welfare Total Welfare ω
Number A B Change A Change B Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
1 85 81 58,025 (3) -36,666 (1) 21,359 0.95
2 955 81 150,671 (1) -392,798 (3) -242,127 -10.73
3 955 150 142,737 (2) -422,454 (4) -279,717 -12.39
4 85 150 49,777 (4) -65,860 (2) -16,083 -0.71
B suffers from negative welfare even under the GRP benchmark (cf. Table 8.6).
Compared to Case 1, it seems that the outcome will favour the stronger player.
Solution 2 and Solution 3 are both highly favoured outcomes for Player A with
the same toll level of 955 set by Authority A which demonstrates the strength of
Authority A. Comparing the preference ranking in Case 2 with that from Case 1 and
with reference to Table 8.7, now Authority A gives Solution 1 {85,81} secs nearer
to the global regulator outcome {90,80} secs (cf. Table 8.6) a lower ranking while
Authority B actually prefers this.
Whilst Authority B appears to be worse off in all cases, the response surface around
the no-toll situation shows that both players have an incentive to move from the no-
toll case so long as the other city is assumed not to toll. As expected, this incentive
is stronger for Authority A. However, once the game begins, Authority B always
ends up in a Prisoner’s Dilemma and is worse off as a result in all 4 LNE solutions.
Similarly, Authority A is always better off. This is in stark contrast to Case 1 where
both authorities ended up worse off. It is, however, possible to show that solution
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Figure 8.14: (Left) Case 2: Authority A’s objective as its toll varies when B tolls at 81
secs (Right) Case 2: Authority B’s objective as its toll varies when A tolls at 955 secs
2 is the NE which favours the stronger player, A, and is its preferred outcome.
This can be inferred from Table 8.7 since if A moves first, it sets a toll of 955 secs
and B responds (assuming full information) with a toll of 81 secs, conversely if B
moves first, it sets a toll of 81 secs and A would respond with a toll of 955 secs. In
other words, assuming perfect information, regardless of who moves first, the same
solution results. This suggests that Solution 2 is not only an LNE but also the NE.
To ascertain this observation, the left panel of Fig. 8.14 plots the welfare of Author-
ity A as its own toll xA varies assuming Authority B sets a toll of 81 secs. It can be
seen that A’s toll of 955 secs in response of B’s toll of 81 secs is the global optimum
of its welfare function. Similarly, the right panel shows the welfare of Authority B as
its own toll xB varies assuming Authority A sets a toll of 955 secs and thus confirms
that the toll of 81 secs is a global optimum of its welfare function, in response to
A’s toll of 955 secs. As both are simultaneously best responses within the entire
strategy space and in line with Definition 3.1, the tuple {955,81} secs is the NE.
The findings support the findings of an econometric study by Levinson (2001) men-
tioned in Chapter 2 who found that that the more non-resident workers a state (in
the US context in which the research was done) has, the greater the likelihood of
toll pricing. Since Authority A has a larger number of non-resident workers (com-
pared to Authority B as more commute to work in its jurisdiction) and so A has
a stronger incentive to apply tolls to raise revenue from these extra-jurisdictional
users and this is evident from the results shown in Table 8.7. The negative welfare
experienced by Authority B offer a reason why strong objections were raised by
neighbouring jurisdictions surrounding both Edinburgh and Stockholm when these
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authorities proposed to implement pricing schemes. In addition, a policy implica-
tion is that if there is extensive commuting by non-urban residents towards a city
for employment as in many cities in Europe (De Borger and Pauwels, 2010), the city
importing a large number of extra-jurisdictional users could be incentivised to tax
export by setting tolls to extract revenues from extra-jurisdictional users.
The analysis also sheds some light on why large cities such as London or Stockholm
can start the game and gain an advantage while smaller authorities (when including
set up and operating costs that are ignored here) decide that in fact the benefits of
going alone are not even there so this explains why there is a no-move case for the
smaller regions especially if they think that the other larger town will retaliate and
they may end up being even worse off.
Application of NDEMO
The NDEMO algorithm was also applied to determine the NE tolls and exactly the
same control parameters used in Case 1 are used here. The population mean and
standard deviations are plotted in the left and right hand panes of Fig. 8.15.
In this test, NDEMO required 120 iterations (and 2115 cpu secs) to converge to
the pre-specified tolerance criteria. The results, reported in Table 8.8, is the mean
of each population (encoding each authority’s tolls) at the final iteration. These
results augment the view that Solution 2 in Table 8.7 is the NE.
Table 8.8: Case 2: Tolls and Welfare obtained by application of NDEMO
Toll A Toll B Welfare Welfare Total Welfare
Change A Change B Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
954.51 80.59 150,672 -392,798 -242,126
267
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Iteration
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
M
ea
n 
(se
cs
)
 
 
Population Mean: Toll Authority A
Population Mean: Toll Authority B
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Iteration
St
an
da
rd
 D
ev
ia
tio
n 
 σ
 
 
Standard Deviation σ : Toll Authority A
Standard Deviation σ : Toll Authority B
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at each Iteration of NDEMO
8.6 Revenue Sharing
Thus far, the analysis has assumed that δ = 1 in each jurisdiction’s objective func-
tion (Eq. 8–2 and Eq. 8–5). This means that beyond improving transport condi-
tions as far as their residents are concerned, each jurisdiction is also interested in
maximising the net revenues raised from extra-jurisdictional users.
As highlighted in Chapter 2 (see p. 60), the public economics literature (e.g. Ladd,
2005; Ulbrich, 2011) views revenue sharing as a tool that central governments can use
to correct inter-jurisdictional spillovers and to influence the activities of lower level
governments. In the toll pricing context, revenue sharing has practical relevance as
the City of Edinburgh Council (CEC), the proponents of the Edinburgh scheme,
had suggested a revenue sharing arrangement with local authorities surrounding it
so that revenues paid by users would be returned to these authorities in proportion
to the trip origins (Gaunt et al., 2006; Laird et al., 2007). Furthermore, while Proost
and Sen (2006) studied revenue sharing in the case of vertical competition, there
is no literature on the effects of revenue sharing when jurisdictions are engaged in
horizontal toll revenue competition. A revenue sharing agreement can be modelled
using the parameter δ taking values between 0 and 1 (inclusive).
When δ = 1, there is no revenue sharing and so the toll revenues are retained by the
authority levying the toll and redistributed only within that authority. The case
with δ = 1 is also known as full tax-exporting since the authority levying the tolls
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retain the revenues and it contributes to its welfare measure.
When δ = 0, there is full revenue sharing which means that there is full recycling
of revenues back to those, regardless of origin, who paid the toll. Crucially δ = 0
implies that the authority is no longer interested in the net revenues from extra-
jurisdictional users but will only be concerned with the welfare of its residents.
Likewise, this is the case with no tax exporting since the toll revenues from extra-
jurisdictional users do not add to local welfare. For intermediate values of δ, there is
degree of sharing of revenues collected i.e. some proportion of revenues are returned
to the relevant authority.
For the case of δ = 1 used so far, the numerical results above confirm the existence of
multiple LNE. Therefore, in order to identify LNE for the range of δ values tested, a
grid search of each authority’s welfare as each toll varies between 0 and 1000 second
was conducted before contour plots obtained by finite differenced approximation
of the gradients were produced. These contour plots are best response functions.
As noted in Chapter 3, the intersection points of best response functions are LNE.
To further reduce the set of LNE to focus on the NE, the FPI algorithm was then
applied to locate the NE based on the intersections.
However, attempts to apply the SLCP Algorithm (Algorithm 4.2) to this problem
failed due to changes in the used paths. Since SLCP relies on the derivatives, it en-
countered numerical difficulties due to discontinuities in each jurisdiction’s objective
function. The failure is not entirely surprising given that it has been documented,
as previously noted, that the equilibrium link flows (and demands) satisfying the
Wardropian DUE route choice principle are not necessarily differentiable everywhere
(Patriksson, 2004). Attempting to change the starting point in the SLCP algorithm
did not circumvent this issue. As the SI algorithm (Algorithm 6.2, p. 148) is only
designed for identifying LNE when players optimise revenue/profit, it cannot be
tailored to the problem of players maximising welfare as considered in this chapter.
In order to benchmark the tradeoffs when jurisdictions are assumed to cooperate,
the MOPEC in Eq. 8–9 is formulated. In this case, the Pareto Front will show
points which maximise both jurisdictions’ objectives simultaneously such that no
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one jurisdiction can be made better off without making another worse off. It is
hypothesised that the GRP solution lies on this Pareto Front.
Maximise
x∈X
Φ(x) = (φA(x), φB(x))
⊺
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{V(x)}.
(Eq. 8–9)
8.6.1 Revenue Sharing in Case 1: Symmetric Demands
Table 8.9: Case 1:Tolls and Welfare Change as Revenue Sharing Parameter δ varies
δ Toll A Toll B Welfare Welfare Total Welfare
Change A Change B Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
0 80.00 80.00 10,146 10,146 20,292
0.2 81.30 81.39 10,020 10,104 20,125
0.4 159.27 159.32 -19,798 -19,777 -39,575
0.6 240.24 242.72 -32,337 -31,442 -63,779
0.8 356.08 356.08 -54,030 -54,030 -108,059
1 504.67 504.67 -88,006 -88,005 -176,011
Table 8.9 shows the tolls and welfare obtained by applying the FPI algorithm for
values of δ between 0 and 1 inclusive in steps of 0.2. This table shows that as δ
is reduced i.e. when there is more revenue sharing, then there is a tendency for
the solution to move towards the lower toll regime. In fact, in the extreme case
when δ = 0, the welfare obtained with revenue sharing is very close to that obtained
in the solution of Problem GRP (see Table 8.2). Any remaining difference is a
result of numerical imprecision. In this case, the tolls with full revenue sharing are
equal to the GRP solution. However, this is not generally true when the demand
is asymmetric as will be shown later or when there is more extensive mixing of link
flows in an example discussed in Chapter 9.
The Pareto Front, obtained as the solution of Eq. 8–9, by the use of MOSADE
(cf. Algorithm 5.5) is shown in Fig. 8.16. In addition, the jurisdictional welfare of
Authority A and B (last two columns of Table 8.9 for the range of δ) are also plotted
on this figure. Given the scale of the diagram, the solutions with δ = 0 and δ = 0.2
are very close. Thus for clarity, they are separately plotted on the right panel.
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Figure 8.16: Left: Case 1- Cooperation and Revenue Sharing between Authorities: Pareto
Front and jurisdiction welfare as revenue sharing parameter δ varies. Right: Zoom in of
plot in left panel showing welfare for GRP (indicated by ∗) and for δ = 0 and δ = 0.2
It is observed that the NE outcome without revenue sharing (i.e. δ = 1) on the left
panel of Fig. 8.16 is not Pareto Optimal since the welfare of both players lie in the
interior of the Pareto Front. However, as hypothesised, the solution of the GRP
(see Table 8.2, p. 252), which aims to maximise the social welfare of all users lies
on this front as indicated on both panels of Fig. 8.16 by a ∗.
As δ decreases from 1 to 0, an increasing proportion of the revenue is returned to
the counterpart authority. Conversely, this means that the emphasis given to the
revenue term in each authority’s objective function (net effect of the third and fourth
terms in (Eq. 8–2) and (Eq. 8–5)) is reduced. This implies that the impact of the
demand related markup component in each authority’s toll (see discussion on p. 47)
also diminishes and this reduces the equilibrium toll level. For this reason, each
authority’s welfare tends toward to the Pareto Front as δ decreases. When δ = 0,
the welfare outcome lies on the Pareto Front. Furthermore, with fully symmetric
demands, the path joining the welfare outcome with δ = 1 to the welfare outcome
obtained as the solution to the GRP lies on the 45◦ line.
Recall that in the absence of revenue sharing, in the low toll LNE, the index of
relative welfare improvement ω is 0.85 (see line 1 in Table 8.3, p. 253). This
means that even without revenue sharing, the congestion externality is adequately
internalised. Thus it is the fiscal externality, arising from the desire to raise revenues
that explains why tolls are above the GRP solution. Full revenue sharing then
eradicates this fiscal externality and this is sufficient to restore welfare levels to that
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attainable by the GRP. However, this is only because of the limited interactions
in this network, as highlighted above. The ability of revenue sharing to do this
should be contrasted with the situation where there are extensive interactions over
the network as will be discussed in Chapter 9 (see Section 9.5, p. 304) as well when
demands are asymmetric as in Case 2 discussed next.
8.6.2 Revenue Sharing in Case 2: Asymmetric Demands
For Case 2, Table 8.10 shows the results obtained by the FPI algorithm for selected
values of δ between 0 and 1. As reported in Table 8.6 (see p. 264), the solution
of the GRP, modelling the situation where a single regulator sets tolls to maximise
welfare for the entire network would set a toll of approximately {90, 80} secs. On
the other hand, it can be seen that the NE tolls with full revenue sharing (δ = 0)
(first line of Table 8.10) is not the same as that obtained by solving the GRP.
Table 8.10: Case 1:Tolls and Welfare Change as Revenue Sharing Parameter δ varies
δ Toll A Toll B Welfare A Welfare B Total Welfare
Change A Change B Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
0 102.73 79.99 9,064 -13,286 -4,222
0.2 171.61 80.60 18,584 -27,629 -9,045
0.4 263.59 81.20 34,843 -58,788 -23,945
0.6 395.04 81.78 59,781 -115,609 -55,828
0.8 609.77 82.03 96,634 -218,552 -121,918
1 953.17 83.05 150,585 -392,325 -241,740
In Case 2, the stronger authority is still able to charge more than in the GRP (102
secs compared to 90 in the latter). The question then becomes why Authority A
would do this even though net revenue collected from extra-jurisdictional users do
not add to welfare since δ = 0. The answer is that Authority A does not include in its
objective/welfare function the social surplus experienced by the extra-jurisdictional
users8.3. In this way, Authority A merely regard extra-jurisdictional users as adding
to congestion in its network and hindering its users when in fact, all users contribute
8.3The first two terms of its objective function Eq. 8–2 only relate to benefits
experienced by Authority A’s residents i.e. trips originating within zones in A.
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to and suffer from congestion by hindering each other. This explains why, despite
the absence of any revenue incentive, Authority A still charges a toll higher than
the GRP. This serves to stress that the elimination of the fiscal externality does
not result in the welfare level achievable by a single regulator concerned with the
welfare of all users equally in attempting to imperfectly internalise the congestion
externality.
The results presented in Table 8.10 show that while Authority B would prefer rev-
enue sharing, Authority A would prefer not to do this. The implication, when
comparing the asymmetric case with the symmetric case, is that there may be a
greater need for regulation when there exists a stronger player (as is the case with
in other sectors of the economy). For society to be better off as a whole in Case
2, there needs to be a regulator in place which could also offset any disbenefits to
those residents from Authority B by re-distribution of the revenues collected.
As in Case 1, MOSADE was applied to generate the Pareto Front showing the
(Pareto Optimal) welfare tradeoff possibilities between the two authorities i.e. solu-
tion to Eq. 8–9. The jurisdictional welfare to Authority A and B (last two columns
of Table 8.10 for different δ) are also indicated on this diagram. It is evident that
the NE solution without revenue sharing (i.e. at δ = 1) on Fig. 8.17 is not Pareto
Optimal as both players are inside the Pareto Front. The solution of GRP, which
maximises the social welfare of all users, lies on this Pareto Front.
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Figure 8.17: Left: Case 2- Cooperation and Revenue Sharing between Authorities: Pareto
Front and jurisdiction welfare as revenue sharing parameter δ varies. Right: Zoom in of
plot in left panel showing welfare for GRP (indicated by ∗) and for δ = 0 and δ = 0.2
It can be seen from Fig. 8.17 that Authority A is the stronger player. Through the
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range of revenue sharing parameters tested, Authority A consistently obtains higher
welfare. The welfare of Authority B, given the parameters used, is consistently
negative and worse than doing nothing (i.e. not imposing a toll).
Most crucially, even though full revenue sharing results in lower welfare losses for
Authority B compared to no revenue sharing, it can be seen that in contrast to
Case 1 with symmetric demands, full revenue sharing, does not result in a Pareto
Optimal outcome. Thus while revenue sharing may address the welfare loss resulting
from the fiscal externality, it is unable to correct the welfare loss stemming from
the fact that in setting its toll, Authority A does not account for the full congestion
externality caused by the interactions of both local and extra-jurisdictional users.
8.6.3 Nash Bargaining in Case 2: Asymmetric Demands
Up to this juncture, the research has assumed, following large portions of the lit-
erature, that jurisdictions act non-cooperatively in setting tolls. However, as noted
in Chapter 2 (see p. 60), unlike toll road concessionaires, jurisdictions do not face
legal restrictions preventing them from making binding agreements or collaborating
with each other. Thus, following De Borger and Pauwels (2010), the assumption
of non-cooperative behaviour is relaxed. Specifically, Authority A and B can co-
operate when setting tolls through bilateral bargaining (Nash, 1950b). In this way,
the tolls will be obtained by solving the Nash Bargaining Problem with Equilibrium
Constraints (NBPEC) in Eq. 5–9 (see p. 135). In the numerical example to follow,
the CCA (see p. 147 in Chapter 6) was applied to solve the NBPEC.
The Best Alternative to A Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) (Fisher et al., 1991) is
the backstop payoffs each player obtains should no bargaining agreement be reached.
In bilateral bargaining between toll road concessionaires discussed in Chapters 6
and 7, it is assumed, following Schmalensee (1987) that should negotiations fail, toll
road concessionaires would act non-cooperatively and obtain the payoffs at the NE
outcome. A complication with bilateral bargaining between jurisdictions is that the
BATNA is not necessarily unique as jurisdictions could continue to share toll pricing
even if there is no bargaining agreement. In this way, the NBS is not unique but
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dependent on the BATNA assumed.
As the test only considers Case 2, the BATNA used in the first variant (labelled
NBS (I)) is the outcome shown in the ultimate line of Table 8.10 i.e. welfares
without revenue sharing (δ = 1) with tolls of {953.17, 83.05} secs. This means that
if negotiations fail, both jurisdictions fall back to acting non-cooperatively without
revenue sharing. The BATNA used in the second variant (NBS (II)) is the outcome
shown in the first line of this table i.e. welfares with tolls of {102.73, 79.99} secs when
δ = 0. This means that if negotiations fail, both jurisdictions act non-cooperatively
but share toll revenues when doing so.
While only two variants are considered here, it is obvious that a number of BATNAs
are possible depending on the extent of revenue sharing δ possible should negotia-
tions collapse.
From Authority A’s perspective, full revenue sharing means that it returns to Au-
thority B the toll revenues it collects from users originating from zones within Au-
thority B’s subnetwork. As previously discussed, Table 8.10 had shown that there
is a welfare loss if these jurisdictions act non-cooperatively regardless of whether
they share revenues or not. Even with full revenue sharing, the index of relative
welfare improvement, ω (Verhoef et al., 1996) is -0.19 (see Table 8.11). Furthermore,
as shown previously in Fig. 8.17, full revenue sharing does not result in a Pareto
Optimal outcome.
Table 8.11: Jurisdiction Toll and Welfare with Revenue Sharing, GRP, NBS(I) and
NBS(II)
Full Revenue
Sharing GRP NBS (I) NBS (II)
Authority Toll Welfare Toll Welfare Toll Welfare Toll Welfare
Change Change Change Change
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
A 102.73 9064 90.36 62,012 84.76 54,532 42.09 19,626
B 79.99 -13,286 79.99 -40,593 79.93 -36,485 80.21 -3,923
Total -4222 21,419 18,047 15,703
ω -0.19 0.95 0.80 0.70
Next, consider the GRP. The values in these columns in Table 8.11 are taken directly
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Figure 8.18: Left: Pareto Front, GRP, NBS(I), NBS(II)and BATNA with and without
revenue sharing. Right: Zoom in confirming Pareto Optimality of NBS(I) and (II).
from Table 8.2. The GRP is the analogue of the Utilitarian Solution8.4 as discussed
in Chapter 5 (see p. 133) since it aims to maximise the welfare of the entire network.
Though the Authority B is worse off compared to doing nothing, the GRP yields
positive welfare gain to society.
Finally, the two NBS variants are reported. As noted, for NBS(I), the BATNA,
acting as a constraint to the NBPEC, is the individual welfare without revenue
sharing and in NBS(II), the BATNA is the individual welfare with full revenue
sharing. While the NBS does not result in maximum network wide social welfare
gain, the constraints to the NBPEC ensure that the welfare of each authority will be
greater than the relevant BATNA. This is verified by comparing each jurisdiction’s
welfare under NBS(I) in Table 8.11 against the same for δ = 1 in Table 8.10.
Similarly, each jurisdiction’s welfare under NBS(II) is also greater than (or less
negative than) that attainable with δ = 0 in Table 8.10. Therefore, this verifies that
the NBS satisfies Nash Axiom 1 (p. 134) of Individual Rationality.
Table 8.11 shows that Authority B suffers a welfare loss under both NBS variants,
although a lower one with NBS(II). Nevertheless, unlike full revenue sharing, both
NBS variants are Pareto Optimal since they lie on the Pareto Front. This is indicated
on Fig. 8.18 by the9 and ⋄ markers for NBS(I) and NBS(II) respectively. However,
for either NBS outcome to be realised, it also requires Authority A to agree to one
of these solutions. This seems unlikely as A has more to gain by not cooperating. A
discussion of this issue would require a strategic approach to bargaining problems
(Nash, 1953) beyond the Axiomatic approach that this thesis focuses on.
8.4In contrast to bargaining between toll road concessionaires (see footnote 6.4),
the term “utilitarian” here does indeed have a utility or welfare interpretation.
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The more interesting result is NBS (II). In contrast to all other solutions in Table
8.11, NBS (II) requires a lower toll for Authority A but a higher toll for Authority
B. While Authority B suffers the lowest welfare loss in NBS (II), the network wide
index of relative welfare improvement also falls (ω = 0.70 compared to ω = 0.80
in NBS (I)). Authority B would prefer NBS (II) but as noted, Authority A might
object to this as it could obtain higher jurisdictional welfare with either GRP or NBS
(I). The results show that the NBS is non unique and dependent on the BATNA
assumed. However in both cases tested, the NBS satisfies Axiom 1 of Individual
Rationality so that both parties would obtain at least their BATNA.
While revenue sharing does not necessarily result in a Pareto Optimal outcome, the
NBS does. This verifies that Axiom 2 of Pareto Optimality is satisfied. This has
a policy implication for the governance of toll pricing. One way to achieve Pareto
Optimality with toll pricing policies in a multi-level governance setting is to assign
the task to a higher level national regulator or arbitrator. This is precisely the
GRP, which as shown, results in a Pareto Optimal outcome. However, because of
ideological reasons or concerns that federal officials may not take into account unique
local conditions (Banzhaf and Chupp, 2012), this might not be the desired approach
to the governance of toll pricing schemes. In that case, an alternative possibility
would be to allow jurisdictions to bargain bilaterally to attain Pareto Optimality.
8.7 Summary and Policy Implications
This chapter has focused on competition for toll revenues between jurisdictions. The
simplest possible setting of two jurisdictions competing for toll revenues through
their choice of toll levels on a cordon surrounding their CBDs with the aim of
maximising a jurisdictional measure of social welfare was constructed. Travellers
were assumed to route in the network obeying Wardrop’s DUE principle.
To benchmark the welfare impacts of such horizontal competition for toll revenues,
a Global Regulator Problem (GRP) was introduced. The inter-jurisdictional toll
revenue competition problem was subsequently formulated and shown to be an in-
stance of a NCEPEC. Employing grid search techniques (by evaluating welfare to
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each jurisdiction in the range of tolls tested in combination with the application of
finite difference numerical approximations to obtain the best response functions),
basic tools of game theory were subsequently applied to enumerate the LNE. It was
shown that multiple LNE could exist in the toll revenue competition game and this
was due to multiple maxima in the welfare/payoff function for each jurisdiction.
The sensitivity of the number of LNE to the travel demand elasticity was investi-
gated. It was shown that multiple NE existed over a large range of elasticity values
tested. For the network examined, it was only if travel demand was highly elastic
would there be a single NE solution.
Focusing only on maximising jurisdictional welfare which incorporates the twin ob-
jectives of improving transport conditions for their residents and maximising rev-
enues from extra-jurisdictional users, it was shown that there is an incentive for each
jurisdiction to introduce tolls. Regardless of the trip matrix assumed, it was shown
numerically that in all LNE, the tolls were always higher (and network wide social
welfare always lower) than the GRP benchmark. This is because of the demand
related markup component in each jurisdiction’s toll associated with their desire to
maximise toll revenues from extra-jurisdictional users. Thus the higher toll (vis-a´-
vis the GRP) is because of the fiscal externality of tax exporting. This finding is
entirely consistent with the literature (e.g. De Borger et al., 2007, 2008; Ubbels and
Verhoef, 2008b) reviewed in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.5.3, p. 48).
Furthermore, depending on the tolls authorities levy, it was possible that the NE
outcome could result in Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome. This is because of the re-
taliatory response from an authority adversely impacted by the policies of another
jurisdiction. In this case, competition for toll revenues not only reduced welfare
below the GRP but also made each city worse off than if they had not been in-
centivised to toll in the first instance. In this extreme case, the fiscal externality
has such an adverse impact on social welfare that it, in fact, outweighs any welfare
gains from imperfectly internalising the congestion externality. Again, this finding
resonates with previous findings in the literature (Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008b; Zhang
et al., 2010).
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By allowing for asymmetries in demand, the analysis showed that stronger cities
could be incentivised to introduce toll pricing with the aim of increasing jurisdic-
tional welfare. However, a weaker region could suffer disbenefits as a result. This is
likely to occur, for example, if there were a lot of residents commuting out of juris-
diction which is the usual case in many regions in Europe (De Borger and Pauwels,
2010). This concurs with findings reported elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Levin-
son, 2001). The result contributes to explaining the reason behind objections raised
by jurisdictions when their neighbours propose introducing tolls as was the case
observed in both Edinburgh and Stockholm (Gaunt et al., 2006; Laird et al., 2007;
Eliasson et al., 2008; Bo¨rjesson et al., 2012)
The objective function for jurisdictional welfare used allowed for the study of revenue
sharing/tax exporting which can be modelled by introducing the unitless parameter
δ that can take a value between 0 and 1 inclusive. Revenue sharing could take the
form of δ proportion of toll revenues returned to the jurisdiction from where the tolls
were collected. When δ = 0, all toll revenues are returned to the authority from
which charge payers originate. When δ = 1, the revenue is retained by the collecting
authority for that authority’s own disposal. In this sense, as toll revenues collected
from extra-jurisdictional users was counted as a jurisdiction’s social welfare and so
this allows for the modelling of tax exporting.
In the case when cities were symmetric and if the interactions were weak, it was
possible for revenue sharing to attain Pareto Optimal outcomes. This is because with
limited interactions, the GRP was sufficiently effective in correcting the congestion
externality. Therefore, with symmetric demand, revenue sharing was able to correct
the remaining fiscal externality.
However, when asymmetries in demand were allowed for, with the network topology
held fixed, revenue sharing did not reduce toll levels to the level of the GRP and
the stronger authority was able to charge a higher toll. The end result is that the
outcome with revenue sharing was not Pareto Optimal. The reason for this is that
even though full revenue sharing eliminates the tax exporting incentive from each
jurisdiction’s objective function, each jurisdiction is only concerned with maximising
the welfare of its own users (residents) and view extra-jurisdictional users as a source
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of congestion impeding their users. Further asymmetries, involving extensive inter-
actions between users from both jurisdictions, will be discussed in the subsequent
chapter.
Furthermore, relaxing the assumption of non-cooperative behaviour, a sensitivity
test considered the NBPEC which models the situation of the jurisdictions engaged
in bilateral bargaining when setting tolls. This could be modelled by solving the
Nash Bargaining Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (NBPEC) employing CCA
to obtain the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). It was emphasised that the NBS was
not unique but dependent on the assumption regarding the BATNA vector which
differed depending on whether full revenue sharing was possible. Two cases out of
the various possible BATNA were considered depending on whether in the absence
of an agreement, jurisdictions would share revenues or otherwise.
In both cases, it was shown that the Nash Axiom of Individual Rationality was
satisfied in that both parties obtain higher welfare than their relevant BATNAs by
engaging in bilateral bargaining. Most crucially, it was shown that unlike revenue
sharing, the NBS is Pareto Optimal. The policy implication of this result is that
should a national regulator (solving the GRP problem) not be the preferred ap-
proach to the institutional governance of toll pricing, bilateral bargaining between
jurisdictions could be an alternative strategy to encourage jurisdictions to work
towards Pareto Optimal outcomes when implementing toll pricing.
Although the welfare function introduced in this chapter allows for revenue sharing,
it suffers from the disadvantage that it requires link flows disaggregated by authority.
While it is shown in Appendix D, with additional mild assumptions, that these link
flows are indeed unique for the example network used in this chapter, this is not true
in general if route choices follow Wardrop’s DUE principle. Furthermore, the SLCP
approach failed to locate NE toll levels in this network as it encountered numerical
difficulties when attempts were made to obtain first and second order derivatives.
The failure of SLCP encountered stems from the recognition that the DUE link
flows are not necessarily differentiable everywhere(Patriksson, 2004).
The inter-related issues of non-uniqueness and nonsmoothness therefore pave the
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way in Chapter 9 to consider the situation in which travellers route according to
the more general SUE principle which, as noted in Chapter 7, is both smooth and
differentiable. This also guarantees uniqueness of authority based link flows without
requiring further restrictive assumptions, thereby allowing for the application of
SLCP on a larger network, building on the analysis presented in this chapter.
While SLCP could not be applied to the numerical examples in this chapter because
of the nonsmoothness of the DUE constraints, the NDEMO algorithm, on the other
hand, was able to identify the NE. However, extensive function evaluations were
required. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that the ability of NDEMO to
detect the NE is not indicative of realistic decision making behaviour, an issue for
which further research is required. Regarding future developments, the next step
would be to develop algorithms capable of identifying all possible game equilibria.
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Chapter 9
Inter-jurisdictional Toll
Competition: Part II9.1
9.1 Introduction
In this chapter, competition for toll revenues between two jurisdictions is discussed
under the assumption that the users’ route choices follow the elastic demand (logit)
SUE principle. The smoothness (i.e. differentiability) of the SUE constraints is
exploited to enable application of the gradient-based SLCP algorithm to determine
LNE toll levels in the game between jurisdictions. This serves to contrast against
the previous chapter where toll revenue competition between jurisdictions was in-
vestigated on the assumptions where routing obeyed the Wardrop’s DUE principle.
In that setting, attempts to apply SLCP to identify LNE failed as a result of nu-
merical difficulties encountered due to the documented non-differentiability of DUE
link flows.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.2 formulates the math-
ematical structure of the problem in the same two instances as discussed in the
previous chapter. In the first, it is assumed that a global regulator decides the toll
levels for all tollable links in the network. In the second, it is assumed that juris-
dictions engage in an inter-jurisdictional game with the objective of maximising a
jurisdictional social welfare measure that explicitly incorporates the revenues raised
from extra-jurisdictional users. This mathematical formulation is applied to Sec-
tion 9.3 to a numerical example discussed in Chapter 8 (Case 1 on p. 250) where
the SLCP algorithm intended to identify LNE failed due to changes in the active
9.1Large portions of this chapter are based on Watling et al. (2014).
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path sets because of non-differentiability of link flows under the DUE assumptions.
Exploiting smoothness of the SUE equilibrium constraints, this chapter shows that
SLCP is indeed able to successfully identify LNE when applied to this same net-
work. However, it is also shown that, depending on the logit dispersion parameter
assumed, the smoothness may also result in convergence to a LNE rather than the
global NE. One key characteristic of this network, as discussed in Chapter 8 was
that there was limited interactions between users originating from the two different
jurisdictions resulting in a separated traffic flow regime at high toll levels.
Thus in a second numerical example, Section 9.4 adapts a 62 link network from
Zhang et al. (2011) that features extensive interactions in each subnetwork between
users from both jurisdictions. In general, the numerical examples show that inter-
jurisdictional toll competition has an adverse impact on social welfare. Section 9.5
investigates the implications of revenue sharing and Nash Bargaining between ju-
risdictions in this network. Revenue sharing can reduce and even eliminate the
incentive to extract revenues from extra-jurisdictional users. In doing so, it reme-
dies the welfare losses stemming from tax exporting. However, revenue sharing
cannot address the failure of jurisdictions to take into account welfare of these
extra-jurisdictional users when non-cooperatively setting tolls. For this reason, it
performs poorly compared to a toll pricing policy that considers the welfare of all
users equally. On the other hand, it is shown that Nash Bargaining can yield Pareto
Optimal outcomes. Section 9.6 summarises.
9.2 Problem Formulation
9.2.1 Preliminaries
In discussing the elastic demand SUE model, this section will make use of the nota-
tion used in Chapter 7 (see Section 7.2). As previously done in Chapter 8, the study
focuses on the case of horizontal competition between two jurisdictions/authorities,
identified as Authority A and Authority B.
As defined previously, the set of all links in the traffic network is denoted by L.
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Suppose each authority has their own pre-defined subset of network links over which
they may charge a toll. These tollable links are identified by means of a link-
authority incidence matrix |L| × 2 matrix, Λ with elements Λji equal to 1 only if
link j may be tolled by authority i and equal to 0 otherwise (j ∈ L; i ∈ {A,B}).
It is assumed that each authority i has a single, non-negative toll xi, i ∈ {A,B}
that they may determine and levy on their tollable links. Thus the toll vector is a
two element vector representing the toll for each authority and can be written as
x = (xA, xB)
⊺.
Based on the assumptions and subsequent discussion in Chapter 7 (see Section 7.2),
when the route choices of users are described by a elastic demand logit SUE model,
there exists an unique SUE vector of link flows (and demands), (v∗,q∗) ∈ D, that
solves the system of equations S(x) in Eq. 9–1 for given toll vector x (Cantarella,
1997).
S(x)


v∗(x) =∆qp(∆⊺(t(v) + (Λx)); θ)
q∗(x) = d(−θ−1 ln (Γ exp (−θ∆⊺(t(v) +Λx))))
{v,q} ∈ D
(Eq. 9–1)
where D is a convex feasible set of demands and link flows satisfying Eq. 9–2.
D =
{
(v,q) : v =∆f and q = Γf where f > 0, f ∈ R|R|
}
(Eq. 9–2)
Thus once again for brevity, the shorthand notation in Eq. 9–3 will be used to
denote specifically such a vector of link flows (and demands) that solves Eq. 9–1
given toll vector x.
{v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{S(x)} (Eq. 9–3)
9.2.2 Global Regulator Problem
Consider the situation of a regulator deciding tolls on all tollable links J in the
network in order to maximise social welfare. The problem can be framed as the
MPEC in Eq. 9–4. This is the SUE analogue of the Global Regulator Problem
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(GRP) introduced in Chapter 8 (see Eq. 8–1).
GRP


Maximise
x∈X
WSUE(x; θ) =
∑
k∈K
qk∫
0
d−1k (w)dw − q
⊺s(c; θ) + (Λx)⊺v
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{S(x)}
(Eq. 9–4)
where s(c; θ) is the composite generalised travel times experienced by each user as
given by Eq. 9–5.
s(c; θ) = −θ−1 ln {Γ exp (−θ∆⊺ (c(v)))}
= −θ−1 ln {Γ exp (−θ∆⊺ (t(v) +Λx))}
(Eq. 9–5)
An equivalent MPEC was used to benchmark the welfare gains attainable in the case
of competition between toll road concessionaires as described in Chapter 7 (see Eq.
7–10, p. 190). As explained therein, the objective function gives the social surplus
experienced by all users. The first and second terms together measure the difference
between the benefit these users receive from highway travel between all OD pairs
(i.e. the Marshallian measure given by the integral under the inverse demand or
marginal benefit functions) and the generalised composite costs (inclusive of tolls)
incurred in doing so. The revenue collected from tolls are added as they represent
a transfer payment from users to the collecting agency.
Due to the smoothness of the SUE constraints as discussed in Chapter 7, this GRP
can be solved by directly embedding the SUE constraints directly into an optimisa-
tion algorithm. In the tests to be discussed later, similar to that done in Chapter 7,
the interior point solver IPOPT (Wa¨chter and Biegler, 2006) available as an option
in the OPTI toolbox for MATLAB (Currie and Wilson, 2012) was used to solve this
problem.
9.2.3 Inter-Jurisdictional Game
In the case of jurisdictions competing for toll revenues, it is assumed that each
regulatory authority has jurisdiction over setting tolls in its own local area only
and that its responsibility is only to residents, which are assumed to be trips that
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originate in its area.
Authority Specific Objective Function
As was previously done in Chapter 8, the OD matrix is partitioned into two mutually
exclusive and exhaustive sets, such that Ki is the index of OD movements originating
in Authority i, i ∈ {A,B} with K = KA ∪ KB and KA ∩ KB = ∅. In this way, the
|K|-dimensional column vectors qA and qB are defined according to Eq. 9–6.
qA =

 qk, if k ∈ KA0, if k ∈ KB qB =

 0, if k ∈ KAqk, if k ∈ KB (Eq. 9–6)
Thus the vector of link flows, v, and demands, q, can be partitioned such that the
conditions in Eq. 9–7 is satisfied.
vA + vB = v (Eq. 9–7a)
qA + qB = q (Eq. 9–7b)
where vA and vB are |L|-dimensional column vectors denoting the authority based
link flows i.e. link flows from origins in Authorities A and B respectively.
In the inter-jurisdictional competition for toll revenues, Eq. 9–8 is the SUE analog
of Authority A’s objective function introduced in the last chapter (see Eq. 8–2, p.
244). As mentioned in Chapter 8, δ,0 6 δ 6 1 is a (unitless) revenue sharing/tax
exporting parameter. assumed throughout to be common for both jurisdictions.
WSUEA (xA,vA,vB,qA,qB|xB) =
∑
k∈KA
qk∫
0
d−1k (w)dw − qA
⊺s(c; θ) + (Λx)⊺vA+
δ

Λ

 xA
0



⊺ vB − δ

Λ

 0
xB



⊺ vA
(Eq. 9–8)
To understand Eq. 9–8, consider the extreme case where δ = 0. This means that
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there is full revenue sharing where Authority A returns in full, all revenues collected
from users originating in Authority B and that Authority B does the same.
The first term in Eq. 9–8 is the summation of the Marshallian measure of user
benefits but only for trips made from origins located in Authority A i.e. KA. The
second term is the composite generalised travel time experienced by trips with origins
in Authority A. As defined in Eq. 9–6, qA is 0 if the origin is in Authority B. Thus
trips with an origin in Authority B, do not play any role in the first two terms.
The third term reflects the fact that A recycles the revenues collected from its own
users only. Since δ = 0, the last 2 boxed terms in Eq. 9–8 do not play a role in the
computation of jurisdictional welfare.
Next consider the other extreme case where δ = 1. As previously, this means that
Authority A retains all the revenues collected from users from Authority B traversing
its subnetwork and paying its tolls and Authority B also does the same. However,
as revenues are retained by the jurisdiction imposing the toll, the two boxed terms
affect jurisdictional welfare. The first boxed term states that B’s users paying a
toll to A will increase the welfare of A by the amount of toll revenue paid to A.
Conversely, in the second additional term, A’s users paying a toll to B will increase
the social welfare of Authority B and therefore equally reduce the social welfare of
A by the amount of toll revenue paid.
In this way, Eq. 9–8 allows for the modelling of jurisdictions pursuing two objectives
simultaneously: “improving transport conditions as far as their own residents are
concerned and generating profit or tax revenue from through traffic” (De Borger and
Proost, 2012, p. 39). In Sections 9.3 and 9.4, the numerical examples will assume
the absence of revenue sharing and thus δ = 1. Variations in δ are discussed in
Section 9.5.
Formulation of NCEPEC
In the game between jurisdictions under DUE routing constraints as discussed in
Chapter 8 (see Section 8.2.2), it was necessary to impose restrictive assumptions
to ensure uniqueness of such variables disaggregated by authority as the standard
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assumptions of the DUE model can only assure uniqueness of total link flows. In
contrast, with a SUE assignment model with elastic demand applied here, uniqueness
of path flows is assured (Bell and Iida, 1997). Consequently the formulation is valid,
in general networks, without requiring any further restrictive assumptions.
Let ΩA be the K×K diagonal matrix with diagonal entries ΩAkk = 1 if OD movement
k has an origin in Authority A and equal to zero otherwise. This matrix can be
defined a priori from the network structure. Similarly the counterpart matrix for
Authority B, ΩB, can be analogously defined.
Suppose that {v∗(x),q∗(x)} is an elastic SUE solution given by Eq. 9–1 given
toll vector x. Then the link flows and demands disaggregated by Authority to be
uniquely determined as shown in Eq. 9–9.
q∗A(x) = Ω
Aq∗ v∗A(x) =∆q
∗
Ap(∆
⊺(t(v) + (Ξx)); θ) (Eq. 9–9a)
q∗B(x) = Ω
Bq∗ v∗B(x) =∆q
∗
Bp(∆
⊺(t(v) + (Ξx)); θ) (Eq. 9–9b)
Thus, for a given revenue sharing parameter δ, Authority A, in setting a toll level
to maximise its objective in Eq. 9–8, solves the MPEC in Eq. 9–10 that is a variant
of the GRP in Eq. 9–4.
Maximise
xA∈XA
WSUEA (xA,vA,vB,qA,qB|xB)
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{S(x)}
vA + vB = v
qA + qB = q
(Eq. 9–10)
Similar to the GRP (Eq. 9–4), the constraints to Eq. 9–10 define a unique allo-
cation of link flows and demands disaggregated by authority. From Eq. 9–9, the
disaggregated link flows are differentiable functions of the total link flows and de-
mands (v∗(x),q∗(x)) which are in turn differentiable functions of the toll vector x.
Therefore, a smooth single-level problem equivalent to Eq. 9–10 can be formulated
as Eq. 9–11.
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Maximise φA(xA|xB) =W
SUE
A (xA,v
∗
A(x),v
∗
B(x),q
∗
A(x),q
∗
B(x)|xB)
subject to xA > 0
(Eq. 9–11)
At the same time, noting that Authority B will be doing likewise, the optimisation
problem it faces can be analogously stated as a single level optimisation problem
given by as Eq. 9–12.
Maximise φB(xB|xA) =W
SUE
B (xB,v
∗
A(x),v
∗
B(x),q
∗
A(x),q
∗
B(x)|xA)
subject to xB > 0
(Eq. 9–12)
Since both Authority A and Authority B each non-cooperatively aim to maximise an
individual measure of jurisdictional welfare, each reacting to the toll set by the other
but taking into account the route choices of the users, this results in a NCEPEC. In
this game, a vector of tolls, x∗, is a NE when neither authority is able to increase
its jurisdictional welfare by unilaterally deviating from its chosen toll level. Thus
the condition in Eq. 9–13 is satisfied.
φi(x
∗) = φi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≥ φi(xi,x
∗
−i) ∀xi ∈ Xi , i ∈ {A,B} (Eq. 9–13)
As shown in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.5.1, p. 105), the NE problem can be formu-
lated as a CP (Complementarity Problem), based on the KKT conditions for the
simultaneous maximum of each jurisdiction’s optimisation problem (Eq. 9–11 and
Eq. 9–12).
Based on the discussion in Chapter 3 and the experience in the previous chapter,
because of possible local maxima in each jurisdiction’s welfare or payoff functions,
solutions may only satisfy Eq. 9–13 locally i.e. LNE solutions may be obtained. In
this case, when jurisdictions are only able to verify optimality within a neighbour-
hood of a given solution, the sets of solutions satisfying the weaker LNE condition
in Eq. 9–14 would also be relevant (see Definition 3.4).
φi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≥ φi(xi,x
∗
−i) ∀i,∀xi ∈ B
ǫ
i (x
∗
i ) , i ∈ {A,B} (Eq. 9–14)
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where Bǫi (xˆi) = {xi ∈ Xi | ‖xi − xˆi‖ < ǫ}.
9.3 Example 1: Tests on Network from Chapter 8
In this section, the first network used is that discussed in the previous Chapter
(see Fig. 8.1). The network parameters remain unchanged and the focus will be
restricted to symmetric demands in the Base Matrix (i.e. Case 1 as described in
Section 8.4). In this chapter, the only difference is that the routing of the users is
assumed to follow a SUE elastic demand model.
9.3.1 Exploration of Nash Equilibria as logit dispersion parameter
(θ) is varied
Chapter 8 demonstrated the existence of 4 LNE in this network when the traveller
routing follows a DUE model. In this section, it is shown that multiple LNE continue
to exist under SUE for large θ (small dispersion), but as θ decreases and there is a
departure from DUE, then only one LNE solution exists, which also satisfies the NE
conditions over the entire strategy space (and thus is also the unique NE solution
following Definition 3.1).
As was done in the Chapter 8, a grid search was conducted over the entire tollable
space of 1000 secs for each authority. This enabled numerical estimation of the
best response functions. As noted previously, intersections of these best response
functions identify toll combinations that could be potentially LNE.
Examples of such best response function plots for the cases θ = 0.005 and θ = 0.5
are shown in the left and right panes of Fig. 9.1. Where the best response functions
are near horizontal or vertical, this is indicative of a low level of interaction between
the two problems solved by the authorities. This is an artefact of the network and
demand scenario selected in this example; this will not always be the case, as will
be seen in Example 2 (see Section 9.4). With θ = 0.005 there is only one point of
intersection, which demonstrates there is only one LNE solution, and hence only one
NE solution, at a toll of around 300 secs set by each authority. With θ = 0.5 there
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Figure 9.1: Left: Numerically estimated best response functions for both Authority A
(continuous line) and Authority B (dashed line) θ = 0.005 with a single intersection (1 NE).
Right: Numerically estimated best response functions for both Authority A (continuous
line) and Authority B (dashed line) θ = 0.5 with 4 intersections (4 LNE)
are four points of intersection, therefore four LNE solutions, and it can be verified
(by checking the welfare levels at each LNE) that there is one NE solution, which
is the one marked “Solution 3” in the right panel of Fig. 9.1
9.3.2 Solution by SLCP Algorithm
Firstly, a grid search was carried out for a large range of θ to estimate the best
response functions. This allows an identification of the number of potential LNE.
Next, by starting SLCP relatively close to each of the LNE identified through the
grid search mentioned above, SLCP was applied to determine the LNE solutions
corresponding to the nearest starting point. Tables 9.1 present the LNE solutions
(either a single LNE or all 4 where they exist) and the impacts on jurisdictional
welfare relative to the no toll base equilibrium.
With competition between jurisdictions, it can be seen that welfare improves as θ
increases since more users are assigned to the cheaper town centre route, avoiding
the more costly bypass. Table 9.1 also shows that for θ > 0.02, the NE solution
(Solution 3) did not vary with θ, and this coincides (as may be anticipated) with
the solution found under DUE as reported in Chapter 8.
From Table 9.1, there are two types of LNE solutions, symmetric (i.e. equal toll for
both jurisdictions) and asymmetric. In the asymmetric solutions, the highest welfare
improvement (or in some cases, least bad deterioration in welfare) is obtained for
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the city charging the higher toll, for all θ. In all cases where multiple LNE exist, the
total welfare change (given by the sum of welfare change in A and welfare change in
B) for both Solutions 2 and 4 is lower than that attainable at Solution 1, while all
three of these solutions are preferable to the NE (outcome shaded in grey in Table
9.1) on total welfare grounds.
In terms of numerical implementation, a question of interest is how SLCP performs
in locating the NE (Solution 3 if there are multiple NE) rather than each of the
arbitrary LNE solutions. In order to understand this, a grid of initial conditions
between 0 and 1000 secs in steps of 10 was generated for each jurisdiction, thereby
generating 10201 distinct start points for application of the SLCP algorithm. The
performance of SLCP in locating each of these LNE solution is reported in Table
9.2.
Table 9.2 shows that when θ = 0.02, the solutions found by SLCP were distributed
evenly among each of the four LNE. This suggests that for this case, if the initial
starting point was chosen randomly, there is almost equal probability of locating
each of the LNE solutions. In contrast, for the case of θ = 1, 98% of the solutions
converged to the Solution 3, the NE solution while Solution 1 was found in 0.02% of
these cases. This suggests that the performance of SLCP algorithm in this respect
is therefore sensitive to the value of θ.
To understand why this is the case, the welfare changes for Authority A as the
toll it sets varies, assuming that Authority B sets the NE (Solution 3) toll, are
plotted in Figs. 9.2 and 9.3. These figures show how changes in the logit dispersion
parameter θ change the shape of the welfare function and highlights the transition
from multiple optima to one with a single optimum.
It can be seen that when θ = 0.5 (left panel of Fig. 9.2), the welfare function exhibits
an obvious peak at the NE solution with the LNE solution being quite distinctly
a local optima. On the other hand, the global optimum of the welfare function
corresponding to the NE solution is less obvious when θ = 0.02 (right panel of Fig.
9.2). It is clear then that while SUE smooths the problem, it also makes the local
optima of the welfare function less distinct and not easily distinguishable from the
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Table 9.1: Tolls (secs) and Welfare Change by Authority (secs) corresponding to LNE Solutions, NE solutions indicated by shaded cells
θ
LNE Solution 1 LNE Solution 2 LNE Solution 3 LNE Solution 4
Welfare Welfare Welfare Welfare Welfare Welfare Welfare Welfare
xA Change Change xA xB Change Change xA Change Change xA xB Change Change
(=xB) A B A B (=xB) A B A B
(secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs) (secs)
0.005 295.4 -41,845 -41,845
SINGLE LNE=NE0.007 257.0 -33,459 -33,458
0.009 231.6 -28,190 -28,190
0.01 221.7 -26,157 -26,156
0.02 159.3 -12,691 -12,690 498.8 165.2 -10,880 -103,358 497.6 -98,661 -98,660 165.2 498.8 -103,358 -10,880
0.03 123.8 -3,560 -3,560 505.2 127.1 5,680 -105,498 504.0 -93,868 -93,868 127.1 505.2 -105,498 5,680
0.04 107.9 913 913 504.0 107.9 14,265 -105,168 504.0 -91,416 -91,416 107.9 504.0 -105,168 14,265
0.5 85.6 9,646 9,645 504.0 85.6 23,822 -102,092 504.0 -87,843 -87,843 85.6 504.0 -102,092 23,822
1 85.4 9,372 9,372 504.2 85.3 23,960 -102,475 504.0 -87,843 -87,843 85.3 504.2 -102,475 23,960
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Table 9.2: Percentage of runs with 10201 alternative starting points converging to each
LNE solution
θ Solution 1 Solution 2 Solution 3 Solution 4
0.02 27.36% 24.86% 23.08% 24.70%
0.05 0.54% 6.54% 86.31% 6.62%
0.5 0.08% 2.98% 94.61% 2.33%
1 0.02% 0.99% 98.30% 0.69%
global optima. Thus the basin of attraction around this local optimum is larger with
a lower θ which implies that SLCP is not easily able to distinguish between these
two solutions. Furthermore, the left and right panels of Fig. 9.3 show that as θ is
further reduced, the welfare plots also display a single optimum which corresponds
to the case where there is only one NE.
Figure 9.2: Left: Welfare Change for Authority A as toll it sets varies (θ=0.5) assuming
Authority B sets the NE toll of 504.0 Right: Welfare Change for Authority A as toll it sets
varies (θ=0.02) assuming Authority B sets the NE toll of 497.6.
Figure 9.3: Left: Welfare Change for Authority A as toll it sets varies (θ=0.01) assuming
Authority B sets the NE toll of 221.7(secs) Right: Welfare Change for Authority A as toll
it sets varies (θ=0.005) assuming Authority B sets the NE toll of 295.4 (secs)
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9.3.3 Comparison of LNE solutions with Solution to GRP
As noted above, four LNE were found to exist for θ > 0.02. In such cases, some LNE
solutions result in positive changes in welfare for both jurisdictions relative to the no
toll base equilibrium. However, as noted above, there is a NE solution that results in
the highest overall negative welfare change because when jurisdictions aim to extract
revenues from extra-jurisdictional users, they are both simultaneously incentivised
to set a high toll. Thus, to avoid this situation, it may be necessary to regulate the
tolls whereby a regulator institutes tolls with the aim of maximising total welfare.
In this setting, a single regulator rather than the individual jurisdictions determines
both cordon tolls with the aim of maximising total welfare and this leads to the
GRP (see Eq. 9–4). Due to the symmetry of this example, the tolls obtained as a
solution to the GRP are identical and each city’s welfare change is equal to half the
total (i.e. network wide) welfare change.
Table 9.3: Tolls (secs) and Total Welfare Change (secs) obtained as solutions to GRP
θ Toll A Toll B Total Welfare
(secs) (secs) Change (secs)
0.005 61.19 61.19 9,835
0.007 60.12 60.11 10,556
0.009 59.27 59.27 11,333
0.01 59.19 59.19 11,740
0.02 58.79 58.79 15,522
0.03 60.07 60.08 18,441
0.04 61.87 61.88 20,404
0.5 79.00 78.99 21,114
1 79.38 79.38 20,705
Table 9.3 shows the solution of the GRP. Comparing Table 9.1 with Table 9.3,
it is evident that the total welfare change (i.e. sum of Welfare Change A and
Welfare Change B) at the Solution 1 LNE moves further away from the GRP solution
as θ is decreased (users becoming less cost sensitive). As θ decreases, the tolls
charged in the Solution 1 LNE become higher (and are always higher than the tolls
obtained as the solution of the GRP) and total welfare decreases. For the cases
where there is only one LNE/NE (θ <0.02), this suggests that in this network, there
is no solution for the Nash game which is “close” to the GRP solution. Thus as
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dispersion increases (i.e. a smaller θ) then under competition, there is no possibility
of achieving a positive welfare change, and a regulator would be required to obtain
this. Furthermore, with decreasing θ, as users are assumed to be less cost sensitive
in terms of their route choices and decisions to travel, competition between cities
would result in greater dis-benefits for both cities, with higher tolls imposed on the
users.
For cases with higher θ, the Solution 1 LNE is seen to be closer to the regulator
solution, and so there may be a greater chance that authorities in such a case would
accept regulation. However, as the gap between the GRP solution and the Solution
1 LNE increases with a decrease in θ, then there is a greater need for regulation of
the authorities. It is also of interest to note that as θ decreases even further, that
the welfare to be gained even under the GRP will also decrease. This may suggest
that if users are less cost-sensitive, then there is less benefit to be gained from toll
pricing in general, as would be expected.
9.4 Example 2: Grid Network
Fig. 9.4 shows the network with 20 nodes and 62 links from Zhang et al. (2011)
that is used as the second example. Each link j, j ∈ L in this network has a travel
time function of the form given by Eq. 9–15.
tj = t
0
j + βj(vj/κj)
4 (Eq. 9–15)
where t0j , βj and κj are the free flow travel time, coefficient and capacity for link
j,j ∈ L. The travel time parameters of this network are uniform throughout but
differ depending on whether they are vertical or horizontal links (Zhang et al., 2011).
Each horizontal link, such as link 1, connecting nodes 1 and 2, has a free flow time
t0j of 2.5 mins, βj of 0.375 and a capacity, κj, of 700 pcus per hour. On the other
hand, vertical links such as link 34 connecting nodes 1 and 6, has t0j of 5 mins,
βj of 0.75 and κj of 1000 vehicles per hour. Note that tolls will be reported in
the same units as travel time i.e. in minutes. The broken line down the centre of
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Figure 9.4: Grid Network from Zhang et al. (2011). Rectangular nodes represent origins
and destinations while circular nodes only serve to connect links in the network. The dotted
line demarcates the separation of the authority. The thicker lines in each authority represent
the tolled links that form a closed cordon.
the network demarcates the boundaries of the authorities such that the subnetwork
located to left of this line contains the jurisdiction of Authority A. The subnetwork
of Authority B is rightward of this line.
While the network parameters follow that as reported in Zhang et al. (2011), the
demand characteristics differ. The demand function adopted is based on the power
law demand function in Eq. 9–16 with the elasticity of demand ηk set to -0.58 for
all OD pairs, consistent with parameters used previously.
qk = q
0
k
(
sk/s
0
k
)ηk , k ∈ K (Eq. 9–16)
The centroids are shown in Fig. 9.4 as rectangular boxes. Two zones constitute the
Central Business District (CBD) in each authority (Zones 7 and 12 in A and Zones
9 and 14 in B). There are also two residential suburbs in each authority (Zones 1
and 16 in A and Zones 5 and 20 in B). Furthermore, there are trips between the
suburbs as well as within the CBD zones representing through traffic. In total,
there are 60 OD pairs. Details of the base matrix, intended to reflect a typical AM
peak commuting flow pattern, and the associated base composite generalised travel
times for θ = 10 are shown in Appendix E in Tables E.1 and E.2, respectively. The
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base matrix is entirely symmetric for both authorities. The dominant movement is
from the suburbs of each authority to the its own CBD comprising 1000 pcus/hour.
Furthermore, there is demand from all suburbs in either jurisdiction to the other
jurisdiction’s CBD of 500 pcus/hr.
The toll cordon for Authority A is around its two CBD zones (7 and 12). In this
way, links 9, 12, 17, 20, 36 and 55, distinguished by the thick lines in Fig. 9.4, form
the set of tollable links in A that will be subject to a single toll. Similarly, Authority
B is assumed to set a single toll on links 13, 16, 21, 24, 40 and 59 (also distinguished
by the thick lines) so as to form a closed cordon around its CBD (Zones 9 and 14).
9.4.1 Solution of Global Regulator Problem
Table 9.4: GRP Tolls, Total and Jurisdictional Welfare
Jurisdiction Level Network Wide
Toll A Welfare Welfare Total First Best ω
θ (=Toll B) Change A Change B Welfare Change Welfare Gain
(mins) (mins) (mins) (mins) (mins)
0.2 16.81 51,431 51,417 102,849 175,265 0.59
0.4 28.33 37,534 37,546 75,080 137,454 0.55
0.6 28.05 36,857 36,863 73,720 130,093 0.57
0.8 28.25 36,688 36,688 73,376 127,266 0.58
1 28.18 36,619 36,619 73,237 125,722 0.58
10 28.26 36,099 36,099 72,197 120,557 0.60
The penultimate column of Table 9.4 shows the welfare gain obtainable with marginal
cost tolls on all links for the range of θ considered. This gives the maximum possible
welfare gain forming the theoretical first best pricing benchmark.
For each θ, Table 9.4 reports the solution of the GRP. Due to symmetry, the GRP
tolls for each cordon in either jurisdiction are equal. The last column of this table
gives the index of relative welfare improvement, ω, computed according to Eq. 6–15
which reports the extent of welfare improvement of each pricing scenario studied
relative to the theoretical first best benchmark.
It is noticeable that the optimal tolls (in mins) in the GRP are much higher in this
example than in Example 1 of the previous section, despite using the same demand
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elasticity, similar free flow travel times and the same functional form for link travel
time. To understand this, it is helpful to distinguish between captive trips and
non-captive trips. Captive trips are those that have destinations within the tolled
zones (i.e. CBDs of either authority) and are therefore captive to any cordon toll
introduced. On the other hand, an example of a non-captive trip is the movement
from Zone 16 to Zone 5; such trips have a choice of avoiding the tolled links. For
θ = 10, in the untolled base equilibrium, approximately 120 (out of 200) trips from
this particular OD pair utilise a route that includes one or more of the tollable
links. With the GRP toll, captive trips are suppressed. While trip suppression is
also present in Example 1, the difference is that Example 2, the captive and non-
captive trips share untolled entry links. The effect of this is that in this example,
as the captive trips are suppressed, the non-captive trips benefit substantially from
congestion relief.
Because of these shared entry links, as captive trips are suppressed, non-captive
trips experience a reduction in costs because of the freeing up of untolled entry
links. Since elastic demand is used, the number of these non-captive trips increases
compared to the untolled base equilibrium for each θ. This increase in the non-
captive trips, along with the decongestion benefits, then counter the suppression of
the captive trips and so a greater welfare gain is possible with a much higher toll.
Note that even with lower demands than the modified matrix used here and with
different tollable links, Zhang et al. (2011) also reported tolls of a similar order of
magnitude (between 9 and 30 minutes) in their equivalent of the GRP.
Note that this effect was not observed in Example 1 because the introduction of a
toll only results in non-captive trips rerouting around the more costly bypass, and
as the toll increases, more trips are routed onto the bypass so that the costs faced
by non-captive trips is always increasing with tolls.
A second noticeable feature of Table 9.4 is that the toll level is much lower when
θ = 0.2 being 16 mins versus a value around 28 mins for higher θ. In general,
as θ decreases users are less sensitive to costs, and so for any given toll level, the
suppression achieved is lower with a lower θ. At the same time, this also means
that the “indirect generation” effect caused by the freeing up of untolled entry links
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Figure 9.5: Welfare Change for Authority A, as own cordon toll varies, assuming Authority
B sets no toll on cordon in B), for two different logit dispersion parameter, θ. Left: θ = 0.2.
Right: θ = 10
will also be lower. In addition to the generation effect, there is a noticeable change
in use of paths for certain OD pairs as users become less cost sensitive, and are
more dispersed across the available routes. This dispersion of traffic across paths
combined with a lower demand response affects different elements of each authority’s
welfare function, so that a relatively lower toll becomes optimal with a lower θ. In
contrast, with a higher θ, because users become more sensitive to costs, more captive
OD pairs are suppressed for a given toll level. This also implies that there is more
freeing up of shared entry links. Essentially, the trade-off between benefits arising
to different OD pairs within the welfare function varies as the demands and route
choices vary with changes in users’ sensitivity to cost.
9.4.2 Incentives to Engage in Inter-jurisdictional Game
Consider now the situation when the jurisdictions retain the full revenue from tolls
or the case of no revenue sharing. Thus the analysis in this section will assume
that δ = 1, equally that revenues raised from extra-jurisdictional users add to local
welfare. The left panel of Fig. 9.5 show the welfare of Authority A as the toll
it sets varies for the case of θ = 0.2, assuming that Authority B sets a toll of 0.
Thus, assuming Authority B does not toll, Authority A finds that it can obtain
higher jurisdictional welfare by introducing a toll. The right panel gives the same
illustration for the case of θ = 10. Due to symmetry, the same can be said for
Authority B (assuming that Authority A does not toll). Thus, both panels of Fig.
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Table 9.5: NE Tolls and Welfare Change with Inter-jurisdictional Competition
Jurisdiction Level Aggregate Level
θ Toll A Welfare Welfare Welfare ω
(=Toll B) Change A Change B Change
(mins) (mins) (mins) (mins)
0.2 65.52 10,590 10,561 21,151 0.12
0.4 66.27 4,678 4,677 9,355 0.07
0.6 67.31 3,306 3,306 6,613 0.05
0.8 68.03 2,641 2,641 5,281 0.04
1 68.47 2,270 2,270 4,540 0.04
10 69.89 1,125 1,125 2,250 0.02
9.5 confirm that based on the potential for increased jurisdictional welfare, there is
an incentive for either authority to introduce a toll and begin the game.
9.4.3 Identification of LNE with SLCP
As the incentives to engage in inter-jurisdictional competition exists, the SLCP
algorithm was applied to this problem to determine the NE toll levels. Table 9.5
reports the results.
Figs. 9.6 to 9.8 shows the numerically estimated best response functions for both
authorities. In these figures, the best response function of Authority A to any
toll level of Authority B is indicated by the continuous line. Similarly the best
response function for Authority B to any toll level of Authority A is indicated
by the broken lines. As noted in Chapter 3, the NE is the intersection of these
best response functions. These figures serve to numerically verify that the solution
reported in Table 9.5 obtained by SLCP coincides with the intersection of these
best response functions. These figures show that these best response functions are
negatively sloped which is similar to the case of toll road competition between serial
links as discussed in Chapter 7 (see Section 7.4.3, p. 201). This is indicative of
complementary linkages between the two jurisdictions.
The NE tolls in Table 9.5 are nearly three times higher compared those obtained
as solutions to the GRP in Table 9.4. Thus the welfare change for each jurisdiction
while positive, is far lower than under the GRP. The last column of Table 9.5 reports
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ω, i.e. the index of relative welfare improvement measuring the welfare change under
competition relative to first best pricing. In the case of θ = 10, ω reduces from close
to 0.6 under GRP to around 0.02 under competition. While the welfare change
under competition is still positive (indicating that positive welfare gain can still be
obtained), there is a Prisoners Dilemma outcome since both jurisdictions are worse
off than if they had cooperated e.g. allowing an independent regulator to maximise
welfare for both jurisdiction as modelled by the GRP. Compared to Example 1 and
the example in Chapter 8, it can be seen in Example 2 that while welfare is reduced
as a result of the fiscal externality of tax exporting, it does not have as adverse an
impact as to offset the positive welfare impacts brought about by the use of tolls to
internalise congestion.
The higher tolls obtained is due to a combination of both the over-internalisation
of externalities as well as revenue maximising/tax exporting incentive of each ju-
risdiction. On the former (over-internalisation) issue, the double marginalisation
problem, arises because in a serial setting, each authority does not take into ac-
count the reduction in revenues to the other authority when setting its toll. This
reflects research presented in Chapter 7 on competition between toll road concession-
aires. On the latter (revenue maximising) issue, this arises since extra-jurisdictional
users who travel on a jurisdiction’s road network contribute only to the toll revenue
component in each jurisdiction’s objective function. Such a finding thus extends a
conclusion from the literature, notably De Borger et al. (2007) and Ubbels and Ver-
hoef (2008b) to a more general network setting under SUE, and is line with findings
in Zhang et al. (2011) and the previous results presented in Chapter 8.
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Figure 9.6: Left: Intersection of numerically estimated best response functions for θ = 0.2
coincides with the cordon toll obtained by SLCP, of 65.52 mins for both authorities A and
B. Right: Intersection of numerically estimated best response functions for θ = 0.4 coincides
with the cordon toll obtained by SLCP, of 66.27 mins for both authorities A and B.
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Figure 9.7: Left: Intersection of numerically estimated best response functions for θ = 0.6
coincides with the cordon toll obtained by SLCP, of 67.31 mins for both authorities A and
B. Right: Intersection of numerically estimated best response functions for θ = 0.8 coincides
with the cordon toll obtained by SLCP, of 68.03 mins for both authorities A and B.
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Figure 9.8: Left: Intersection of numerically estimated best response functions for θ = 1
coincides with the cordon toll obtained by SLCP, of 68.47 mins for both authorities A and
B. Right: Intersection of numerically estimated best response functions for θ = 10 coincides
with the cordon toll obtained by SLCP, of 69.89 mins for for both authorities A and B.
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9.5 Revenue Sharing
In the results presented so far, attention has been restricted to the case of no revenue
sharing (i.e. δ = 1). In this section, the analysis is focused on how changes in δ
affect the NE toll levels and the resulting welfare implications. Focusing on the
network used in Example 2 as shown in Fig. 9.4, extensive grid searches confirm
that a single LNE exists for all combinations of δ and θ reported here, regardless
of the starting point of the SLCP algorithm. Thus it is appropriate to refer to this
solution as “the NE solution”.
Table 9.6 shows the NE tolls as the revenue sharing parameter δ is varied for three
representative values of dispersion parameter θ alongside the welfare change over
the network. Note that the results for δ = 1 corresponds to the results reported, for
equivalent θ, in Table 9.5. The left panel of Fig. 9.9 shows the variation in the NE
toll graphically. The right panel shows the index of relative welfare improvement ω
as the revenue sharing parameter δ varies. This is elaborated further below.
Table 9.6: Tolls and Welfare Change as Revenue Sharing Parameter, δ varies
Revenue Sharing Dispersion Parameter
Parameter δ θ=0.2 θ=0.4 θ=0.8
0 Toll A=Toll B (mins) 11.12 7.86 6.53
Total Welfare Change (mins) 93,512 58,276 45,621
0.2 Toll A=Toll B (mins) 14.57 11.09 21.11
Total Welfare Change (mins) 101,574 65,525 69,109
0.4 Toll A=Toll B 18.47 30.04 30.03
Total Welfare Change 102,315 74,704 73,075
0.6 Toll A=Toll B (mins) 37.48 39.52 39.85
Total Welfare Change (mins) 79,649 66,325 64,691
0.8 Toll A=Toll B (mins) 50.57 50.88 51.77
Total Welfare Change (mins) 56,524 46,033 43,668
1 Toll A=Toll B (mins) 65.52 66.27 68.03
Total Welfare Change (mins) 21,151 9,355 5,281
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Figure 9.9: (Left): NE Toll Levels (mins) and (Right): Index of Relative Welfare Im-
provement ω as Revenue Sharing Parameter (δ) varies
To understand the results, consider the two extreme points of δ = 0 (full revenue
sharing) and δ = 1 (no revenue sharing). When δ = 0, the NE tolls are lower than
that obtained under as the solution of the GRP. This can be seen by comparing
each θ for δ = 0 against the corresponding solutions to the GRP reported in Table
9.4. This is in contrast to the results presented in Chapter 8 and the reason for this
will be discussed further below (see Section 9.5.1).
Next, consider the case of δ = 1. In this case, the highest tolls should be expected
since the authority retains all revenues from tolls including those collected from
extra-jurisdictional users. Given these two points, it would then be expected that as
δ increases from 0 towards 1, the NE tolls should increase. An increase in δ increases
the revenue retained by the authority, and in the extreme case of no revenue sharing,
the tolls are highest. The results in Table 9.6 confirm this expected phenomenon,
and this continues to hold for each of the θ values tested.
An additional effect is that as the toll levels rise with an increase in δ, the number of
paths effectively utilised by an OD pair decreases; that is to say, although all paths
are used at least a small (non zero) amount at any value of δ due to the nature of
the underlying SUE assignment model, the number that are used by a significant
amount of traffic decreases. As the tolls increase, analysis of the path flows shows
that with an increase in δ, non-captive OD pairs begin to avoid using the tolled links
by rerouting away from these less attractive tolled links. This explains the apparent
change in toll regime in Fig. 9.9, which notably appears at different levels of δ for
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different dispersion parameters θ. That is to say, sensitivity to costs (as controlled
by θ) has a complex interaction effect with the assumption on revenue sharing/tax
exporting (as controlled by δ), at the NE solution.
Where the phenomenon of a change in the toll regime precisely occurs depends on
both θ and δ, and this is difficult to predict a priori. But in general, as θ increases,
because users become more sensitive to costs, this would be expected to take place at
lower values of δ. For example, for θ = 0.2, there is a noticeable “break” at δ = 0.6
and an NE toll of 37.48 mins compared to the NE toll of 18.47 mins at δ = 0.4.
However, when users become more cost sensitive this “break” occurs earlier. A
noticeable change can be observed in the left panel of Fig. 9.9 in the case of θ = 0.8
of between δ = 0 and δ = 0.2.
If in the competitive case, some higher-level regulatory authority were able to in-
fluence the revenue sharing agreement through δ (given knowledge of θ), so as to
achieve the highest total welfare gains, then the “optimum” value occurs around
δ = 0.4 for all cases of θ. This is shown in the right panel of Fig. 9.9 which shows
the trend in the index of relative welfare improvement ω (Verhoef et al., 1996) mea-
suring the overall welfare gains as the revenue sharing parameter δ varies (relative to
the theoretical first best benchmark for given θ reported in the penultimate column
of Table 9.4). The welfare gains achieved in such a way seems to be close to the
benefits achieved by the GRP (for equivalent θ) reported in Table 9.4.
It should be recognised that the welfare that is obtained close to that with GRP
tolls when δ = 0.4 is most likely network-specific and only reflects the fact that there
is a trade-off being made by the local decision makers with respect to congestion
impacts on their own residents (the first three terms in Eq. 9–8) and revenues from
neighbours (the last two terms in Eq. 9–8). This implies that for this network at
least, if indeed a revenue sharing policy were to be pursued, some degree of revenue
sharing resulting in tolls close to the GRP solution could be better for welfare
than full revenue sharing. Therefore, in any given network, any overall regulator of
jurisdictions would need to evaluate NE solutions for varying δ, in order to determine
an optimal level of revenue sharing/cooperation for the region as a whole.
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9.5.1 Pareto Inefficiency of Full Revenue Sharing
Consider the situation in which the authorities could cooperate. In this case, the
problem under consideration can be represented as the MOPEC in Eq. 9–17.
Maximise
x∈X
Φ(x) = (φA(x), φB(x))
⊺
subject to {v∗(x),q∗(x)} ← SOL{S(x)}.
(Eq. 9–17)
The solutions of this MOPEC should satisfy the principle of Pareto Optimality given
in Definition 3.3. In this context, Pareto Optimality implies that that no jurisdiction
should be able to be improve its welfare without reducing the welfare of the other.
As was done in previous chapters, the MOSADE algorithm is applied to obtain the
Pareto Fronts as the solution to the MOPEC in Eq. 9–17. These are shown in Fig.
9.10 for the case of θ = 0.4 (left panel) and θ = 0.8 (right panel). The jurisdiction
level welfare obtained as a solution to the GRP problem (see Table 9.4) is also
plotted on each of these figures. It can be seen in each case that this individual
jurisdictional welfare lies on the Pareto Front.
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Figure 9.10: Left: Cooperation between Authorities in Example 2: Illustration of Pareto
Front alongside authority welfare for δ = 1 and δ = 0 with welfare under GRP. Left: Case
of θ = 0.4. Right: Case of θ = 0.8
Next, the welfare to each jurisdiction assuming no revenue sharing i.e. δ = 1 is also
shown on these figures (indicated on each panel of Fig. 9.10 with +). It is clear
that this point lies in the interior of these Pareto Fronts. This means that at least
one jurisdiction could be made better off without making the other worse off. The
reason this solution lies inside the Pareto Front is, as discussed above, due to the
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welfare decreasing effect of the revenue objective in each authority’s welfare function
i.e. tax exporting.
Finally, the welfare to each jurisdiction assuming full revenue sharing or equivalently,
no tax exporting is also plotted on these figures (i.e δ = 0, indicated on each panel
of Fig. 9.10 with ×). It is evident that jurisdictional welfare in this case, also lies in
the interior of these Pareto Fronts. This is contrasted with the equivalent problem
investigated in the network discussed in the last chapter (see Fig. 8.16 in Section
8.6.1) where the revenue sharing outcome in that case was on the Pareto Front.
However, that particular example was a special case due to the limited interactions
between users from either jurisdiction particularly in the high toll regime.
Returning to the example at hand, while demand is symmetric between the jurisdic-
tions, the difference is that, in each jurisdiction, there are more extensive interactions
between local and extra-jurisdictional users. The extensive interactions is brought
out by analysing the path flows in the competitive tolled equilibrium with δ = 0.
In the case of θ = 0.4, with tolls at the GRP toll level, only 12 of the 62 links
(approximately 20%) are exclusively used by traffic originating from one authority.
In other words, 80% of links are used by traffic from both authorities.
However, even when tax exporting is eliminated with δ = 0, each jurisdiction is
only concerned with the welfare of its own users (see Eq. 9–8). As a result, they
fail to take into consideration the fact that on the 80% of links that carry traffic
from both authorities, extra-jurisdictional users also suffer from congestion. Since
this spillover is disregarded in the jurisdiction’s toll setting decision, the toll is lower
than the GRP toll.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, it is possible to allow jurisdictions to engage
in bilateral bargaining in order to correct the inter-jurisdictional spillovers. The
NBS solution of the bilateral bargaining problem can be obtained by solving the
NBPEC for which again, due to the smootheness of the SUE constraints, can be
solved by directly embedding the SUE conditions as constraints into the non-linear
programming solver.
Superimposed on the Pareto Fronts for θ = 0.4 and θ = 0.8 in the left and right
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panel of Fig. 9.11 respectively, are the jurisdictional welfares obtained by the NBS,
plotted with the9 markers as well as the GRP (Utilitarian) solutions. However, in
this example, because of the symmetry of the network and the base demands, the
tolls obtained by bilateral Nash bargaining are not materially different (to 3 decimal
places) from that obtained under the GRP solution as reported in Table 9.4. This
conclusion is invariant to the choice of BATNA assumed (i.e. whether there is
revenue sharing should negotiations fail). Nevertheless, this example verifies once
again that Pareto Optimal outcomes are attainable with the NBS, unlike full revenue
sharing.
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Figure 9.11: Pareto Front, GRP, NBS(I), NBS(II)and BATNA with and without revenue
sharing Left: θ = 0.4 . Right: θ = 0.8
9.6 Summary and Policy Implications
This chapter has investigated toll competition between jurisdictions on the assump-
tion that users route according to the SUE route choice principle. This toll com-
petition problem can be formulated as a NCEPEC where at the upper level, each
authority aims non-cooperatively to maximise social welfare of their residents by
introducing tolls in its subnetwork, anticipating the reactions of travellers while
reacting to the tolls set by the other authority.
In the case where there was no revenue sharing, jurisdictions were assumed to fo-
cus on the twin objectives of maximising welfare for their residents and maximising
the toll revenues from extra-jurisdictional users. In competition with others for toll
revenues, they would set tolls higher than the GRP level. The resulting effect in
physically adjacent regions (modelled as networks with serial dependencies) is ex-
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acerbated by the double marginalisation (Spengler, 1950; Economides and Salop,
1992) problem. The results have shown that horizontal competition between juris-
dictions for toll revenue could result in welfare losses that significantly offset the
welfare gains from employing tolls to internalise congestion. In the worst case, as
illustrated in Example 1 (and in the previous chapter), toll competition could result
in lower total welfare than if there were no tolls at all.
As was done in the previous chapter, revenue sharing was modelled by assuming
that each authority returned a proportion of the revenues collected from extra-
jurisdictional users to the counterpart authority. The results presented in Example
2 show that even with full revenue sharing, the solution obtained was not Pareto
Optimal when there are extensive interactions between users from both jurisdic-
tions. Revenue sharing was shown to reduce tax-exporting thereby alleviating wel-
fare losses from this fiscal externality. However, revenue sharing is unable to address
the failure of jurisdictions acting non-cooperatively to take into account the welfare
of extra-jurisdictional users. Specifically, they ignore, in their toll setting decisions
the transport specific congestion externality in that extra-jurisdictional users both
contribute to as well as suffer from congestion when circulating in their subnet-
work. Thus a potential policy implication of this research is that when pricing is
decentralised to the local level, individual jurisdictions need to take into account
the interactions of all users rather than solely that of local users.
As highlighted in Chapter 2 (see p. 59), a key question of interest is the appropriate
level of governance of toll pricing policies i.e. whether toll pricing policies should
be regulated at the national level or whether it should be treated as a local traffic
management issue with responsibilities devolved to local governments/jurisdictions.
In view of the above findings, the results of the numerical tests suggest that a
regulated environment for toll pricing, as represented by the GRP, would be most
favourable in terms of social welfare compared to all revenue sharing arrangements
considered.
However, this may not be the most preferred approach to the institutional gover-
nance of toll pricing such as concerns that a federal/national regulator might not
sufficiently cater to local circumstances. This observation motivated the study of
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bilateral bargaining between jurisdictions modelled using the NBPEC encapsulating
Nash Bargaining (Nash, 1950b). Due to the symmetry of the network and demands
tested in this chapter, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) yielded welfare lev-
els close to that obtained by the solution of the GRP. Nevertheless, the numerical
tests in reported in this (and the previous) chapter show that bilateral bargaining
can yield Pareto Optimal outcomes. The policy implication here is that bilateral
bargaining could facilitate a decentralised approach which would be more closely
aligned to local interests without overlooking inter-jurisdictional spillovers.
The smoothness of the SUE formulation used in this chapter is exploited in two ways.
Firstly, it facilitated the mathematical formulation of the toll competition problem
between jurisdictions as a single level Complementarity Problem (CP). Secondly,
it enabled application of the SLCP algorithm which was successfully applied to
identify LNE points in the inter-jurisdictional game in the numerical examples.
However, the numerical tests show that while SUE smooths the problem and assures
differentiability, there is still the potential for the SLCP algorithm to miss the global
peak and identify LNE rather than the NE.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions and Further
Research
10.1 Summary
From the point of view of economists, the theoretical argument for introducing
pricing for road use in the form of tolls is that an unpriced highway network results
in a welfare loss to society because highway users do not take into account the
costs their use of the highway network imposes on others. At the same time, the
literature has implicitly assumed that the transportation network is managed by a
sole benevolent regulator keen on maximising welfare for all users of the network.
As highlighted in Chapter 2, in reality, transportation networks transcend jurisdic-
tional boundaries and are managed by multiple governments. In implementing fiscal
policies, governments generate fiscal distortions due to the competition for funds to
finance public goods desired by their residents. In recognition of the desire to lever-
age private sector resources to overcome budgetary constraints faced by governments
in their attempts to meet highway infrastructure requirements, the involvement of
the private sector (which was assumed in this thesis to be synonymous with revenue
maximising entities) in the operation of toll roads has increased around the world.
When these private sector participants have successfully obtained concessions for
the development of toll roads, these concessionaires set tolls to maximise revenue.
This objective then implies that the toll a concessionaire levies will be different from
one introduced so as to maximise social welfare. In the face of competition between
toll road concessionaires for toll revenues, the specific question of interest is the
extent to which welfare losses stemming from the use of tolls aimed at maximising
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revenue outweigh the welfare gain from using tolls used to internalise the congestion
externality.
As a consequence of the desire for revenues to finance public goods that benefit their
residents, a growing literature reviewed in Chapter 2 has alluded to the possibility
that local governments/jurisdictions may introduce toll pricing in order to compete
with other jurisdictions for toll revenues. Furthermore, jurisdictions may not be-
have benevolently towards all users who traverse the transportation networks within
their jurisdiction when a toll pricing policy is in place. While they are politically
motivated to look after the welfare of their own residents, they may regard users
from outside a jurisdiction, (referred to as extra-jurisdictional users in this thesis) as
a source of revenue and as a source of congestion impeding local residents. In doing
so, jurisdictions introduce a fiscal externality of tax exporting which reduces welfare
compared to toll pricing solely aimed at imperfectly internalising congestion.
Therefore the aim of this thesis has been to investigate the extent of
welfare losses stemming from competition for toll revenues a) amongst
toll road concessionaires, b) and separately, amongst jurisdictions.
Since the research question revolves around the central theme of competition, re-
gardless of who the specific players were, or the precise details of the game, Chapter
3 focused on the principles of oligopolistic non-cooperative game theory which is
used as the tool to study how these players would interact when they are engaged
in a strategic encounter with each other where each is pursuing his own objective.
In this context, the Nash Equilibrium principle was identified as the appropriate
solution concept for games but as recognised therein, there could be multiple Nash
equilibria. Furthermore, it was also highlighted that if these players could act coop-
eratively rather than unilaterally pursuing self-interests, they could, in fact, obtain
better outcomes for themselves.
Chapters 4 developed the mathematical modelling framework applied in the numer-
ical examples. Following the literature, the model of a sole regulator was framed
as a Stackelberg leader-follower game or Mathematical Program with Equilibrium
Constraints (MPEC) where the actions of the regulator was constrained by the equi-
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librium condition in the lower level route choice model expressed as a variational
inequality.
In tandem with the policy requirement to take into account the interactions amongst
multiple agents involved in toll pricing decisions in transportation networks, Chapter
4 showed that the problem could be posed as an Equilibrium Problem with Equi-
librium Constraints (EPEC) which directly extends the MPEC. In this formulation,
the actions of all leaders implementing toll pricing decisions were inextricably linked
as users respond to tolls set by all players in their DUE/SUE route choices. While
the problem formulation is theoretically attractive for studying the problems posed
in this thesis, the study into EPECs itself had only just begun in earnest recently and
theoretically proven solution algorithms for such problems are not widely available.
Thus in order to identify solutions that reflect the Nash Equilibria of the games
(as well as solutions that reflect the Pareto Optimal benchmark), along with the
recognition that analytically obtaining these were infeasible in larger networks, the
research sought to identify a number of heuristic methodologies with this objective
in mind. By adapting existing solution methods from microeconomics and the field
of evolutionary computation, several algorithms for solving the EPEC formulation
were suggested in Chapters 4 and 5. Subsequently, these algorithms were applied ex-
tensively to the case studies involving competition amongst toll road concessionaires
and separately, amongst jurisdictions in Chapters 6 to Chapters 9.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Following this overview, Sections
10.2 and 10.3 summarise the findings from the case studies involving competition
amongst toll road concessionaires and amongst jurisdictions respectively. In these
sections, policy implications are summarised. An evaluation of the performance of
the algorithms that were proposed and applied in this thesis is presented in Section
10.4. Section 10.5 summarises the key policy messages and novel contributions of
this thesis. Potential areas identified for further research are outlined in Section
10.6.
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10.2 Competition between Toll Road Concessionaires
Using network models comprising exclusively either parallel or serial links connecting
a single OD pair, the literature, as summarised in Chapter 2, has emphasised that
whether competition enhances or reduces welfare crucially depends on whether the
competition took place between concessionaires exercising control (i.e. toll setting
decisions) over parallel or serial links. The key messages from the literature are
as follows:
• competition between parallel links is welfare enhancing with welfare increasing
with the intensity of competition;
• competition between serial links deteriorates welfare with welfare decreasing
with the intensity of competition, and
• in the case of serial links, tolls would be higher and welfare lower with com-
petition vis-a´-vis a monopolist in control of the entire serial corridor.
It was highlighted in Chapter 2 that the issue of collusion between toll road con-
cessionaires has not been discussed in the literature. As the number of toll road
operators in a network would likely be small, it was postulated that concessionaires
would recognise their mutual inter-dependence and thus would be incentivised to
engage in collusion to increase their revenues.
Building on and extending the literature, the objectives of the research10.1 specifi-
cally in relation to competition amongst toll road concessionaires were to:
1. assess the transferability of findings regarding private sector toll road compe-
tition from simple network models to a more realistic network setting and
2. investigate the incentives for, and consequences on social welfare of, collusion
between toll road operators.
Competition between toll road concessionaires was studied in Chapters 6 and 7. In
Chapter 6, tests were conducted on a small network model where users chose routes
10.1See p. 8 with objectives numbered accordingly.
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in accordance with Wardrop’s DUE principle. Though the SLCP algorithm was able
to successfully identify the NE in this case, it was recognised that this should only
be viewed as a heuristic since the DUE is not necessarily differentiable. Further
tests were subsequently conducted on a larger network of Edinburgh in Chapter 7
where the underlying route choice model was based on the (logit) SUE principle
which, as outlined in Chapter 7, is smooth and differentiable.
As noted in the literature review, in a realistic network with multiple OD pairs, links
cannot be unambiguously categorised into being substitutes (in the case of parallel
links) or complements (in the case of serial links). This is because a link might serve
as a complement for some OD pairs while simultaneously serving as a substitute for
other OD pairs. While it might be difficult to identify the degree of substitutability
or complementarity between links, a pragmatic approach was adopted in this thesis
to categorise links in order to assess the transferability of findings.
With the smaller network tested in Chapter 6, it was still relatively easy to identify
these parallel and serial links through inspection of both the network topology and
the OD matrix. With the larger network of Edinburgh used in Chapter 7, the
first set of 6 scenarios involving two links in competition were identified based on
their volume capacity ratios in the untolled base equilibrium. Subsequently, 6 more
scenarios were formed based on incremental combinations of the initial 6 scenarios
with reference to the network topology.
The welfare consequences of competition, as summarised by the index of relative
welfare improvement, were assessed against two benchmark models. Firstly, to
benchmark the welfare levels attainable where the same links in competition would
be the only links in the network subject to a second best welfare maximising tolls.
Secondly, to benchmark the revenues attainable, where these links were tolled by a
single revenue maximising concessionaire termed the “monopolist”. In the case of
competition, the tests assumed that each concessionaire was able to exercise control
over one single link in the network. In this case, there were up to 6 concessionaires
(and hence 6 links) in competition in the network. Subsequently, the analysis was
extended in Chapter 7 where a concessionaire could exercise control over two links.
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Objective 1: Transferability of findings to general networks
Results of the numerical tests carried out in Chapters 6 and 7 extend
the insights of the literature to a more general network context.
In all cases of competition between parallel links, the toll levels were always lower
and welfare changes were always higher compared to when a monopolist exercised
control over the links 10.2.
However, it is more difficult to predict, a priori, in the case of parallel competition,
whether toll levels would be higher or lower compared to the second best welfare
maximising levels. In Chapter 6, the possibility was highlighted that competition
between concessionaires controlling parallel links, in the presence of an untolled
alternative, could result in toll levels lower than those obtained by a policy of sec-
ond best welfare maximisation. On the other hand, with the larger network of
Edinburgh, used in Chapter 7, despite the presence of a large number of toll-free al-
ternatives, the competitive toll levels were always higher than those obtained under
a second best welfare maximisation policy.
The larger network employed in Chapter 7 allowed for the investigation into the
effects of increasing the intensity of competition. It was shown therein that increas-
ing the number of concessionaires in parallel competition could, in fact, increase,
rather than reduce, the competitive toll levels. An increase in the number of conces-
sionaires in parallel competition in the network reduces the opportunity for users to
avoid travelling through one of these tolled links. However, this also increases the
marginal external congestion cost of the link controlled by the concessionaire. As
highlighted in the literature review (see p. 35), the toll that a revenue maximising
concessionaire charges incorporates the link’s marginal external congestion cost (as
well as a demand related markup). Thus as more congestion is internalised due to
higher volumes, this accounts for the higher toll levels with increased intensity of
competition.
On the other hand, in all cases of serial competition, it was found that competitive
10.2This holds true independent of whether routing follows a DUE or SUE model
and independent of the functional form of demand assumed.
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tolls were always higher and welfare always lower vis-a´-vis a monopolist in control of
all links in the series. As noted in Chapter 2 (see p. 37), this arises because of both
the double marginalisation problem and that the concessionaire will also internalise
the congestion externalities associated with other links in the series. The double
marginalisation problem occurs because a concessionaire does not take into account
the reduced revenues to concessionaires controlling other segments of the serial link
in his toll setting decision.
A further test allowing for concessionaires to decide tolls on two links demonstrated
that the extent of welfare gains would also depend on the assignment of links to
concessionaires. It was demonstrated that welfare could be further enhanced by
organising concessionaires such that a concessionaire controlled the entire corridor
(comprising two links in a series) but faced competition from a concessionaire con-
trolling another parallel corridor.
Objective 2: Incentives for, and welfare impacts of, collusion
In this research, the study of collusion was focused on scenarios involving two conces-
sionaires. In order to benchmark the revenue possibilities to concessionaires if they
were to collude, the Pareto Front, identifying revenue tuples satisfying the criteria
that one concessionaire could not increase his toll revenue without making another
worse off, was generated using the MOSADE algorithm. It was shown that besides
the monopoly solution, there were a number of solutions on the Pareto Front.
In all tests, it was shown that the revenues attained by each concessionaire in com-
petition were not Pareto Optimal. Therefore, a surplus would be created by the
move from the NE solution to the Pareto Front. Since the incentives for collusion
ultimately depend on the distribution of the surplus amongst the concessionaires,
two possibilities for surplus division were investigated in the research as follows:
• The first is the Utilitarian approach to collusion based on reciprocal signalling
behaviour where each concessionaire took into account a proportion, represent-
ing the degree of collusion, of the toll revenues earned by his rival while each
was independently setting the toll level for the link under his control. In this
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regard, the collusion path, as a function of the degree of collusion/cooperation
amongst the two concessionaires, reflecting the move from none through to
full collusion would be traced.
• The second is based on Nash Bargaining. This aims to maximise the product
of gains to the parties relative to the fully competitive outcome. As a novel
contribution, the research proposed to model this as a Nash Bargaining Prob-
lem with Equilibrium Constraints (NBPEC) in order to determine the Nash
Bargaining Solution (NBS).
In all cases tested, the collusion path was an inverted U shaped. This means that
the revenues to one concessionaire reaches a maximum before full collusion or the
Utilitarian/monopoly revenues are attained. If that is the case, there might not be
an incentive to collude fully unless again some form of compensation takes place.
However, this does not rule out partial collusion.
In cases where one concessionaire could be constrained by an upper bound on the
toll level (see e.g. Scenario 1 Fig. 6.4, p. 165), then to increase total revenue, the
other concessionaire might have to accept a reduction in revenue. Thus in such an
instance, there would be limited incentive to collude without some form of agreement
to share revenues set up in advance.
It was shown that with the Utilitarian approach to collusion on parallel links, any
move away from the fully competitive outcome toward the monopolistic outcome
always resulted in higher tolls. These higher tolls implied higher revenues to both
concessionaires and lower welfare compared to the fully competitive outcome. Thus
even if there is concessionaires only collude partially (since the collusion path is an
inverted U shape as noted above), welfare (as measured by the index of relative
welfare improvement) would deteriorate (see Tables 6.9, p. 166 and the left panel
of Fig. 7.18, p. 234).
However, an exception to this general observation was highlighted in Chapter 6 (see
Table 6.12, p. 172). In this case some degree of collusion could, in fact, be welfare
enhancing. It was emphasised that this was not because of collusion per se that
improved welfare but rather because full competition resulted in tolls below the
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second best welfare maximising level.
Next, consider the Utilitarian approach to collusion in the case of serial links. As
highlighted above, in the case of serial links, the welfare change obtained in the
monopolistic outcome was always higher than under full competition. However,
whether the concessionaires would be incentivised to collude fully in this case cannot
be answered unambiguously. In Example 4 in Section 7.6.1, it was shown that
the revenues to each concessionaire was higher with full collusion compared to full
competition and thus the incentive to collude fully exists. In this instance, collusion
would therefore be welfare improving. However, there are counter examples to this.
It was shown (see Scenarios 5 and 6 in Section 7.6.1) that in both cases, the revenue
accruing to one concessionaire from full collusion could be lower vis-a´-vis the fully
competitive outcome. In this case, then there is no incentive to collude unless there
was a compensation by the concessionaire made better off to the concessionaire who
would be made worse off with collusion e.g. through an explicit revenue sharing
agreement. This emphasises a disadvantage of the Utilitarian approach to collusion
where one party could obtain lower revenue vis-a´-vis the fully competitive outcome
even though is total revenue increased, thereby violating the Axiom of Individual
Rationality.
On the other hand, the Nash Bargaining Solution was shown to satisfy both the Nash
Axioms (see p. 134) of Individual Rationality (no player obtains lower revenues than
at the fully competitive outcome) and Pareto Optimality (the NBS lies on the Pareto
Front). Furthermore, the results suggest that the NBS could result in a more equal
allocation of the surplus gained from moving from the NE to the Pareto Front (see
e.g Table 7.23, p. 232).
Nash Bargaining was applied to the case of collusion involving concessionaires con-
trolling parallel links in Chapter 6 and to the case of serial links in Chapter 7. In
the case of parallel links, the NBS resulted in similar levels of welfare loss as the
monopoly solution (as measured by the index of relative welfare improvement).
In the case of serial links, it was shown that because the NBS satisfies the Axiom
of Individual Rationality, they would be incentivised to collude. This then resolves
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the double marginalisation problem associated with serial competition. Therefore,
welfare was found to improve in this case. It was noted that this is a rare instance
where the commercial (revenue maximising) objective and social (welfare maximis-
ing) objective were not in conflict with each other.
To summarise, the following are the conclusions from the study of collusion between
concessionaires:
• There may not always be an incentive for concessionaires to collude
fully towards the Utilitarian Solution.
• With few exceptions, partial collusion can worsen welfare in the
case of parallel links. Similarly, in the case of serial links, partial
collusion can improve welfare.
• The Nash Bargaining Solution was shown to be both Pareto Optimal
and ensures that no concessionaire obtains lower revenues than in
the fully competitive outcome.
10.2.1 Policy Implications
Endorsing existing policy insights from the literature, it is emphasised that on the
basis of welfare alone, interrelationships between the links should be taken into
account when concessions are awarded. In particular, competition between parallel
links should be encouraged while competition between links in a series (such as links
that comprise a corridor) should be curtailed.
It was emphasised that allowing concessionaires the right to manage a corridor
comprising serial links but facing competition from others doing the same on other
corridors would be the most welfare enhancing policy to pursue. Similarly, conces-
sionaires should be prevented from including non-compete clauses in the concession
agreements. This would keep open the possibility of developing future welfare en-
hancing parallel toll roads.
As mergers, acquisitions and corporate takeovers accelerate in pace across the cor-
porate world (Deloitte, 2014), regulators should scrutinise planned mergers between
toll road concessionaires. The findings implies that, on the basis of efficiency, merg-
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ers between concessionaires that control parallel links should not be prevented since
in such an instance, there is a move from a situation of welfare enhancing parallel
competition to that of a welfare deteriorating monopoly control. On the other hand,
if such a merger involves concessionaires controlling serial links, it could potentially
be welfare improving as the double marginalisation problem is resolved.
In the case of parallel links, it was noted that tolls may rise as a result of increased
competition. The possibility of an increase in tolls as a result of increased compe-
tition would make it harder to justify increased private sector involvement in toll
roads to the public. Even though this enhances welfare by increasing the internalisa-
tion of the congestion externality, the notion of welfare itself is arguably an abstract
concept to the users who have to bear the very real cost of increased toll payments.
Related to the point above, there is a potential regulatory issue in that it makes
it difficult to discern whether an observed rise in the toll level is indeed a genuine
outcome of competition, justified on the grounds of increased need to internalise
congestion or whether it is an outcome of tacit collusion where concessionaires are
setting higher tolls to exercise their spatial monopoly power to extract more revenue
from users.
Collusion, through signalling behaviour, achieved by means of regular revision of
tolls, could result in toll levels tending towards the monopolistic outcome. The
regulatory framework could be designed to curtail the frequency of revisions to toll
levels.
It was highlighted that concessionaires might not have an incentive to collude if tolls
were capped (see e.g. Scenario 1, Fig. 6.4, p. 165). In this case, placing a cap on
the maximum toll levels chargeable would serve two goals. It would make tolls more
acceptable to the public and also dis-incentivise concessionaires deciding to collude.
It was shown that there could be local NE stemming from signalling behaviour which
might be achieved through relatively modest increases in tolls. Thus if the resulting
toll revisions are indeed small, the colluding concessionaires could escape detection
unless revisions to toll levels are scrutinised carefully.
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10.3 Inter-jurisdictional Competition
A common theme of the literature discussed in Chapter 2 is that in its implemen-
tation of a toll pricing policy, a jurisdiction is motivated to maximise the welfare
of local users but would regard extra-jurisdictional users utilising its network as a
source of congestion impeding local users and as a source of revenues.
It was highlighted in Chapter 2 that the discussions of revenue sharing can be found
in the public economics literature. As described in Chapter 2 (see p. 60), this
was suggested by the proponents of the toll pricing scheme in Edinburgh but the
effects of revenue sharing have not been discussed in the context of horizontal inter-
jurisdictional toll revenue competition. In addition, it was recognised also that a
majority of the literature had conventionally assumed that governments play non-
cooperative games when engaged in toll competition. In reality, jurisdictions are not
prevented from making binding agreements with one another. With few exceptions,
the possibility of jurisdictions engaging in bargaining had also not been studied
extensively.
Building on and extending the literature, the objectives of the research10.3 specifi-
cally in relation to inter-juridictional competition were to:
3. study the welfare impacts of inter-jurisdictional competition for toll revenues
and
4. assess the welfare implications when jurisdictions share toll pricing revenues
while setting tolls non-cooperatively;
Inter-jurisdictional competition was studied in Chapters 8 and 9 under two alterna-
tive assumptions of users’ route choice behaviour: in Chapter 8, users chose routes
following the DUE principle and the SUE principle was applied in Chapter 9.
The numerical tests were all conducted in a setting with two jurisdictions. In its
toll setting decision, each jurisdiction was modelled as deciding a single toll level on
a set of pre-defined links constituting a closed cordon around its central business
10.3See p. 8 with objectives numbered accordingly.
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district.
The welfare implications of inter-jurisdictional competition for toll revenues were as-
sessed against the benchmark of the Global Regulator Problem (GRP). This models
the situation where a single regulator sets tolls, on the set of tollable links within
each jurisdiction to maximise the welfare of all users. It was emphasised that the
GRP could be viewed as a regulated environment for toll pricing such as that di-
rected by a higher level government agent. Implicitly, the GRP tolls recognises that
within a jurisdiction, both local users and extra-jurisdictional users contribute to
and experience congestion.
Objective 3: Welfare impacts of inter-jurisdictional competition
Results of the numerical tests carried out in Chapters 8 and 9 show that
inter-jurisdictional competition for toll revenues can substantially reduce
welfare compared to the regulated outcome.
On the assumption that each jurisdiction retained full control over the revenue it
collects from all users, the literature review emphasised that there were two simul-
taneous objectives of the toll pricing policy the local jurisdictions pursued in their
toll setting decisions (see p. 59). These were: firstly, to internalise congestion
externalities experienced by local users only and secondly, to raise revenues from
extra-jurisdictional users. The second objective is based on the desire to tax export
(a fiscal externality) resulting in a welfare loss. Therefore, the extent of welfare
losses rests on whether the welfare improvements achieved by employing tolls to
internalise the congestion externality, would be dwarfed by the welfare decreasing
fiscal externality of tax exporting. In order to examine these issues, two networks
were considered.
The first network discussed in Chapter 8 had limited interactions (at least in the
high toll regime) between extra-jurisdictional users and local users, resulting in a
separated traffic flow regime. In this network, the tolls were able to internalise
congestion significantly (thereby meeting the first objective of the jurisdiction’s toll
setting decision). Thus, tests with this network allowed for a focus on the welfare
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losses resulting primarily from the fiscal externality of tax exporting. In the second
network tested in Chapter 9, the interactions between these two groups of users were
more extensive. This network highlights an additional drawback of non-cooperative
toll setting: it only accounts for congestion experienced by local users only but not
that experienced by extra-jurisdictional traffic. This point is further emphasised in
the discussion on revenue sharing possibilities below.
Regardless of the network structure or the underlying routing paradigm assumed,
the results showed that non-cooperative tolls were always higher than the regulated
outcome. This stems from a combination of the desire by the jurisdictions to tax
export by adding a demand-related markup as well as the double marginalisation
problem associated with serially interdependent networks. The overall outcome is
the observed reduction in welfare.
However, the extent of welfare losses varies. This is complicated by the existence of
multiple Local Nash Equilibria (LNE) in the inter-jurisdictional competition game
in Chapter 8 (Table 8.3, p. 253). In the extreme case (see Solution 3 in Example
1, Table 8.3, p. 253), the results show that the welfare decreasing fiscal externality
of tax exporting could dominate the welfare enhancing effect of internalising the
congestion externality. In other words, welfare would be higher had the jurisdictions
not been incentivised to introduce tolls in the first instance, resulting in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
However, with other LNE solutions (e.g. Solution 1 in Example 1, Table 8.3, p. 253),
or in the case of the second network tested where there was only a single NE (see
Table 9.5, p. 301), it was shown that the welfare gain, even though better than not
implementing any tolls, was always lower than attainable with the GRP/regulated
tolls. In this case, the fiscal externality while significantly reducing the welfare gains
(compared to the regulated outcome) did not outweigh the welfare gains achieved
from internalising congestion.
When asymmetries in demand was allowed for, the jurisdiction that had more extra-
jurisdiction users commuting into it was shown to have an incentive to charge a toll
higher than the regulated toll (see Table 8.7, p. 265). There are two reasons for
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this observation. Firstly, these extra-jurisdictional users were regarded by the im-
porting jurisdiction as contributing to congestion in its subnetwork. Secondly, the
presence of additional extra-jurisdictional users enhances the ability of the jurisdic-
tion importing these additional users to extract revenue. The combined effect is
that the welfare of the jurisdiction exporting its residents is reduced significantly
and the welfare of the importing jurisdiction improves. Such a finding provides an
explanation for the opposition encountered by authorities surrounding Edinburgh
and Stockholm, when these latter jurisdictions proposed the implementation of toll
pricing.
Objective 4: Welfare implications of sharing toll revenues while setting
tolls non-cooperatively
Full (partial) revenue sharing was modelled by assuming that a jurisdiction returns
in full (a proportion of) the toll revenues collected from extra-jurisdictional users to
the authority from where these extra-jurisdictional users originate.
Allowing for some degree of revenue sharing reduces the toll levels and improves
welfare achievable with toll pricing compared to the situation where jurisdictions
retained the revenues raised from extra-jurisdictional users. In this way, revenue
sharing can correct and even eliminate (in the case of full revenue sharing) the
welfare loss resulting from the fiscal externality of tax exporting associated with the
desire to raise revenue from extra-jurisdictional users.
In the case of symmetric demands and weak interactions (see Example 1 in Chapter
8, p. 271), eliminating the fiscal externality was sufficient to result the same Pareto
Optimal outcome as under the regulated (i.e. GRP) solution. However, in more
general cases, when there were asymmetries in demand (see Example 2 in Chapter
8, p. 273), or when there were extensive interactions between users from both
jurisdictions (see Example 2 in Chapter 9, p. 307), revenue sharing was shown to
be no longer Pareto Optimal with tolls and welfare being vastly different from the
GRP/regulated solution. The reason is because revenue sharing does not address
the failure of jurisdictions acting non-cooperatively to take into account the welfare
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of extra-jurisdictional users. Specifically, they ignore, in their toll setting decisions,
the transport specific congestion externality in that extra-jurisdictional users both
contribute to and suffer from congestion when circulating in their subnetwork and
this results in a welfare loss. This should be contrasted against the GRP toll which
takes into account the welfare of all users.
It should be noted that with partial revenue sharing, it was possible for welfare
gain to be similar to the level obtained with the GRP toll. However, it should be
emphasised that this only occurs because, with partial revenue sharing, there was
still an incentive to extract revenues from extra-jurisdictional users and it was this
effect that brought the tolls close to the GRP levels.
Recognising the limitations of revenue sharing, the assumptions of non-cooperative
behaviour was relaxed such that jurisdictions could act cooperatively and engage
in bilateral bargaining. In this way, Nash Bargaining was also applied and tested
in 2 examples (see p. 274 and p. 309). It was shown that both parties would
obtain higher welfare gains than acting non-cooperatively, in some cases close to
the regulated outcome, through by bilateral bargaining. Furthermore, the bilateral
bargaining outcome, unlike full revenue sharing, was Pareto Optimal.
To summarise, the following are the conclusions from the study of revenue sharing
between jurisdictions:
• vis-a´-vis no revenue sharing, allowing for some degree of revenue
sharing reduces toll levels and improves the extent of welfare gains
achievable with toll pricing,
• in general, revenue sharing does not result in the regulated outcome
and is not Pareto Optimal, with the exception of a special case of
limited interactions and symmetric demands and
• bilateral Nash bargaining was shown to result in Pareto Optimal
outcomes and ensured that jurisdictions would obtain higher welfare
gains than acting non-cooperatively.
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10.3.1 Policy Implications
The underlying issue motivating this research into inter-jurisdictional competition
has been on the appropriate level of governance for toll pricing policies (see p. 59).
Specifically, the question of interest is whether toll pricing should be designed and
instituted at the federal/central level or whether it should be viewed as a demand
management tool with responsibilities devolved/decentralised to local jurisdictions.
The results suggest that on the grounds of social welfare alone, a regulated environ-
ment for toll pricing would be the most favourable compared to the implementation
of non-cooperative toll pricing policies. This would require a central/higher level
regulator to take into account inter-jurisdictional spillovers. However, for various
reasons such as concerns that federal/national approach implementing a “one size
fits all” policy may not take into account local conditions, this may not be the
preferred approach.
If responsibility for toll pricing is to be decentralised to the local level, the research
has emphasised the potential for tolls to be levied in order to extract revenues from
extra-jurisdictional users which has an adverse impact on welfare. Therefore there
is a need for a regulatory authority to ensure that individual jurisdictions a) do
not set tolls in order to tax export and b) take into account the interactions of all
users rather than solely that of local users, recognising that both groups of users
contribute to and suffer from congestion. The policy advice is particularly relevant
in the case of cities that attract high inward commuting flows. The numerical results
suggest that should such a city implement toll pricing policy, it would have a strong
incentive to set tolls in order to extract revenues from extra-jurisdictional users.
Regulators should reduce the incentive to tax export by e.g. requiring that toll
revenues are also invested in transportation projects that benefit all users rather
than just local users and preventing toll revenues being diverted to reduce local
taxation.
As a good “middle ground” to facilitate a decentralised approach to toll pricing,
the research has alluded to, and demonstrated the potential, of bilateral bargain-
ing. This has the advantage of being more closely aligned to local interests than
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a national level approach without overlooking inter-jurisdictional spillovers, in the
process resulting in Pareto Optimal outcomes.
Only in the absence of these possibilities, should some form of revenue sharing be
pursued. While revenue sharing may not equate to a fully cooperative outcome,
revenue sharing could, as a minimum, address the tax exporting incentive which
was shown to constitute a significant component of welfare loss.
10.4 Algorithms
The focus of primary interest in this thesis has been on leaders engaged in a Nash
non-cooperative game amongst themselves which, as emphasised throughout, could
be modelled as a Non-Cooperative Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Con-
straints (NCEPEC). The objective of solving the NCEPEC was to identify the NE
in the game. In this regard, it should be recognised that the computational com-
plexity of determining pure strategy NE in Nash non-cooperative games where the
players were not bound by a binding VI constraint is known to be high (Daskalakis
et al., 2009). At the same time, it is evident that the identification of LNE toll
strategies in general networks would require the development and application of
solution algorithms.
Therefore, with regards to solution algorithms, this thesis set forth the objectives
of10.4:
5. developing solution algorithms taking into account route choices of the users
in support of the above; and
6. testing the algorithms developed with realistic networks and demonstrating
the applicability of the methods to realistic problems;
In order to achieve these goals, several solution algorithms for the NCEPEC were
proposed and applied in this thesis in the case studies. Broadly speaking, these
algorithms fall into two categories: those that rely on derivative information and
10.4See p. 8 with objectives numbered accordingly.
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those that do not. In the former category, the research discussed an adaptation
of the Fixed Point Iteration (FPI) algorithm, adaptation of the Sequential Linear
Complementarity Problem (SLCP) algorithm and in the case of competition between
toll road concessionaires, the Synchronous Iterative (SI) algorithm. The algorithm in
the latter category was the Nash Domination Evolutionary Multiplayer Optimisation
(NDEMO) algorithm.
This distinction is necessary because as highlighted throughout this thesis (see e.g.
Chapter 7) the smoothness of the SUE model compared to the non-differentiability
of the DUE link flows plays an important role in determining the most appropriate
solution algorithm. In this context, it should be emphasised that while both SLCP
and SI could be successfully applied in a DUE setting in Chapter 6 where derivatives
were obtained by means of finite differencing, these procedures should only be viewed
as heuristics.
The FPI algorithm had been proposed in earlier work for solving Nash non-cooperative
games (Harker, 1984) and has been subsequently extended to solving NCEPECs
(Su, 2005). This is a “workhorse” algorithm which has been applied in the study of
NCEPECs formulated in other disciplines e.g. deregulated electricity markets (Hu
and Ralph, 2007).
FPI is intended to locate LNE points of the NCEPEC by decomposing and solving a
series of inter-related MPECs until the system converges. The primary advantage of
the FPI algorithm is that it is intuitively related to the concept of Nash Equilibria
since it models each player’s search for the best response to the strategies of all
other players. At the same time, FPI relies on the use of an MPEC solver to solve
each player’s MPEC, given the toll strategies of all other players in the game. In
this thesis, this was solved using CCA.
To identify NE tolls in the case of competition between toll road concessionaires,
the SI algorithm proposed by Yang and Huang (2005) was also tested. The primary
advantage of the SI algorithm over SLCP is that SI does not rely on second order
derivatives. However, three drawbacks of the SI algorithm can be identified. Firstly,
it requires the computation of first order derivatives of the link flows with respect
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to tolls, which as noted above, may not exist under DUE. Secondly, it relies on
the method of successive averaging which was shown to reduce the efficiency of the
algorithm. Thirdly, the SI algorithm is specifically designed to identify LNE in the
case of competition between toll road concessionaires only, (where players optimise
revenues) and cannot be extended to identifying NE in the case of inter-jurisdictional
competition (where players optimise welfare and revenues).
The first novel algorithmic contribution of this thesis is the extension of
the SLCP algorithm to identify LNE points in NCEPECs. SLCP was orig-
inally proposed to identify NE a Cournot Game in Kolstad and Mathiesen (1991).
By posing the NCEPEC as a complementarity problem, SLCP solves the NCEPEC
by iteratively solving a sequence of linear complementarity problems and thus aims
to solve the system of inter-related MPECs simultaneously. This explains why it was
concluded that SLCP was more efficient than FPI in all applications. It was noted
that SLCP encountered numerical difficulties when it was applied to determine LNE
in the case of inter-jurisdictions competition when routing following the DUE model
in Chapter 8. However, the ability of SLCP to exploit derivative information also
presents with it a drawback. Although heuristically applied in the case of DUE link
flows, SLCP converged to a LNE in the study of collusion in Chapter 6 (see Table
6.11, p. 170) Furthermore, it was found to be dependent on the starting point used.
It was shown in Chapter 9 (see Table 9.2, p. 294) that while the differentiability of
the SUE link flows allows for the application of SLCP, the smoothing effect achieved
by SUE could make the local optima less distinct and not easily distinguishable from
the global optima and this resulted in SLCP identifying a LNE solution rather than
the NE solution.
The second novel algorithmic contribution of this thesis is the popula-
tion based NDEMO algorithm to identify NE points in NCEPECs. This in
turn extends earlier work by Lung and Dumitrescu (2008) who developed the Nash
Domination principle to solve general Nash non-cooperative games. The premise of
this principle is that at an NE, players should not have an incentive to unilaterally
deviate from their chosen strategies. When used to compare two strategy profiles
(each embodying possible strategies of all players), this principle operates by count-
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ing the number of players that would be incentivised to switch from one profile to
the other. In this way, the strategy profile resulting in a lower number of players
deviating away from it was deemed to be closer to a NE compared to the other.
In NDEMO, the parent profiles are generated randomly while a population of child
strategies are created by application of Differential Evolution and in comparisons
between each parent strategy profile and each child strategy profile, the Nash Dom-
inance principle was applied.
In contrast to FPI, SLCP and SI, NDEMO is distinguished by two characteristics:
a) it operates with a population of trial points and b) it does not require differentia-
bility of link flows. These two distinguishing features of NDEMO are at once both
its advantages as well as its weaknesses. Since it obviates the use of derivatives,
there is theoretically no restriction as to whether the underlying route choice model
follows the DUE or SUE principle. Indeed, NDEMO was able to identify the NE
tolls in Chapter 8 when the SLCP approach encountered numerical difficulties due
to non-differentiability of DUE link flows. However, application of the Nash Domi-
nation principle requires extensive function evaluations which necessitates carrying
out a (DUE/SUE) traffic assignment each time for each unilateral deviation of a
player. This points to the intrinsic computational complexity in solving EPECs us-
ing evolutionary algorithms in that the lower level traffic assignment problem must
be solved each time in keeping with the Stackelberg leader-follower principle upon
which the NCEPEC is founded.
From a theoretical perspective (see Proposition 5.1, p. 129), there is theoretical
assurance that NDEMO can, in fact, identify the NE of the NCEPEC and not just
a LNE and this was seen in the numerical tests. The unique feature of NDEMO is
that despite being based on Evolutionary Algorithms, it is endowed with a conver-
gence proof that an NE has been located. However, despite this, NDEMO was also
found to be the most computationally demanding amongst all algorithms for solving
NCEPECs tested. As an example of the computation burden, NDEMO took close
to 4 days (see p. 200) to identify the NE. Most importantly, it should be emphasised
that the ability of any algorithm to identify NE does not necessarily reflect realistic
decision making behaviour.
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If the leaders were to cooperate, this could be modelled as a Multiobjective Optimi-
sation Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (MOPEC). The objective of solving
the MOPEC was the identification of Pareto Optimal points. The algorithm applied
to do this was the Multiobjective Self Adaptive Differential Evolution (MOSADE)
algorithm. The primary advantage of MOSADE is that the algorithm does not rely
on any user input control parameters beyond the population size and the size of the
archive of solutions retained. However, it should be recognised that this algorithm
is a heuristic. There is much scope for further research into theoretically conver-
gent algorithms for solving MOPECs and as noted, this has only begun in earnest
recently.
Another novel contribution in this thesis is the formulation of the Nash
Bargaining Problem with Equilibrium Constraints. This directly extends
proposals in Nash (1950b) to incorporate the equilibrium route choice condition
of the traffic assignment model. This model bridges the gap between the fully
cooperative MOPEC and the non-cooperative paradigm of the NCEPEC. Though
it is recognised that this is a heuristic formulation of the bilateral Nash bargaining
problem, it has been demonstrated, through the numerical tests, that the solutions
obtained satisfied the Nash Axioms of Individual Rationality and Pareto Optimality.
10.5 Summary of Contributions
Returning to the overarching question of the extent of welfare losses as a result
of competition in the two groups of agents with toll setting responsibilities, viz.
toll road concessionaires and (governmental) jurisdictions, these are summarised as
follows:
• Tests with network models with multiple links and multiple Origin Destination
pairs showed that the welfare effects of competition amongst toll road conces-
sionaires for toll revenues depend crucially on the interrelationships between
the toll roads in competition. Thus, the findings obtained generalise results
obtained previously in the literature to more realistic settings.
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• In the case of inter-jurisdictional competition for toll revenues, the welfare
gains from imperfectly internalising congestion are significantly reduced by the
fiscal externality of tax exporting resulting from their toll setting decisions.
In general while it is possible to conclude that overall welfare would be lower
compared to that achievable by a regulated outcome, the numerical tests also
suggest that the extent of welfare losses could be network specific. In addition,
this is complicated by the possible existence of multiple local Nash equilibria.
To summarise, the following are the novel contributions of the research:
• investigate the effects of collusion and the incentives for collusion between toll
road concessionaires,
• proposed and demonstrated two effective algorithms for identification of Nash
Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Con-
straints (NCEPECs): SLCP and NDEMO,
• propose and formulate the Nash Bargaining Problem with Equilibrium Con-
straints (NBPEC) to bridge the gap between the fully competitive NCEPEC
and the fully cooperative MOPEC,
• demonstrate the possibility of multiple Local Nash Equilibria (LNE) solutions
in inter-jurisdictional competition for toll revenues,
• demonstrate Pareto suboptimality of revenue sharing between jurisdictions
and show that bilateral Nash bargaining can overcome this.
The primary policy implications are as follows:
• Awards of toll road concessions should take into account intrinsic interrela-
tionships between the toll roads,
• regulators should be aware of the potential for concessionaires to collude,
• judged solely on the basis of welfare, a nationally/federally led cooperative toll
pricing policy would be desirable,
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• but by being able to incorporate both local needs and take into inter-jurisdictional
spillovers, bilateral bargaining could be exploited as a means of facilitating a
devolved approach to toll pricing.
It is worth highlighting that while bilateral bargaining between toll road conces-
sionaires would be viewed by anti-trust regulators as anti-competitive, bargaining
between jurisdictions should be encouraged.
Limitations
With regard to private sector toll road concessionaire competition, this study as-
sumed that the underlying PPP model was free of transaction costs. In reality, PPPs
involve a high degree of risks and transaction costs (e.g. Becker and Patterson, 2005).
With regard to inter-jurisdictional competition, the research assumed that jurisdic-
tions implementing toll pricing would focus only on the twin objectives of maximising
welfare for its own users and extracting toll revenues from extra-jurisdictional users.
In reality, in the process of developing their transportation strategies, jurisdictions
would face a number of conflicting objectives which would have repercussions on the
policy implications obtained in this thesis.
10.6 Further Research
This thesis has focused on competition solely within the context of highway trans-
portation networks alone. Competition between public transport providers has been
investigated previously (e.g. Harker, 1988; Li et al., 2012) but these have been con-
sidered in isolation from the highway mode. There is much scope for combining
these two modes within a multimodal model that could be applied to study e.g.
competition between private roads simultaneously with privately operated public
transport.
In a similar vein, vertical competition between governments (inter-governmental
competition) was not investigated in this thesis. Conceivably a high level regulator
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(e.g. central government agent) would indeed influence the policies of either con-
cessionaires, jurisdictions or even both together within this framework. This would
lead directly to a vertical extension of the bilevel programming problem presented
in Chapter 4 and result in the study of an even more complex class of hierarchical
optimisation problems known as the tri-level programming problem. It is speculated
that this genre of optimisation problems would be extremely complex to formulate
and solve. While there exist some preliminary work in this area (Zhang et al.,
2010), this is still relatively uncharted territory where significant theoretical and
methodological advances could be made.
In the NCEPEC, the toll road concessionaires/jurisdictions are modelled as Stack-
leberg leaders taking into account route choice of users, but non-cooperative Nash
players in the game amongst themselves. Consider an alternative situation in which
a player e.g. a toll concessionaire was able to take into account both the reactions
of the users and the reaction of the other toll concessionaires when setting his tolls.
This player would then become the Stackelberg leader amongst the leaders in the
toll pricing game. In microeconomic theory, a Stackelberg firm desires to be the
leader as it is able to earn higher profits by taking into account the behaviour of
the follower firms (Varian, 2010). In the setting of a network with two parallel links
connecting a single OD pair, Shepherd and Sumalee (2008) showed the paradoxi-
cal result that, in fact, the Stackelberg toll concessionaire could be made worse off
by being the leader. It would be of definite interest to understand whether such
paradoxical results hold in general networks. In considering this question in general
networks, another area for research would be the development of efficient solution
algorithms to solve the above resulting formulation whilst continuing to take into
account the route choice of users.
This thesis has studied the Bargaining Problem restricted to bilateral settings (i.e.
2 bargaining parties). There is extensive scope to extend the proposed NBPEC to
multilateral bargaining situations. In addition, further work could extend alternative
paradigms of surplus distribution between bargaining parties (e.g. proposals in
Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975; Perles and Maschler, 1981) to bargaining problems
incorporating route choice equilibrium constraints.
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While the algorithms proposed in this thesis have been able to identify a single LNE
in the game, it is recognised that this is only the beginning of fruitful research in
locating NE in NCEPECs. At least three further research issues can be identified
in this regard. Firstly, since the ability of any algorithm to detect NE does not
necessarily reflect realistic decision making behaviour, it would be useful to be able
to identify all LNE solutions. While some progress has been in this direction in
the context of general Nash non-cooperative games (Judd et al., 2012), whether
techniques employed therein would be transferable to detecting multiple equilibria
in NCEPECs is at present an open question. Secondly, this thesis has only focused
on single shot games i.e. players meet once in a single encounter. In reality, rational
agents repeatedly interact and it is known that the (finite and infinite) repetition
of play affects the outcomes of games (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). It would be
of interest to investigate how the dynamics of interactions affect a rational agents’
decision making behaviour in transportation networks and how this impacts on the
policy implications. Thirdly, by exploiting the fact that a Nash game can be posed as
a variational inequality problem, it is hypothesised that projection methods (see e.g.
Tinti, 2005, for a review) are also applicable in this context. It should be remarked
that a number of alternative approaches based on minimizing the Nikaido-Isoda
function (Nikaidoˆ and Isoda, 1955) have also been proposed for single level Nash
non-cooperative games, and applied in Krawczyk and Uryas’ev (2000). Development
of algorithms based on these principles could be an useful area of research given the
underlying practical relevance of the EPEC framework both within and outside
transportation systems management.
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Appendix A
Verification of NE tolls obtained
by SLCP: Power Law Demand
Function
This appendix provides numerical estimates of the best response functions (cf. Def-
inition 3.2) in the case of competition between toll road concessionaires with the
power law demand function.
These are used to numerically verify that the solutions reported in main text (see
Tables 7.2 to 7.4) where the SLCP algorithm was applied, to locate the NE. These
figures show that the solutions reported therein is the intersection of these best
response functions for the tests with the power law demand function (Eq. 7–13). In
each graph, the dashed line shows the best response function for the player indicated
on the x-axis. Similarly, the continuous line shows the best response function for
the player indicated on the y-axis.
In the scenarios which involve competition between more than 2 concessionaires
(i.e. Scenarios 7 to 12), the procedure to numerically estimate the best response
functions was modified. In these cases, the toll levels for all other players (except
for those being considered) were fixed at the NE levels obtained by SLCP shown in
Tables 7.3 and 7.4, during the grid search for the 2 players shown on the respective
axes. Due to space constraints, only a selection of these are shown.
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A.1 Scenarios 1 to 6 with Two Links
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Figure A.1: (Left) Scenario 1: Intersection of best response functions coincides with SLCP
tolls for Links {284, 285} of {1,088.48, 1,132.19} secs. (Right) Scenario 2: Intersection of
best response functions coincides with SLCP tolls for Links {258, 259} of {1,432.40, 855.16}
secs.
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Figure A.2: (Left) Scenario 3: Intersection of best response functions coincides with SLCP
tolls for Links {229, 230} of {611.21, 912.02} secs. (Right) Scenario 4: Intersection of best
response functions coincides with SLCP tolls for Links {284, 286} of {732.37, 691.06} secs
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Figure A.3: (Left) Scenario 5: Intersection of best response functions coincides with SLCP
tolls for Links {243, 247} of {467.17, 497.79 } secs. (Right) Scenario 6: Intersection of best
response functions coincides with SLCP tolls for Links {291, 296} of {501.60, 740.21} secs.
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A.2 Scenarios 7 and 11 with Three Links
Toll on Link 285 (seconds)
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Figure A.4: (Left) Scenario 7: Intersection of best response functions coincides with SLCP
tolls, all other link tolls fixed at NE, for Links {284, 285} of {1,114.52, 1,162.20} secs. (Right)
Scenario 11: Intersection of best response functions coincides with SLCP tolls, all other link
tolls fixed at NE, for Links {284, 286} of {730.14, 697.41} secs
A.3 Scenarios 8 and 12 with Four Links
Toll on Link 285 (seconds)
To
ll o
n L
ink
 28
4 (s
eco
nds
)
1100 1110 1120 1130 1140 1150 1160 1170 1180 1190 1200
1100
1110
1120
1130
1140
1150
1160
1170
1180
1190
1200
Toll on Link 259 (seconds)
To
ll o
n L
ink
 25
8 (s
eco
nds
)
700 750 800 850 900 950 1000 1050 1100
1200
1250
1300
1350
1400
1450
1500
1550
1600
Figure A.5: (Left) Scenario 8: Intersection of best response functions coincides with SLCP
tolls, all other link tolls fixed at NE, for Links {284, 285} of {1,124.72, 1,173.83} secs. (Right)
Scenario 8: Intersection of best response functions coincides with SLCP tolls, all other link
tolls fixed at NE, for Links {258, 259} of {1,429.66, 905.36} secs.
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Figure A.6: (Left) Scenario 12: Intersection of best response functions coincides with
SLCP tolls, all other link tolls fixed at NE, for Links {238, 291} of {221.67, 894.73} secs.
(Right) Scenario 12: Intersection of best response functions coincides with SLCP tolls, all
other link tolls fixed at NE, for Links {291, 296} of {894.73, 639.65} secs.
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A.4 Scenarios 9 and 10
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Figure A.7: (Left) Scenario 9: Intersection of best response functions coincides with SLCP
tolls, all other link tolls fixed at NE, for Links {284, 285} of {1,127.28, 1,175.54} secs. (Right)
Scenario 9: Intersection of best response functions coincides with SLCP tolls,all other link
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Appendix B
Verification of NE tolls obtained
by SLCP: Exponential Demand
Function
This appendix provides numerical estimates of the best response functions (cf. Def-
inition 3.2) in the case of competition between toll road concessionaires with the
exponential demand function. These are used to numerically verify that the solu-
tions reported in main text (see Tables 7.5 and 7.6) where the SLCP algorithm is
applied, to locate the NE. These figures show that the solutions reported therein is
the intersection of these best response functions for the tests with the exponential
demand function (Eq. 7–14). In each graph, the dashed line shows the best response
function for link indicated on the x-axis. Similarly, the continuous line shows the
best response function for the player indicated on the y-axis.
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B.2 Scenarios 7 and 11 with Three Links
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B.3 Scenarios 8 and 12 with Four Links
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B.4 Scenarios 9 and 10
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Appendix C
Verification of NE tolls obtained
by SLCP reported in Section 7.5
This appendix provides numerical estimates of the best response functions (cf. Def-
inition 3.2) in the case of competition between toll road concessionaires as described
in Section 7.5. These are used to numerically verify that the solutions reported in
main text (see Tables 7.19 and 7.20) where the SLCP algorithm is applied to locate
the NE. The following figures show that the solutions reported therein is indeed
the intersection of these best response functions. Note that in these tests, only the
exponential demand function (Eq. 7–14) was used. In each graph, the dashed line
shows the best response function for the player indicated on the x-axis. Similarly,
the continuous line shows the numerical estimates of the best response function for
the player indicated on the y-axis.
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Appendix D
Uniqueness of Equilibrium Link
Flows Disaggregated by
Authority
Figure D.1: Highway Network Used in Chapter 8
In this section, uniqueness of the equilibrium link flows disaggregated by authority
(i.e. “authority link flows”), at any given toll vector, for the network previously
shown in Fig. 8.1 and reproduced in Fig. D.1 is established with the aim of justi-
fying the approach set out in Chapter 8. In order to do so, some mild additional
assumptions are made. Let c∗j denote the equilibrium generalized cost on link j, j ∈ L
corresponding to a given solution to Eq. 8–6. Formally, for any given toll vector
solution x∗ to Eq. 8–6 these are given uniquely by the elements of vector c∗ i.e.
c∗ = c
(
V˜∗(x) 1, x
)
Specifically the following assumptions are made:
c∗3 + c
∗
2 > c
∗
4 (Eq. D–1)
c∗4 + c
∗
5 > c
∗
3 (Eq. D–2)
c∗10 + c
∗
11 > c
∗
9 (Eq. D–3)
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c∗9 + c
∗
8 > c
∗
10 (Eq. D–4)
With these assumptions uniqueness of authority flows can be established through
the following steps, and applying where relevant, conservation of flow principles:
1. The assumptions on the cost functions and demand functions are sufficient
to guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium total link flows and OD demands
(Sheffi, 1985), so the issue can be equivalently posed as follows: in the given
network structure, is this uniqueness sufficient to also guarantee uniqueness of
the link flows disaggregated by authority?
2. At equilibrium, intra-authority OD movements will never use the links of the
other authority. For example, one possible route from node 1 to node 2 is
to follow the route given by the link sequence {2,7,10,11,6}, but since link
costs are strictly positive it follows that such a route will always have higher
cost than the route following links {2,6}, and so this earlier route can never
appear in an equilibrium solution at any toll vector. An analogous argument
may be made for all intra-authority OD movements, so for such movements
we need only consider the routes that use links strictly within that authority’s
jurisdiction.
3. The network structure is entirely equivalent to one in which an additional bi-
directional, dummy link is added by dividing node 3 in two and inserting the
link between the two nodes resulting from the divided node 3. The only flow
on the left-pointing direction of this link will be (all of) that demand travelling
from Authority B (node 4 or 5) to Authority A (node 1 or 2), there will be
no intra-authority demand using it given remark 2. Returning to the original
network definition, it is possible to represent the demand from Authority B as
if it were from an origin at node 3 with OD flow to nodes 1 and 2 equal to the
relevant OD flows from the sum of nodes 4 and 5 (noting that such sums are
unique since the individual demands are unique by remark 1). By symmetry,
the same argument may be made regarding demand from Authority A to B,
if thinking from the perspective of Authority B’s network.
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4. Considering Authority A’s network, links 2 and 4 take traffic into node 3. In
view remark 2, such links could never be part of an equilibrium route for traffic
from Authority B. Therefore links 2 and 4 only carry Authority A’s demand,
and these flows are unique since the total link flows are unique by remark 1.
5. Eq. D–2 means that for demand travelling from node 2 to nodes 4 or 5, it
is more costly (at equilibrium) to travel on the indirect route to node 3 (via
links 3 and 2) than via the direct route via link 4, and so such demand will
never use the indirect route. This implies that the only Authority A flow on
link 2 is that demand from node 1 (destined for nodes 2, 4 or 5). All the
remaining demand from node 1 to these other nodes must use link 1. Since at
equilibrium we uniquely determine the total demand from node 1 (as the sum
of demands to nodes 2, 4 and 5), and since in remark 4, Authority A’s flow on
link 2 can be uniquely determined and since by the argument just made this
flow on link 2 can only be from node 1, then by subtracting the (unique) link
2 flow from the (unique) total demand from node 1, then we have uniquely
determined the flow on link 1 that is due to demand from node 1. Now since
no demand from node 2 would ever use link 1, so that the only Authority A
demand on link 1 is that from node 1, and this has been uniquely determined.
Thus the Authority A flow on link 1 is unique, and by subtraction from the
total link 1 flow (which is unique by remark 1) then the Authority B flow on
link 1 is also unique.
6. Eq. D–2 implies that it is never efficient for demand from node 2 to travel to
node 1 via the indirect route of links 4 and 5, in preference to the direct route
via link 3. In particular, it means that link 5 is not used by demand from
node 2; neither is this link on a route from node 1. Therefore no Authority A
flow uses link 5, only Authority B flow and so this must equal the total flow
on link 5, which is unique by remark 1.
7. Since by remark 3, the total Authority B demand arriving at node 3 (and
destined for nodes 1 and 2) is uniquely determined, and since links 5 and 6
are the only exit nodes from node 3, and since by remark 6. the Authority
B flow on link 5 is unique, then it follows that the Authority B flow on link
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6 can be uniquely determined by conservation of Authority B flow at node 3.
By subtraction from the total link 6 flow, the Authority A flow on link 6 is
then also unique.
8. Consider node 2. By remarks 4, 5 and 7, the Authority B flow on links 1, 4
and 6 is uniquely determined. By remark 1, the total Authority B OD flow
that is destined for node 2 is uniquely determined, and by definition of the OD
matrices in Tables 8.1 and 8.5, there is no Authority B OD flow originating at
node 2. Therefore, applying conservation-of-flow at node 2 to the Authority
B flow, then the Authority B flow on link 3 may be uniquely determined, as it
is then the only unknown in the conservation equation. By subtraction from
the total link 3 flow, the Authority A flow on link 3 is then also unique.
9. Remarks 4 to 8 establish uniqueness of the authority flows on links 1-?6, i.e.
those under Authority A’s jurisdiction. By symmetry, equivalent arguments
can be made about links 7-12 (i.e those in Authority B’s jurisdiction), ex-
ploiting assumptions Eq. D–3 and Eq. D–4 in place of Eq. D–1 and Eq.
D–2.
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Appendix E
Base Matrices Used in Example
2 in Chapter 9
The base trip matrix (in pcus/hr) for the network shown in Fig. 9.4 used in Example
2 of Chapter 9 (see Section 9.4, p. 296) is given in Table E.1. The base composite
generalised travel time matrix (in minutes) for θ = 10 is given in Table E.2.
Table E.1: Base Trip Matrix (pcus/hr) used in Example 2, Chapter 9 (see Section 9.4).
Destinations
1 5 7 9 12 14 16 20
1 0 200 1000 500 1000 500 200 200
5 200 0 500 1000 500 1000 200 200
7 200 200 0 200 100 200 200 200
Origin 9 200 200 200 0 200 100 200 200
12 200 200 100 200 0 200 200 200
14 200 200 200 100 200 0 200 200
16 200 200 1000 500 1000 500 0 200
20 200 200 500 1000 500 1000 200 0
Table E.2: Base Composite Generalised Travel Time Matrix (in minutes) corresponding
to Base Matrix in Table E.1 used in Example 2 of Chapter 9 (see Section 9.4) for θ = 10.
Destinations
1 5 7 9 12 14 16 20
1 0 31.51 25.29 34.80 31.14 40.64 23.79 48.28
5 31.51 0 34.80 25.29 40.64 31.14 48.28 23.79
7 7.74 17.18 0 9.72 5.93 15.49 13.57 22.98
Origins 9 17.18 7.74 9.72 0 15.49 5.93 22.98 13.57
12 13.57 22.98 5.93 15.49 0 9.72 7.74 17.18
14 22.98 13.57 15.49 5.93 9.72 0 17.18 7.74
16 23.79 48.28 31.14 40.64 25.29 34.80 0 31.51
20 48.28 23.79 40.64 31.14 34.80 25.29 31.51 0
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Appendix F
Abbreviations
ASC Average Social Cost.
BATNA Best Alternative To a Negoti-
ated Agreement.
BBC British Broadcasting Corpora-
tion.
BLPP Bilevel Programming Problem.
BOT Build-Operate-Transfer.
CBD Central Business District.
CBO Congressional Budget Office.
CCA Cutting Constraint Algorithm.
CEC City of Edinburgh Council.
CP Complementarity Problem.
CPU Central Processing Unit.
DE Differential Evolution.
DEBLP Differential Evolution for
BiLevel Programming.
DfT Department for Transport.
DUE Deterministic User Equilibrium.
EA Evolutionary Algorithm.
EC European Commission.
EEU Eurasian Economic Union.
EPEC Equilibrium Problem with Equi-
librium Constraints.
EU European Union.
FHWA US Federal Highway Adminis-
tration.
FPI Fixed Point Iteration.
GA Genetic Algorithm.
HA Highways Agency.
HOT High Occupancy/Toll.
hr hour.
IOA Iterative Optimisation Algorithm.
LCP Linear Complementarity Problem.
LNE Local Nash Equilibrium.
mins minutes.
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MOEA Multiobjective Evolutionary
Algorithm.
MOP Multiobjective Problem.
MOPEC Multiobjective Optimisation
Problem with Equilibrium Con-
straints.
MOSADE MultiObjective Self Adap-
tive Differential Evolution.
MPB Marginal Private Benefit.
MPC Marginal Private Cost.
MPEC Mathematical Program with
Equilibrium Constraints.
MR Marginal Revenue.
MSA Method of Successive Averages.
MSB Marginal Social Benefit.
MSC Marginal Social Cost.
NBPEC Nash Bargaining Problem
with Equilibrium Constraints.
NBS Nash Bargaining Solution.
NCEPEC Non-Cooperative Equilib-
rium Problem with Equilibrium
Constraints.
NDEMO Nash Domination Evolution-
ary Multiplayer Optimisation.
NE Nash Equilibrium.
OD Origin Destination.
pcu Passenger Car Units.
PFI Public Finance Initiative.
PPP Public Private Partnership.
RHS Right Hand Side.
SBTP Second Best Toll Pricing.
secs seconds.
SI Synchronous Iterative.
SLCP Sequential Linear Complemen-
tarity Problem.
SOL solution of.
SUE Stochastic User Equilibrium.
TEN-T TransEuropean Network for
Transport.
TfL Transport for London.
TRB Transportation Research Board of
the US National Academy of Sci-
ence.
UK United Kingdom.
US United States.
VI Variational Inequality.
VIP Variational Inequality Problem.
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